State of Minnesota, Respondent

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0022

State of Minnesota,
Respondent

vs.

Shawn Merle Mechtel,
Appellant.

Filed April 19, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Dissenting, Cleary, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-18-1480

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial , without holding an evidentiary hearing, of his
postconviction petition seeking to withdraw his guilty plea as unintelligent. Because the
petition and the record conclusively establish that appellant was aware of the direct
consequences of his plea, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Shawn Mechtel was charged in October 2018 with two counts of first -
degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of second -degree criminal sexual conduct
based on allegations that he sexually penetrated his stepdaug hter, who was under the age
of 16. The state offered a plea agreement under which Mechtel would plead guilty to one
of the first-degree charges in exchange for dismissal of the other charges and the mandatory
minimum 144-month sentence. Mechtel rejected the offer and proposed a counteroffer,
which the state declined.
In July 2019, Mechtel pleaded guilty to one count of first -degree criminal sexual
conduct with no agreement from the state as to sentencing.1 Mechtel signed a plea petition
that stated the maximum sentence for the offense was 30 years’ imprisonment and the
minimum sentence was 144 months’ imprisonment. The plea petition further stated that
Mechtel was entering a “straight plea -no agreement with the state,” and that the “ defense
anticipates a downward durational departure.” During the plea hearing, defense counsel

1 The state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.

3
confirmed Mechtel’s understanding that there was no agreement with the state and that he
would be sentenced according to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines . Counsel later
indicated that the presumptive sentence for the offense was “in the neighborhood of 144
months.” Counsel also memorialized that he would file a motion requesting a downward
durational departure, but reminded Mechtel that “there is no guarantee that the judge would
accept that.” Mechtel responded , “Sure.” Before asking for his plea, the district cour t
twice advised Mechtel that the maximum penalty for the offense was 30 years in prison.
The district court determined that Mechtel’s guilty plea was knowin g, intelligent, and
voluntary.
Mechtel moved for a downward durational departure to 75 months. The district
court denied the motion and sentenced him to 187 months—a top-of-the-box guidelines
sentence.
Mechtel appealed his conviction. At his request, we stayed the appeal while he
pursued postconviction relief. Mechtel filed a postconviction petition, seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea as unintelligent. The petition alleges that Mechtel did not understand that
the district court could impose a 187-month sentence without departing from the sentencing
guidelines. And it alleges Mechtel would not have pleaded guilty if he knew a sentence of
187 months was possible. The district court denied the petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing , concluding that the petition and records “conclusively show that
[Mechtel] is not entitled to the relief he has requested.” Mechtel challenges the denial of
postconviction relief.

4
DECISION
Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018) authorizes a person convicted of a crime to seek
postconviction relief. A d istrict court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the
[postconviction] petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that
the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). When deciding
whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing, the district court must “consider[] the facts
alleged in the petition as true and construe[] them in the light most favorable to the
petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017). No evidentiary hearing
is required when the alleged facts “are legally insuffi cient to entitle [the petitioner] to the
requested relief.” Rossberg v. State, 932 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Minn. 2019). We review a district
court’s “summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.”
Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). A district court abuses its discretion
“when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A district court “must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea” when “necessary
to correct a manifest injustice. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice
exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To
be valid, a plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id.
A plea is intelligent if the defendant “understands the charges against him, the rights
he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96. The intelligence requirement
is met if the d efendant understands the plea’s “ direct consequences .” Id. Direct
consequences “are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the

5
guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.” Alanis v. State, 583
N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998) , abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356,
374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010); accord State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn.
App. 2013) (holding direct consequences “are those which flow definitely, immediately,
and automatically from the guilty plea, such as the maximum sentence to be imposed and
the amount of any fine” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Mechtel argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition
without an evidentiary hearing. He contends that defense counsel affirmatively misadvised
him regarding the guidelines sentence for the off ense to which he pleaded guilty and that
the district court erred by failing to credit this contention. And he urges this court to hold
that the guidelines sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea that a defendant must
understand to enter an intelligent plea. We are not persuaded for two reasons.
First, the record —including the facts alleged in the postconviction petition —
demonstrates that Mechtel was aware of the direct consequences of his guilty plea. The
criminal complaint informed Mechtel that the “maximum sentence” for both charges of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct was “Not less than 144 months nor more than 30 years
imprisonment a nd/or $40,000 fine.” Mechtel acknowledged both the maximum and
minimum sentences he faced in the written plea petition he prepared with his counsel’s
assistance. And the district court told him two times during the plea hearing that he faced
up to 30 years in prison. Armed with this knowledge, Mechtel went forward with his guilty
plea.

