Charity Slaughter, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0014

Charity Slaughter,
Appellant,

vs.

Independent School District No. 833,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-3507

Leslie L. Lienemann, Celeste E. Culberth, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael J. Waldspurger, Kristin C. Nierengarten, Rupp, Anderson, Squires &
Waldspurger, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of her retaliatory-
discharge claims against respondent school district under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act
(MWA) and Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA). We affirm.
FACTS
In the summer of 2014, respondent Independent School District No. 833 (the
district) hired appellant Charity Slaughter as a custodian at Pine Hill Elementary School.
During the summer, Slau ghter worked daytime hours, but during the school year she
worked a night shift. Shortly after she began working for the district in the summer of
2014, Slaughter believed that a school foreman was intoxicated at work after she observed
him drinking in a school parking lot and exhibiting indicia of intoxication. She reported
her concerns about the foreman to her supervisor. The district confirmed Slaughter’s report
that the foreman was intoxicated at work, sent him home, and eventually discharged him.
Later, on September 16, 2014, Slaughter emailed all of the staff at Pine Hill and told
them that she was “struggling to complete all of [her] tasks” by the end of her shift and to
vacuum classroom rugs daily. Slaughter stated that she would instead vacu um classroom
rugs twice a week. On September 17, Slaughter’s supervisor responded to Slaughter’s
email stating, “ I need to see you in my office Thursday 8:00 a.m. , we need to have a
discussion.”
On September 18, Slaughter’s supervisor discharged her. On September 25, another
district employee overruled the discharge decision and placed Slaughter on paid

3
administrative leave effective September 18. On October 6, the district removed Slaughter
from paid administrative leave and reinstated her as a custodian at another elementary
school. In August 2015, the district transferred Slaughter back to Pine Hill.
In 2017, Slaughter left notes for teachers in classrooms regarding building issues,
including notes encouraging teachers to flush classroom toilets before they left for the day.
In September 2017, the school’s principal told Slaughter not to leave such notes and to
contact only the principal or the district’s facilities supervisor if she had any building - or
teacher-related issues. That same month, the principal told Slaughter several times not to
lock the school’s interior fire doors before 5:00 p.m. Nonetheless, Slaughter continued to
lock those doors around 4:00 p.m. On September 29, 2017, the district placed Slaughter
on administrative leave based on allegations that , contrary to the directives from the
principal, she left notes for teachers in classrooms and locked the school’s fire doors before
5:00 p.m.
On October 6, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry received a MOSHA
complaint from Slaughter regarding lead levels in the water at Pine Hill, air-quality issues
at the school, and the safety and security of the school building. On October 9, the
department notified the district that it had received a complaint regarding “[p]oor indoor
air quality” at Pine Hill. The department’s notice to the distric t did not identify the
complainant.
On October 25, the district interviewed Slaughter as part of its investigation of the
allegations underlying her administrative leave. During the interview, Slaughter admitted
that although the principal had told her not to lock the school’s fire doors before 5:00 p.m.,

4
she had continued to do so. Slaughter also admitted that she had hidden a vacuum that the
principal had reserved for staff use because she disagreed with staff use of the vacuum. In
explaining why she disobeyed the principal’s directives, Slaughter stated, “[Y]our title
means nothing to me. I don’t care who you are. A directive, if given to me, I will follow,
unless it goes against me personally, goes against my job or goes against my safety.”
Slaughter acknowledged that the district’s human-resources director (HR director) asked
her if she had her keys with her when he place d her on administrative leave. Slaughter
admitted that although she had her keys, she chose to lie and say they were at home.
Slaughter explained that she lied to see if the HR director would “call [her] out on it” and
to “prove a point.”
On October 30, the district discharged Slaughter. In a letter dated October 30, 2017,
the district notified Slaughter of her discharge and provided the following grounds:
(1) directly contacting teachers regarding building issues after being directed not to do so,
(2) taking a vacuum from the staff lounge and hiding it in a locked storage room because
of a disagreement regarding classroom rugs, (3) failing to vacuum on six days in September
2017 and telling a staff member that she was not vacuuming to “prove a point,” (4) locking
fire doors before 5:00 p.m. after the principal directed her several times not to do so, (5)
violating the applicable dress -code policy, (6) lying to the HR director about not having
her keys when he placed her on paid administrative leave, an d (7) being disrespectful to
the principal.
In July 2018, Slaughter sued the district, asserting claims of retaliatory discharge in
violation of the MWA and MOSHA. Slaughter alleged that throughout her employment

