Peter Haluszka, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0041

Peter Haluszka,
Relator,

vs.

Prime Pork LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 28, 2020
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 37568977-3

Peter M. Haluszka, Wilmont, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Katherine A. Conlin , Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Prime Pork LLC, Windom, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this unemployment-benefits appeal, relator challenges a fac tual finding by an
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that relator quit his employment. Relator also argues that
the ULJ should have required additional witness testimony. First, we c onclude that
relator’s conduct and state ments substantially support the ULJ’s finding. Second, we
conclude that the ULJ adequately developed the record, and we affirm the ULJ’s decision.
FACTS
Respondent Prime Pork LLC hired relator Peter Haluszka in December 2016. In
August 2019, Haluszka went on vacation. When he returned, he had a disagreement with
his supervisors and did not report to work on August 11, 12, or 13. On August 13, Prime
Pork sent Haluszka a letter stating that he was te rminated because he voluntarily quit.
Haluszka applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED issued a determination of
eligibility, concluding that Haluszka was “unaware that the absence or tardiness seriously
violated employer standards or expectations.” Prime Pork appealed the determination, and
a ULJ conducted a de novo hearing.
At the hearing, several individuals testified, including Haluszka, the director of
facilities and engineering (S.D.), the maintenance manager (T.E.), the human resources
manager (L.S.), and a parts clerk who worked on the first shift. According to the testimony
of S.D. and L.S., T.E. planned to restructure the maintenance department and was
considering hiring lead mechanics. Haluszka believed that he was a “lead mechanic

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trainer” for the third shift and became concerned that this restructuring would result in his
demotion. Contrary to Haluszka’s belief, L.S. testified that the company did not have lead
mechanics at that time and that Haluszka’s job title was “maintenance technician.” In
addition to his belief that the anticipated restructuring would result in his demotion,
Haluszka also had concerns about his immediate supervisors. On August 9, 2019 ,
Haluszka met with S.D., T.E., and Haluszka’s shift supervisor (J.H.) to address his
concerns. Both S.D. and T.E. testified that the company did not demote Haluszka and had
no plans to do so. Haluszka testified that, although he believed he was being demoted, no
one ever told him what position he would be demoted to, what his demoted rate of pay
would be, or what shift he would work. After this meeting, Haluszka turned in his tools
and then left the facility. Haluszka also spoke with the parts clerk for the first shift. The
parts clerk testified that he visited with Haluszka and several other people because they
heard “he was moving on. ” The parts clerk testified that he said to Haluszka, “I’ve got
your tool bag, you’re quitting?” In response, Haluszka answered, “I’m done here.”
L.S. testified that on August 10, 2019, S.D. texted Haluszka asking if he had quit.
Haluszka responded, explaining that because he expected to be fired in the near future, he
had no intentions of returning to work under the maintenance manager . L.S. testified that
Haluszka’s texted the following:
I was saving myself any more humilities, just being demoted
was ridiculous and embarrassing enough. I figured getting
fired was next on someone’s bucket list so I turned everything
in instead of dealing with any more BS. The way you made
things sound that’s what was coming, and beside that, no way
in hell am I going to work under the two idiots that are now
running third shift.

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Haluszka testified that after he left, he was expecting a call from the company to discuss
next steps , but no one from Prime Pork called him . At this point, Halu szka “had the
impression” that Prime Pork was going to terminate his position. 1 Haluszka further
testified that he called the corporate human resources department and asked if he had been
terminated. The department representative told him that according to the information in
her system, he had not been terminated. Haluszka did not report to work for the next three
scheduled shifts. Haluszka claimed that he did not report to work because he had not heard
from management regarding whether or not he had a job.
In a written order, the ULJ found that Haluszka quit employment on August 9, 2019,
and that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ULJ found that Haluszka quit
when “[h]e turned in his tools and told at least one coworker he was ‘done.’” The ULJ also
found that a manager asked Haluszka if he quit, and “Haluszka responded that he thought
he was going to be fired.” The ULJ further found that Haluszka “did not report to work or
attempt to report to work” for three of his shifts despite the fact that “[n]o one told Haluszka
he was terminated or was about to be terminated.” The ULJ concluded that this “evidence
shows Haluszka chose to end the employment” and that “[t]his was a quit.”
Haluszka requested reconsideration asserting that there were “factual errors” in the
judgment and challenging the ULJ’s conclusion that he quit. The ULJ reviewed the request
and determined t hat t he prior order was factually and legally correct. At no point did

1 L.S. explained that both S.D. and T.E. could have terminated Haluszka’s employment,
but they would have needed to involve HR beforehand, which they never requested.

