State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2077

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leticia Rene Morales,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-18-179

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this direct appeal fro m the final judgment of conviction and sentence for pattern
of stalking conduct, appellant Leticia Rene Morales argues that her conviction must be

2
reversed because the state relied on a stalki ng-by-telephone provision that is facially
unconstitutional to prove the pattern of stalking conduct. She also argues that the evidence
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty of two counts of threats
of violence. We affirm the pattern-of-sta lking conviction and conclude that sufficient
evidence supports the guilty verdicts for threats of violence, but we reverse and remand for
the district court to set aside the three unadjudicated verdicts for stalking by telephone and
to dismiss the underlying stalking-by-telephone charges.
FACTS
Morales had a brief romantic relationship wi th R.M.C. After the relationship ended,
R.M.C. obtained an order for protection (O FP) that prohibited Morales from contacting
him in person, by phone, or by social media. A deputy sheriff served the OFP on Morales
on December 28, 2017.
In the months that followed, Morales repeatedly called R.M.C., sent him text
messages, and came to the auto shop owned by R.M.C.’s brother where R.M.C. worked as
a mechanic. Morales’s conduct at the auto shop, which included damaging vehicles, drove
customers away at times and, on at least one occasion, caused R.M.C.’s brother to close
the shop. Morales’s actions took such a toll on R.M.C. that he considered moving away or
asking his brother to sell the business. On four separate occasions, R.M.C. reported
Morales’s contacts with him to law enforcement. Those reports led to the charges in this
case.
On February 14, 2018, Mora les came to the auto shop and began yelling and kicking
and pulling on the locked front door while R.M. C. was inside. R.M.C. called the police.

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When the responding officer arrived, R.M.C. showed the officer a vi deo of the incident
that he recorded on his cellphone. In the video, Morales screams and repeatedly demands
that R.M.C. “open the f-----g door.” While R.M.C. was speaking with the officer, R.M.C.’s
phone rang. The contact information indicated that it was Morales calling, and the officer
answered the phone with a “hello.” The officer heard what sounded like two female voices,
but the caller hung up without replying.
R.M.C. also showed the responding office r a series of several hundred text messages
that Morales had sent him over the past fe w weeks. The text messages from Morales
included many statements expressing both love and hatred for R.M.C. Morales stated that
she knew R.M.C. was dating someone new, a nd her messages on that topic included an
offer to “let” R.M.C. have relations with the other woman if Morales could be present. She
also told R.M.C. multiple times that she wo uld make him “pay” for what he had done,
stating that she would ruin hi s life and did not care if she we nt to prison. R.M.C. also
reported that, the day before the February 14 incident at the shop, Morales told him during
a phone call that she was going to kill him and his new girlfriend.
On March 8, 2018, Morales again came to the auto shop and attempted to enter.
When R.M.C. told her that he was going to call the police, she got in her vehicle and began
to drive away. R.M.C. followed her outside and took pictures on his cell phone to
document that she had been there, but as he was doing so, Morales circled the block, turned
back into the parking lot, and drove her car directly toward him. R.M.C. jumped out of the
way to avoid being struck. When a police offi cer arrived, R.M.C. showed the officer the

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photos on his phone and also showed the offi cer a text message he received the day after
the February 14 incident in which Morales again threatened to kill him.
A few weeks later, R.M.C. reported to po lice that Morales had called him 20 to 30
times within the past day. R.M.C. also reported that Morales drove past him when he left
the auto shop earlier that day. He pulled over, intending to tell Morales to stop calling him.
Morales turned around, drove towards R.M.C., bumped the front of his car with her car,
and drove away. The o fficer took pictures of R.M.C.’s car, which had minor front-end
damage, and R.M.C. later sent the officer screenshots showing Morales’s multiple calls.
About five months later, in August 2018, R.M.C. informed la w enforcement that
Morales had sent him more text messages, including photographs of herself. R.M.C. told
the responding officer that Morales had been sending him messages for the past month and
showed an officer the messages.
The state initially charged Mo rales with several offenses following the February 14
incident. After the additional incidents, the state amended the complaint to charge a total
of twelve counts: one count of pattern of stalking, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2016);
two counts of threats of violence, Minn. Stat . § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016); four counts of
stalking by telephone, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4) (2016); four counts of violating an
order for protection, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b) (2016); and one count of failing to
stop for a collision, Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 2 (2016). The case proceeded to a jury
trial. After the close of ev idence, the state dismissed one of the stalking-by-telephone
counts. The jury found Morales guilty of all remaining co unts except for the charge of
failure to stop after a collision.