5
with the district she reported “concerns about illegal levels of lead in the school’s drinking
water” and “unsafe airborne mold and pollutants in the school” and that she repeatedly
raised safety concerns with the principal regarding the importance of locking the school’s
fire doors at 4:00 p.m. Slaughter alleged that the district terminated her employment
because she made those reports and because she refused to perform tasks in an unsafe
environment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the district and dismissed
Slaughter’s claims, reasoning that Slaughter had failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under the MWA or MOSHA. Slaughter appeals.
D E C I S I O N
“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo , 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) . A genuine
issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole,
could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558,
564 (Minn. 2008). No genuine issue of material fact exists “when the nonmoving party
presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and
which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v.
Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment as

6
a matter of law when the record reflects a com plete lack of proof on an essential element
of the plaintiff’s claim.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).
“Summary judgment is a blunt instrument that is inappropriate when reasonable
persons might draw different conclusio ns from the evidence presented. ” Kenneh v.
Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 232 (Minn. 2020) (quotations omitted). But “the
court is not required to ignore its conclusion that a particular piece of evidence may have
no probative value, such that reasonable persons could not draw different conclusions from
the evidence presented.” DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 70.
An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs. , 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 ( Minn. 2014). “We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the
district court correctly applied the law.” Id.
I.
Slaughter contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for
the district on her retaliation claim under the MWA.1
The MWA provides,
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten,
otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an emp loyee

1 Slaughter assigns error to several aspects of the district court’s reasoning, including that
the court “erroneously required proof of an actual violation of law under the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act” and “ improperly weighed evidence of causation.” Because our
standard of review is de novo, we do not address those assertions of error. See Wheeler v.
State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018) (“Under the de novo standard, we do not defer
to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.”).

7
regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
location, or privileges of employment because:
(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of
an employee, in good faith, reports a violation, suspected
violation, or planned violation of any federal or state law or
common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or
to any governmental body or law enforcement official[.]

Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (2018).
Minnesota courts use the burden -shifting test established by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817
(1973), to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate on a claim of retaliation
under the MWA. Moore v. City of New Brighton, 932 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. App. 2019),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019).
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, an employee must present a prima facie case of
(1) statutorily protected conduct by the employee, (2) an adverse employment action by
the employer, and (3) a caus al connection between the two. Id. “If the employee fails to
meet any of these elements, summary judgment in the employer’s favor is appropriate.”
Id. “But if the employee presents evidence establishing a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer, whose summary -judgment motion should fail unless it provides a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its challenged adverse employment action.” Id. at
323-24. If the employer meets this burden, “the burden shifts back to the employee, who
can then avoid summary judgment only by producing evidence that would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find that the employer’s stated reason for the allegedly adverse
action was more likely than not merely a pretext for retaliation.” Id. at 324.

8
A whistleblower claim need not identify the specific law or rule
that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there
is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is
implicated by the employee’s complaint, the employee
reported the violation or suspected violation in good faith, and
the employee alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a
violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.

Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 354-55 (Minn. 2002).
However, a plaintiff must identify the relevant legal violation to avoid summary
judgment and show facts that, if true, would prove a violation. See Gee v. Minn. State
Colls. & Univs. , 700 N.W.2d 548, 555 -56 (Minn. App. 2005) (affirming summary -
judgment dismissal of whistleblower claim in part because plaintiff failed to satisfy her
“burden to demonstrate that the suspected misconduct implicated a violation of law”). “[A]
mere report of behavior that is problematic or even reprehensible, but not a violation of the
law, is not pro tected conduct under the Whistleblower Act.” Kratzer v. Welsh Cos. , 771
N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2009).
Statutorily Protected Conduct
Slaughter argues that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct under the MWA
in four ways: (1) by objecting to and refusing to follow the principal’s directive not to lock
the school’s interior fire doors before 5:00 p.m., (2) by informing supervisors that a
foreman was intoxicated at Pine Hill in 2014 , ( 3) by reporting air- and water -quality
concerns at the school in 2016 and 2017, and (4) by reporting that exterior doors at the
school were propped open during school hours.
We first consider Slaughter’s refusal to obey the principal’s directive not to lock the
school’s fire doors before 5:0 0 p.m. Slaughter argues that her “reports to [the principal]

