State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-2090

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Elliott Skinaway, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed October 26, 2020
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-19-173

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree dr iving-while-impaired (DWI) conviction,
arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against
him because it was obtained as the result of an unlawful stop and illegal arrest. We affirm.

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FACTS
In the early morning hours of January 26, 2019, D.B. called the police to report that
she had been on a phone call with her daugh ter, C.B., and heard what she believed was a
physical altercation between C. B. and W.B. Officers were di spatched to the residence.
C.B. then called the police to report that W. B. had left. An offi cer continued to the
residence to ensure that nobody required assistance. After the officer arrived on scene, he
notified the other officers still en route to the residence that W.B. had left in a black Chevy
Avalanche with N.B., who had a felony arrest warrant.
Officers searched for the vehicle, a type uncommonly seen in the area, eventually
locating it at the entrance of a casino and hotel. N.B. exited the vehicle, and an officer
made contact with her. Another officer attempted to speak with the driver, who remained
inside the vehicle, to determine whether the driver was W.B. The officer walked up to the
vehicle and shined his flashlight in the driver-side window. The officer then walked around
the front of the vehicle, shined his flashlight into the vehicl e, and yelled “hey, hey, hey!”
at the driver. But the driver “pulled away,” “ignoring” the officer. The officer got into his
vehicle, activated his emergency lights, and followed the vehicle until it stopped.
The officer approached the vehicle and aske d the driver for his driver’s license. The
driver replied: “That’s the thing, I don’t have one.” The officer then pointed out that the
driver attempted to avoid him, and the driver replied, “Yeah.” Th e officer detected the
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle and noticed that the driver
had slurred speech. The officer directed the driver many times to exit the vehicle, but the
driver ignored his commands and wanted to reach into the center console for his cell phone.

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Knowing that individuals store weapons in center consoles, the officer instructed the driver
to get out of the vehicle. When the driver fa iled to exit the vehicle, the officer pulled the
driver out of the vehicle and arrested him.
The driver, appellant Ronald Elliott Skinaway Jr., had his driver’s license canceled
as inimical to public safety. Skinaway agreed to take a breath test at the jail, and his alcohol
concentration measured 0.21. Skinaway was charged with two counts of first-degree DWI,
driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety, and with a viol ation of a restricted
license. Skinaway moved to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing, the district court
denied Skinaway’s motion, concluding that th e officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
Skinaway’s vehicle to investigate a domestic disturbance. The district court also concluded
that the arrest was lawful b ecause Skinaway fled in a motor vehicle and did not have a
valid driver’s license.
The parties agreed to a stipulated-facts pr oceeding, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 3. The state dismissed counts three a nd four. The district court found Skinaway
guilty of two counts of first-degree DWI and sentenced him to 48 months in prison. This
appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Skinaway challenges the district court’s pret rial ruling. When reviewing a district
court’s pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews factual findings
for clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 849
(Minn. 2011). Findings of fact are clearly e rroneous if, based on all of the evidence, “we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 846-47.

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Stop
Skinaway first argues that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling as to whether an officer had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to conduct a stop. Hoekstra v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 839 N.W.2d
536, 539 (Minn. App. 2013).
Individuals have a constitutional protectio n against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Generally,
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008). But an officer may initiate a warrantless, limited investigatory stop if he has
a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476,
486 (Minn. 2016).
Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basi s for suspecting the
person stopped of criminal activity. Id. “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.”
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted). But an officer must articulate specific facts,
and rational inferences draw n from those facts, to objec tively support the officer’s
reasonable suspicion. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). Trained police
officers may “draw inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”
Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487 (quotation omitted).
This court considers the totality of the circumstances in reviewing whether the
reasonable-suspicion standard was met. State v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn.
App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). The totality of the circumstances
includes “the collective knowledge of all investigating officers,” In re Welfare of G.

