State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2086

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Reginald Fenion Coe,
Appellant.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-22849

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from final judgment of conviction for first -degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state failed to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and
affirm the conviction . Appellant also challenges his sentence on the grounds that the

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district court relied on legally impermissible reasons and abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a downward dispositional departure. Because the district court relied
on valid reasons and carefully evaluated the record before making its determination, the
district court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to depart , and we affirm the
sentence imposed.
FACTS
In September 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Reginald
Fenion Coe with one count of first -degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subd ivision 1(a) (2016 ) ( engaging in sexual
penetration with a person under the age of 13 a nd more than 36 months younger). A jury
found Coe guilty and the district court sentenced him to an executed sentence of 201
months, denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure.
The trial testimony established that i n 2017, T.T. lived with h er mother, younger
sister, and Coe. 1 In April 2017, T.T. reported to a school counselor that she felt unsafe
going home because of the way Coe looked at her and that he looked at her in the wrong
places. Specifically, T.T. said that Coe would come into h er bedroom and stare at her.
Shortly after reporting to the school counselor that she felt uncomfortable , T.T. went to
live at her grandmother’s house. Grandmother testified that T.T. told her “she was afraid
to be at home” and that Coe “was looking at h er when she was in her room.” Child
protective services began an investigation and a social worker who interviewed T.T. and

1 Coe met T.T.’s mother when T.T. was three. Both T.T.’s mother and Coe had drug and
alcohol addictions. At times, T.T. and her younger sister lived with their grandmother.

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Coe testified at trial. The social worker testified that T.T. was “quite specific” in speaking
about feeling unsafe around Coe, and that T.T. seemed “[r]eserved, sad, cautious . . . [and]
stressed.” The social worker explained that Coe acknowledged that T.T. said he was doing
things that made her feel uncomfortable. Coe told the social worker that he was going into
T.T.’s room to see if she was on her electronics. In August 2017, T.T.’s mother died.
In June 2018, T.T. and grandmother had an argument after grandmother tried to take
her phone away. During this argument, T.T. stated that Coe had sex with her. After this
disclosure, grandmother admitted T.T. to a hospital. A social worker with child protective
services met T.T. while she was in the hospital. During the meeting, T.T. initially denied
that anyone touched her inappropriately, but later disclosed that Coe had touched he r
“private parts.”
Shortly thereafter, a forensic interviewer met with T.T. at CornerHouse. The district
court received into evidence the video recording of the forensic interview at CornerHouse.
During the interview, T.T. disclosed that Coe had stared at her in her bed and that he had
sexually penetrated her rectally and vaginally. T.T. described, and used dolls to
demonstrate, that Coe came into her bedroom, pulled down her pants, and put his penis
into her “butt” and “vagina.” T.T. said that it hurt and made her feel disgusting. After the
abuse, T.T. said that Coe went into her younger sister’s bed, which was in the same room,
and went to sleep. The forensic interviewer from CornerHouse testified at trial and stated
that during the CornerHou se interview, T.T. was “able to talk about how people moved
into the room and where the body positions were before, during, and after the assault. She
talked about how her own body got turned, where he touched on her own body, and she

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was able to demonstrate that in three dimensions.” T.T. also described Coe ejaculating: “It
was like white stuff coming out . . . on my panties.” When asked if T.T. was stable, the
forensic interviewer testified that she did not have any mental health or disassociation
concerns about T.T. during that interview. In addition, the forensic interviewer explained
that if abuse is by a family member or trusted adult, the victim is much more likely than
victims abused by a stranger or acquaintance to delay reporting, to disclose t he abuse
incrementally, and to deny the abuse.
T.T. also testified at trial. She testified that at first, living with Coe was “good,” but
that it changed. T.T. testified that Coe would stare at her at night in her room. T.T. thought
this was wrong and she felt uncomfortable. T.T. testified that when she was in fifth grade,
Coe came and slept in her bed . Then Coe pulled her clothes off. T.T. then remembered
“[f]eeling numb and pressure” in her “but t and [her] vagina.” Coe was
“[m]oving . . . [b]ack and forth.” T.T. could feel Coe’s “stomach and penis” on her “butt
and [her] vagina.” T.T. testified that she could feel Coe on the inside and outside o f her
“butt,” which made her feel horrible. T. T. also described Coe’s penis “[g] oing in” her
vagina. While this was happening, T.T. “was trying to pray and [she] was hoping he would
stop, but [she] didn’t want him to know [she] was awake because [she] thought he would
hurt [her].” Then, Coe got up and went into her sister’s bed. T.T. tried to go back to sleep
and to “act like it never happened.”
T.T. testified that she did not plan on telling anyone about what happened with Coe
in her bedroom because after her mother died, she didn’t have to see Coe “so it wouldn’t
matter.” She explained that when she t old her grandmother, she “just blurted it out” and

