In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of A. N. N. and J. R. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0026

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of A. N. N. and J. R. S., Parents.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-JV-17-4

J.R.S., Colorado Springs, Colorado (pro se respondent)

Julia Craig, Birkholz & Associates, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant A.N.N.)

Considered and decided by Tracy Smith, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
On appeal from the juvenile court’s order, appellant-mother argues the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear respondent-father’s motion to modify custody
and relocate the child out of state and erred by applying the rules of juvenile protection
procedure to determine the timeliness of her post-trial motions. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother A.N.N. and respondent -father J.R.S. are the parents of minor
child E.S. On December 27, 2017, sole physical custody of E.S. was voluntarily transferred

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to respondent. Previously, following appellant’s admission, E.S. was adjudicated as a child
in need of protection and services and placed out of the home for over a year. Parenting
time for appellant remained as previously ordered , and both parents continued to share
legal custody of E.S. Despite being granted sole physical custody , respondent was
specifically ordered “not to move the child out of the state, without first moving for a
modification of this order.” In this same permanency order, the juvenile court also stated,
“This court’s jurisdiction is hereby terminated.”
On May 30, 2019, in a separate proceeding, an o rder for protection was issued
against appellant which prohibited her from having contact with respondent or E.S. On
July 18, respondent filed a motion with the juvenile court requesting sole legal custody of
E.S. and permission to relocate E.S. to Colorado . The court held a hearing on September
25, and issued an order granting respondent’s requests o n October 4. In its order
transferring sole legal custody to respondent, the court found domestic abuse had occurred
between appellant and respondent, as well as between appellant and E.S., and that moving
to Colorado was in E.S.’s best interests, although it would make maintaining the child’s
relationship with appellant more difficult. Notice of filing of this order was filed and served
on appellant on October 8.
On October 28, appellant retained counsel and filed a motion for amended findings
of th e October 4, 2019 o rder, a motion for a new trial , and a parenting -time request.
Appellant’s motions were heard on December 11, 2019. The juvenile court denied all three
motions and rejected appellant’s jurisdictional challenges, stating it had “specifically
retained jurisdiction to address [respondent ’s] request” through the lan guage in its

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December 27, 2017 order, which provided that respondent could not move the child out of
the state without first moving for a modification of that order. The court found that, despite
recent amendments to the Juvenile Protection Rules of Procedure, rule 42.07 controlled the
procedure in place at the time respondent’s motion was filed. The court went on to find
that the proper timeline to file all post-trial motions in juvenile-protection matters is within
10 days after service of notice by the court administrator, and that appellant’s post-trial
motions, which were filed after this deadline, were therefore untimely. In regards to the
parenting-time request, the court found that appellant would need to initiate a separate
action in the appropriate venue, and denied her parenting-time request solely on this basis.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews questions as to the district court’s jurisdiction de novo. Nelson
v. Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. 2015). As an initial matter, we note that both
appellant and the juvenile court erred in applying the former Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure. The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure were amended effective
September 1, 2019, and the amended rules apply to proceedings pending on or filed after
that date. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure
and the Rules of Adoption Procedure , Nos. ADM10 -8040 & ADM10 -8041 (Minn. May
13, 2019). Because this proceeding was pending on September 1, 2019, the amended rules,
which eliminated former rule 42.07, should have been applied. However, since the juvenile
court continued to have the same authority to transfer permanent custody under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.515 as it did under former rule 42.07, this error was harmless.

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“The juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings
concerning any child who is alleged to be in need of protection or services . . . . ” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 1 (2018). The juvenile court also has “original and exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning . . . permanency matters under sections 260C.503
to 260C.521.” Id., subd. 2(2). Those sections lay out possible permanency dispositions,
including that “[t]he court may order permanent legal and physical custody to a fit and
willing relative in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2018).
Appellant first argues that the juvenile court explicitly terminated its jurisdiction in
the original permanency order ( December 27, 2017 order), thereby losing its jurisdiction
to hear respondent’s motion. At the end of its December 27, 2017 order, the juvenile court
stated, “This court’s jurisdiction is hereby terminated.” However, several lines earlier, the
court ordered, “[respondent] shall not move the child out of the state, without first moving
for a modification of this order.” In its December 13, 2019 order denying appellant’s post-
hearing motions and jurisdictional challenges, the juvenile court found it “specifically
retained jurisdiction to address [respondent’s] request” based on its prior order stating that
respondent could not move the child out of state without moving for a modification of that
December 27, 2017 order.
A district court’s order is ambiguous if reasonable minds can differ a s to its
meaning. Suleski v. Rupe, 855, N.W.2d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014). The meaning of an
ambiguous provision in an order is a fact question; accordingly, we review a district court’s
interpretation of an ambiguous provision for clear error. Id. A district court’s construction
of its own decree receives “great weight” on appeal. Johnson v. Johnson, 627 N.W.2d 359,

