A20-0639

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0066
A20-0639

Joel S. Rabbe, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Farmers State Bank of Trimont, et al.,
Respondents,

First Financial Bank in Winnebago, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed March 1, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Martin County District Court
File No. 46-CV-18-424

Richard E. Bosse, Law Offices of Richard E. Bosse, Chartered, Henning, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Dustan J. Cross, Dean M. Zimmerli, Gislas on & Hunter LLP, Ne w Ulm, Minnesota (for
respondents Farmers State Bank of Trimont, et al.)

Arthur G. Boylan, Philip J. Kaplan, Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents First Financial Bank in Winnebago, et al.)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In the first of these consolidated a ppeals (A20-0066), appellants challenge the
district court’s order granting a motion to di scharge certain notices of lis pendens and
enjoining appellants from recording additional notices of lis pendens (the lis pendens
order). In the second appeal (A20-0639), the same appellants challenge a contempt order
by the district court, which was premised on failure to comply with the lis pendens order.
Because the district court properly enjoined appellants from record ing additional notices
of lis pendens, and because the contempt order is well supported by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
These consolidated appeals are the late st in the lengthy litig ation arising from a
farmer-lender relationship. The facts underlying this dispute appear in several opinions of
this court, most recently in Rabbe v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, No. A19-1353, 2020
WL 2312931 (Minn. App. May 11, 2020), review denied (Minn. July 23, 2020). See also
Farmers State Bank of Trimont v. Rabbe, No. A19-0707, 2019 WL 7287075 (Minn. App.
Dec. 30, 2019); Rabbe v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont , No. A18-1845, 2019 WL
2416036 (Minn. App. June 10, 2019), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). We provide
an abbreviated factual and procedural history here to frame the issues on appeal.
Background
The appellants in this case include indi vidual Rabbe family members Joel Rabbe,
Kirsten Rabbe, Jon Rabbe, Debra Rabbe, and Joyce Rabbe in her personal capacity and as
a trustee (Rabbe individuals), along with two farming companies owned by certain Rabbe

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family members—Rabbe Farms LLP and Rabb e Ag Enterprises (t ogether, the “Rabbe
Entities,” and collectively with the Rabbe individuals, “the Rabbes”). For many years, the
Rabbes had a farmer-lender relationship with respondent Farmers State Bank of Trimont
(FSB).1
In 2013 and 2014, FSB lo aned Rabbe Farms over $17 million. The loans were
personally guaranteed by Rabbe individuals a nd secured in part by mortgages on grain
elevators (the Elevator Properties) and five parcels of farmland covering 503 acres (the
Rabbe Farms Farmland). In Ma y 2014, FSB declared default on the loans. The parties
then negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement. Pursuant to the forbearance
agreement, the Rabbes executed a new mortga ge in the amount of $15 million on about
1,200 acres of additional land owned by Rabbe individuals (the Rabbe Individual
Farmland) to secure the loans. The Rabbes also agreed to release and forever discharge all
claims against FSB if the circumstances giving rise to such claims occurred prior to the
date of the agreement.
Subsequently, the Rabbes defaulted on th e forbearance agreem ent. The parties
executed an amended forbearance agreement, but the Rabbes later defaulted on that
agreement as well. The parties participated in farmer-lender mediation, which yielded no

1 We refer primarily to FSB as “respondent” for the purpose of this opinion, as FSB holds
title to the property for which appellants f iled the notices of lis pendens. The other
respondents in this matter are individuals associated with FSB (Michael Mulder, president,
and Robert Connors, vice pr esident) and First Financia l Bank in Winnebago (William
Erickson, president), which was a bank that bought a participation in loans extended to
Rabbe Farms by FSB. Rabbe, 2020 WL 2312931 at *1.

