Douglas Edwin Minor, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2051

Douglas Edwin Minor, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 14, 2020
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-12-585

Daniel J. Koewler, Charles A. Ramsay, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota;
and

John Carlson, Spears, Carlson & Coleman, Washburn, Wisconsin (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Derek Archambault, Woodbury City Atto rney, Eckberg Lammers, P.C., Stillwater,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court e rred by denying his request to withdraw his
guilty plea to gross-misdemeanor drivi ng while impaired (DWI) because he was
represented by an unsupervised certified stude nt attorney, making his plea presumptively
invalid. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2012, appellant Douglas Edwi n Minor pleaded guilty to third-degree
gross-misdemeanor DWI. At his plea hearing, Minor was represented by a certified student
attorney from the public de fender’s office who reviewed th e plea petition with Minor in
open court.
Q: Mr. Minor, I’m showing you a document entitled Petition
to Plead Guilty in a DWI Gross Misdemeanor or Misdemeanor
Case?
A: Yes.
Q: We had a chance to talk about this document?
A: Yup.
Q: And we went over it and f illed in the blanks on this
document, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: So we went over it and filled in this document together?
A: Yes.
Q: And it’s a one-page document?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: On the backside is your signature?
A: Yes.
Q: Now we had a chance to speak about this document and
about how the fact of the right s that you are giving up by
proceeding with this plea?
A: Yes.
Q: You’re giving up the right to a trial?
A: Yes.

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Q: Either by the bench or by a jury?
A: Yes.
Q: You understand that you’re giving up the right to have
witnesses testify on your behalf?
A: Yup.
Q: Which does come with the subpoena power of the court?
A: Okay.
Q: And you do understand that you have the right to question
witnesses against you?
A: Yes.
Q: You have a right to remain silent--
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: Or to testify on your behalf?
A: Yes.
Q: And you do understand that the prosecutor would have to
prove that you were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Yes.
Q: And that currently you are und er the influence of no drugs
or alcohol at this time, or suffering from any mental disability
or handicap?
A: Correct.
Q: Now we did have a chance to discuss that pleading to this
comes with increased penalties?
A: Yes.
Q: This is currently the second one in ten years, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And you do understand that every time you would receive
another one the penalties do increase?
A: Correct.
Q: For example, if you received a third in ten years it would be
a gross misdemeanor with a minimum of ninety days in jail?
A: Yes . . . .
. . . .

Q: You do understand a fourth one in ten years would be a
felony level which would come with prison time?
A: Yes.
Q: You do also understand that you would face impoundment
of the plates?
A: Yes . . . .
. . . .

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Q: And you do understand that you would be faced with
vehicle forfeiture?
A: Yes.
Q: And you still want to proceed at this point in time?
A: Yes.

Although it was unsigned by the supervisi ng attorney, who did not appear on the
record during the plea colloquy, the district court accepted th e plea petition, finding that
Minor submitted a valid guilty plea. The district court sentenced Minor to 365 days in jail
with 335 days stayed for three years.
On September 17, 2019, Mi nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that “he
was denied his constitutional right to legal re presentation” because the certified student
attorney was not a licensed attorney at the time he pleaded guilty. The district court denied
Minor’s request for postconv iction relief, concluding that Minor’s guilty plea was valid.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
“When reviewing a postconviction court’ s decisions, we examine only whether the
postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence” and will reverse
“only if that court abused its discretion.” Leake v. State , 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn.
2007). “A postconviction court abuses its di scretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is agains t logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State,
819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Timeliness
As a preliminary matter, the state argues that Minor’s motion should be denied as
untimely because his two-year timeframe for seeking postconviction relief ended on

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December 17, 2014. The statute of limitations to file a postconviction petition is two years
from the “entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed.” Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1) (2018). The statute-of-limitations defense is not a
jurisdictional bar to postconviction relief. Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 606 (Minn.
2012). If the state fails to assert the defense, it is subject to forfeiture. Id.
Here, although Minor’s 2019 motion was untim ely, we conclude that the state failed
to assert that defense. Noth ing in the record indicates that the state raised the timeliness
issue in district court. And the state seemin gly concedes that it did not raise the issue
earlier, claiming that it did not realize that Mi nor sought to withdraw his guilty plea in a
postconviction proceeding. However, the only way to seek plea withdrawal after the time
for direct appeal has passed is in a petition for postconviction relief. State v. Hughes, 758
N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. 2008). Thus, because the state di d not assert the timeliness
defense in district court, we conclude that the state forfeited the defense and consider the
district court’s decision on the merits.
Request to withdraw guilty plea
It is unclear whether Minor presents tw o arguments on appeal: that his plea was not
intelligent because he was repres ented by a certified student atto rney, or that his plea is
presumptively invalid because of a violation of the student pr actice rules. As such, we
address each argument in turn.
A district court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists
if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A valid

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guilty plea is “accurate, vol untary and intelligent.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994).
The main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a
defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than
he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to
trial. . . . The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to
insure that the defendant is not pleading guilty because of
improper pressures. The purpose of the requirement that the
plea be intelligent is to insure that the defenda nt understands
the charges, understands the right s he is waiving by pleading
guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.

