State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2063

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Generson Mauriclo Ruiz-Lainez,
Appellant.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CR-18-978

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Smith & Johnson, Slayton, Minneso ta
(for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Connolly, Judge .

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges his five convictions of third -degree criminal sexual conduct,
arguing that the physician assistant who interviewed the two complainants impermissib ly
vouched for their credibility in her trial testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Generson Mauricio1 Ruiz-Lainez was charged with five counts of third -
degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of distri buting material that relates to the
sexual conduct of a child. The charges involved two victims, P.H.P. and V.P.A., who were
both 13 years old when the alleged offenses occurred. The police became invo lved
following a report to the police by V.P.A. that Ruiz-Lainez had sexual intercourse with her.
She provided the police with a condom that she said Ruiz -Lainez had used when he had
intercourse with her. DNA from the condom matched Ruiz-Lainez. V.P.A. also informed
the investigating officer that Ruiz-Lainez was “dating” P.H.P., her close family friend.
V.P.A. and P.H.P. were then both interviewed at Child’s Voice.
A jury trial was held on the five counts of third -degree criminal sexual conduct. 2
Both P.H.P. and V.P.A. testified at the trial. P.H.P. testified that during the summer of
2018 she and Ruiz-Lainez were dating and had sex on four occasions. V.P.A. testified that

1 Ruiz-Lainez’s middle name is listed as “Mauriclo” in the caption of the district court file,
but the record indicates the correct name is “Mauricio.”

2 The state dismissed the charge of distributing material that related to the sexual conduct
of a child prior to trial.

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Ruiz-Lainez came to her house and they had sex on one occasion. The physician assistant
from Child’s Voice who had interviewed the two girls also testified at the trial. She
testified that P.H.P. consented to an anal -genital exam and the results neither confirmed
nor excluded the possibility that she had been sexually abused. She also testified about her
interviews with P.H.P. and V.P.A. and stated, in response to questioning from the
prosecutor, that the disclosures by the two girls were “consistent with sexual abuse.”
The jury found Ruiz-Lainez guilty of all five counts of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subds. 1(b), 2(1) (2016). Ruiz-Lainez was sentenced
to 60 months in prison for three counts and the sentences were stayed for the remaining
two counts. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Ruiz-Lainez argues that the convictions must be reversed because the physician
assistant impermissibly vouched during her testimony for the credibility of V.P.A. and
P.H.P. Ruiz-Lainez did not object to that portion of the testimony at trial and therefore we
review the testimony for plain error. State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 583 (Minn. 2007).
The United States Supreme Court has established a three-prong
test for plain error, requiring that before an appellate court
reviews an unobjected-to error, there must be (1) error; (2) that
is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these
three prongs are met, the appellate court then assesses whether
it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity
of the judicial proceedings.

State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (footnotes omitted). Under the third
prong, Ruiz-Lainez bears the burden of establishing that the error had a significant effect
on the jury’s verdict. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016).

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Generally, vouching for the cr edibility of a witness is impermissible because
assessing credibility is in the exclusive province of the jury. State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d
625, 630 (Minn. 1995). “[O]ne witness cannot vouch for or against the credibility of
another witness.” State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).
Here, the challenged testimony occurred when the prosecutor asked the physician
assistant whether she had formed any impressions during her interviews of P.H.P. and
V.P.A. With respect to P.H.P., the physician a ssistant testified that during her interview,
P.H.P. “disclosed penile -oral penetration, digital -vaginal penetration, penile -vaginal
penetration, and that disclosure is consistent with sexual abuse.” With respect to V.P.A.,
the physician assistant testified that V.P.A. “disclosed penile-vaginal penetration . . . and
that disclosure is consistent with sexual abuse.”
Ruiz-Lainez argues that the testimony by the physician a ssistant that P.H.P. and
V.P.A. made disclosures that were “consistent with sexual abu se” constitutes
impermissible vouching testimony. He argues that the testimony “can reasonably be
construed as [the physician assistant’s] own conclusion that the complainants were sexually
abused based on their disclosures.”
Ruiz-Lainez relies on State v. Morales-Mulato, in which this court determined that
an expert witness impermissibly vouched for the credibility of a child who alleged she had
been sexually abused. 744 N.W.2d 679, 68 8 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 29, 2008). But the im permissible testimony in Morales-Mulato is distinguishab le
from the challenged testimony at issue here. In that case, the individual who conducted
the CornerHouse interview with the complainant testified as an expert witness on sexual

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abuse and opined tha t, based on the interview, the child had been sexually abused. Id. at
684. She further testified that she had some training in “truth-detecting” and how to obtain
accurate information from children during interviews, and that she could “form an opinio n”
about truthfulness. Id. Thus, the expert directly testified in support of the credibility of
the child, stated that she believed the child was telling the truth, and provided background
as to her training in assessing truthfulness.
The testimony of the physician assistant in this case did not rise to the same level.
She did not offer an opinion on whether V.P.A. and P.H.P. were telling the truth, but stated
that the disclosures made were “consistent with sexual abuse. ” See State v. Goldenstein ,
505 N.W.2d 332, 338 (Minn. App. 1993) (noting that the expert witness testified that the
results of an examination were “consistent with” sexual abuse), review denied (Minn. Oct.
19, 1993). We acknowledge that the testimony is concerning since it was in the natur e of
confirmatory evidence, putting the label of “sexual abuse” on the statements made by
P.H.P. and V.P.A. in the interviews . Nevertheless, even if the testimony constitutes
impermissible vouching, we conclude that the two additional prongs of the “plain error”
standard—that the error is “clear or obvious” and that it affected Ruiz-Lainez’s “substantial
rights”—have not been met. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).
Here, as the state notes, the testimony can also reasonably be construed as a
statement that the conduct alleged, if it occurred, was consistent with acts of sexual abuse.
The physician assistant did not offer a conclusion about whether V.P.A. and P.H.P. were
telling the truth or whether the alleged abuse actually occurred, but rather stated that what
they disclosed during their interviews was consistent with sexual abuse. Moreover, the

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testimony was brief and the prosecutor did not emphasize the testimony or suggest that the
physician assistant vouched for V.P.A.’s and P.H.P.’s credibility. The prosecutor also
made no mention of it in the state’s closing argument.
Finally, as in the case of Morales-Mulato, we conclude that the testimony did not
have a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. The jury was presen ted with the DNA
evidence from the condom showing a match with Ruiz -Lainez with regard to the charge
involving V.P.A. The jury heard testimony from both of the victims and was able to view
and assess for themselves the tape of the forensic interview conducted at Child’s Voice. In
addition, defense counsel had the opportunity to cross -examine V.P.A. and P.H.P., along
with the physician assistant, and in the closing argument emphasized the portion of the
physician assistant testimony that the results of the physical examination of P.H.P. did not
reveal signs of sexual abuse. On this record, we cannot conclude that the challenged
testimony constitutes a plain error requiring reversal of Ruiz-Lainez’s convictions.
Affirmed.