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resolution. In September 2015, the Rabb e Entities filed for Chap ter 11 bankruptcy
protection.
While the Rabbe Entities’ bankruptcy pr oceedings were pend ing, FSB initiated
foreclosure litigation regarding the Rabbe Individual Farmland. In May 2016, the district
court entered summary judgment in favor of FSB on all claims and issued a foreclosure
decree as to the Rabbe Individual Farmland. The Rabbes appealed.
Following the foreclosure decree, FSB purchased the entirety of the Rabbe
Individual Farmland at two sheriff’s sales. The district court confirmed the validity of the
sheriff’s sales in a July 2016 order. The sheriffs executed and delivered certificates of sale
to FSB shortly thereafter, confirming FSB’s ownership of the property subject only to the
Rabbe individuals’ statutory right of redemption and right of first refusal under Minnesota
Statutes section 500.245 (2020). See Minn. Stat. § 580.12 (2020). The Rabbe individuals
did not redeem from any of the foreclosure sales.2
Meanwhile, in the Rabbe Entities’ bankrupt cy proceedings, the parties reached a
settlement that was even tually enforced by the bankrupt cy court. Under the settlement,
Rabbe Farms agreed to deed over the Rabbe Farms Farmland and Elevator Properties to
FSB, and the Rabbes agreed to dismiss thei r appeal of the district court’s summary
judgment in the foreclosure litigation. Ra bbe Farms executed and delivered quit claim
deeds conveying Rabbe Farms Farmland and El evator Properties to FSB in May 2017.

2 The Rabbes did initiate litigation regarding thei r right of first refusal, resulting in an
appeal and the unpublished opinion of this court in Rabbe, 2019 WL 2416036, that
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of several claims brought by the Rabbes.

5
This court dismissed the appeal in the fo reclosure litigation with prejudice upon the
stipulation of the parties. Farmers State Bank of Trimont vs. Rabbe, No. A16-0609, A16-
0891 (Minn. App. July 3, 2017) (order).
The present litigation
In November 2017, the Rabbes commenc ed this litigation by serving a summons
and complaint for lender liability on respondent s. The next month, the Rabbes served
respondents with an amended complaint, whic h asserts ten counts arising out of FSB’s
origination, administration, and collection of the loans owed by the Rabbes, and out of the
sale process for real property acquired by FSB. 3 The first amended complaint requests
monetary damages, a civil penalty, treble damages, and an injunction.
Respondents moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. In September 2018,
the district court granted the motion to dismiss except as to an antitrust claim. The Rabbes
filed a second amended complaint in response, containing only allegations relating to the
antitrust claim. They later requested leave to file a third amended complaint, but the district
court denied their request because the proposed amendments essentially reasserted causes
of action already dismissed.
FSB moved for summary judgment as to th e remaining antitrust claim, the district
court granted the motion—dismissing the Rabbe s’ complaint in its entirety—and entered
judgment in favor of FSB. The Rabbes appealed, challenging, among other things, the

3 The first amended complaint asserts, for ex ample, that FSB negotiated in bad faith and
committed numerous incidents of misconduct in regards to th e defaults and forbearance
agreements. It also alleges that FSB violated Minnesota’s antitrust law, Minnesota Statutes
section 325D.53 (2020).

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district court’s October 2018 order dismissing all of their claims, except the antitrust claim,
and the order denying their motion for a third amended complaint (the summary-judgment
appeal). We affirmed the district court’s order on May 11, 2020. Rabbe, 2020 WL
2312931, review denied (Minn. July 21, 2020).
Lis pendens order
While the summary-judgment appeal was s till pending, and before this court had
issued its decision, other events transpired that led to the present consolidated appeals.
Around the same time th at the Rabbes commenced the lawsuit underlying this case
(in other words, the lawsuit that led to the summary-judgment appeal), they commenced
another lawsuit against FSB in Martin County District Court (the right-of-first-refusal
litigation). In that lawsuit, the Rabbes alleged that FSB violated their statutory right of first
refusal under Minnesota Statutes section 500. 245 in regards to marketing and selling the
Rabbe Farms Farmland, Rabbe Individual Farmland, and Elevator Properties after
acquiring them as a result of the bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings. See Rabbe, 2019
WL 2416036 at *2. Th e Rabbes recorded notic es of lis pendens in connection with the
right-of-first-refusal litigation against all of the real estate subject to the purchase
agreements entered into between FSB and third parties, thereby clouding title and hindering
FSB’s ability to sell the prope rty. The district court dism issed the Rabbes’ right-of-first-
refusal claims in May 2018 and entered partial final judgment. The Rabbes appealed, this
court affirmed, and the supreme court denied further review. See Rabbe , 2019 WL
2416036 at *1, review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2019).