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Haluszka request for his supervisor, J.H., to be present at the hearing or that his absence
rendered the hearing procedurally unfair. This certiorari appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
I. Contested Factual Finding
Haluszka argues that the ULJ erred when the ULJ determined that he is ineligible
for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment. Given the testimony about
Haluszka’s actions and statements, we conc lude that substantial evidence supports the
ULJ’s factual finding that Haluszka quit.
Minnesota provides “workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own a
temporary partial wage replacement. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.03 (2018). An applicant who
quits his employment is generally ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1 ( Supp. 2019).2 A quit from employment occurs when the employee
makes the decision to end the employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd . 2(a) (2018).
“Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact subject
to our deference.” Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 31
(Minn. App. 2012). We view the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the
decision and will not disturb those findings as long as substantial evidence in the record
reasonably tends to support them . Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5) ( Supp. 2019 );
Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016). “We review de novo
a ULJ’s determination that an applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits. ” Fay v.

2 Haluska does not argue that any of the enumerated exceptions apply in this case.

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Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev. , 860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015 ) (quotation
omitted).
In this case, the evidence in the record subs tantially supports the factual
determination that Haluszka quit. The testimony indicates that on August 9, 2019,
Haluszka met with his supervisors regarding his concerns that the company intended to
demote him and his concerns about working with his immediate supervisors. The record
shows that at this meeting, S.D. and T.E. explained that they had no plans to demote
Haluszka. After the meeting Haluszka turned in his tools and, when asked if he was
quitting, answered, “I’m done here.” In addition, the next day when S.D. asked Haluszka
if he had quit, Haluszka responded that he “figured getting fired was next.” Before that
could happen, Haluszka said he “turn ed everything in instead of dealing with any more
BS.” This message indicates that Haluszka thought that getting discharged could occur in
the future, but that it had not yet occurred. In addition, Haluszka stated his intentions not
to work for Prime Pork anymore: “[N]o way in hell am I going to work under the two idiots
that are now running third shift.” Haluszka also testified that when he contacted human
resources to determine whether the company had fired him, the representative explained to
Haluszka that, according to her information, he was not terminated. Finally, Haluszka
failed to report to work for three of his scheduled shifts despite knowing that he was not
fired. Based on these actions and statements, the record substantially supports the U LJ’s
finding that Haluszka quit his employment.
Moreover, no one at Prime Pork told Haluszka that he was discharged until
August 13, after he had been absent for three consecutive days. Under Minnesota Statutes

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section 268.095, subdivision 5(a) (2018), a discharge occurs only “when any words or
actions by an employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will
no longer allow the employee to work for the employer in any capacity.” Here,
management asked Haluszka if he quit, which in dicates that management still considered
Haluszka an employee and expected Haluszka to return to work. Contrary to Haluszka’s
argument, there is nothing in the record that shows Prime Pork would “no longer allow”
Haluszka to work in “any capacity” as required by the statute. We affirm the decision that
Haluszka is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
II. Adequate Development of the Record
Haluszka argues that this court should remand his case because the ULJ failed to
adequately develop the record. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2019) (stating
that this court may remand a ULJ’s decision for additional proceedings). Specifically, he
contends that his supervisor , J.H., should have testified at the hearing. We are not
persuaded.
During hearings before a ULJ, each party may examine witnesses, cross -examine
the other party’s witnesses, and offer and object to exhibits. Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2019).
“[ULJs] have a duty to reasonably assist pro se parties with the presentation of the evidence
and the proper development of the record.” White v. Univ. of Minn. Physicians Corp., 875
N.W.2d 351, 355–56 (Minn. App. 2016) (quoting Minn. R. 3310.2921). However, pro se
litigants “are generally held to the same standards as attorneys,” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald,
629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001), and the ULJ remains neutral, even when assisting
a self-represented party in the presentation of their evidence, Stassen, 814 N.W.2d at 32.

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In this case, the ULJ heard from five witnesses and received evidence regarding the
actions of Haluszka and the others involved. In addition, the ULJ informed Haluszka that
he had a right to present evidence and to request to reschedule the hearing in order to obtain
documents or the appearance of witnesses. Haluszka made no request to continue the
hearing or to subpoena J.H., and he did not request reconsideration based on the failure to
call J.H. as a witness . More importantly, Haluszka’s does not explain what testimony he
believes J.H. would provide or how that te stimony would relate to the contested facts.
Given Haluszka’s conclusory argument, and based on our review of the record, we
conclude that the ULJ adequately ensured development of all relevant facts.
Affirmed.