State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2076

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert James Quaas,
Appellant.

Filed January 4, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-19-2084

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Alan Felix, Bemidji City Atto rney, Andrea Kingbird, Assistan t City Attorney, Bemidji,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pr esiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Beltrami County jury fo und Robert James Quaas guilty of misdemeanor theft
based on evidence that he removed several items from a Walmart store without paying for

2
them. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and, therefore,
affirm.
FACTS
On the afternoon of the F ourth of July in 2019, Quaas visited a Walmart store in
Bemidji. Store employees prevented him from leaving the store because his shopping cart
contained several items for which he had not paid. Quaas was cited for misdemeanor theft,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2018).
The case was tried to a jury on one da y in October 2019. The state called two
witnesses. Its primary witness was a Wa lmart asset-protection employee who observed
Quaas while he was in the stor e and participated in the stor e’s effort to stop Quaas from
taking unpaid-for items. The Walmart employ ee testified as follows: Quaas grabbed a
large air-conditioner and placed it in his cart al ongside other items. At a self-check-out
station, Quaas scanned only some of the items in his cart. Quaas walked from the self-
check-out station to the store’s customer-service area to speak with a store employee about
returning some large items (a cabinet and two rugs) but was not allowe d to return them.
While Quaas was talking to a customer-service employee, a man in a red shirt whose name
is unknown took Quaas’s cart and walked toward the exit. Qu aas walked toward the exit
with customer-service employees, who were helping him take the cabinet and rugs from
the store to his vehicle. After the red-shirte d man had passed the last point of sale with
Quaas’s cart, asset-protection employees st opped him and then st opped Quaas. The
Walmart employee testified that Quaas did not pay for severa l items in his cart: the air-
conditioner, two ribeye steaks, a bag of birdseed, and a box of potato chips, all of which

3
had a total value of $368. The state also called as a witness a police officer who responded
to the store’s report of a shoplifter, spoke with the store’s asset-protection employees, and
issued Quaas a citation for misdemeanor theft.
During the Walmart employee’s testimony, th e state introduced into evidence four
video-recordings created by the store’s surveillance cameras and played them for the jury.
We have carefully reviewed the video-reco rdings, which augment the witnesses’ oral
testimony in significant ways. The video-reco rdings depict the following: Quaas took a
large box containing an air-conditioner from a shel f and placed it in his cart. At a self-
check-out station, Quaas scanned many grocery items in his cart but not the air-conditioner,
two ribeye steaks, a bag of birdseed, and a box of potato chips. Quaas paid for the items
that he had scanned with what appears to be a credit card or debit card. Quaas pushed his
cart from the self-check-out st ation toward the customer-ser vice area. He stopped and
looked around for appr oximately 10 seconds. He ste pped away from his cart while he
talked to three Walmart employees at the cust omer-service area. He returned to his cart
and pushed it closer to the ex it, left the cart there, and we nt back to the customer-service
area. Immediately after Quaas let go of his cart, the red-shirted man took the cart and
pushed it toward the exit. The red-shirted man was stopped by a Walmart employee near
the exit, and they had a short conversation. After being stopped, the red-shirted man
walked back toward the interi or of the store and approached Quaas in a familiar way as
Quaas was walking toward the exit with the store employees who were helping him remove
the cabinet and rugs. The Wa lmart employee who had stopped the red-shirted man then
approached Quaas and spoke with him, apparently about the items in Quaas’s cart. The

4
employee led Quaas and his cart back inside the store while the red-shirted man walked
away.
Quaas did not testify and di d not introduce any other evidence. The jury found him
guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 87 days in jail and a fine of $135. Quaas
appeals.
DECISION
Quaas argues that the evid ence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he committed misdemeanor theft.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we undertake “a painstaking analysis
of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). We “carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and
the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the ju ry to reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
“The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be
assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any ev idence that conflicted with the verdict.”
State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (M inn. 2016). We will not reverse a verdict if the
jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the
charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100 (quotation omitted).