7
Three days after the supr eme court denied review in the right-of-first-refusal
litigation, the Rabbes recorded notices of lis pendens in this lawsuit on all of the Rabbe
Farms Farmland, Rabbe Individual Farmland, and Elevator Properties.4 The notices of lis
pendens state that the “object of the action is . . . Claims for declaratory relief and judgment
and cancellation of deeds and mortgages as a result of the execution of such documents
pursuant to contracts which were fraudulently induced without consideration and not
performed by the Defendants.” Again, at th e point when the Rabbes filed these notices,
the district court had dismissed the Rabbes’ claims in this case and the Rabbes had
appealed. See Rabbe, 2020 WL 2312931. FSB promptly moved the district court for an
order discharging the notices of lis pendens.
In a November 2019 order, the district court granted FSB’s motion and discharged
the notices of lis pendens. The district cour t reasoned that none of the versions of the
complaint filed by the Rabbes in this litigation would supp ort the filing of a notice of lis
pendens, as the allegations do not raise a que stion about the validity of FSB’s title to real
property. The district court found that the Rabbes’ decision to file the lis pendens “after
the resolution of numerous co unts in multiple court actions was for the purpose of delay
and to increase FSB’s costs,” and that the filing was not reasonable under the
circumstances. The district court accordingly sanctioned the Rabbes with attorney fees and
expenses and enjoined them from filing additional notices of lis pendens on the real
property owned by FSB.

4 The Rabbes’ attorney conceded at oral arguments on FSB’s motion to discharge the lis
pendens that the timing of the filing of new lis pendens was no coincidence.

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Contempt order
About a month later, in December 2019, the Rabbes filed yet another complaint
against FSB in Martin County District Court. In connec tion with the new complaint, the
Rabbes’ attorney filed new notices of lis pe ndens on the real property owned by FSB.
According to Joel Rabbe, the Rabbes’ attorney advised him th at the lis pendens could be
filed despite the district court’s November 13 injunction, and Joel Rabbe agreed and
authorized the filing.
FSB’s attorney sent the Rabbes’ attorney a letter demanding that the new notices of
lis pendens be discharged, and received no response. FSB moved to hold the Rabbes and
their attorney in contempt of court. After a hearing on the motion, the district court issued
an order in February 2020 that found Joel Rabbe and the Rabbes’ attorney in contempt of
court for violating the injunction against recording new lis pendens on real property owned
by FSB. The order imposed a 180-day jail sentence, but stayed the sentence on the
condition that the notices of lis pendens be discharged within 14 days. The district court
also issued sanctions against the Rabbes fo r FSB’s expenses in connection with the
contempt motion. The Rabbes later discharged the notices of lis pe ndens, which purged
the contempt.
The Rabbes appealed both the lis pendens order (A20-0066) and the contempt order
(A20-0639). We consolidated the cases for review here.
DECISION
In their first appeal, the Rabbes challenge the district court’s lis pendens order on
two bases. They argue that the district court erred by granting FSB’s motion to discharge

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the notices of lis pendens that the Rabbes recorded for this matter. They also contend that
that the district court erred by enjoining them from filing future notices of lis pendens on
real property owned by FSB. In their sec ond appeal, the Rabbes challenge the contempt
order on the ground that the lis pendens injunction they violated is void—an argument that
essentially echoes their challenge to the injunction in the first appeal. We address each
issue in turn.
I. The issue of whether the district erred by discharging the lis pendens in this
matter is moot.

An issue is “moot” when “a determina tion is sought on a matter which, when
rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Marque Plumbing,
Inc. v. Barris, 384 N.W.2d 246, 248 (Minn. App. 1986). The doctrine of mootness provides
that the “requisite personal interest that mu st exist at the commenc ement of the litigation
(standing) must continue through out its existence (mootness).” Dean v. City of Winona ,
868 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted).
The Rabbes ask us to reverse the district court’s order discharging the notices of lis
pendens filed in connection with this case. Notices of lis pendens may be filed in
connection with a lawsuit “at the time of filing of the complaint, or at any time thereafter
during the pendency of such action,” provided that the action is one “in which the title to,
or any interest in or lien upon, real property is involved or affected.” Minn. Stat. § 557.02
(2020) (emphasis added).
When the Rabbes initiated the present appeal from the lis pendens order, their
summary-judgment appeal was s till pending and had not yet been decided by this court.

