In re Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al., Petitioners,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0076

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

In re Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al.,
Petitioners,

Darrell Manselle, Filed: April 21, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs.

Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al.,

Appellants.
________________________

Nathaniel A. Dahl, Derek I. Stewart, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Waite Park, Minnesota,
for respondent.

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Steven R. Schwegman, and Michelle M. Draewell, Quinlivan &
Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota, for appellants.

Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae
Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

Daniel J. Cragg, Vince C. Reuter, Ecklan d & Blando LLP, Minn eapolis, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

_______________________

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S Y L L A B U S
Because the word “several” as used in the context of ve nue motions means
“separate,” two defendants may unite in a request under Minnesota Statutes section 542.10
(2020), to change venu e when a civil action is brought in a count y where one defendant
resides but where the cause of action did not arise.
Reversed; writ of mandamus issued.
O P I N I O N
HUDSON, J.
Minnesota Statutes section 542.10 (2020), governs change of ve nue as of right.
Appellants, the two defendants in this medica l malpractice case, m oved for a change of
venue under Minn. Stat. § 542.10, which allows “several defendants residing in different
counties” to compel the transfer of venue when the majority of them unite in the demand.
The district court denied th e motion, concluding that tw o defendants did not constitute
“several defendants.” The court of appeals agreed, and it therefore denied appellants’
petition for a writ of mandamus. We granted re view to decide the meaning of the word
“several” in Minn. Stat. § 542.10. We conc lude that “several” means “separate,” and
therefore we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and grant the petition for a writ of
mandamus.
FACTS
Darrell Manselle, respondent , obtained medical treatment from appellant Dr. Jeffrey
Krogstad at a medical clinic operated by ap pellant Lakewood Health System. Manselle
alleged that because Dr. Krogstad did not timely refer him to a specialist for treatment of a

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vascular condition in his left foot, Manselle suffered an avoidable partial amputation of his
left leg. Manselle sued Dr. Krogstad and La kewood Health for medical negligence. The
clinic where Manselle obtained treatment from Dr. Krogstad is located in Todd County.
Manselle is a resident of Kandiyohi County, as is Dr. Krogstad. There has been no finding
concerning where Lakewood Health is located for purposes of venue.
Manselle sued appellants in Kandiyohi County, and both appellants joined in
moving to transfer venue to Todd County under Minn. Stat. § 542.10. 1 Appellants also
moved in the alternative for a change of venue, asserting forum non conveniens under
Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4) (2020). The district court denied th e change of venue on both
grounds. The district court found that the second prong 2 of Minn. Stat. § 542.10 was not
met, because two defendants could not be considered “several” defendants for purposes of
this statute. The district court relied on dicta from a decision of the court of appeals, Riddle
v. Ringwelski , 451 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. App. 19 90), to conclude that “several”
generally means more than two.

1 “If the county designated in the complaint is not the county in which the cause of
action or some part thereof arose and if ther e are several defendants residing in different
counties, the trial shall be ha d in the county upon which a majority of them unite in
demanding or, if the numbers be equal, in that whose county seat is nearest.” Minn. Stat.
§ 542.10.

2 To be entitled to a change of venue under the statute, defendants must establish two
prongs. The first is that the “cause of acti on or some part thereof” did not arise in the
county designated by the complaint. Minn. Stat. § 542.10. Neither party disputes that the
original county—Kandiyohi County—is not the county in which “the cause of action or
some part thereof arose.” Thus, the first prong of section 542.10 is satisfied. The second
prong, which requires agreement by the major ity of “several defendants residing in
different counties,” contains the language giving rise to this appeal.

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Appellants then sought a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. In
a published special term opinion the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding
that two (and only two) defendants do not meet the statutory criteria of “several
defendants” in section 542.10. In re Krogstad, 941 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App. 2020).
The court of appeals concluded that “s everal” must mean “more than two.” Id. at 753.
Specifically, after consulting various dictionaries, the court of appeals concluded that there
was more than one reasonable interpretation of “several” and therefore the language of the
statute was ambiguous. Then, relying on th e canon against surplusage, it concluded that
“[b]ecause ‘defendants’ is already plural, interpreting ‘several defendants’ to include two
separate defendants would give no distinct meaning to th e word ‘several.’ Only by
interpreting it to mean more than two does ‘several’ have a distinct meaning from
defendants.” Id. at 753.
ANALYSIS
Minnesota Statutes section 542.10, in relevant part, provides:
If the county designated in the complaint is not the county in which the cause
of action or some part thereof arose and if there are several defendants
residing in different counties, the trial shall be had in the county upon which
a majority of them unite in demanding or, if the numbers be equal, in that
whose county seat is nearest.

