State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0005

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Chukwuebuke Ineh,
Appellant.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-5335

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney , Linda Freyer, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Soren Petrek, Bridge Litigators, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant argues th at his convictions of soliciting a juvenile
prostitute and soliciting a juvenile through el ectronic communication to engage in sexual
conduct should be reversed because (1) the evidence was insufficient, (2) the jury erred in

2
rejecting his entrapment defense, and (3) the district court im properly instructed the jury.
Because the evidence was sufficient, the jury reasonably re jected appellant’s entrapment
defense, and the district court properly instructed the jury, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 1, 2018, polic e placed an advertisement on backpage.com, a website
known by police for its prostitu tion activity. The police placed the advertisement as part
of a sting operation targeting i ndividuals soliciting minors for sex. Because the website
would not allow minors to post advertisemen ts, the advertisement indicated that the
poster’s age was 18 years old. The advertisement also included a picture showing the back
of a female. The female’s face was not visible. The police posted the fictitious
advertisement in the “women seeking men” section of backpage.com.
Appellant Joshua Chukwuebuke Ineh contacted the fictitious poster using the phone
number provided in the advertis ement and said, “Hey beautiful, I will love to make an
appointment with you.” Ineh also asked about her “service.” An undercover police officer
texted back approximately fi ve minutes later, posing as the fictitious poster. The
undercover officer provided information about the fictitious pos ter’s rates and stated that
the poster was available that night in St. Paul. Ineh responded that he wanted to book an
appointment “for 1:30 p.m. tomorrow.” The undercover officer responded, “Sorry, I will
be in school.”
Ineh then asked the fictitious poster when she would be available “tomorrow.” The
undercover officer replied that she was unsure if she would be available that day because
her parents might be back. Af ter receiving that response, In eh requested to talk to the

3
fictitious poster on the telephone “so we ca n fix up something.” The undercover officer
answered, “My phone doesn’t have minutes.” Ineh then asked for a picture of the fictitious
poster. The undercover officer responded by sending a photograph of a woman’s chest
with cleavage showing. The officer told Ineh th at she did not send face pictures and, in
response to a question from Ineh, cl arified that Ineh would have to travel to the fictitious
poster’s location. Ineh continued to ask the fictitious poster about when her parents would
be back the next day and what time would work best to meet. The officer did not respond
to those questions.
The next morning, Ineh resumed contact and asked, “Will you be available today?”
A different undercover officer responded as the fictitious poster, saying, “I’m in Plymouth
today.” Ineh asked when they could meet, and the officer replied that she was ready “now”
if he was. Ineh then asked the fictitious po ster if she did “GFE” and “BBBJ” and if they
could meet at 1:30 p.m. In response to Ineh’s question about “GFE” and “BBBJ,” the
undercover officer responded that she can do both. The undercover officer also confirmed
the 1:30 p.m. meeting time. At trial, the officer testified that “GFE” means “girlfriend
experience,” which is sexual conduct that si mulates a romantic relationship between the
parties. “BBBJ” means oral sex without a condom.
Six minutes after the undercover officer confirmed the meeting time, Ineh texted
back: “Just making sure. Black guys welcom ed?” The officer responded, “Of course, as
long as you’re cool with me being younger than my ad.” Ineh then aske d the fictitious
poster how old she was. The officer replied, “I’m 15, but it’s cool.” Upon learning the
fictitious poster’s age, Ineh aske d if he would get in trouble. Just fourteen seconds after

4
asking if he would get in trouble, and before receiving a response to his question, Ineh
followed up by asking the fi ctitious poster where he was meeting her. The undercover
officer responded to both of Ineh’s questions in one text message, telling him “no trouble
no” and that they would meet at a hotel. Ineh responded by saying, “OK then send me your
location.”
After getting a general locati on from the officer, Ineh asked if the fictitious poster’s
hour included “multiple rounds.” An officer testified at trial that “multiple rounds” means
that the customer expects multiple sexual act s from the prostitute. The officer responded
that Ineh’s hour was his time, to which Ineh responded, “Awesome.” When Ineh arrived
at the hotel, the officer told him to go to a specific room. Ineh then spoke to a detective by
phone, who confirmed the room number. Poli ce arrested Ineh when he entered the hotel
room. The state initially charged Ineh with solicitation of a juvenile prostitute in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3) (2018), a felony offense. The state later added a
second felony charge—solicitation of a juve nile through electronic communication to
engage in sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1) (2018).
At trial, the state presented the testim ony of the two undercove r officers and the
detective who spoke with Ineh. The state also introduced a record of Ineh’s text-message
conversation with the fictitious poster and the backpage.com advertisement. Ineh chose to
testify. He testified that he never believed that the poster was 15 years old. Ineh testified
that he wanted to hire an 18-year-old prostitute. He also testified that, based on the pictures
he saw and the voice that he heard on the telephone when he arrived at the hotel, he believed

