Jordan Carroll, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2078

Jordan Carroll,
Relator,

vs.

Minnesota Apartments, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 14, 2020
Vacated
Ross, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 37501391-4

Erik F. Hansen, Rachel K. Tack, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
relator)

Thomas E. Glennon, Thomas E. Glennon, P .A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
Minnesota Apartments, LLC)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
An unemployment-law judge found that Jordan Carroll quit his job with Minnesota
Apartments LLC, and that judge later purported to amend some details of the decision after
Carroll’s reconsideration-request deadline had expired. Carroll unsuccessfully sought
reconsideration, and he now appeals from the decision denying his request to reconsider.
Because the unemployment-law judge’s jurisdiction terminated when Carroll’s
reconsideration-request deadline expired, neither of the judge’s decisions after that date
has any effect. We therefore vacate both the amended decision and the reconsideration
decision, leaving intact the original post-hearing decision.
FACTS
Relator Jordan Carroll applied for unemployment-ins urance benefits after his
employment as a maintenance technician with respondent Minnesota Apartments LLC
ended in December 2018. Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED) initially determined that Carroll was eligible for benefits,
but Minnesota Apartments appealed that determination, arguing that Carroll had quit work
without good reason.
An unemployment-law judge (ULJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing to decide
Carroll’s eligibility. After hear ing conflicting evidence about how Carroll’s employment
ended, the ULJ issued a decision on August 16, 2019, finding that Carroll quit without
good reason caused by Minnesota Apartments and determining the amount that Carroll had
been overpaid in benefits. The ULJ accompanied the decision with a notice informing
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Carroll that the decision would “be final unless a request for reconsideration is filed with
the unemployment[-]law judge on or before Thursday, September 5, 2019,” consistent with
the 20-day period allowed under Minnesota Statutes section 268.105, subdivision 2(a)
(2018).
The September 5 deadline passed and Carroll had not submitted a request to
reconsider. But on September 10, 2019, the ULJ issued a purportedly amended decision,
again determining that Carroll was ineligible but reducing the overpayment amount.
Carroll immediately asked the ULJ to reconsider and requested the ULJ to conduct another
hearing. The ULJ denied Carroll’s hearing request and then affirmed himself when Carroll
asked him to reconsider.
Carroll appeals by certiorari.
D E C I S I O N
Carroll appeals the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration, arguing that the ULJ erred
either by determining that he quit or by determining that he lacked good reason to quit
caused by his employer. DEED urges us to dismiss Carroll’s appeal, contending that
the ULJ lac ked subject- matter jurisdiction and that this court therefore lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration. We review
de novo questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 813
(Minn. 2012), timeliness, Rowe v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 704 N.W.2d 191, 194
(Minn. App. 2005), and statutory construction, Eischen Cabinet Co. v. Hildebrandt,
683 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. 2004). We strictly construe the statutory deadlines governing
unemployment-benefit-eligibility appeals. See Semanko v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs.,
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244 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. 1976); Rowe, 704 N.W.2d at 195–96. For the following
reasons, we conclude that the ULJ lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when he amended the
August 16, 2019 decision, rendering the amended decision and decision on reconsideration
ineffectual.
Our jurisdictional decision arises from the timing of the key procedural events.
The ULJ issued his primary decision on August 16, 2019, his amended decision on
September 10, 2019, and his decision on reconsideration on November 25, 2019 . On a
timely appeal from an initial eligibility determination, a ULJ must conduct a de novo
hearing and issue a decision. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subds. 1, 1a(a) (2018). That decision
“is final unless a request for reconsideration is filed.” Id., subd. 1a(a). The parties and
DEED’s commissioner may seek the ULJ’s review by filing a request for reconsideration
“within 20 calendar days of the sending of the unemployment[-]law judge’s decision.” Id.,
subd. 2(a). The deadline to request reconsideration of the ULJ’s August 16 decision was
therefore September 5, 2019.
Carroll has described the circumstances of his failure to request reconsideration
within the statutory period. He asserts that he received a notification dated August 23,
2019, prompting him to telephone DEED. His call occurred within the 20-day
reconsideration period. He says that DEED representatives advised him that the ULJ would
be issuing an amended decision and that he should therefore wait to file any request for
reconsideration until after the ULJ issued the amended decision, indicating that his request
would be considered timely. For the purposes of this appeal, we accept as true Carroll’s
description of those circumstances.
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We addressed somewhat similar circumstances in Rowe v. Department of
Employment & Economic Development, 704 N.W.2d at 195–97. Rowe had appealed
determinations of ineligibility on two accounts, and the reviewing ULJ issued separate
decisions on June 11, 2004, modifying one determination and preserving the other. Id.
at 193. Rowe believed one determination of overpayment was no longer in effect when he
received a bill from the department in August 2004, so he contacted DEED. Id. at 193–94.
The ULJ issued an amended decision on August 18, 2004. Id. at 194. Rowe appealed the
decision to the senior unemployment-review judge (SURJ), who dismissed Rowe’s appeal
as untimely. Id. Applying statutory language similar to the current statute to a 30-day
deadline to appeal a ULJ’s decision, we reasoned that the ULJ had the implied authority to
correct a decision within the 30-day appeal period, but that the ULJ “lacked jurisdiction to
consider the matter” when he amended the decision after that period expired, “38 days after
the decision became final.” Id. at 195–96. We emphasized that the statute “specifically
provides . . . that[] if an appeal is not filed within the 30 days, the ULJ’s decision becomes
the final decision of the department.” Id. at 195. Based on that reasoning, we held that the
ULJ’s August 18 amended decision was void, and we reinstated the June 11 decision. Id.
at 196–97.
