State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2050

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Danielle Judith Taylor,
Respondent.

Filed June 15, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-2845

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Danielle Judith Taylor, Apple Valley, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge .

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges a sentencing order that amended a restitution award, arguing
that the district court erred by denying restitution to an insurance company on the grounds
that (1) as a matter of law, a restitution award to the insurance company would constitute
“unjust enrichment” and (2) respondent would suffer undue hardship if ordered to pay
restitution to the insurance company. Because we conclude that the district court’s denial
of restitution was based on an err oneous view of the law and is not supported by the
evidence, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Respondent Danielle Judith Taylor admitted to aiding and abetting a scheme to
make unauthorized personal purchases on a credit card issued to her employer, 180
Degrees, a nonprofit organization. Taylor pleaded guilty, and the district court convicted
her of aiding and abetting theft by swindle. At sentencing, the district court ordered Taylor
to pay restitution in an amount to be determined at a later date. Appellant S tate of
Minnesota later asked the district court to order Taylor to pay $19,987.20 in restitution to
180 Degrees and $9,106.85 to Philadelphia Insurance Compani es, as reimbursement for
the amount that it paid 180 Degrees for insured losses caused by Taylor. Taylor objected
to the amount of restitution sought and requested a hearing.
At the restitution hearing, Taylor argued that she had accepted a settlement offer
made to her by 180 Degrees to compensate it for its losses, and that 180 Degrees was bound
by that offer even though it ultimately withdrew it. Taylor also argued that some of the

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losses claimed were not sufficiently proved . She did not argue that she was unable to pay
the amount of restitution requested.
In an amended sentencing order, the district court found that Philadelphia Insurance
paid 180 Degrees $9,106.85 to cover the los ses that Taylor caused , leaving 180 Degrees
with total out-of-pocket loss caused by Taylor’s crime of $19,987.20. The court amended
its sentencing order to require Taylor to pay restitution of $19,987.20 to 180 Degrees but
awarded no restitution to P hiladelphia Insurance. The district court reasoned that
Philadelphia Insurance was not entitled to restitution because its risk of loss was factored
into the amount of its insurance premiums and, therefore, a restitution award to
Philadelphia Insurance would unjustly enrich it, i.e., “double tap” in its favor. The court
also denied restitution to Philadelphia Insurance “in consideration of [Taylor’s] inability to
make restitution and/or the hardship which payment of restitution would cause [.]”
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
In determining whether to order restitution and the amount of restitution, the district
court must consider “(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of
the offense; and (2) the income, resources, and obligatio ns of the defendant.” Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045 (2018). “The district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and
the district court’s order will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v.
Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. 2019 ). “A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” Riley v. State , 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). But “whether an item meets

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the statutory requirements for restitution” is a question of law that is “fully reviewable by
the appellate court.” State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346 -47 (Minn. App. 2011).
The district court denied restitution to Philadelphia Insurance because it concluded
that a restitution award would unjustly enrich Philadelphia Insurance because it had
charged 180 Degrees insurance premiums “that are determined in contemplation of the risk
[it] assume[s] when [it] agrees[s] to provide protection to insured parties.” We addressed
this proposition in State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 1987), and rejected it as
“[i]ngenious but specious.” Here, as in Jola, Philadelphia Insurance sustained an economic
loss when it paid 180 Degrees for the loss that it sustained as a result of Taylor’s offense.
We conclude that the court’s den ial of restitution to Philadelphia Insurance, based on the
legal theory that we rejected in Jola, was based on an “erroneous view of the law.” See
Riley, 792 N.W.2d at 833.
The district court also denied restitution to Philadelphia Insurance based on its
finding that Taylor would be unable to make the restitution payments or would suffer
hardship if ordered to pay. But the presentence investigation report states that Taylor
“reported that she has a consistent employment histor y,” and that she “does not yet know
her net income for this year, but disclosed that her gross ea rnings are in the six figures. ”
Taylor did not argue to the district court that she was unable to pay restitution to
Philadelphia Insurance, and the record contains no evidence to support the district court’s
finding that Taylor would suffer any hardship. We therefore conclude that the court’s
denial of restitution to Philadelphia Insurance on this basis was an abuse of discretion.

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Because the district court denied restitution to Philadelphia Insurance on the basis
of an erroneous view of the law and findings not supported by the record, we reverse and
remand for the district court to modify its order in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.