10
See Rabbe, 2020 WL 2312931 at *1. Since then, the appeal has been resolved and the
district court’s orders are final; we affirm ed the district court’s orders dismissing the
Rabbes’ claims and denying leav e to again amend the compla int, and the supreme court
denied further review. Id. at *4-6. Accordingly, because the underlying case has been
resolved on the merits, there is no property in dispute in th is action that would permit the
notices of lis pendens to be re-filed. See Minn. Stat. § 557.02. And the Rabbes do not
request any other relief in connection with the discharge. Thus, even if we were to reverse
the district court’s order discharging the lis pendens filed in connection with this case,
doing so would have no practical effect. See Marque Plumbing, Inc., 384 N.W.2d at 248-
49 (dismissing appeal of discharge of lis pe ndens as moot after supreme court denied
review of summary-judgment dismissal of plai ntiff’s underlying lien and claims.) We
accordingly decline to consider the moot issue.
II. The district court properly enjoined the Rabbes from recording additional
notices of lis pendens.

The Rabbes next argue that the district court erred by enjoinin g them from filing
new notices of lis pendens. 5 They argue that because th e district court was without

5 In its response brief for the appeal from the lis pendens order, FSB argues that the Rabbes
waived their challenge to the injunction by not raising it in the district court, and that this
court should accordingly declin e to reach the issue. We generally will not consider
arguments not presented to the district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988). Although FSB is correct that the Rabbes did not provide a specific argument
challenging the injunction at the time FSB re quested it, the Rabbes did later argue during
the contempt proceedings that the district c ourt lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction
and therefore the injunction was void. The di strict court addressed and rejected this
argument in its contempt order. Thus, al though the Rabbes’ method of raising the
challenge was flawed, the Rabbe s at least preserved this ar gument by presenting it to the

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jurisdiction to issue the injunction, the injunction is void. Before analyzing the injunction,
it is necessary to review the general law on lis pendens.
Legal standards and standard of review
A lis pendens is, in essenc e, a “warning that title to property is in litigation.” Bly v.
Gensmer, 386 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. App. 1986). “[T]he sole function of [a] lis pendens
is to give constructive notice to all the world of the pendency of [an] action, which is, alone,
notice to all persons of the rights and equities of the party filing the lis pendens in the land
therein described.” Trask v. Bodson, 169 N.W. 489, 490 (Minn. 1918); see also Bly, 386
N.W.2d at 769 (explaining that a lis pendens “impedes a property owner’s right to free
alienability of real estate”). A party to an action “in which the title to, or any interest in or
lien upon, real property is involved or affected , or is brought in ques tion by either party”
may permissibly “file for record with the county recorder of each county in which any part
of the premises lies a notice of the pendenc y of the action, contai ning the names of the
parties, the object of the action, and a desc ription of the real property.” Minn. Stat.
§ 557.02. As the statute suggests, “[i]n order to be valid, a lis pendens must be based on a
claim involving title to, interest in, or lien upon, real property.” GBJ, Inc., II v. First Ave.
Inv. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Minn. App. 1994) (citing Minn. Stat. § 557.02), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).
Filing a notice of lis pendens with malic e “may constitute sl ander of title, which
could subject the person filing to civil or criminal penalties.” First Constr. Credit, Inc. v.

district court and therefore they may raise it again on appeal. We accordingly consider the
issue here.

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Simonson Lumber of Waite Park, Inc. , 663 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. App. 2003). And the
failure to promptly discharge an improperly filed notice of lis pendens, upon receiving
notice that the filing was improper, can be construed as bad faith that warrants payment of
costs and attorney fees. Id. at 19-20.
A party claiming title to property affect ed by a lis pendens notice can move the
district court for an order discharging the notice. Minn. Stat. § 557.02. The district court
may discharge the lis pendens notice when the referenced lawsuit does not contain a claim
that is “within the class of actions sufficient to support a notice of lis pendens.” Estate of
Mansur v. Eden Prairie Real Estate Inv. Corp., 384 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. App. 1986)
(quotation omitted). An action to recover only a monetary judgment is not within the class
of actions supporting a notice of lis pendens. Melin v. Mott, 4 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Minn.
1942). And a notice of lis pendens may be discharged when the underlying complaint does
not state a valid claim or the undisputed evidence shows a claim cannot succeed. See Estate
of Mansur , 384 N.W.2d . at 239. “[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently
affirmed the district court’s power to cancel an invalid lis pendens.” Constr. Gen., Inc. v.
Richard Schwarz/Neil Weber, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 19, 1985).
Here, the district court determined that no version of the Rabbes’ complaints in this
matter supported a notice of lis pendens, as none of the claims called into question FSB’s
title to real property. It also found that the Rabbes filed the lis pendens unreasonably and
for the purposes of delay and increased cost s for FSB. It enjo ined the Rabbes from
“recording any additional notices of lis pendens on the real estate owned by FSB.”