5
At sentencing, the district court adjudica ted Morales guilty of the pattern-of-stalking
offense and left the other nine counts unadjudicated. The district court sentenced Morales
to 18 months’ imprisonment, stayed executio n of the prison sentence , and placed her on
probation for five years.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
The foundation for Morales’s appeal is a claim that she was co nvicted of multiple
counts of stalking by telephone under an unconstitutional statute. Morales argues that the
state then relied on the unconstitutional stalking-by-telephone offenses to form the pattern
for the separate offense of pattern of stalking conduct. Because the pattern conviction is
premised on violations of an unconstitutional statute, Morales claims that this conviction
is also improper. Finally, Morales attacks the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the
jury’s guilty verdicts for threats of violence—offenses that also may comprise the pattern
of stalking conduct.
We first consider Morales’s foundatio nal argument that she was improperly
convicted under an unconstitutional statute. Then, we address her claims regarding the
pattern offense and threats-of-violence offenses.
I. The district court must set aside the three jury verdicts finding Morales guilty
of stalking by telephone.

Morales seeks reversal of her three “c onvictions” for viola tions of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 2(4)—the stalking- by-telephone statute—because
this court held in State v. Peterson that this particular statutory provision is facially

6
unconstitutional. 936 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26,
2020). Morales was not convicted of the st alking-by-telephone offenses, though; the
district court did not enter convictions or sentences for those guilty verdicts, which the
warrant of commitment accurately reflects. We accordingly construe her request as one to
reverse the jury’s three guilty verdicts for stalking by telephone.
The state agrees that under Peterson, section 609.749, subdivision 2(4), is facially
unconstitutional and Morales cannot be convicted of the stalking-by-telephone charges in
this case. Thus, the state also agrees that the three unadjudicated guilty verdicts for these
offenses should be reversed.
Under the stalking-by-telephone statut e, a person who “stalks another” by
“repeatedly mak[ing] telephone calls, send[ing] text messages, or induc[ing] a victim to
make telephone calls to the actor, whether or not conversation ensues” is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4). “Stalking” is defined in section 609.749,
subdivision 1, as “engag[ing] in conduct which the actor knows or has reason to know
would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed,
persecuted, or intimidated, and causes this reaction on the part of the victim regardless of
the relationship between the actor and victim.” In Peterson, we held that the stalking-by-
telephone provision prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and
is therefore facially overbroad. 936 N.W.2d at 920-21. We also held that the statute is not
susceptible to a judicial remedy and is thus invalid. Id. at 921-22.
“When a statute is unconstitutional, it is not a law and it is as inoperative as if it had
never been enacted.” Fedziuk v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 696 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn.

7
2005). Accordingly, Morales should not have been charged with and cannot be convicted
of stalking by telephone. We remand to the district court to set aside the jury’s three guilty
verdicts for stalking by telephone, dismiss those particular charges, and correct the warrant
of commitment.1 See State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 874, 877 (Minn. 2000).
II. Morales is not entitled to a new trial for the pattern-of-stalking conviction.

Morales next argues that her conviction fo r pattern of stalking conduct in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdiv ision 5(a), should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial because the stat e relied on the unconstitu tional stalking-by-
telephone offenses to prove that she engaged in a pattern of stalking.
Standard of Review
To apply the appropriate standard of review , we must first delineate the type of error
alleged. Morales argues that a constitutional error occurred and that we should reverse her
conviction unless the state can show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 59 (Minn. 2015). She explicitly rejects the state’s
attempt to characterize the alleged error as either a challenge to the jury instructions or a

1 A defendant may not appeal from an unadjudicated guilty verdict because it is not a final
judgment. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2; see also State v. Parnell , 905 N.W.2d
895, 897 (Minn. App. 2017) (“A defendant may not appeal a guilty verdict until the district
court formally enters or records a judgmen t of conviction.”). Morales challenges the
unadjudicated guilty verdicts in connection with her a ppeal from th e judgment of
conviction for the pattern-of-stalking offense. On appeal from a judgment of conviction,
we “may review any order or ruling of the district court or any other matter, as the interests
of justice may require.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11. Because the parties agree that
the district court’s warrant of commitment order should be corrected, and the unadjudicated
verdicts were based on a facially unconstituti onal statute, we have elected to review
Morales’s challenge to the verdicts in the interests of justice.