9
and her superiors in the District that she believed leaving the fire doors open presented a
foreseeable hazard to her safety and to the safety of others in the building, were reports of
a suspected violation of the common law.” She argues that “her refusal to obey an order
to leave the fire doors open” was similarly protected conduct.
Slaughter testified in her deposition that the school’s principal directed her not to
lock the fire doors bef ore 5:00 p.m. Slaughter testified that she disobeyed that directive
and locked the fire doors at around 4:00 p.m. because she had safety concerns about
“unknown occupants in the building with unknown intentions” and noticed that problem
“started way before 5:00 and [she] needed to do what [she] could to make sure [her] safety
was protected [as was] the safety of others.” Slaughter identified two specific incidents
that caused her to feel in danger at the school : a man approached her in the parking lot
behind the school and she encountered someone in the school’s resource room at around
10:15 p.m. Slaughter testified that the person she encountered in the school’s resource
room said he had keys to the school, that she reported the incident to the district’s facilities
supervisor, and that the facilities supervisor told her to leave the building.
Slaughter’s theory seems to be that the district breached a common-law duty to use
reasonable care for the safety of all entrants by locki ng the fire doors at 5:00 p.m. and not
at 4:00 p.m.2 We fail to discern how either of the incidents on which Slaughter relies could

2 To succeed on a common-law negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence
of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) that the breach of the duty
was a proximate cause of the injury. Doe 169 v. Brandon , 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn.
2014). “A landowner generally has a continuing duty to use reasonable care for the safety
of all entrants.” Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

10
lead a reasonable person to find for Slaughter. The record simply does not support a
conclusion that l ocking the fire doors one hour earlier would have prevented either
incident.
Once again, a MWA plaintiff must identify the relevant legal violation to avoid
summary judgment and show facts that, if true, would prove that violation. See Gee, 700
N.W.2d at 555-56. The only record evidence supporting the district’s alleged breach of a
common-law duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all entrants is Slaughter’s
personal opinion that the fire doors should have been locked at 4:00 p.m. and not at 5:00
p.m. Slaughter’s opinion regarding the impact of the one -hour delay is not sufficiently
probative to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions regarding the alleged
breach. Because no reasonable person could find that Slaughter’s repo rts to the district
regarding the fire doors implicated a violation of common law , Slaughter has failed to
establish a prima facie case showing that either her reports or her disobedience of the
principal’s directive was statutorily protected conduct under the MWA.
We next consider Slaughter’s reports regarding the intoxicated foreman, air- and
water-quality concerns, and the propped -open exterior doors . Those reports appear to
implicate potential violations of law or rule adopted pursuant to law and ther efore might
constitute statutorily protected conduct.3 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.335 (Supp. 2017)

We assume without deciding that a landowner’s failure to satisfy that duty can constitute a
violation of law supporting an MWA claim.
3 Propping open exterior doors during school hours is contrary to district policy , under
which all exterior school doors must be locked from 15 minutes after the start of the school
day to the end of the school day.

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(regulating testing of lead content in school drinking water ), .9501-.9512 (2016 )
(regulating lead content of water) , 116.01-.994 (2016) (establishing Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency), 624.701, subd. 1 (2012) (criminalizing the introduction or possession of
an alcoholic beverage on the grounds of a public elementary school). However, we need
not decide that issue because, as explained below, Slaughter has failed to establish a prima
facie case of a causal connection between those reports and her discharge. We therefore
assume without deciding that those reports constitute statutorily protected conduct.
Causal Connection
A plaintiff can demonstrate a causal connection between statutorily protected
conduct and an adverse employment action by showing that the employer ha d actual or
imputed knowledge of the protected activity and that the adverse employment action
followed closely in time. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc. , 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 -45
(Minn. 1983); see also Cokley v. City of Otsego, 623 N.W.2d 625, 633 (Minn. App. 2001)
(stating that close proximity between an employee engaging in protected conduct and a
termination decision supports an i nference of reprisal), review denied (Minn. May 15,
2001). Slaughter generally argues that “causation may be shown by the close proximity in
time between protected conduct and adverse action” and that there was “proximity in time
between the protected con duct and the termination” here. However, “the presence of
intervening events undermines any causal inference that a reasonable person might
otherwise have drawn from temporal proximity .” Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 467 F.3d
695, 698 (8th Cir. 2006).