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then felt bad because did not think her mo ther would want Coe in trouble. When asked
why she did not disclose earlier, T.T. said sh e did not tell because she was scared. T.T.
also explained that she did not tell her mo ther about what happened because she “knew
that [her mother] loved [Coe] and [she] didn’t want her to be sad.”
In an effort to discredit T.T., Coe presented the testimony of T.T.’s psychologists
and her psychiatrist. One psychologist testif ied that she met with T.T. and her mother in
2016 when T.T. was transitioning back into her mother’s home. At the time, T.T. was
seeing things, such as “girls dancing,” and “something with yellow eyes.” The
psychologist testified that T.T. had moderate t o severe paranoia. She also testified that
T.T. did not pose a risk of mental instability. A family therapist for T.T., her mother, and
Coe testified that he counseled the family in the spring of 2017 because T.T. was sad and
having sleep disturbances. T.T. appeared withdrawn and “very r esistant.” T.T.’s
psychiatrist testified as well. He met T.T. when she was eleven because she “gets angry
too much.” T.T. told him that when she “gets angry she says things impulsively without
thinking and then often regrets what she has said.”
The jury found Coe guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The jury
then determined that two aggravating factors were present: that Coe had a significant
relationship with T.T. and that Coe engaged in m ultiple for ms of penetration. Prior to
sentencing, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI
stated that due to Coe’s criminal -history score, the presumptive term of commitment was
168 months. But because the jury found the prese nce of two aggravating factors —
significant relationship and multiple forms of penetration —the PSI recommended an

6
executed sentence of 336 months in prison. A forensic psychologist with the Hennepin
County District Court also prepared a presentence psychosexual evaluation report. In that
report, Coe denied “all allegations against him” and indicated that “the victim made up the
allegation to get revenge for her mother’s death.” The psychologist concluded that Coe
has a “below average risk to reoffe nd sexually.” The psychologist noted that Coe could
receive treatment in prison, or “based on his level of risk and cooperation with this
evaluation he could participate [in treatment] on an outpatient basis.”
Coe moved the district court for a downward d ispositional departure. He argued
that he was particularly amenable to probation because he has community and family
support, and because he shows remorse for how his addiction issues affected T.T.’s life
(despite claiming his innocence) . Coe also attach ed over twenty letters from family and
friends attesting to his character. Coe presented testimony from his mother and son, and
also spoke on his own behalf. T he state opposed a dispositional departure and sought a
double upward departure. The state arg ued that a dispositional departure in a criminal-
sexual-conduct case against a child is “extraordinary ” and emphasized Coe’s significant
criminal history.
The district court denied both the state’s upward departure motion and Coe’s
downward departure motion. In denying the departure requests, the district court noted the
presence of two aggravating factors. The district court also observed that no one else had
alleged Coe of criminal sexual conduct before, stating “I don’t know you’re a risk to the
community in the way that the jury found that you were in this particular incident because
there isn’t any alle gation that it happened before.” The district court balanced this