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We are not convinced that statements defense counsel made regarding the
sentencing guidelines render Mechtel’s plea unintelligent. According to his postconviction
petition, counsel advised Mechtel twice in writing about possible sentences if he did not
accept the state’s offer of a 144 -month minimum sentence. Counsel told him both times
that he faced a potential sentence “significantly higher than 144 months, ” including a
sentence “up to 187 months without a departure.” And during the plea hearing, counsel
said “the presumptive sentence in a situation of this nature is in the neighborhood of 144
months.” None of these statements contradict the information th at Mechtel repeatedly
received as to the maximum 30-year sentence he was subject to upon his guilty plea.2 The
imposed 187-month sentence is well below the 30 years he was willing to accept as a direct
consequence of his plea. Taking the allegations in the petition as true, as we must, the
record conclusively demonstrates Mechtel understood the direct consequences of his plea.
We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Mechtel’s petition
without an evidentiary hearing.
Second, we reject Mechtel’s invitation to extend the law so a guilty plea is intelligent
only if the defendant is advised of the applicable sentencing guidelines. We are an error-
correcting court. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“The function
of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”) ; accord
State v. McCormick , 835 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating this court is “an

2 In briefing and oral argument to this court, Mechtel emphasiz es that defense counsel
affirmatively misadvised him about the applicable sentencing guidelines. But he does not
contend that counsel was ineffective.

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error-correcting court” whose role is to “find the law, to state it and to apply it to the facts”
(quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). The job of extending the law
falls to our supreme court or the legislature. State v. Grigsby, 806 N.W.2d 101, 110 (Minn.
App. 2011), aff’d, 818 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 2012). Where, as here, a defendant pleads
guilty with no agreement as to sentencing, his plea is intelligent if he is advised of the
maximum sentence to which he could be exposed. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578. Because
Mechtel’s plea was intelligent, we affirm.
Affirmed.

D-1

CLEARY, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The issue before us is whether the
appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether his plea was intelligently made.
The district court denied his post -conviction petition without an evidentiar y hearing even
though, as the majority notes, the district court must “consider[] the facts alleged in the
petition as true and construe[] them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v.
State, 895 N.W.2d 612,618 (Minn. 2017).
Here, the appellant explained at a pretrial hearing that he understood from his first
attorney that he was facing 144 months if he pleaded guilty. His second attorney told him
that he could limit his exposure to 144 months if he pleaded guilty and the state would seek
additional time if he was convicted after trial. Eventually he pleaded guilty as a “straight”
plea, without an agreement. In the petition to enter a plea of guilty, his attorney wrote the
“defense anticipates a downward durational departure.” The use of “ant icipates,” rather
than “will seek,” suggests a likelihood of success. Then, to muddy the waters further, the
prosecutor informed the appellant “we don’t know at this point if the judge will send you
to prison or not,” suggesting the possibility of a downward dispositional departure. It does
not appear in the record that the appellant was advised that he faced a presumptive sentence
up to 187 months or that the state would seek anything above the presumptive sentence
mentioned by his attorney at the plea hea ring “in the neighborhood of 144 months.” One
hundred eighty seven months is clear across town from 144 months, far away from the
“neighborhood.” So where is the notice to appellant that he was look ing at the possibility
of a 187-month sentence?

D-2

Against th is murky backdrop, the majority holds that as long as appellant was
informed that the minimum sentence was 144 months and that the statutory maximum was
up to 30 years, he was on proper notice and the plea was intelligently made.
To suggest that a mere rec itation of a statutory maximum to a defendant obviates
the need to ensure a plea is otherwise intelligently made as to a possible sentence disregards
our responsibility to ensure that those who face a loss of freedom understand specifically
the parameters of a possible sentence. The Minnesota Supreme Court should clarify what
the “direct consequences” of a plea include and, at a minimum, they should include the
applicable sentencing guidelines to properly put a defendant on notice as to the
consequences of a plea.
Here, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellant, his plea was
made unintelligently. I would remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to consider
whether or not he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.