A20-0069 Precedential Affirmed in part and reversed in part Processed

A20-0072

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed December 7, 2020

The holding in the court’s own words

9 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings and affirm the district court’s decision to issue the HRO against Shane Olson.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0069
A20-0072

Judith Ann Rossel,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Olson,
Appellant (A20-0069),

Rhonda Spreeman,
Appellant (A20-0072).

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Bryan, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CV-19-10001 and 73-CV-19-10733

Judith Rossel, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Shane Olson, Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Ronda Spreeman, Montrose, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order granting a harassment restraining order
(HRO) against a ppellants Shane Olson and Ronda S preeman,1 appellants make the
following two arguments: (1) this court should reverse the district court’s decision to issue
the HRO against Spreeman due to procedural deficiencies; and (2) this court should reverse
the district court’s decision to issue the HRO against Shane Olson because the record does
not support the district court’s factual findings. We agree with Spreeman’s first argument
and conclude that the district court improperly issued the HRO against her because she was
never personally served. We do not agree with appellants’ second argument, however, and
we affirm the district court’s decision to issue the HRO against Shane Olson because the
district court did not clearly err in making its factual findings.
FACTS
In November 2019, respondent Judith Rossel petitioned for an HRO against Shane
Olson and Spreeman. The petition named as respondents, “Shane Olson, Alicia Jean Olson
aka Ronda Spreeman.” Rossel’s accompanying documents indicated that Shane Olson was
a bail-bond insurer and suggested that his and Spreeman’s actions were taken while they
were attempting to collect a debt that Rossel supposedly owed on an indemnitor contract.

1 The caption of this opinion spells Ronda Spreeman’s first name with an “h,” as do some
of the documents in the record. The caption on appeal must match the caption in the district
court’s order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. However, the original p etition and
Spreeman’s signature in appellants’ brief and in her December 18, 2019, affidavit spell her
first name as “Ronda,” so we use that spelling here. In addition, we distinguish between
the Olsons, referring to them as Shane Olson and Alicia Jean Olson.

3
The petition alleged generally that Shane Olson and Spreeman harassed Rossel by making
uninvited visits to her residence, making repeated phone calls at “all hours of the day and
night,” and threatening to take her property if she did not pay them. The district court
granted a temporary ex parte HRO. Shane Olson requested a hearing to contest the petition.
The district court held a hearing on December 12, 2019, and all parties appeared.
At the outset of the hearing, the district court discovered that Alicia Jean Olson and
Spreeman were not the same person. The district court acknowledged the error and
replaced the “aka” in the case caption with “and,” so that the caption then listed three
separate individuals: “Shane Olson, Alicia Jean Olson, and R honda Spreeman.” The
district court heard testimony from the parties.
In her testimony, Rossel admitted that she owed Shane Olson money but said that
she did not want di rect contact with him. She also explained that she first encountered
appellants when Spreeman came to her residence in May 2019 and told her she needed to
pay $14,500 that day. Rossel stated that, during that month, at “different times he’d come
to the door,” referring to Shane Olson. Rossel also spoke with Shane Olson on the phone
in May 2019. According to Rossel, Shane Olson told her, “I can come to your house any
time. I can take your house and your car and everything.” Shane Olson then began
“threatening and screaming.” Rossel said that she “just couldn’t get anywhere with him”
and characterized Shane Olson’s demeanor during that phone conversation as “very
volatile.” Rossel testified that Shane Olson also called her once at 11:00 p.m. and that he
threatened to take her property if she did not pay him. In addition, she testified that Shane
Olson made other unwanted telephone contact with her.

4
According to Rossel’s testimony, t he most recent alleged incident of harassment
occurred on November 7, 2019, when Shane Olson came to her house and dropped off a
letter. Rossel was not home at the time but said that her security system included devices
that recorded video and audio of the encounter . Rossel said that, based on the security
footage, “it looked like him,” referring to Shane Olson. On cross-examination, Rossel was
asked whether she could clearly identify the person, to which she responded, “I thought it
was Shane because that’s the only one who’s been dropping letters at my door.” When
pressed as to whether she merely assumed it was Shane Olson, she said, “Looked like it to
me that it was him.” Rossel further testified that, when Shane Olson came to her residence
that day, her security system record ed him saying, “We’re going to F up those pe ople.”
Rossel then commented about his use of that language, saying, “[T]hat’s a threat to me.”
Shane Olson also testified and disputed Rossel’s allegations, insisting that neither
he nor the others had called her, texted her, or driven by her house. He indicated that he
had not communicated with Rossel for several months until November 2019 when he
received a call from her, so he texted her and called her a few times afterwards.
The district court granted the HRO against Shane Olson and Spreeman but denied
the requested HRO against Alicia Jean Olson. It found that both Shane Olson and
Spreeman had engaged in three types of acts that constituted harassment. First, the district
court found that Shane Olson and Spreeman “[m]ade uninvited visits” to Rossel, ”
“[a]ppeared at [Rossel’s] home on 11/7/19,” and that the “security system picked up oral