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“The granting of an injunction generally re sts within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its actions will not be disturbed on appeal unless, based upon the whole record,
it appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.” St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Carter ,
913 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). This court’s review of the district
court’s decision to grant an injunction “is deferential.” Id. Jurisdiction, though, is a
question of law that we review de novo. Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (In re
Comm’r of Pub. Safety), 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007).
Analysis
The Rabbes frame their cha llenge to the injunction as one of “jurisdiction.” Their
argument appears to be twofold. First, they argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to both discharge the lis pendens and, corresp ondingly, issue an injunction against future
notices of lis pendens because doing so wa s “premature” when the lawsuit was still
pending. Second, they argue that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction as it relates to
that of other courts.
Before turning to the Rabb es’ specific arguments, we not e that they use the term
“jurisdiction” imprecisely. Recent precedent cautions against the inaccurate use of the
term “jurisdiction” when the issue does not regard subject-matter or personal jurisdiction
and instead regards “nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules or nonjurisdictional limits on
a court’s authority to address a question.” Johnson v. Princeton Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 899
N.W.2d 860, 868 n.3 (Minn. App. 2017); see, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
510, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006) (observing that “jurisdiction . . . is a word of many, too
many, meanings” (quotation omitted)); Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S. Ct.

14
906, 915 (2004) (noting that it would increase precision if courts used “jurisdictional” only
when referring to issues of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction).
The Rabbes’ challenge does not implicate the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
which “refers to a court’s authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions and
the particular questions presented to the court for its decision.” Giersdorf v. A & M Constr.,
Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Minnesota district courts are
courts of general jurisdiction and have the authority to hear “all civil and criminal cases.”
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3; see also Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(1) (2020) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction in . . . all civil actions within their respective
districts.”). Nothing suggests that civil cases involving notices of lis pendens fall outside
this broad scope.6
Likewise, the district court here did not l ack personal jurisdiction over the parties.
A court has personal jurisdicti on over those who “voluntarily invoke[] the power of the
court in [their] own behalf.” Fed.-Hoffman, Inc. v. Fackler , 549 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn.
App. 1996) (quoting Morehart v. Furley, 182 N.W. 723, 724 (Minn. 1921)), review denied

6 The Rabbes’ reliance on State ex rel. Evans v. Dist. Court, 136 N.W. 746 (Minn. 1912),
does not support a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Evans involved an injunction issued
by the juvenile court of the City of Minne apolis—a court of lim ited jurisdiction over
children adjudged to be “inc orrigible and neglected.” Evans, 136 N.W. at 746-47. The
disputed injunction was issued before the court had made that incorrigibility determination,
and the supreme court accordingly determined on appeal that the injunction went beyond
the juvenile court’s limited statutory authority. Id. at 747. It went on to determine that the
injunction was void and the juvenile could not be held in contempt for violating it. Id.
This case is unlike Evans, as the district court is one of general—not limited—jurisdiction.
Evans is thus inapposite to our decision.