5
that the poster was an adult and was lying to hi m about being 15. He testified that if he
had seen a 15-year-old in the hotel room, he would have left immediately.
On cross-examination, Ineh admitted that he stated “[a]re you sure I won’t be in any
trouble” in direct response to the fictitious pos ter telling him that she was 15 years old.
The state then asked Ineh abou t a statement he made following his arrest. After reading
the interview transcript, Ineh admitted that, dur ing the interview, he stated that “she was
like—she was 15, I think?” Ineh also admitted on cross-examination that he agreed to pay
$150 for an hour of sex with the poster and that he was arrested with $150 cash on his
person.
On redirect examination, In eh’s counsel asked him about the post-arrest interview.
Ineh testified that he told the officer that he thought the poster was 18 years old and that he
wanted to hire an 18-year-old. The state did not introduce evidence of Ineh’s post-arrest
interview other than his testimony on cross-examination. At trial, Ineh contended that he
was entrapped by the state.
The jury rejected Ineh’s entrapment defense and found Ineh guilty on both counts.
The district court entered convictions for both counts, ordered a stay of imposition of the
sentence for count one, and di d not pronounce a sentence on count two. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
Ineh raises three arguments on appeal, each of which he contends supports reversal
of his convictions. First, he argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
support either his prostitution conviction or his electronic-solicitation conviction. Second,

6
he argues that the jury’s rejection of his entrapment defense was not reasonably supported
by the evidence. Third, he argues that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury.
We address each argument in turn.
I. The evidence was sufficien t to prove that Ineh reasonably believed that the
person he solicited and agree d to hire was 15 years old.
Ineh argues that the evid ence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions of solicitation of a juvenile pros titute and solicitation of a juvenile through
electronic communication because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he reasonably believed the person he solicited and agreed to hire was 15 years old. He
contends that the evidence inst ead shows that he solicited and agreed to hire an 18-year-
old. We are not persuaded.
When reviewing the sufficien cy of the evidence for a conviction, we undertake a
“painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, wa s sufficient” to supp ort the conviction.
State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) ( quotation omitted). In reviewing the
evidence, we “assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with th[e]
verdict.” State v. Palmer , 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We
will not overturn a verdict if the factfinder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof bey ond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at
100.

7
The jury found Ineh guilty of solicitation of a juvenile prostitute under Minn.
Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3), and solic itation of a juvenile through electronic
communication under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). A person is guilty of prostitution
of a minor if he: (1) intentionally; (2) hires or offers or agrees to hire; (3) an individual who
the actor reasonably believes to be under the age of 16 but at least 13 years; (4) to engage
in sexual penetration or contact. Minn. Stat . § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3). And a person is
guilty of electronic solicitation of a child if he: (1) is at least 18 years old; (2) uses
electronic communication; (3) to solicit some one he reasonably believes is a child to
engage in sexual conduct; (4) with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person.
Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). For bo th crimes, Ineh cha llenges only the third
element—his reasonable belief as to the age of the person whom he solicited and agreed to
hire.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, as we must, we
conclude that the evidence wa s sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ineh
reasonably believed that the person he solicited and agreed to hire was 15 years old. The
evidence shows that Ineh learned directly from the fictitious poster that she was 15 years
old. While exchanging messages with the poster, Ineh asked, “How old are you?” The
poster responded, “I’m 15.” After learning th at she was 15 years old, Ineh asked if he
could get in “trouble.” Then, just fourteen seconds later and befo re the poster responded
to his question, he proceeded to ask where he could meet her and asked her to send her
location. After that, despite knowing that she was 15 years old, he requested multiple
rounds of sex and continued to communicate with her about the meeting location. He then

8
arrived at the hotel room specifi ed by the poster with the exact amount of cash needed to
pay for one hour of her services. And, during his post arrest interview, Ineh acknowledged
that the person he solicited and agreed to hire was 15 years old. This evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, was su fficient to permit the ju ry to find that Ineh
reasonably believed that the person he solicited and agreed to hire was 15 years old.
Ineh contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he reasonably believed
that the fictitious poster was 15 years old becaus e when he first agreed to meet with her,
she had not yet told him that she was 15 years old. Ineh emphasizes that he did not ask her
how old she was until after they had agreed to meet at 1:30 p.m. on the day in question.
He argues that his solicitation and offer to hire was “complete” when they agreed to meet,
and, at that point he believed that the poster was 18 years old. Ineh maintains that the
subsequent text messages between Ineh and the poster—in which he learned that she was
15 years old and thereafter requested multiple rounds of sex—are not properly considered
in our determination of whether the evidence was sufficient. We are not persuaded.
As we stated in a factually similar case: “That [the defendant] did not initially intend
to solicit a 13-16 year old does not change the fact that he ultimately solicited a minor to
engage in prostitution. The crime is what [the defendant] did, not what he initially intended
to do.” State v. Dentz, 919 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Minn. App. 2018). By the same token, Ineh’s
initial agreement to m eet with the poster does not change the fact that he ultimately
solicited and agreed to hire a person that he reasonably believed to be 15 years old to
engage in prostitution. The record reflects that after initially ag reeing to meet, Ineh
proceeded to ask the poster how old she was, continued to negotiate with her for multiple