5
threats,” including the statement, “We’re gonna f-ck these people up.” 2 Second, it found
that Shane Olson and Spreeman “[m]ade harassing phone calls or sent harassing text
messages” to Rossel . Third, the district court found that Shane Olson and Spreeman
“[f]rightened [Rossel] with threatening behavior,” which included “vulgar language,”
“[l]oud screaming,” and “boisterous tone.” The district court ordered Shane Olson and
Spreeman not to have contact with Rossel and prohibited them from coming within
500 feet of Rossel’s residence. The HRO was to be in effect for one year.
Shane Olson and Spreeman filed separate appeals, which this court consolidated.
D E C I S I O N
I. Lack of Personal Service on Spreeman
Spreeman argues that the HRO must be reverse d with respect to her because a
petition for an HRO was never filed against her, she was never properly served, and she
has never been provided any documents regarding the HRO despite mul tiple requests.
Because Spreeman was never personally served with the HRO petition, we vacate the HRO
against her.
The procedures for issuing an HRO are governed by Minnesota Statutes ,
section 609.748 (2018). When a petitioner files an HRO petition and the district court
grants a temporary harassment restraining order, “[a] copy of the restraining order must be
served on the respondent along with the order for hearing and petition,” and “[p]ersonal
service must be made upon the respondent not less than five days before the hearing.”

2 The district court’s findings do not exactly match the phrase used in the trial testimony :
“We’re going to F up those people.”

6
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subds. 3(a), 4(c) . The distric t court may issue an HRO only if,
among other things, “a peace officer has served respondent with a copy of the temporary
restraining order . . . and with notice of the right to request a hearing.” Id., subd. 5(b)(2).
Here, the record shows that Spreeman was never personally served with a copy of
the HRO petition or temporary restraining order before the hearing. Only Shane Olson and
Alicia Jean Olson were served. The error apparently occurred because the petition
mistakenly listed “Ronda Spreeman” as an alias for “Alicia Jean Olson” and so Spreeman
was not believed to be a separate person who needed to be served. Because Spreeman was
never properly served as required by the HRO statute, the district court lacked authority to
issue the HRO against her. Accordingly, we vacate the HRO against Spreeman.
II. Factual Findings Regarding Shane Olson
Shane Olson appeals the HRO against him, arguing that the HRO is not supported
by the testimony at the hearing.3 Specifically, Shane Olson challenges the district court’s
finding that he came to Rossel’s residence on November 7, 2019, and stated that he was

3 Shane Olson also argues that the HRO was improperly filed against multiple individuals
because it also named Alicia Jean Olson and Spreeman. Shane Olson does not cite any
legal authority for this argument. We need not address such inadequately briefed
arguments. State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480,
480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address issue not adequately briefed ); Melina v. Chaplin,
327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (declining to address issue not adequately briefed );
Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 46 4-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never
presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . . [T]he
burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” ). Moreover, because the
district court did not grant an HRO against Alicia Jean Olson and because we are reversing
the HRO with respect to Spreeman, this argument is moot.

7
“gonna f-ck these people up.” Because the district court’s findings are not clearly
erroneous, we affirm the decision to grant the HRO against Shane Olson.4
The district court may grant an HRO only if, among other things, it “finds at the
hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3). Harassment includes “ repeated
incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse
effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy
of another.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1). The district court must base its decision on testimony and
documents that were properly introduced into evidence. Anderson v. Lake , 536 N.W.2d
909
, 911-12 (Minn. App. 1995). We will set aside a district cour t’s factual findings only
if those findings are clearly erroneous. Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.
App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is
“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1985).
We give due regard “to the district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of
witnesses.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843-44. We will reverse the grant of an HRO if it is not
supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 844.
In this case, the district court found that Shane Olson and Spreeman “[m]ade
uninvited visits” to Rossel, that they “[a]ppeared at [Rossel’s] home on [November 7,
2019],” and that the “security system picked up oral threats ,” including the statement that

4 Shane Olson challenges only the district court’s factual findings but does not argue that
the district court abused its discretion in applying the law to its factual findings.

8
“We’re gonna f-ck these people up.” Shane Olson argues that the district court’s findings
are clearly erroneous because Rossel “could not identify who was there ” on November 7,
2019.
We disagree with Shane Olson for three reasons. First, this argument
mischaracterizes Rossel’s testimony. While Rossel first testified that she “thought it was
Shane because that’s the only one who’s been dropping letters at [her] door,” she later
definitively identified him in her testimony as the person on the recordings. In response to
a question about how she knew who it was on the recording, Rossel explained that she
recognized Shane Olson, stating that when she saw the person on the recording, it “[l]ooked
like it to [her] that it was him.” Second, the challenged factual finding rests on a credibility
determination made by the district court. On appellate review, we defer to the district
court’s determinations of credibility and do not second guess the weight that the district
court afforded to conflicting testimony . See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843 -44. Third, the
district court’s decision to grant the petition for an HRO rested on multiple incidents, not
just what happened on November 7, 2019. The district court found that Shane Olson and
Spreeman made other unwanted visits to Rossel’s residence, made harassing phone calls,
and frightened her with their behavior. The trial record contains sufficient evidence
regarding Shane Olson’s conduct for us to conclude that the district court did not clearly
err when it made these factual findings. For example, Rossel testified that Shane Olson
made uninvited visits during May 2019, and initiated unwanted telephone contact. During
these unwanted communications, Rossel testified that Shane Olson was “very volatile” and
“screaming.”

9
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual
findings and affirm the district court’s decision to issue the HRO against Shane Olson.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.