8
challenge to the constitutionality of a pattern -of-stalking conviction that is based on a
pattern of stalking by telephone. 2 Instead, she argues that because the stalking-by-
telephone offenses are invalid , it was a constitutional error fo r the prosecutor to present
those offenses to the jury throughout the trial as both independent crimes and as potential
predicate crimes for a pattern of stalking.
Because the stalking-by-telephone statutor y provision is facially unconstitutional
and not subject to judicial remedy, it is “ino perative as if it had never been enacted.”
Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 349. We accordingly agree that an error occurred when stalking-
by-telephone was presented as a criminal offense at trial—both as an independent offense
and as a predicate offense for the pattern-of- stalking charge. But to be entitled to relief,
appellants must generally prove not only that an error occurre d, but also that they were
prejudiced by the error.3 See State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012).

2 Even though Morales does not argue that the pattern-of-stalking statute is unconstitutional
if the predicate offenses are stalking-by-te lephone offenses, we note that the pattern
offense, section 609.749, subdivision 5(a), requires the state to prove a different mens rea
element than the unconstitutiona l stalking-by-telephone sect ion. To prove stalking by
telephone, the state must show that the actor engaged in conduct that the actor knew or had
reason to know “would cause the victim under the circum stances to feel frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.” Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4). By
contrast, to prove a pattern of stalking the state must show that the actor engaged in conduct
that the actor knew or had reason to know “would cause the victim under the circumstances
to feel terrorized or to fear bodily harm.” Id., subd. 5(a). The pattern statute seemingly
does not prohibit the same breadth of ex pressive communication as the stalking-by-
telephone provision. We do not resolve that issue here though, as Morales does not raise
it.

3 In her briefing, Morales describes the error, at one point, as “one of fairness of the trial.”
We note that this initially sounds like an argument that a structural error occurred.
Structural errors are “defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis
by ‘harmless-error’ standards because the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end

9
Depending on the type of error alleged, we apply one of two different harmless-
error tests to determine whether a defendant was prejudiced. See State v. Sanders , 775
N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn. 2009). When an error does not im plicate a constitutional right,
appellate courts do not award a new trial unl ess “the error substantially influenced the
jury’s verdict.” Id. When an error does implicate a constitutional right, appellate courts
“will award a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis,
820 N.W.2d at 533.4 We need not determine whether the error here was constitutional in

is obviously affected.” State v. Dalbec , 800 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn. 2011) (quotation
omitted). Courts have found structural error in “a very limited class of cases,” Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997), and such errors require
automatic reversal of a conviction without consideration of prejudice. See State v.
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 2011). Morales does not argue that her conviction
should be automatica lly reversed, though; she argues that the harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard for assessing prejudice applies. Because it appears to us that we
can “quantitatively assess[]” th e error that Morales asserts “in the context of the other
evidence presented in order to de termine whether it was harmless,” Colbert v. State, 870
N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted), and be cause Morales presents no
argument to the contrary, we decline to apply structural-error review here.

4 Additionally, when an issue is not raised in the district court, the issue is forfeited, and
appellate courts ordinarily review a forfeited issue for plain error. See, e.g. , State v.
Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Minn. 2018). The state contends that we should apply
plain-error review here because Morales did no t specifically object to the district court’s
jury instruction on pattern of stalking conduc t. But Morales filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss the counts of stalking by telephone, along with the pattern-o f-stalking count, on
the basis that section 609.749 is overbroad and thus unconstitu tional. The district court
denied her motion in its entirety, as Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912, had not yet been decided.
While Morales did not again raise a challenge to the stalking counts at trial, her argument
on appeal is essentially that those counts s hould not have been charged and included at
trial, which is the same challenge she raised at the appropriate time in her the omnibus
motion. We conclude that she did not forfeit the issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the
district court.

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dimension because even under the higher st andard for constitutional errors, Morales’s
claim fails.
Application
To show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the state must
demonstrate that “the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error.” Sanders, 775
N.W.2d at 887. In examining whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, an
appellate court looks to the record as a whole to discern the actual effect of the error on the
guilty verdict. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 59. “Overwhelming evidence of guilt is a factor,
often a very important one, when determini ng whether an error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). But the appellate court cannot focus solely on
evidence of guilt. State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2005). The court also
considers “the manner in wh ich the evidence was presen ted, whether it was highly
persuasive, whether it was used in closin g argument, and whether it was effectively
countered by the defendant.” Id.
Under section 609.749, su bdivision 5(a), “A person wh o engages in a pattern of
stalking conduct with respect to a single victim . . . which the actor knows or has reason to
know would cause the victim under the circumst ances to feel terrorized or to fear bodily
harm and which does cause this reaction on the part of the victim, is guilty of a felony.”
Subdivision 5(b) defines a “pattern of stalking conduct” as “two or more acts within a five-
year period that violate or attempt to violat e” certain statutes. Mi nn. Stat. § 609.749,
subd. 5(b) (2016). The enumerated statutes that can form a pattern of stalking include the