9
rounds of sex despite learning that she wa s a minor, and ultimately arrived at the
agreed-upon location with money in hand.
The two cases that Ineh relies upon to s upport his argument do not persuade us
otherwise. Both cases involv e adult prostitution, in which th e age of the prostitute is not
an element of the offense. See State v. Crist , 281 N.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Minn. 1979)
(involving prostitution under Mi nn. Stat. § 609.32, subd. 4( 1) (1978), which makes it a
crime for an adult to engage in prostitution); State v. Kelly, 379 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn.
App. 1986) (involving prostitution under Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 3(2) (1984), which
makes it a crime for an adult to offer to engage in pros titution with another adult).
Accordingly, Ineh’s argument is unavailing.
In sum, we conclude that there is suffici ent evidence to support Ineh’s convictions
because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the convictions, the jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ineh reasonably believed the person he solicited
and agreed to hire was 15 years old.
II. The evidence was sufficien t to support the jury’s de cision to reject Ineh’s
entrapment defense.
Ineh next argues that his convictions must be reversed because the jury improperly
rejected his entrapment defense. We disagree.
A defendant raising an entrapment defense must “establish by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that the state induced the defendant to commit the offense by improper
pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” State v. Bauer , 776 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Minn.
App. 2009). The defendant mu st show that the state went beyond merely soliciting the

10
commission of the offense. State v. Olkon , 299 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 1980). If the
defendant establishes that he was induced to commit the crime, the “burden shifts to the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
offense.” Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 470.
Ineh contends that he showed that the state entrapped him when it induced him to
commit both offenses, and that the state di d not meet its burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was predisposed to commit the offenses. The state argues that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Ineh was not entrapped because
the evidence shows that law enforcement did not induce Ineh to commit the offenses, but
rather gave him the opportunity.
We apply the sufficiency of the evidence standard of review to determine if Ineh’s
argument regarding the entrapment defense requires reversal. Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at
469-70. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the convictions and assume
that the jury believed the evidence supporting the guilty verdict and disbelieved any
contrary evidence. Id. at 470; see also State v. Chambers , 589 N.W.2d 466, 477
(Minn. 1999). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if a reasonable jury could find that the
defendant failed to establish either element of the entrapment defense from the record. See
Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 471 (declining to reach the second prong because a reasonable jury
could have found that the defendant did not show inducement).
Ineh argues that the stat e induced him to solicit a prostitute by placing an
advertisement on backpage.com. But, to establish inducement, the defendant must
establish that the state did something more than merely solicit the commission of the crime.

11
Olkon, 299 N.W.2d at 107. The placing of an advertisement shows only that the state
solicited the commission of the crime. It doe s not provide evidence of something in the
nature of pressure, badgering, or persuasion—the type of evidence needed to demonstrate
inducement. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d at 107-08 (stating that “something in the nature of
persuasion, badgering, or pressure by the state must occur before the inducement element
is satisfied” and concluding that the defendant did not demonstrate inducement because he
“readily agreed” to assist an undercover officer with filing a false claim).
Ineh also argues that he had to be “cajol ed and given assurances” to proceed with
meeting the fictitious poster, but Ineh does no t specify when or ho w the alleged cajoling
occurred. Moreover, the record does not support this contention. Rather, the record shows
that Ineh initiated contact with the poster a nd was seeking an appointment from the very
beginning. In his initial text message, he stated: “H ey beautiful. I will love to make an
appointment with you. Pls let me know more about your service and how I can go about
booking an appointment.” The two then exchanged text me ssages about when the poster
would be available. Ineh sent the final text message of the day, asking, “What time works
for you best tomorrow?” The next morning, it was Ineh who reinitiated the conversation,
not the poster. He asked the poster when she would be available. Following that question,
there were additional text messages between the two about a variety of topics including the
poster’s age, the meeting time, whether “Black guys [are] welcome[],” the services to be
provided, and the exact meeting location. None of the text messages indicate any type of
cajoling.