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(NMN) M., 542 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. App. 1996), aff’d, 560 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 1997),
and information supplied by someone other than the arresting officer. Marben v. State,
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980). Under the collective-knowledge
doctrine, everything the police force knows is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer.
State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982).
Here, it is undisputed that the stop occu rred when the officer shined his flashlight
into the vehicle and yelled at Skinaway. The district court determined that the stop was
justified to investigate the reported domestic assault. Skinaway ar gues that the stop was
not justified because there was no evidence about the informant who called 911 to report
the domestic disturbance or about the belief that W.B. left in the vehicle.
We agree with the district court’s conc lusion that the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion justifying the stop. Of ficers testified that D.B. reported a domestic
assault between C.B. and W.B., in which W.B. was the alleged assailant. An officer who
arrived at the scene relayed to officers that W.B. had left the residence in a black Chevy
Avalanche, a vehicle uncommon in the area, with N.B., who had a felo ny arrest warrant.
When officers found the vehicle, they saw N.B. exit the vehicle, but the driver remained
inside the vehicle. It was reasonable for the officers to infer that W.B. was in the vehicle
because they were informed that W.B. and N.B. left in the vehicle together.
The totality of the circumstances, includi ng the pooled know ledge of the entire
police force, shows that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the
driver of the vehicle had been involved in a domestic assault, which justified the stop. See
State v. Rendon, No. A05-109, 2006 WL 278929, *2 (Min n. App. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding

6
that totality of the circumstances supported st op of van to investigat e report of domestic
dispute because officer stopped a van similar in color to suspect’ s vehicle coming from
general direction of the dispute), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2006).
Arrest
Skinaway next argues that, even if the stop was justifie d, the officer did not have
probable cause to arrest him.
Probable cause exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the
totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a
specific individual has committed a crime.” State v. Onyelobi , 879 N.W.2d 334, 343
(Minn. 2016) (emphasis omitted) (quotation om itted). The level of proof required to
establish probable cause is “more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary
for conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). A probable-ca use inquiry includes “reasonable
inferences that police officers draw from facts, based on their training and experience,
because police officers may interpret circumst ances differently than untrained persons.”
State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016).
Here, the district court determined that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Skinaway based on Skinaway driving without a license and fleeing in a motor vehicle.
Skinaway argues that there was no lawful basis to arrest him for driving without a license
because that offense is a misdemeanor subject to a mandatory citation. He also argues that
the officer did not have probable cause to arre st him for fleeing beca use the record does
not show that he intended to elude the offi cer. But the record shows that Skinaway
intentionally attempted to elude the officer.

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A driver flees an officer when he “incr ease[s] speed, extinguish[es] motor vehicle
headlights or taillights, refuse[s] to stop the vehicle, or use[s] other means with intent to
attempt to elude a peace officer following a signal given by any peace officer to the driver
of a motor vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 1 (2018). “Whoever by means of a motor
vehicle flees or attempts to flee a peace officer who is acting in the lawful discharge of an
official duty, and the perpetrator knows or should reasonably know the same to be a peace
officer, is guilty of a felony . . . .” Id., subd. 3 (2018).
Here, the officer shined his flashlight into the vehicle and yelled to get the driver’s
attention, but Skinaway drove away. The officer’s body-camera footage shows Skinaway’s
image facing the officer when the officer shined his flash light in the driver-side window.
Following the stop, Skinaway “acknowledged that he was avoiding [the officer].” Again,
the officer’s body-camera footag e reveals that Skin away admitted that he did not have a
driver’s license, and that was the reason he attempted to avoid the officer. Thus, the district
court did not err in determining that Skinaway fled in a motor vehicle, which provided the
officer with probable cause to arrest him. See id., subd. 1 (stating a driver flees in a motor
vehicle when he refuses to stop with intent to attempt to elude th e officer following the
officer giving a signal).
The record shows that the officer also ha d probable cause to arrest Skinaway for
suspicion of DWI. The officer testified that he detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage
coming from the vehicle and noticed that Skin away was slurring his words. The officer
also testified that Skinaway failed to follow his directive to exit the vehicle. Skinaway
claims that he was not slurring his words. But the probable-cause determination of an

8
experienced police officer is entitled to deference. See State v. Kvam , 336 N.W.2d 525,
528 (Minn. 1983). And an officer needs only one objective indication of intoxication to
constitute probable cause, wh ich can include the smell of alcohol or an uncooperative
attitude. See Holtz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983).
The arrest was therefore legal, and the dist rict court appropriately denied Skinaway’s
pretrial-suppression motion.
Affirmed.