Woodland Gale Owners’ Association, LLC, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0057

Woodland Gale Owners’ Association, LLC, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

City of Woodland,
Respondent.

Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-18-10164

Douglas J. McIntyre, Thomas H. Priebe, Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellants)

George C. Hoff, Justin L. Templin, Hoff Barry, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellants-landowners challenge respondent -city’s denial of their request for a
variance, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that respondent (1) was allowed

2
to rely on the written resolution it adopted a month after the meeting at which it voted to
deny the variance and (2) provided adequate support for its denial of the variance. Because
our independent examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that respondent’s
decision was reasonably supported by the e vidence and was not arbit rary, capricious, or
unreasonable, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Woodland Gale Owners’ Association, LLC, and Homestead Partners,
LLC, are the owners of two noncontiguous pieces of property located about 730 feet apart
horizontally and 50 feet apart vertically in Woodland , a small city on the shore of Lake
Minnetonka. The upper property has a family residence. The lower property, which is too
small to be buildable, has a small nonconforming building (the building) 14.4 feet from the
lake. Originally a pump house , the building now functions as a cabana. There is an
easement for water pipes between the residence and the building; the easement crosses
property that appellants do not own. Woodland’s residents use private sewage dispos al
systems rather than a city-wide sewage system.
In the summer of 2017, appellants sought a building permit to add plumbing to the
building so that persons using the lakeshore on the lower property would have toilet
facilities closer than 730 feet away; they described this as an “interior modification of a
non-conforming structure.” In September , appellants were informed that, because the
plumbing would change the building’s nonconforming use to another nonconforming use,
they needed a variance, not a building permit.

3
In October 2017, appellants submitted a variance application to respondent, giving
the present use of the build ing as “storage of boating and lawn items” and seeking “to
install a toilet, sink/shower for public health, safety and welfare reasons.” The application
was accompanied by photographs showing that most of the building’s interior is finished
living space. A small inside area is unfinished storage space and is the intended site of the
plumbing installation.
In November 2017, respondent’s city council (the council) made a site visit to the
building and decided to hold a public hearing on the variance application. Following a
staff report on the variance application, further consideration of it was postponed until the
public hearing, which was held at the April 2018 council meeting.
One of the three council members present at that meeting functioned as the “acting
mayor.” After conducting and closing the public hearing, he said:
I would like to make a motion and read it into the record.
I move findings of fact as follows: That the proposed
variance would result in a fundamental change of use and that
the proposed use would materially increase the frequency and
duration of the occupancy of the structure, resulting in
unreasonable increase s in artificial light pollution and man -
made noise on the shore which is contrary to Woodland’s 2030
[comprehensive] plan.
Based on these findings of fact, I further move that the
variance application be denied because it is not consistent with
the comprehensive plan and does not put the property to use in
a reasonable manner.

After his motion was seconded, he and the two other council members present voted in
favor of it. At the next meeting, in May 2018, the council adopted a resolution, or written
statement, outlining its reasons for denying the variance.

4
In June 2018, appellants brought this action, seeking a reversal of the denial of the
variance. The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court, after
concluding that (1) it could consider the May 2018 resolution as well as the minutes of the
April 2018 meeting; (2) the denial of the variance was not ar bitrary and capricious, and
(3) respondent properly directed appellants to apply for a variance rather than a building
permit or a conditional use permit , granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment
and denied appellants’ motion.
Appellants challenge the summary judgment decisions, arguing that respondent
should not be allowed to rely on the resolution adopted at its May meeting and that
respondent does not provide adequate support for its denial of the variance.
D E C I S I O N
Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court’s review of a municipality’s decision, this court “[does]
not give any special deference to the conclusions of the [district] court s, but rather
engage[s] in an independent examination of the record and arrive[s] at [its] own
conclusions as to the propriety of the city’s decision.” Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of
Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 180 (M inn. 2006); see also Clear Channel Outd oor
Advert., Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 675 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Minn. App. 2004) (noting that
interpretations of state statutes and existing ordinances are questions of law that this court
reviews de novo, while the decis ions of a municipal body are reviewed to determine
whether the evidence reasonably supports them and whether they are arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable) , review denied (Minn. May 18, 2004). “In reviewing actions by a

5
governmental body, the focus is on the proceedings before the decision-making body, . . .
not the findings of the [district] court.” Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis,
502 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1993).
1. The May 2018 Resolution
Appellants argue that only the materials in the record in April 2018, when the vote
to deny the variance was taken, not the written resolution explaining the denial that the
council adopted in May 2018, should have been considered by the district court and may
be considered by this court. The district court rejected this argument, quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 2(c) (2018):
If a multimember governing body denies a request, it must state
the reasons for denial on the record and provide the applicant
in writing a statement of the reasons for the denial. If the
written statement is not adopted at the same time as the denial,
it must be adopted at the next meeting following the denial of
the request but before the expiration of the time allowed for
making a decision under this section. The written statement
must be consistent with the reasons stated in the record at the
time of the denial.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court observed that respondent followed the procedure in the statute; it
did not adopt the document from which a council member read his motion at the April
meeting, and it did adopt a written statement of the reas ons for denial at its next meeting
in May. Given that the legislature specifically provided the procedure respondent
followed, this court has no basis for deciding that respondent was not entitled to follow that
procedure and disregarding the resolution adopted in accord with the procedure.

