In the Matter of the Welfare of: K. D. M., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0015

In the Matter of the Welfare of: K. D. M., Child.

Filed August 24, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-18-2188

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-18-5459

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant K.D.M.)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
K.D.M. pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary. The juvenile court ordered him to
pay $6,000 in restitution. We conclude that the juvenile court did not lack authority to

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order restitution on the ground that K.D.M. had been discharged from probation. We also
conclude that the juvenile court did not err by finding that K.D.M. is able to pay the amount
of restitution ordered. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2018, three boys drove a sport -utility vehicle into the front of a gun
store in New Brighton and threw bricks at a window. Some of the boys entered the store.
After an alarm was activated, police officers saw the vehicle leaving the area and began a
high-speed chase. Officers eventually stopped the vehicle and arrested K.D.M., who then
was 16 years old, and two other boys.
The next day, the state filed a juvenile-delinquency petition in the Ramsey County
District Court , charging K.D.M. with four offenses, including third-degree burglary, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3 (2018). K.D.M. agreed to plead guilty to third-
degree burglary and to pay “reasonable restitution” for property damage in exchange for
the state’s agreement to dismiss the remaining th ree charges and to not pursue a pending
theft count in a different case. Two days later, the Ramsey County District Court found a
factual basis for K.D.M.’s plea, dismissed the other charges, and transferred the case to the
Hennepin County District Court for disposition.
In the Hennepin County District Court, K.D.M.’s burglary case was consolidated
with other pending cases for which he was on probation. In January 2019, a juvenile court
referee adjudicated K.D.M. delinquent of third-degree burglary, placed him on probation
for one year, stayed placement in a residential treatment facility, ordered a restitution study,

3
and scheduled a review hearing for February 2019 . Before the review hearing, the
consolidated cases were reassigned to a different referee.
At the scheduled review hearing in February 2019, the state requested that the stay
of placement be revoked. K.D.M. opposed the state’s request and requested that any
unpaid restitution be docketed and that K.D.M. be discharged from probation. Later that
day, the referee filed an order stating that K.D.M. “shall be discharged from probation”
and that the remaining amount of restitution would be docketed as a civil judgment. The
caption of the order bears the case numbers of two pending cases but not the burglary case.
In April 2019, a probation officer completed the restitution study. The probation
officer’s report states that the gun store sustained damages to inventory of $1,000 and that
the damage to the building would require repairs costing $14,000. A juvenile court judge
filed an order in the burglary case requiring K.D.M. to pay restitution in the amoun t of
$15,000.
In May 2019 , K.D.M.’s probation officer recommended that the juvenile court
docket K.D.M.’s restitution obligation, discharge him fr om probation, and terminate the
court’s jurisdiction over the case. The juvenile court judge did not adopt the
recommendation but, rather, scheduled a hearing to discuss continuing probation. Due to
an apparent clerical error, the register of actions err oneously indicated that the juvenile
court had discharged K.D.M. from probation in the burglary case. K.D.M.’s attorney later
filed a written objection to restitution on the ground that the juvenile court did not have
authority to order restitution in the burglary case because he had been discharged from
probation in that case as well as the other cases.

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In June 2019, the juvenile court judge conducted a hearing. The juvenile court
began by reviewing the procedural history of the case. The court noted K.D.M.’s position
that the order filed after the February 2019 review hearing encompassed the burglary case
and terminated the court’s jurisdiction in that case as well as the other cases. The court
noted, however, that the February 2019 order did not bear the case number assigned to the
burglary case. The court and counsel agreed that a hearing should be scheduled to address
K.D.M.’s objection to the restitution order.
The juvenile court judge conducted a restitution hearing on three days in July and
August of 2019. On the first day, K.D.M. appeared, and the state presented the testimony
of three witnesses but did not complete its case. At the conclusion of the first day, the court
continued the hearing to early August 2019 and ad dressed K.D.M. directly by saying,
“You’re ordered to return to Court on the date that we selected.”
On the second day, K.D.M. did not appear, but his attorney asked the juvenile court
to proceed in his absence. The court stated that K.D.M. had signed a hearing notice and
knew that he was required to be present in court that day and, thus, waived his right to be
present. The court noted that, in light of K.D.M.’s absence and failure to file an affidavit,
there would be no evidence concerning his ability or inability to pay restitution. The state
presented the testimony of two additional witnesses and rested its case. At the conclusion
of the second day, K.D.M.’s attorney requested that the hearing be continued so that
K.D.M. could testify. The court granted the request.
On the third day of the hearing, K.D.M. again did not appear. The prosecutor noted
that K.D.M. had not introduced any evidence concerning his ability or inability to pay