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statutes that criminalize thr eats of violence, violations of an order for protection, and
stalking by telephone. Id.
The state argues that including the st alking-by-telephone counts was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence that Morales is guilty of a pattern of
stalking was overwhelming. Morales was not only charged with and found guilty of three
counts of stalking by telephone, but was also charged with and found guilty of two counts
of threats of violence and four counts of violating an OFP. The threats-of-violence and
OFP violations also qualify as predicate offenses that may serve as the basis for a pattern-
of-stalking conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(b)(3), (6) (incorporating threats
of violence under Minn. Stat. § 609.713 (2016) and OFP vi olations under Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 14 (2016)). The state argues that because the jury found Morales guilty
of six additional qualifying predicate offens es—above and beyond the three stalking-by-
telephone offenses—it is unreasonable to believe the jury found a pattern of stalking based
exclusively on the stalking-by-telephone offenses.
A review of the record satisfies us that the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable
to any error in submitting the stalking-by-telephone counts to the jury at trial. See Sanders,
775 N.W.2d at 887-88 (finding jury verdict wa s unattributable to the alleged error). The
jury found beyond a reasonabl e doubt that Morales committed nine offenses that can
constitute a pattern of stalking conduct, and a pattern requires proof of only two such

12
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 609.74 9, subd. 5(b). The threats of violence and OFP violations
were more than sufficient to establish a pattern of stalking.5
Moreover, the state did not emphasize the stalking-by-telephone offenses in arguing
that Morales had engaged in a pattern of stalking. During closing arguments, the
prosecutor informed the jury that, in order to prove patte rn of stalking, the state had to
“show that there were at least two [predicate] crimes and [it was] attempting to do that with
the threats of violence, stalking, and the [OFP ] violations.” The prosecutor also advised
the jurors that they did not need to find all of the violations proved, but only two of them.
In discussing how the state had proved the element of causing the victim to “feel terrorized
or to fear bodily harm,” the prosecutor described how R.M.C. must have felt when Morales
pounded on the door of the auto shop screaming to be let in and when Morales nearly ran
R.M.C. over with her car. The prosecutor highlighted that Morales’s behavior led R.M.C.
to call law enforcement and to consider asking his brother to sell the shop. This evidence

5 Although unpublished decisions of this court are not precedential, Dynamic Air, Inc. v.
Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. App. 1993 ), we nonetheless note that our decision
here is distinguishable from State v. Vosburg, No. A19-0878, 2020 WL 1846451 (Minn.
App. Apr. 13, 2020). In Vosburg, the defendant pleaded guilty to a pattern of stalking
conduct under section 609.749, subdivision 5(a). 2020 WL 1846451, at *1. To show that
he had committed two offenses that violate se ction 609.749, Vosburg testified during his
plea that he committed two instances of stalki ng by telephone in violation of section
609.749, subdivision 1. Id. Following the Peterson decision, we held that Vosburg’s plea
was inaccurate, and thus invalid, because it lack ed a sufficient factual basis, as he had
“testified to two instances of conduct that are no longer criminalized.” Id. at *3. Here,
unlike in Vosburg, the pattern-of-conduct element of Morales’s pattern-of-stalking
conviction is not only supporte d by two non-criminal acts, but is also supported by six
additional offenses that violate section 609.749. The issue of an inadequate factual basis
is not present here.

13
involved Morales’s in -person contact with R.M.C. I ndeed, the prosecutor made no
mention of Morales’s text messages in disc ussing the pattern-of-stalking charge during
closing argument.
Additionally, we note that Morales does not argue that the text messages themselves
were inadmissible as evidence. Morales instead argues that her text messages to R.M.C.
played such a significant role at trial that the jury’s verdict on the pattern offense must have
relied on them. But the state was not prohibi ted from describing Morales’s behavior that
gave rise to a pattern of stalking, which in cluded the text messages. And, as noted, the
state did not emphasize the text messages in arguing that it had pr oved the pattern-of-
stalking elements. We conclude that any error in allowing the jury to consider the stalking-
by-telephone offenses as predicate offenses for a pattern of stalking was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
III. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Morales is guilty of two counts of threats
of violence.