State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “If a plea fails to meet any one of these
requirements, it is invalid.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). Whether
a plea is valid is a legal question subject to de novo review. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
Certified student attorney
Minor argues that his plea was not intelligen t. A plea is inte lligent when it is
knowingly and understandingly made. Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn.
1997). The record demonstrates that Minor’s plea was entered intelligently.
Although he was represented by a certified student attorney, Minor was thoroughly
advised of the rights he was waiving, the enhanceable nature of the offense, and the
possibility of vehicle forfeiture. After revi ewing those rights and consequences, Minor
stated that he wanted to proceed with pleading guilty. And Minor read and signed the plea
petition. Therefore, we conclude that Minor’s plea was made intelligently.
But Minor claims that his plea was per se invalid because the certified student
attorney was not licensed to practice law. Although there is little caselaw addressing this
issue, Minor asserts that a certified student attorney is similar to an “imposter” attorney, or

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someone who has never been admitted to the bar. In cases involving “imposter” attorneys,
the supreme court has established a per se violation of one’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn. 1991) (stating that “[i]f counsel has
never been a lawyer, never been admitted to th e bar, persuasive author ity holds that this
creates a per se Sixth Amendment violation”). However, in cases in which a once-licensed
attorney loses the authority to practice law, there is no per se Sixth Amendment violation,
and courts examine such circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 513-14.
Minor’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Although ce rtified student attorneys are
not admitted to the bar, Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.01 specifically provides that “[a]n eligible
law student . . . may, under the supervision of a member of th e bar, perform all functions
that an attorney may perform in representing and appearing on behalf of . . . any indigent
person . . . who is accused of a crime.” According to Smith, part of the concern with
“imposters” is that it “seems incongruous to entrust a person’s liberty to counsel in whom
the court has formally declared its lack of tr ust.” 476 N.W.2d at 51 4. But that concern
does not apply to certified student attorneys, in whom the court has formally declared a
degree of trust through the student certification process. See Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.03.
Because certified student attorneys are not the same as “imposter” attorneys, there
was no per se violation of Minor’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the district court
did not abuse its discretion by determining that Minor’s plea was valid.

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Student practice rules

Minor additionally argues that a viola tion of the student practice rules occurred
when his plea petition was signed by only th e certified student a ttorney and not the
supervising attorney.
Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.04(4) provides th at a supervising attorney shall “sign all
pleadings.” A pleading is defined as “[a] formal document in which a party to a legal
proceeding . . . sets forth or responds to allegations, claims, denials, or defenses,” “[a]
system of defining and narrowing the issues in a lawsuit whereby th e parties file formal
documents alleging their respective positions,” or “[t]he legal rules regulating the statement
of the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s defenses.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1394-96
(11th ed. 2019). These definitions do not in clude a rule 15 plea petition. A plea petition
is not a “formal document” setting forth the parties’ positions of a case, but instead
principally explains in writing the plea agre ement and a defendant’s constitutional rights.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.03, subd. 2.
It is important to note that, in addition to filling out the petition in this case, Minor’s
plea agreement and the contents of the petition were also explained to him in open court.
See id. (providing that “[a]s an alternative to the defendant personally appearing in court,
the defendant or defense counsel may file with the court a petition to plead guilty”
(emphasis added)). Because Mi nor personally appeared in court to plead guilty, we
conclude that the filing of the plea petition may not have been necessary.
Minor lastly argues that the certified stude nt attorney was unsupervised at the time
he pleaded guilty. Minn. Student Prac. R. 1.04( 6) states that a supervising attorney shall

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“appear with the student at all . . . proceedings unless the attorney deems his or her personal
appearance unnecessary to assure proper supervision. This authorization shall be made in
writing and shall be available to the judge . . . conducting the proceedings upon request.”
However, the student practice rules do not require that the supervising attorney make his
or her appearance known on the record.
It is unclear from the record submitted on appeal whether the supervising attorney
was present in the courtroom at the time Minor pleaded guilty. Although Minor contends
that the certified student attorney was unsupervised, he provided no additional evidence to
support his assertion. As such, because the burden of proof in postconviction proceedings
is on the petitioner, and because Minor’s asser tions are without factual support in the
record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denyin g Minor’s motion to
withdraw his plea. See Fagin v. State, 933 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. 2019) (noting that, “as
a general matter, the petitioner has the burden of proof in postconviction proceedings”).
Affirmed.