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Slaughter argues that the district discharged her in 2014 because of her report
regarding the intoxicated foreman. Slaughter’s intervening September 16, 2014, all-staff
email undermines any causal inference that a reasonable person might have otherwise
drawn from the temporal proximity of Slaughter’s report regarding the intoxicated foreman
and her discharge. See id. And although Slaughter argues that the deposition testimony of
the principal and Slaughter’s former custodial supervisor are inconsisten t regarding the
reasons for her 2014 discharge, she does not provide a basis for her assertion that the district
discharged her because of her report other than temporal proximity.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the district discharged the foreman after confirming
Slaughter’s report regarding his conduct. Thus, the undisputed record indicates that the
district responded to Slaughter’s report in a manner consistent with the concern she had
raised. On this record, we fail to discern how a rational factfinder could conclude that
Slaughter was discharged in 2014 because she report ed the intoxicated foreman to her
supervisor. Thus, Slaughter has failed to establish a prima facie case showing a causal
connection between her report regarding the intoxicated foreman and her 2014 discharge.
Slaughter argues that the district discharged her in 2017 in part because of her
reports regarding poor air and water quality at the school, as well as her reports that exterior
doors had been propped open during school hours. Slaughter testified in her deposition
that she reported concerns about the school’s air and water quality to supervisors several
times in 2016 and 2017. When the district’s counsel asked Slaughter why she believed her
reports of air- and water-quality concerns caused her discharge, she testified that she was
vocal about those concerns and that any time she brought up a new concern “it was met

13
with resistance and unwillingness to communicate about it.” Slaughter testified that she
made reports regarding outside doors being propped open in the spring of 2016. Slaughter
also noted in a daily shift report on September 28, 2017 , that staff at the school were
propping open exterior doors.
Although Slaughter’s discharge on October 30, 2017, was close in time to some of
Slaughter’s reports regarding air and water quality and the propped-open exterior doors,
there was a relevant intervening event: the October 25, 2017 , investigative interview
regarding the allegations that resulted in Slaughter ’s administrative leave . During that
interview, Slaughter admitted that she had purposely disobey ed directives from the
school’s principal regarding when to lock the school’s fire doors. Slaughter’s disobedience
of the principal’s directive is material because district policy authorized the principal to
determine how to secure doors after school hours , and it is undisputed that she had told
Slaughter several times not to lock the fire doors before 5:00 p.m.
Slaughter’s damaging admissions in the October 25, 2017 , interview, coupled with
the district’s reference s to those admissions in its discharge letter , undermine any causal
inference that a reasonable person might have otherwise drawn from the tempo ral
proximity between Slaughter’s discharge and her reports regarding air and water quality
and propped-open exterior doors. See id. And Slaughter provides no other basis on which
to draw a causal inference between those reports and her 2017 discharge. On this record,
no reasonable person could conclude that the district discharged Slaughter in 2017 because
she reported air- and water-quality concerns and propped-open exterior doors , and not

14
because of her insubordination and deceit. Thus, Slaughter has failed to establish a prima
facie case showing a causal connection between those reports and her 2017 discharge.
In sum, because Slaughter has failed to present evidence that creates a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the necessary elements of he r retaliatory-discharge claim under
the MWA, summary judgment is appropriate.
II.
Slaughter contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for
the district on her retaliation claim under MOSHA.
Minnesota courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to evaluate a
claim of retaliatory discharge under MOSHA. See Cox v. Crown CoCo, Inc., 544 N.W.2d
490, 496 (Minn. App. 1996) (applying McDonnell Douglas standard to MOSHA retaliation
claim in analyzing whether district court e rred by denying motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict); see also Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114,
119 n.7 (Minn. 1991) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas test must be used in analyzing
a retaliatory-discharge claim). Again, under the McDonnell Douglas test, an employee
must present a prima facie case of (1) statutorily protected conduct by the employee, (2) an
adverse employment action by the employer, and (3) a causal connection between the two.
Moore, 932 N.W.2d at 323. “If the employee fails to meet any of these elements, summary
judgment in the employer’s favor is appropriate.” Id.
Slaughter’s MOSHA claim is based on two different grounds under Minn. Stat.
§ 182.654 (2018). We address each ground in turn.
Retaliation for MOSHA Complaint

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No employee shall be discharged or in any way
discriminated against because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding or inspection under or related to this chapter or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because
of the exercise by such employee on behalf of the employee or
others of any right afforded by this chapter.