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A person is guilty of misdemeanor theft if he “intentionally and without claim of
right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or re tains possession of movable property of another
without the other’s consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession
of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1).
Quaas’s argument for reversal has three part s. He argues that the state’s evidence
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable do ubt that (1) he took Walmart’s property
“without . . . consent,” (2) he took Walmart’s property “without claim of right,” and (3) he
intended to permanently deprive Walmart of its property. See id. In each part, Quaas
contends that he may be held responsible on ly for leaving his cart in a place near the
customer-service area but that he is not responsible for removing or attempting to remove
the cart from the store. He does not contend that he had permission or a claim of right to
remove unpaid-for items from the store; rather, he contends merely that he did not commit
a crime by temporarily leaving his cart, wh ich contained unpaid-for items, near the
customer-service area and the exit while he spoke with customer-service employees. In
essence, Quaas contends that th e evidence is insufficient to prove that he, rather than the
red-shirted man, intended to take and did take unpaid-for property from Walmart.
To determine whether Quaas intended to take property from Walmart without
paying for the property, we apply the standard of review for circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) State v. Raymond, 440 N.W.2d 425,
426 (Minn. 1989). That standard of review requires a two-step analysis. State v. Moore,
846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. “In
identifying the circumstances proved, we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes

6
in a manner that is consistent” with the verdict. Id. Second, we must “examine
independently the reasonableness of [the] inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved” and determine whether “the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (alteration
in original) (quotations omitted) . In the second step of th e analysis, we do not give
deference to the jury’s verdict. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). In
assessing the circumstances proved and the inferences that may be drawn from the
circumstances, we consider the evidence as a whole rather th an examining each piece of
evidence individually. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002).
At the first step, we must identify the circumstances proved that are relevant to
whether Quaas intended to take un paid-for property from Walmart. See Moore ,
846 N.W.2d at 88. The circumstances proved are stated above in the statement of facts.
At the second step, we must “examine . . . the reasonableness of [the] inferences
that might be drawn from the circumstan ces proved” and “determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.” See id. Quaas does not contend that the
circumstances proved are inconsistent with an inference of gu ilt. The state contends that
the circumstances proved support an inference of guilt. We agree with the state that the
circumstances proved allow an inference that Quaas intended to take unpaid-for property
from Walmart.
At the second step, we also must de termine whether “the circumstances proved
are . . . inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. Quaas contends
that “the circumstances proved do not exclude the rational inference that [he] did not intend

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to permanently deprive Walmart of the unpaid-for items.” Specifically, he asserts that he
was not paying attention to his cart while he was talking to customer-service employees,
at which time the red-shirted man “pushed the cart away from customer service, around the
corner, and out of the store.” He contends that “[a]n entirely rational inference is that [he]
brought the unpaid-for items where he did be cause he hoped to use the money from his
return to pay for them, and th at he thought [the red-shirte d man] would merely tend the
cart while he completed the return.” He contends that another reasonable inference is that
he “exited the store to assist the employees with bringing the cabinet and rugs back to his
vehicle” with an intention to return to the cart to complete his purchases of the unpaid-for
items.
In response, the state contends that th e inferences identified by Quaas are not
rational. The state notes that Quaas did not bring his cart all the way into the customer-
service area but, rather, left it closer to the exit, where the red-shirted man could more
easily remove it from the store. The state also notes that Quaas did not attempt to pay for
the unpaid-for items in his cart after he was not allowed to return the cabinet and rugs. The
state contends that the more reasonable infere nce is that Quaas knew that the red-shirted
man was going to push his cart out of the stor e and that Quaas was conscious of that fact
when he walked out of the store with the cabinet and rugs.
We agree with the state that Quaas’s alternative hypotheses are not rational
inferences in light of the circumstances proved. Quaas’s alternative hypotheses are
inconsistent with the evidence that he had multiple opportunities to purchase the unpaid-
for items but did not do so. The video-recordings show that Quaas carefully scanned most

8
of the items in his cart but refrained from scanning the most expensive items. The fact that
Quaas used a credit card or de bit card at the self-check-out station shows that he likely
could have used the same card for the unpa id-for items, which undermines the inference
that it was necessary to use m oney from the return of the cabinet and rugs. As the state
points out, Quaas made no attempt to purchase the unpaid-for items at the customer-service
area, either before or after his attempted retu rns were refused. The inference that Quaas
intended to purchase the unpaid-for items in his cart after putting the cabinet and rugs back
in his vehicle is not a reasonable inference in light of the evidence that Quaas and the red-
shirted man coordinated a hand-off of the cart. Furthermore, when the red-shirted man was
prevented by a store employee from exiting the store, the red-shirted man immediately
sought out Quaas as he was walking toward the exit and led him to the store employee.
Quaas appears to have assumed responsibility for his cart while sp eaking with the store
employee. This last piece of evidence shows that Quaas’s conduct is not limited to leaving
an unattended cart near the customer-service area. Rather, the ci rcumstantial evidence
shows that Quaas, by employing a scheme invo lving another person, intended to remove
the unpaid-for items from the Walmart store without paying for them.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of misdemeanor theft.
Affirmed.