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observation against the conduct in this case: “ I cannot overlook what I’ve heard and what
I saw about how this affected [T.T.]. I don’t need to go on about what a horrible thing it is
to have a child raped and to have so much of her life lost as a result of it .” The district
court, “after balancing all the things out,” sentenced Coe within the guidelines, “but the top
end of the box to reflect the aggravating factors that were there.” Coe received a 201 -
month prison sentence. Coe appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Coe argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict because
T.T.’s testimony is uncorroborated. In a supplemental pro se brief, Coe reiterates that the
evidence is insufficient and that T.T.’s testimony is unreliable.2 Because T.T.’s testimony
does not need to be corroborated and the jury found her credible, we conclude that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain Coe’s conviction.
We review a claim of insufficient evidence to determine whether, given the evidence
presented and the legitimate inferences drawn from the record, a jury could determine guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt . State v. Flowers , 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2010). We
view the evidence in the ligh t most favorable to the verdict, and we assume that the jury
believed the evidence supporting the verdict and disbelieved contrary evidence.3 Id.; State

2 The supplemental pro se brief contains no argument or citation to legal authority to
support the assertions made. To the extent that Coe intended to raise an issue not briefed
by his counsel, we deem such issues forfeited. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719
(Minn. 2002).
3 The parties d o not dispute t hat Coe’s conviction rests on direct evidence —T.T.’s
testimony. See State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (noting that d irect

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v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if
the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requireme nt of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, reasonably could conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
To prove the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense, the state had to prove the
following elements: (1) Coe sexually penetrated T.T.; (2) T.T. was under the age of 13 at
the time of the offense; and (3) Coe was 36 months older than T.T. at the time of the
offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a). Coe only disputes the first element. As noted
above, the state’s evidence consisted of T.T.’s testimony, T.T.’s forensic interviews, and
testimony from other individuals to whom T.T. had reported Coe’s abuse.
Coe argues that T.T.’s testimony is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Coe
acknowledges that the law does not require corroboration of a victim’s testimony in
criminal-sexual-conduct cases. See Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2018) (the testimony
of a victim in criminal-sexual-conduct cases “need not be corroborated”); see also State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (discussing that a guilty verdict may be
based on the testimony of a single witness). Nevertheless, Coe claims that the evidence is
insufficient based on State v. Ani , 257 N.W.2d 699, 70 0 (Minn. 1977), in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court contemplated the possibility that an absence of corroboration
might render a victim’s testimony insufficient to establish guilt. We are not persuaded that
Ani requires reversal, as Coe argues, for two reasons.

evidence is “based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact
without inference or presumption” (quotation omitted)).

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First, the language relied on by Coe from Ani is dictum, because the supreme court
upheld Ani’s conviction based only on the victim’s uncorroborated testimony:
Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient because
there was no corroboration of the victims’ testimony of sexual
abuse and no medical testimony establishing penetration. This
claim is without foundation. . . .

Appellant relies solely on dictum in State v. Ani , 257
N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1977), to support his contention . . . .
Appellant’s use of this language distorts the court’s holding in
Ani. In that case, the supreme court upheld the defendant’s
conviction for rape, finding the victim’s testimony positive,
uncontradicted and strongly corroborated by other evidence.
Ani, 257 N.W.2d at 700.

State v. Folley, 378 N.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Minn. App. 1985); see also Foreman, 680 N.W.2d
at 539 (“ Ani clearly states that corroboration is not mandated by statute or the
constitution.”).
Second, we defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations, and it is not our role
on appeal to reweigh the evidence or to reassess witness credibility. See State v. Franks,
765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009) (“Our precedent does not permit us to re -weigh the
evidence.”); State v. Pippitt , 645 N.W.2d 87, 9 4 (Minn. 2002) (“weighing the credibility
of witnesses is a function exclusively for the jury”); State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108
(Minn. 1989) (holding that appellate courts defer to the jury’ s credibility determinations
even in the face of contrary evi dence). Here, t he jury credited T.T.’s testimony,
disbelieving the evidence to the contrary. T.T. testified that Coe came into her bed, pulled
her clothes off, and put his penis in her vagina and inside and outside her anus. T.T.
testified that Coe moved back and forth and that she remembered feeling “numb and