12
Viewing the evidence in th e light most favorable to the convictions, a reasonable
jury could easily have concluded that Ineh was not entrapped. There is no evidence in the
record to support Ineh’s contention that the state induced Ineh to solicit and hire the poster.
And, because we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Ineh failed to establish by
a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was induced to solicit the fictitious poster, we
need not address whether he was pr edisposed to comm it the offense. See Bauer ,
776 N.W.2d at 471 (declining to reach seco nd prong of the defendant’s entrapment
defense). The evidence is suffi cient to support the jury’s re jection of Ineh’s entrapment
defense.
III. The district court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
Ineh argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the
standard of proof by which it was to evaluate his entrapment defense and also by failing to
define one of the terms used in the jury instructions. We disagree.
Because Ineh did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error.
State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 158 (Minn. 2020). Th is standard requires Ineh to “show
that: (1) there was an error; (2 ) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected substantial
rights.” State v. Campbell, 861 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Minn. 2015 ). An error is plain when it
“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “If plain error is established, the defendant bears a
heavy burden of showing that substan tial rights have been affected.” State v. Johnson ,
915 N.W.2d 740, 746 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). If Ineh satisfies all three prongs,

13
this court will then assess “whe ther it should address the erro r to ensure fairness and the
integrity of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998).
We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether they “fairly and
adequately explain the law.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). But district courts have “broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing
the language of jury instructions.” Id. (quoting State v. Smith , 674 N.W.2d 398, 400
(Minn. 2004)). A district court abuses that discretion if its instructions “confuse, mislead,
or materially misstate the law.” State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted).
The district court gave the following inst ructions to the jury with regard to
entrapment:
The defendant asserts that he was entrapped. A person is
entrapped when he commits an act or engages in conduct
otherwise criminal if the criminal design does not originate
with the person but is conceive d in the mind of a government
agent and the person is by co ercion, persuasion, deceitful
representation, or inducement lured into committing an act the
person otherwise would not have committed and had no
intention of committing. If a person is willing and ready to
commit the crime, the fact that the government agents has
provided what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not a
defense. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had the ready willingness to commit the act. The
defendant is not guilty of a cr ime if he was entrapped into
committing a crime.

14
This language mirrors the language applicable at the time of the offense in the Jury
Instruction Guides for the defense of entrapment. 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 7.02
(2018).
Ineh first argues that these jury instructions confused or misled the jury because they
failed to specify that the defendant must prove inducement by a preponderance of the
evidence. But Ineh has not provided any authority suppor ting his contention that the
district court was required to expressly instruct the jury in this mann er. Nor does he cite
to any authority suggesting that the language from the Jury Instruc tions Guides is in
anyway misleading or confusing. Instead, he cites to cases involving other types of jury
instructions in unrelated matters that have been found to be erroneous: jury instructions on
the “reasonable doubt” standard and jury instructions on the elements of an offense. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-82, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-83 (1993) (holding
that use of a definition of “reasonable doubt” previously found to be unconstitutional was
an error); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-02, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991) (holding that
instructions that shift the bu rden of proving an essential element of the offense to the
defendant were erroneous). Because Ineh c ites no case law establishing that jury
instructions on the entrapment defense must in clude an explanation that the defendant is
required to prove inducement by a prepondera nce of the evidence, Ineh has failed to
demonstrate that the district court plainly erre d in this regard. And, even assuming plain
error, Ineh has not shown that his substan tial rights were affected by this alleged
jury-instruction error because, as discussed above, there is no evidence to support his claim
that he was induced by the state to commit prostitution or electronic solicitation of a minor.

15
Ineh next argues that the district c ourt committed plain error because it did not
define the term “criminal design” in the jury instructions for the entrapment defense. The
state argues that Ineh cannot sh ow plain error because he cite s no case law that clearly
required the court to define the term. We agree with the state that Ineh has not shown plain
error. Like Ineh’s first jury-instruction argu ment, this argument also fails because he has
not provided any controlling legal authority that supp orts his claim. Further, he has not
demonstrated that the jury instructions were confusing or misleading due to the failure to
include a definition of “criminal design.” Accordingly, we discern no plain error resulting
from the absence of the definition. And, because there is no plain error in this regard, we
need not address whether Ineh’s substantial rights were affected by the alleged error. See
State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Minn. 2017) (declining to consider whether the
defendant’s substantial rights were affected because the defendant failed to show plain
error).
In sum, because the district court instru cted the jury on the entrapment defense
according to the Jury Instruction Guides and there is no authority to suggest that doing so
was clearly erroneous, we conclude that Ineh has not demonstrated plain error with regard
to the jury instructions. Th erefore, Ineh has not demonstr ated that reversal of his
convictions is required.
Affirmed.