Morales also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she made two threats of violen ce. As an initial matter, Morales again
characterizes the guilty verdicts as “convictions.” But the district court never adjudicated
and sentenced Morales for the thre ats-of-violence offenses. In State v. Ashland , the
supreme court declined to address a suffi ciency-of-the-evidence challenge to guilty
verdicts that were neither adjudicated nor sentenced. 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979).
Here, though, the threats of violence may have been part of the pattern-of-stalking

14
conviction; the jury could have found that they constituted the pattern of stalking conduct.
We will thus briefly address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty verdicts.
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,
appellate courts analyze the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the
verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). To do so, we
assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.
State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
When an element of an offense is proved entirely by circumstantial evidence,
appellate courts review the sufficiency of that evidence using a two-part standard. Loving
v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). First, we identify the circumstances that the
state proved. Id. This requires that we “winnow do wn” the evidence by “resolving all
questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict” and disregarding any evidence inconsistent
with the verdict. State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017). Second, we
determine “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothe sis other than guilt.” State v. Bahtuoh , 840 N.W.2d 804, 810
(Minn. 2013).
Morales’s challenge to the threats-of-violence verdicts implicates the state’s proof
of her intent in making the threatening statem ents. Intent is a “subjective state of mind”
that usually can only be established by “reasonable inference[s] from surrounding
circumstances.” State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975). The parties agree

15
that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies here. We accordingly begin
the analysis by delineating the circumstances that the state proved.
Assuming that the jury credited the testimony of th e state’s witnesses, and
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, see State v. Hawes, 801
N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011), the circumstances proved are as follows.
After Morales and R.M.C. ended their da ting relationship, R.M.C. obtained an OFP
prohibiting Morales from contacting him. Morales repeatedly violated the OFP by
contacting R.M.C. by phone and in person. Morales’s contacts with R.M.C. at his place of
business drove customers away and, on at least one occasion, ca used R.M.C. and his
brother to close the shop. R.M.C. contemplated asking his brother to sell the business and
considered moving out of town.
Text messages from Morales to R.M.C. s how that Morales was having a difficult
time regulating her emotions in regards to the break up. She sent many messages
expressing anger, sadness, frust ration, and love and hatred for R.M.C. Her messages
indicate that she was particularly upset that R.M.C. was seeing another woman. Morales
told R.M.C. that she would make him “pay,” and that she did not care if she went to prison.
She told him over the phone on February 13, 2018, that she was going to kill him. The
next day, on February 14, Morales went to the auto shop, screamed and demanded to be let
in, and tried to pull and kick open the locked front door. After she left, she called R.M.C.
and a police officer answered. Th e next day, Morales told R.M.C. over text message that
she was going to kill him. And on March 8, Morales returned to the auto shop and tried to
hit R.M.C. with her car.

16
Having identified the circumstances prov ed, we next determine whether, when
viewed as whole, they permit a reasonable inference of guilt and are inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 810. A person is guilty of
threats of violence under Minnesota Statutes se ction 609.713, subdivision 1, if he or she
“threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize
another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” A statement is a
threat if the statement would, in its cont ext, “have a reasonable tendency to create
apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at
613 (quotations omitted). “Terrorize,” in this context, means “to cause extreme fear by use
of violence or threats.” Id. at 614. The statute is not me ant “to authorize grave sanctions
against the kind of verbal threat which expresses transitory anger which lacks the intent to
terrorize.” State v. Jones , 451 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). In determining whether a person’s communications
recklessly disregarded the risk of causing terror, the victim’s actual reactions are a relevant
factor. Id.
Morales concedes that the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt. The
record supports this concession, as the ci rcumstances proved are consistent with a
reasonable hypothesis that she threatened to commit a crime of violence against R.M.C. on
two occasions by saying she was going to kill him, and th at she did so with a reckless
disregard of the risk of causing terror to R.M.C. Morales contends, however, that the
circumstances proved are consistent with another rational hypothesis: that her statements
that she was going to kill R.M.C. were “merel y expressions of transitory anger.” She

17
argues that, considered in the context of all the text messages she sent, those statements
“are that of a lovelorn, brokenhearted woman who was desperate to have the man she still
loved acknowledge her existence, even for a fleeting moment.”
We do not agree that Morales’s statemen ts about killing R.M.C., in the context of
all the evidence, support a rational hypothesis th at she merely expressed transitory anger.
Morales repeatedly contacted R.M.C. for over nine months, and she did so at a time when
she knew that an OFP forbid her from doing so. She expressed to R.M.C. that he would
“pay” and that she did not care if she went to prison. Her contact was not limited to text
messages and phone calls. She followed her threats of violen ce with visits to R.M.C.’s
place of business, where she attempted to break through a locked door and shouted to be
let in. Her conduct was so c oncerning to R.M.C. that he called the police multiple times,
documented Morales’s visits with video and photos, and considered moving away and
asking his brother to sell the business. Ultimately, the only reasonable inference from the
circumstances proved is that Morales made threatening statements with a reckless disregard
of a known, substantial risk that the statem ents would terrorize R. M.C. We accordingly
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for threats of
violence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.