10
pressure.” In addition, the forensic interviewer from CornerHouse described how T.T. was
“able to talk about how people moved into the room and where the body positi ons were
before, during, and after the assault. She talked about how her own body got turned, where
he touched on her own body, and she was able to demonstrate that in three dimensions.”
The interview also included T.T.’s description of Coe ejaculating. Deferring to the jury’s
assessment of witness credibility and assuming that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary,” Porte, 832 N.W.2d at 309 (quotation
omitted), we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Coe’s conviction of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Denial of Downward Dispositional Sentencing Departure
Coe makes two arguments regarding his sentence. First, Coe argues that the district
court relied on an im permissible reason when it denied his motion for a dispositional
departure because it considered offense-related factors rather than offender-related factors.
We conclude that the district court properly relied on offense-related factors in denying the
dispositional departure. Second, Coe argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his departure motion because he is particularly amenable to probation .
Because the district court carefully evaluated the record before denying Coe’s departure
motion, it did not abuse its discretion.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2016). A sentence prescribed under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines is presumed to be appropriate. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308
(Minn. 2014). A district court “may” depart from the presumptively appropriate guidelines

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sentence only if “identifiabl e, substantial, and compelling circumstances” warrant doing
so. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Substantial
and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular
case different f rom a typical case.” State v. Peake , 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).
The sentencing guidelines provide “a nonexclusive list of factors that may be used as
reasons for departure.” State v. Hicks , 864 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted); see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3 (201 6). To maintain uniformity and
proportionality in sentencing, departures from the guidelines sentence are discouraged.
State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017).
The standard of review applied depends on the nature of the challenge to the district
court’s departure decision. We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law,
such as the validity of the stated reason for departure. State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353,
357 (Minn. 2008); see also Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App. 2010)
(observing that a de novo standard of review applies “when reviewing whether a particular
reason for an upward departure is permissible”), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). We
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the district court’s decision whether to
depart. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. Where a district court makes factual findings to
which it then applies the provisions of the sentencing guidelines, we review those facts for
clear error. See State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating the general
rule that district court findings of fact are subject to review for clear error), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 20, 1996). In applying these standards of review, we have observed that only

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“a rare case . . . would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart” on appeal. State v. Kindem,
313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Coe first argues that the district court denied his dispositional departure motion for
a legally impermissible reason : that it considered offense-related factors to deny the
motion. Contrary to Coe ’s argument, appellate courts have repeatedly held that district
courts may consider both offense -related and offender -related factors when decidin g
whether to grant a request for a dispositional departure. See State v. Stempfley, 900 N.W.2d
412, 418 (Minn. 2017) (holding that a district court may issue a dispositional departure
when it finds that the offense is significantly less serious than the typical case); State v.
Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (“For a downward dispositional
departure, a district court may consider both offender - and offense-related factors.”); see
also State v. Allen , 706 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 2005) (“Upward di spositional departures
under the guidelines may be based on either offender - or offense -related aggravating
factors.”). We conclude that the district court properly relied on both offense -related and
offender-related factors when it considered Coe’s departure motion.
Next, Coe argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying the departure
request because he is particularly amenable to probation. When the district court imposes
a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range, as is the case here, we generally will
not interfere “as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion because the district court gave careful
consideration to Coe’s request before determining that the identified reasons for departure
were not substantial or compelling. The district court denied the departure request because
Coe’s conduct was “so severe.” The district court noted that , although it had few safety
concerns regarding a probationary sentence because Coe did not have a history of criminal-
sexual-conduct charges, the district court could not overlook the impact that Coe’s offense
had on T.T. And that it is “a horrible thing . . . to have a child raped and to have so much
of her life lost as a result of it.” The district court also reiterated that the jury found Coe
guilty and found that the state established “two aggravating factors” that could support an
upward departure. Ultimately, “after balancing all the things out,” the district court
concluded that it would not grant a departure either for the state or for Coe.
While there were reasons to support a downward departure, there were also reasons
to support an upward departure and reasons to impose a presumptive guidelines sentence.
The district court carefully considered all testimony and decided that none of the identified
reasons were substantial or compelling enough to justify any departure. We conclude that
the district court acted well within its discretion when it denied Coe’s departure request.
Affirmed.