5
restitution and further noted that the record included on ly evidence of a rehabilitative
program that would allow him to earn money by performing work. The court requested
post-hearing memoranda from the parties.
In December 2019, the juvenile court filed an amended restitution order. The court
first determined that it had authority to order restitution because K.D.M. had not been
discharged from probation. T he court then considered the victims’ losses and K.D.M.’s
ability to pay restitution. The court found that the victims’ losses should be limite d to the
amounts of their insurance deductibles. The court also stated that K.D.M. did not file an
affidavit concerning his ability to pay restitution and did not testify. The court found that
K.D.M. could earn $60 per day on weekends while on probation. Accordingly, the court
ordered K.D.M. to pay $6,000 in restitution. K.D.M. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Authority to Order Restitution
K.D.M. first argues that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction or authority to
order restitution on the ground that K.D.M. was discharged from probation in the burglary
case in February 2019.
As a general rule, “ the juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent . . . and in proceedings
concerning any minor alleged to have been a delinquent . . . prior to having become 18
years of age.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2018). “Unless terminated by the court,
. . . the jurisdiction of the court shall continue until the individual becomes 19 years of age

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if the court determines it is in the best interest of the individual to do so. ” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.193, subd. 5(a) (2018).
If a juvenile court finds that a child is delinquent, “it shall enter an order making
any of [twelve specified] dispositions of the case which are deemed necessary to the
rehabilitation of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a) (2018). If a child’s offense
“resulted in damage to the person or property of another, the court may order the child to
make reasonable restitution for such damage .” Id., subd. 1(a)(5). A juvenile court may
order restitution after a dispositional hearing if the juvenile is on probation. See In re
Welfare of H.A.D. , 764 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Minn. 2009) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(b) (2008)). This court applies a de novo standard of review to a juvenile court’s
ruling concerning its authority to order restitution . In re Welfare of I.N.A. , 902 N.W.2d
635, 640 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017).
In this case, the juvenile court considered K.D.M.’s objection to restitution on the
ground that he had been discharged from probation in February 2019. The juvenile court
did so both at the June 2019 hearing and in the December 2019 amended restitution order.
During the June 2019 hearing, the juvenile court noted that the order following the
February 2019 hearing was not filed in the burglary case but, rather, was filed only in two
other cases, which had different case numbers. In the amended restitution order, the
juvenile court acknowledged that, if K.D.M. was discharged from probation in Februa ry
2019, the juvenile court would not have authority to order restitution. See H.A.D. ,
764 N.W.2d at 67. But the juvenile court reasoned that K.D.M. had not been discharged
from probation in February 2019 because the order filed following the review hearing was

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filed only in two other cases but not in the burglary case. The juvenile court declined to
speculate as to whether the referee who presided over that hearing and filed the subsequent
order intended to discharge K.D.M. from probation in all pending cases.
On appeal, K.D.M. renews the argument he made to the juvenile court . He points
out that his probation officer testified at the July 2019 hearing that she understood that the
referee presiding over the case in February 2019 intended to discharge K.D.M. from
probation in all pending cases. He also describes various other ways in which the juvenile-
court record is ambiguous as to whether the burglary case was at issue during the February
2019 hearing. But K.D.M. does not cite any legal authority that would allow this court to
conclude that the juvenile court erred by construing the record as it did and by relying on
the case numbers on the caption of the February 2019 order.
As a general rule, “We defer to a district court’s interpretation of its o wn order.”
LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 162 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. May
16, 2000). This is true even if one judge interprets an order filed by a different judge or
judicial officer. Johnson v. Johnson , 627 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn. App. 2001), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001). Although the record is somewhat unclear, there are multiple
ways in which the record supports the juvenile court’s ruling. For example, t he burglary
case was not called at the outset of the February 2019 hearing. In addition, the register of
actions for the burglary case does not indicate that a hearing either was scheduled for or
actually occurred in February 2019. And, as noted by the juvenile court, the February 2019
order that discharged K.D.M. from probation included two case numbers but not the case