6
Appellants also argue that respondent cannot rely on the May resolution because it
contained reasons that were not included in the much shorter statement read at the April
meeting. But not every reason advanced for a denial needs to be convincing; if just one of
the reasons given for a municipality’s denial of a land -use request satisfies the rational -
basis test, the denial is not arbitrary. Trisko v. City of Waite Park , 566 N.W.2d 349, 352
(Minn. App. 1997) , review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 1997) . Not all reasons given for a
denial must be legally sufficient and supported by facts in the record. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 765 n.4 (Minn. 1982).
The district court construed the statutory la nguage with the aid of Black’s Law
Dictionary 279 (5th ed. 1979), which defines “consistent” as “harmonious,” “compatible,”
and “not contradictory,” and concluded that:
The fact that the [May] Resolution contains additional
information o[n] the reasons for denying [appellants’] variance
request does not, by itself, mean the Resolution is not
consistent with the reasons stated in the record at the time of
the denial. As l ong as the additional information is
harmonious, compatible, and not contradictory, the written
record complies with Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(c).

Moreover, the resolution is an amplification rather than a contradiction of the
statement made at the April meeting. The resolution explained how the proposed variance
would fail to comply with respondent’s code and comprehensive plan in several ways, e.g.:
(1) adding a bathroom to a pump house located less than 15 feet from the lake would result
in more people spending more time in the building and would not support “preservation of
open space, scenic views, natural topography and habitat, wetlands, lakes, indigenous
vegetation and trees, and rehabilitation of existing housing units”; (2) the installation o f a

7
septic system would create “an unnecessary risk of contamination to . . . Lake
[Minnetonka]”; (3) it would “materially increase the frequency and duration of occupancy
of the accessory structure [ pump house], resulting in unreasonable increases in arti ficial
light pollution and manmade noise on the shore” ; (4) it would “convert the structure from
a pump house to a dwelling/guesthouse” that would violate both the city code requirements
for setback from the lake and Minn . R. 6120.330, subp. 3(A)( 1) (2019); (5) “[a]llowing
[appellants] to circumvent these prohibitions by converting an existing accessory structure
into an entirely different, and materially increased use mere feet from the lakeshore is not
a reasonable use of the property”; and (6) “the addit ion of restroom facilities. . . when
combined with the heater, air conditioner, pizza oven, and refrigerator . . . [already] existing
. . . and/or shown on [appellants’] plans, would convert the property in to a Dwelling as
defined by City Code (‘a building having running water and cooking an d toilet facilities
. . .’).” The resolution reflects and is consistent with the proposal made at the April
meeting; therefore, the district court correctly decided that respondent may rely on it as
evidence of its reasons for denying the variance application.
2. The Denial
Appellants argue that the re was no factual support for the denial of the variance
voted on by the council in April and further explained by the resolution it adopted in May.
But appellants offer no support for the view that the damage caused by a variance must be
proved before the variance can be denied, and caselaw indicates a different standard.
A municipal decisionmaking body has a broad discretionary
power to deny an application for variances. The fact that a
court reviewing the action of a municipal body may have

8
arrived at a different conclusion, had it been a member of the
body, does not invalidate the judgment of the city officials if
they acted in good faith and within the broad discretion
accorded them by statutes and the relevant ordinances. Based
upon an independent examination of the record, we must
determine whether the City’s denial of . . . [the] application . . .
was reasonable.

VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights , 336 N.W.2d 503, 50 8-09 (Minn. 1983)
(citation omitted). The standard in that case was what the city council “could have
rationally concluded” or “could have found” as a basis for its denial of variances, not what
those opposing the variance s proved would happen if t he variances were granted. Id. at
509.
The record reflects that, a t the November 2017 meet ing, the council considered
(1) the environmental risks of having a sewage line close to the lakeshore, (2) the possible
requests of other pump house owners to see k similar variances, (3) the difficulty of
enforcing a requirement that the pump house not be used as a residence, (4) the
comprehensive plan’s mandate of open shoreline, and (5) the fact that “Woodland is not a
city of shoreline cottages.”
At the April 2018 meeting, the council heard from a representative of Minnesota
Pump Works that there have been overflows of septic systems and considered the results
of a system failure leading to discharge into the lake. The council also considered that the
building now looks like a studio apartment and, with the installation of a ba throom, could
be used as such, and that the variance would result in a fundamental change of use of the
building that would lead to increases in artificial light and manmade noise on the shoreline,
which would conflict with respondent’s comprehensive plan.

9
Respondent’s record of the process resulting in a denial of the variance refutes
appellants’ argument that the denial lacked reasonable suppo rt, and we affirm the district
court’s affirmance of the denial.
Affirmed.