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(Minn. Aug. 20, 1996). The Rabbes initiated this action and thereby submitted to the
district court’s personal jurisdiction.
In sum, the Rabbes’ challenge is a nonjuris dictional challenge to whether the district
court exceeded its authority by prematurely discharging th e notices of lis pendens or
prohibiting future lis pend ens notices through an injunction. With that clarified, we turn
to the Rabbes’ specific arguments regarding the district court’s authority.
The Rabbes’ first argument regarding prematurity is based on their assertion that a
district court “cannot discharge a notice of lis pendens prior to the completion [of] the
litigation.” They argue that “[i]f the discharg e of the notice of lis pendens is premature[,
then] an order restraining filing of a notice of lis pendens is premature.”
The Rabbes’ argument is with out merit. As explained above, a party whose title to
real property is clouded by a notice of lis pendens has a statutory right to move the district
court for an order discharging the notice. See Minn. Stat. § 557.02. The district court can
discharge a notice of lis pendens if it is invali d, for instance, when the lawsuit referenced
in the notice does not contain a claim that is “within the class of actions sufficient to support
a notice of lis pendens.” Estate of Mansur , 384 N.W.2d at 238 (quotation omitted).
Nothing in the statute obligates the district court to wait fo r a case to move through the
appellate process before discharging an in valid notice of lis pendens. The Rabbes’
argument that the district court exceeded its authority by acting prematurely in discharging
the lis pendens, and, correspondingly, by issuing the injunctions, fails.
The Rabbes’ next argument is that the district court exceeded its authority by barring
additional lis pendens notices in matters pending be fore other courts. They argue that

16
“even though the district courts of this st ate have concurrent jurisdiction, they are
independent tribunals and this [district court] does not have the authority or jurisdiction to
impose its orders on other district courts.”
The Rabbes’ argument is unpersuasive, as th e district court enjoined action by the
Rabbes—who invoked the district court’s juri sdiction in this matte r—and did not enjoin
the actions of other courts. And the district court enjoined action regarding the specific
real property owned by FSB that the Rabbes put at issue in this litigation, and that has been
the subject of extensive court proceedings.
The Rabbes’ reference to “c oncurrent jurisdiction,” which as FSB argues, seems to
refer to the first-to-file rule, does not advance their position. The first-to-file rule provides
that “where two courts have concurrent juri sdiction, the first to acquire jurisdiction has
priority to decide the case.” Levine v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 49, 56
(Minn. App. 2019). This rule “is not a rigid rule, but a princi ple to be applied flexibly as
a blend of courtesy and expediency.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, this action—initiated in 2017—was the only lawsuit re garding these facts
pending when the district court issued the lis pendens order in November 2019. It was not
until a month later, in December 2019, that the Rabbes filed their new complaint and
recorded the new notices of lis pendens. Mo reover, the new lawsuit, while assigned to a
different judge, was also filed in the Martin County District Court. Accordingly, the
Rabbes have not shown how another court wa s deprived of, or could be deprived of,
“concurrent jurisdiction.”

17
Ultimately, the Rabbes have not shown that the district court erred by issuing the
injunction. The district court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over the matter
and parties, and it made a finding well supported by the record that the Rabbes filed notices
of lis pendens unreasonably and for the purpose of causing delay. We discern no abuse of
the district court’s broad discretion to grant this equitable relief to FSB. See St. Jude Med.,
Inc., 913 N.W.2d at 678.
III. The district court did no t err in holding Joel Rabbe7 in contempt.

“The district court has broad discretion to hold an individual in contempt.”
Crockarell v. Crockarell, 631 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 16, 2001). Appellate courts review a dist rict court’s decision to invoke its contempt
power for an abuse of discretion. Mower Cty. Human Servs. ex rel. Swancutt v. Swancutt,
551 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1 996). Thus, we consider whether the order “was arbitrary
and unreasonable or whether it finds support in the record.” Gustafson v. Gustafson, 414
N.W.2d 235, 237 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted).
An individual may be held in contempt if the individual has “acted contumaciously,
in bad faith, and out of disresp ect for the judicial process.” Newstrand v. Arend , 869

7 The Rabbes’ brief asserts th roughout that the di strict court erred by finding both Joel
Rabbe and his attorney, Richard Bosse, in contempt of court. But Bosse is not a party to
this appeal. This court’s order consolidati ng these appeals specifica lly notes that Bosse
did not appeal and that “Joel S. Rabbe, et. al ., the plaintiffs in the underlying action, are
the only appellants.” That order, which issued before the deadline to appeal the contempt
order had expired, put Bosse on notice that he would need to file his own appeal to be
included here. Because he has not done so, the judgment is accordingly final as to him.
See Poured Concrete Founds., Inc. v. Andron, Inc. , 507 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. App.
1993) (“Generally, a party who fails to appeal is bound by the lower court’s decision.”),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1994).