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363 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 2001). This is true even if the
judge who interpreted the order is not the same judge who wrote it. See id.
We acknowledge that there is ambiguity in the original December 27, 2017 order at
issue here. In this single order, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction for a specific issue,
yet included a general statement that its jurisdiction was “terminated.” However, we defer
to a district court’s interpretation of its prior order and do not find a clear error in the
juvenile court’s finding that jurisdiction was specifically retained to hear respondent’s
request regarding modification of the outstanding custody order. Id.
Appellant next argues that, even if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction, it did not
have statutory authority while acting as the juvenile court to grant respondent’s requests.
This argument is unavailing. The juvenile court has authority to transfer permanent legal
and physical custody to a fit and willing relative in the best interests of the child. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4. Even after a permanency disposition has been entered, “further
court hearings are necessary if the court orders further hearings in a transfer of permanent
legal and physical custody matter including if . . . a party seeks to modify an order under
section 260C.521, subdivision 2.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.519. “ An order for a relative to
have permanent legal and physical cus tody of a child may be modified using standards
under sections 518.18 and 518.185. ” Minn. Stat. § 260C.521, subd. 2 (a). Under the
standards set forth in section 518.18, the court may modify a custody order, including
changing the child’s primary residenc e. This same section references requests by the
primary custodial parent to relocate a child out of the state, as well as requests for
modification of prior custody orders seeking permission to move the residence of the child

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to another state. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), (e). The juvenile court may use the standards
set forth in section 518.18 to address a “request of the primary custodial p arent to move
the residence of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(v); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.521, subd.
2.
Appellant also asserts the juvenile court acted outside its jurisdiction by applying
the standards outlined in Minn. Stat. § 518.175—the family law provision governing
changes in parenting time —and, accordingly, that this matter should have been heard in
family court. As previously discussed, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.521, the juvenile court
may apply the standard s established by Minn. S tat. § 518.18 to modify an outstanding
permanent custody order, including when considering a change in the child’s primary
residence. The juvenile court’s order met the applicable standards of sections 260C.521
and 518.18, and the court was acting within its statutory authority when it granted
respondent’s modification requests. Any reference to another standard was harmless.
To the extent appellant challenges the sufficiency of the juvenile court’s findings,
we observe the court’s order was supported by findings of fact regarding the changed
circumstances that constituted endangerment and the best interests of the child, consistent
with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv). Based on the evidence presented by
both parties, the court concluded that appellant committed domestic abuse, which
constituted endangerment, and that it was in E.S.’s best intere sts to transfer sole legal
custody to respondent and to allow respondent to relocate with E.S. to Colorado, where he
had family support and job prospects. The court explicitly considered the impact of

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relocation on E.S.’s ability to maintain a relationshi p with appellant and concluded the
transfer of custody and move was in E.S.’s best interest.
Finally, appellant challenges the juvenile court’s determination that her post-trial
motions were untimely. Appellant argues that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which grant 30 days to bring a motion, should have governed this matter rather than the
Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, which provide a shorter 10-day timeline.
Unless otherwise specifically provided for, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
generally do not apply to juvenile-protection matters. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.01. Under
Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 21.01, subdivision 1, which governs the
procedure and timing of post-trial motions, “[a]ll post-trial motions . . . shall be filed with
the court and served upon the parties within 10 days of the service of notice by the court
administrator of the filing of the court’s order .” Accordingly, the court properly applied
the timing requirements imposed by rule 21.01 to appellant’s motions, which were filed
and heard in juvenile court.
Because the juvenile court retained jurisdiction in its original permanency order,
acted within its statutory authority in granting respondent’s custody-modification motion,
and properly applied the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure to appellant’s post-trial
motions, we affirm.
Affirmed.