Carroll unconvincingly urges us to distinguish Rowe. He highlights that the event
triggering the ULJ’s amendment in Rowe’s case occurred only after the deadline to appeal
had expired, see id. at 193, while the ULJ here had begun contemplating amending his
decision before the 20-day deadline expired. We reject Carroll’s implied assertion that the
ULJ could extend his inherent authority to amend a decision by merely committing himself
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to amend the decision. The assertion contradicts our reasoning in Rowe, where we clarified
that the ULJ’s authority to actually amend the decision existed only during the period to
seek reconsideration:
Because a relator has 30 days to appeal a decision of the
ULJ, the ULJ’s implied power to correct an erroneous decision
arguably exists for the same 30-day period. Section 268.105
specifically provides, however, that, if an appeal is not filed
within the 30 days, the ULJ’s decision becomes the final
decision of the department. . . . Once the ULJ’s decision
became final, the entire department— including the ULJ and
the SURJ—lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter further.
Without jurisdiction, the ULJ lacked the legal authority to
correct an erroneous decision.
Id. at 195–96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The ULJ’s implicit “legal authority to
correct” the prior decision within the statutory period is not tolled by the ULJ’s merely
contemplating a correction or even deciding that he should (or will) make a correction. Not
only does Carroll’s notion extend far beyond Rowe’s reasoning, it implies the untenable
possibility that a ULJ might, within the 20-day reconsideration period and without notice
to any party, privately decide that he will amend the original decision and thereby hold
open his jurisdiction over the case until he finally issues the amended order, say, perhaps
eight or nine weeks (or months, or years ) later. The inherent authority we recognized in
Rowe follows logically and consistently from the statute, but extending ULJ jurisdiction
beyond the reconsideration deadline does not.
Regardless of when the ULJ began contemplating amending the August 16 decision,
Rowe’s guidance and the lack of any request for reconsideration within the 20-day period
lead us to conclude that the ULJ’s subject-matter jurisdiction to amend the August 16
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decision terminated immediately after September 5, and the ULJ lacked subject -matter
jurisdiction when he purportedly sua sponte amended the decision and later entered his
decision on reconsideration. Carroll presents five arguments urging a different outcome,
some of which he raised in opposition to an earlier motion to dismiss this appeal and which
we address now. None prevail.
First, Carroll argues that DEED forfeited the jurisdictional challenge by not acting
sooner. We reject the argument because “[s]ubject[ -]matter jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by consent of the parties, it cannot be [forfeited], and it can be raised at any
time . . . .” Tischer v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Cambridge, 693 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.
2005).
Second, Carroll similarly contends that the issue is not properly before us because
the ULJ did not find that Carroll’s request was untimely. But the statute he relies on fails
to make the case. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(f) (2018) (requiring ULJ to “issue a
decision dismissing the request for reconsideration as untimely if the judge decides the
request for reconsideration was not filed within 20 calendar days” (emphasis added)). And
although we typically do not review issues raised for the first time on appeal, see Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988), our consideration of issues on undisputed facts
is proper if there is no advantage or disadvantage to the parties ba sed on the lack of a
determination below, see Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687
(Minn. 1997).
Third, we decline to follow Carroll’s suggestion that we remand the case for a
hearing over facts related to the jurisdictional question. We have accepted as true Carroll’s
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allegations about those facts, and no party disputes the timing of any of the key events,
making the analysis purely legal rather than factual. See Rowe, 704 N.W.2d at 194.
Fourth, Carroll contends alternatively that the ULJ “arguably” deemed his request
timely. This is not so. The ULJ’s decision on reconsideration clarifies that he believed
that Carroll was asking him to reconsider the September 10 amended decision. The
November 25 decision recounted issuing “findings of fact and [a] decision” on
September 10 and stated that Carroll “filed a request for reconsideration asking the
unemployment[-]law judge to reconsider that decision” (emphasis added), identifying the
amended decision.
Fifth, Carroll also raises several issues emphasizing DEED’s misadvice. He implies
that he should not be held accountable for DEED’s representatives’ mistakes, that the
parties recognized that the reduced overpayment amount in the amended decision was
accurate, and that reinstating the August 16 decision would contravene the spirit and
purpose of Minnesota’s unemployment-insurance program. He also suggests that he might
be entitled to “s ome leeway” because he was self -represented during the underlying
proceedings. Jurisdiction, which naturally tends toward harsh results, does not extend
based on these sentiments. And in this case, the (immaterial) concerns about staff mistakes
and severity are lessened by the fact that the ULJ accompanied his August 16 decision with
an advisory informing Carroll unambiguously , “Under Minnesota Statute[s section]
268.105, subdivision 2, this decision will be final unless a request for reconsideration is
filed with the unemployment[-]law judge on or before Thursday, September 5, 2019.”
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We briefly address DEED’s contention that the jurisdictional defect deprives this
court of subject- matter jurisdiction. We rejected the argument when we denied DEED’s
earlier motion to dismiss this appeal, and we reject it again. We have jurisdiction to review
a decision on reconsideration provided that a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed and
served within 30 days after the decision was sent. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7 (2018).
Carroll timely appealed the November 25 decision on reconsideration, and we trace our
appellate jurisdiction to that decision notwithstanding the jurisdictional infirmity
underlying it.
The ULJ lacked subject- matter jurisdiction after September 5, 2019, and so his
amended decision and his decision on reconsideration are ineffectual . We vacate those
decisions, clarifying that the August 16 decision remains in effect because no request for
reconsideration of that decision was filed within 20 days.
Vacated.