18
N.W.2d 681, 692 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15,
2015). Under Minnesota law, there are two kinds of contempt of court: direct and
constructive. Minn. Stat. § 5 88.01, subds. 1-3 (2020). Direct contempt occurs in the
presence of the court, id., subd. 2, while constructive c ontempt is committed outside the
presence of the court and arises from any of the 11 “acts or omissions” specified in section
588.01, subdivision 3. The third of the specified acts or omissions is “disobedience of any
lawful judgment, order, or process of the court.” Id., subd. 3(3).
A district court may enforce its prior order by issuing a civil contempt order, which
“impos[es] a sanction that w ill be removed upon compliance with a court order that has
been defied.” State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1996). Before the district court
may do so, it must ensure that the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) subject matter jurisdiction, (2) a clear definition of the acts
to be performed, (3) notice of the acts to be performed and time
to comply, (4) application by th e party seeking to enforce the
acts, giving specific grounds for complaint, (5) a hearing after
due notice at which nonperforming parties can show
compliance or reason for failure , (6) formal determination by
the court of a failure to comply and a determination of whether
conditional confinement will aid compliance, (7) an
opportunity for the nonperforming party to show inability to
perform a good-faith effort, and (8 ) an ability to gain release
through compliance or a good-faith effort to comply.

Walz v. Walz, 409 N.W.2d 39, 40 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d
212, 216-17 (Minn. 1968)).
Here, the district court addressed the requi red elements in its contempt order. It
determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, and that the lis pendens
order clearly defined the prohibited action: “FSB’s motion to enjoin Plaintiffs, or anyone

19
acting on their behalf, from recording any additional notices of lis pendens on the real estate
owned by FSB is GRANTED.” The court went on to find in the contempt order that the
Rabbes and their attorney “too k volitional steps to violate th e injunction,” and that they
had a reasonable time to comp ly with the injunction both be fore and after FSB filed its
contempt motion. The Rabbes were also afforded a hearing to show compliance or reasons
for noncompliance. The district determined that their “reason for non-compliance with the
order was that they simply di sagreed with the [o]rder.” It went on to determine that
conditional confinement would aid compliance, and imposed 180 days of jail time for Joel
Rabbe and his attorney, stayed on the condition that they discharge the offending notices
of lis pendens within 14 days.
The Rabbes do not challenge any of the district court’s above determinations, which
are supported by the record, except to reassert that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to issue the lis pend ens injunction. They argue th at the order is void because
the district court lacked the authority to en join them from filing fu ture notices of lis
pendens, and because the orde r is void, the Rabbes maintain they cannot be held in
contempt for violating the injunction.
As explained, the district court acted with in its jurisdiction and authority by issuing
the lis pendens injunction. The order is not void, and therefore the Rabbes’ argument that
they are not bound by the injunction fails.
At its essence, and despite their repeated attempts to construe the issue here as one
of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Rabbes’ cha llenge to the lis pendens order is that the

20
order itself is incorrect.8 But even if the order was incorrect, the Rabbes were not at liberty
to disobey it. See Reid v. Indep. Union of All Workers, 275 N.W. 300, 301 (Minn. 1937)
(explaining that the “jurisdicti on to decide is the power to decide erroneously as well as
correctly,” and holding that a challenge to an injunction should be made to the order itself
and not raised as a defense to contempt). The United States Supreme Court has explained
that there is “impressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter and pers on must be obeyed by the parties until it is
reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.” United States v. Unite d Mine Workers of
Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293, 67 S. Ct. 677, 695-96 (1947) (concluding that “[t]he defendants,
in making their private determination of the law, acted at their peril” and could be held in
criminal contempt). Instead of waiting for a decision in their appeal or otherwise pursuing
relief through lawful proceedings, Joel Rabbe and his attorney filed the new notices of lis
pendens because they disagreed with the injunction. The district court did not err by
holding Joel Rabbe in contempt.
Affirmed.

8 They argue repeatedly that the district court erred because, contrary to its conclusion, the
lis pendens notices that they filed were for an action within the class sufficient to support
notices of lis pendens. Estate of Mansur, 384 N.W.2d at 238 (quotation omitted).