Minn. Stat. § 182.654, subd. 9.
Slaughter testified in her deposition that she submitted a complaint regarding air
quality at Pine Hill to the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. A notice from the
department to the district dated October 9, 2017, states that the department received a
complaint on October 6, 2017, regarding “[p]oor in door air quality” at Pine Hill. The
parties do not dispute that Slaughter’s filing of the MOSHA complaint was statutorily
protected conduct. Instead, they dispute whether the district knew that Slaughter filed the
MOSHA complaint when it discharged her a nd whether there was a causal connection
between the MOSHA complaint and Slaughter’s discharge. See Wolf v. Berkley Inc., 938
F.2d 100, 103 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that a causal relationship between statutorily
protected activity and an employee’s discharge “does not exist if the employer is not aware
of the employee’s statutorily protected activity”).
Slaughter argues that the district knew that she filed the MOSHA complaint because
it “directly correlated with [her] emails and daily safety reports an d followed closely in
time.” Slaughter argues that the district “became aware of her formal complaint to
MOSHA on October 9, 2017, just two weeks prior to telling her she could either quit or be
fired.” Slaughter argues that the “timing of [her] terminat ion relative to her complaints
provides . . . evidence of causation.”

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Even if the HR director was aware that Slaughter had filed the MOSHA complaint,
the record lacks evidence showing that the HR director discharged her because she filed
that complaint. Although Slaughter’s filing of the complaint on October 6, 2017, was close
in time to her discharge on October 30, there was a significant intervening event between
those two dates: Slaughter’s October 25 investigative interview, in which she admitted
that she had intentionally disobeyed multiple directives from the school’s principal and had
lied to the HR director about her possession of keys to the school. That intervening event
undermines Slaughter’s proximity-based causation theory, and she provides no other basis
for drawing a causal inference between the complaint and her 2017 discharge. Thus,
Slaughter has failed to establish a prima facie case s howing that there was a causal
connection between the filing of her MOSHA complaint and her discharge.
Retaliation for Refusal to Perform an Assigned Task
An employee acting in good faith has the right to refuse
to work under conditions which the employee reasonably
believes present an imminent danger of death or serious
physical harm to the employee.

A reasonable belief of imminent danger of death or
serious physical harm includes but is not limited to a
reasonable belief of the employee that the employee has been
assigned to work in an unsafe or unhealthful manner with a
hazardous substance, harmf ul physical agent or infectious
agent.

An employer may not discriminate against an employee
for a good faith refusal to perform assigned tasks if the
employee has requested that the employer correct the
hazardous conditions but the conditions remain uncorrected.

Minn. Stat. § 182.654, subd. 11.

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To prevail on a MOSHA retaliation claim based on a refusal to perform an assigned
task, an employee must prove (1) the employee, in good faith, refused to work under
conditions which the employee reasonably believed presented an imminent danger of death
or serious physical harm to the employee; (2) the employee requested that the employer
correct the hazardous conditions but the conditions were not corrected ; and (3) the
employer discriminated against the employee for the employee’s refusal to perform the
assigned tasks. Id.
Slaughter argues that during the investigative interview on October 25, 2017, she
“specifically said she felt a threat of immediate harm and gave examples of events that had
occurred in the past in the [school] building that had placed her in jeopardy.” Slaughter
argues that she “refused to perform an assigned task —leaving the doors open until 5:00 ”
based on those safety concerns.
During the investigative interview, Slaughter stated that she locked the fire doors at
4:00 p.m. in direct contravention of the principal’s directive because she was at the school
alone and “there have been immediate threats in the building. There have be en people
found in the building.” She specifically mentioned being “approached by strange people
in the building at 10 o’clock at night sometimes” and being “approached in the parking lot
by someone.” It is unclear how locking the interior fire doors at 4:00 p.m. instead of at
5:00 p.m. would have affected either of those circumstances, and Slaughter does not point
to any other evidence supporting her claim.
Slaughter argues that the “District has no evidence to suggest that [the] events” she
identified as presenting safety concerns in the investigative interview “did not occur or that

18
[her] safety was not in jeopardy.” She argues that a “jury must determine whether [her]
concerns of imminent harm were reasonable.” She mentions certain school shootings as
support for her argument.
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test, Slaughter must present a prima
facie case of statutorily protected conduct to avoid summary judgment . See Moore, 932
N.W.2d at 323. In other words, Slaughter has the initial burden to establish a prima facie
case that she reasonably believed that locking the doors at 5:00 p.m. instead of 4:00 p.m.
presented an “imminent danger of death or serious physical harm.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 182.654, subd. 11. On this record, we fail to see how a rational factfinder could conclude
that Slaughter’s belief was reasonable. Thus, Slaughter has failed to present a prima facie
case of statutorily protected conduct.
In sum, because Slaughter has failed to present evidence that creates a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the necessary elements of her claim s under MOSHA, summary
judgment is appropriate.
Affirmed.