8
number of the burglary case. Accordingly, the juvenile court reasonably determined that
K.D.M.’s probation had not been discharged.
Thus, the juvenile court did not lack authority to order restitution.
II. Ability to Pay
K.D.M. also argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering restitution in an amount
that he is unable to pay.
Upon finding that a child is delinquent, a juvenile court “shall enter an order making
any . . . disposition[] . . . which [is] deemed necessary to the rehabilitation of the child .”
Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a). As stated above, if the child’s offense “resulted in
damage to the person or property of another ,” the juvenile court may order the child to
“make reasonable restitution for such damage.” Id., subd. 1(a)(5).1 In ordering a juvenile
to pay restitution, a juvenile court is governed by statutory provisions in both the Juvenile
Court Act, Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(a)(5), and the general restitution statute, Minn.
Stat. §§ 611A.04-.046 (2018). H.A.D., 764 N.W.2d at 66; I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d at 640.
“[I]n determining whether to order restitution and the amount of the restitution,” a
court “shall consider” two criteria: first, “the amount of economic loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense ” and, second, “the income, resources, and obligations of
the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a). A court’s analysis of the se two
statutory criteria is guided by procedures that are prescribed by statute. As an initial matter,

1In the juvenile court, K.D.M. also argued that restitution in a juvenile-delinquency
case must be necessary to the juvenile’s rehabilitation and must be reasonable. But K.D.M.
has not renewed those arguments on appeal.

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“the offender shall have the burden to produce evidence if the offender intends to challenge
the amount of restitution or specific items of restitution or their dollar amounts. ” Id.,
subd. 3(a). The offender’s burden of production “must include a detailed sworn affidavit
of the offender setting forth all challenges to the restitution or items of restitution, and
specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution which differ from the
amounts requested by the victim or victims. ” Id. If the offender has satisfied his or her
burden of production, the prosecution bears “[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of
loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense and the appropriateness of a particular
type of restitution.” Id. The court must resolve any disputes “as to the proper amount or
type of restitution” by applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence evidentiary standard. Id.
On appeal of a juvenile court’s order for restitution, this court applies an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. In re Welfare of M.R.H., 716 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. App.
2006), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).
In this case, K.D.M. did not personally execute an affidavit challenging restitution
on the ground that he is unable to pay, as required by statute. In addition, K.D.M. did not
testify at the restitution hearing because he was absent from court on the second and third
days of the hearing. The juvenile court found that K.D.M. waived his right to appear, and
that finding is not challenged on appeal. The juvenile court stated in its order that the only
evidence in the record concerning K.D.M.’s ability to pay restitution is evidence “that
juveniles on probation in Hennepin County are eligible to earn $60.00 per day on weekends
to pay off their restitution.” Based on that evidence, the juvenile court ordered K.D.M. to
pay restitution in the full amount of the victims’ losses, $6,000.

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On appeal, K.D.M. contends that the juvenile court overlooked evidence that he is
unable to pay $6,000 in restitution. K.D.M. asserts that he qualified for a public defender,
that his parents have limited means, and that he was unsuccessful in a prior opportunity to
earn money through a probation -based work program. These contentions do not directly
address the fact that K.D.M. did not comply with the statute that requires an offender to
submit a “detailed sworn affidavit” with “all challenges” to restitution and “all reasons”
justifying a lesser amount of restitution. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). The
affidavit required by statute is “the sole vehicle” by which an offender can satisfy the
burden of production. State v. Thole , 614 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Min n. App. 2000). The
absence of a timely affidavit is a sufficient reason for rejecting an offender’s challenge to
an award of restitution. State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 336 (Minn. 2016). By not filing
an affidavit, K.D.M. failed to satisfy his burden of production.
In any event, the evidence identified by K.D.M. does not compel a finding that he
is unable to pay restitution of $6,000. That he qualified for a public defender at the outset
of the case does not preclude him from earning money thereafter, and his parent’s financial
resources are not determinative of his own ability to pay restitution. The evidence
concerning his prior attempts to earn money while on probation is potentially relevant, but
K.D.M.’s attorney did not make that argument to the juvenile court.
As stated above, the juvenile court found “that juveniles on probation in Hennepin
County are eligible to earn $60 .00 per day on weekends to pay off their restitution.” The
juvenile court’s finding is supported by evidence introduced by the state. K.D.M.’s
probation officer testified that K.D.M. was eligible to earn money through a supervised

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work program. A different probation employee who works with the supervised work
program testified that the program pays juvenile workers $60 per d ay and that K.D.M.
received credit for 12 full days of work in 2018 and 2019. The district court’s finding also
is consistent with caselaw that allows a court to consider income that an adult offender may
earn while serving a prison sentence. See State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 664 (Minn.
2001); State v. Tenerelli , 583 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. App. 1998), aff’d, 598 N.W.2d 668
(Minn. 1999).
Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding that K.D.M. is able
to pay restitution in the amount of $6,000.
Affirmed.