(Emphasis added.) Determining the meaning of the emphasized text presents a question of
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 3 Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti ,

3 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, used to compel the performance of a duty
clearly imposed by law. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162,
171 (Minn. 2006). We review de novo the c ourt of appeals’ decision to deny the petition

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865 N.W.2d 706, 708 (M inn. 2015). Our goal in statutor y interpretation is to “ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532,
536 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Statutory
interpretation begins by assessing whether the statutory language, on its face, is ambiguous.
State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 2018). A word is ambiguous if it is “subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have cautioned, however, that simply “[ b]ecause a word has more than one meaning
does not mean it is ambiguous. The sense of a word depends on how it is being used; only
if more than one meaning applies within that context does ambiguity arise.” Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994).
In the absence of statutory definitions, we give words their plain and ordinary
meaning. State v. Alarcon , 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019). “We may consider
dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.” Id. Although the
parties both contend that the word “several” is unambiguous, we are presented with three
potential dictionary definitions of “several ,” with each party proffering a different
definition in support of their position. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 1652 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “sever al” as “[b]eing of a number more
than two or three but not many . . . . Single; distinct . . . .”); cf. The Random House
Dictionary of the English Language 1754 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “several” as “being more

for a writ of mandamus. Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell , 889 N.W.2d 568, 571
(Minn. 2017).

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than two but fewer than many in number . . . . [I]ndividual . . . . [S]eparate”). Appellants’
position is that the best defi nition is “separate,” which th ey suggest is functionally
equivalent to “two or more.” Respondent’s position is that “several” means “more than
two.” Neither party advocate s for adopting the third option, “more than two, but fewer
than many,” but appellants contend that this definition is the only alternative to their
proposed definition. Appellants point out that all dictionaries include “more than two, but
fewer than many” as one definition, and argue that respondent is surgically separating a
clause to create an artificial and incomplete definition.
To resolve whether the statute is ambi guous, we first address respondent’s
contention—upon which the court of appeals based its holding—that the word “several”
must mean “more than two,” or the term would be superfl uous because the Legislature
already pluralized the word “defendants” in the text of the statute. If “several defendants”
could apply to two defendants, the argument goe s, then “several” would be unnecessary.
This argument relies on the can on against surplusage, which stat es that as a general rule,
“[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2020). Thus, each word must be gi ven a distinct and non-identical meaning.
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017).
Initially, we observe that the canon against surplusage, “like all other canons, . . .
must be applied with judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context.” Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interp retation of Legal Texts 176 (2012).
As Scalia and Garner expl ain, “Sometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include
words that add nothing of substa nce, either out of a flawed se nse of style or to engage in

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the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.” Id. at 176−77.
In other words, context matters.
First, Section 542.10 begins with one long block paragraph, which lists several rules
for transfer of venue in single-defendant ca ses, before switching mid-paragraph from the
singular to address transfer of venue in situations involving multiple defendants. Even if
we were to apply the canon against surplusage, we conclude that the word “several” serves
multiple purposes in this context and is t hus not superfluous. First, the text of
section 542.10 refers to a singular defendant four times—in three of the instances referring
to “the defendant,” emphasizing the singularity—before switching to “several defendants.”
Including the word “several” serves the purpose of demarcat ing and drawing attention to
this transition. The transitional function of the word “several” highlights another point in
favor of appellants’ interpretation of the word as meaning “separate” or simply “more than
one.” It is most logical to read the word “several” as indicating a transition between the
many rules for single-defendant cases and the ru le for what happens in the case of more
than one defendant. Even ap plying this canon would thus not compel us to adopt
respondent’s proposed definition outright.
Second, the Legislature has instructed us that “the singular includes the plural; and
the plural, the singular.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) (2020). Under section 645.08(2),
therefore, the phrase “defendant s residing in different counties” could be interpreted to
include “a defendant residing in a different county.” It would not make sense to read this
statute as “several defendant living in a different county.” Under this canon, therefore, the
addition of the word “several” clarifies that there must be more than one defendant living

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in a different county. Otherw ise, assuming the singular incl udes the plural, this statute
would work interchangeably for one or mul tiple defendants, which would render it both
illogical and useless.
Amicus Minnesota Association for Justic e raises a counter argument. In two
adjacent sections, Minn. Stat. §§ 542.09–.095, the Legislature uses the word “defendants”
without first modifyin g it with “several.” 4 According to the Association, this language
suggests that the Legislature intentionally included the word “several” in section 542.10,
while intentionally omitting it in related provi sions, opting instead for simply pluralizing
“defendants.” We are not pers uaded by this argument. The text of section 542.10 uses
“defendants” quite differently than does the text of sections 542.09 and 542.095. The first
sentence of section 542.09 reads: “All actions not enumerated in sections 542.02 to 542.08
and 542.095 shall be tried in a county in which one or more of the defendants reside when
the action is begun or in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose.” This is the
only reference to “defendants” in the section. Similarly, section 542.095 is one sentence
long and uses the phrase “the defendant or a majority of the defendants” only one time. In
contrast, section 542.10 has one lengthy paragraph that uses the singular “defendant” four
times before switching to the plural form of the word in the middle of the paragraph.
Because the relevant portion of section 542.10 is a lengthy paragraph, it is different from

4 “All actions not enumerated in sections 542.02 to 542.08 and 542.095 shall be tried
in a county in which one or mo re of the defendants reside wh en the action is begun or in
which the cause of action or some part thereo f arose.” Minn. Stat. § 542.09. Similarly,
Minn. Stat. § 542.095 reads, “[An action] may be brought in the county where the action
arose or in the county of the residence of th e defendant or a majority of the defendants
against whom the action is brought . . . .”

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sections 542.09 and 542.095. It requires a demarcation of the transition, which was not
required to make the Legislature’s purpose clear in sections 542.09 and 542.095.
For their part, appellants identify the use of the word “several” in 257 Minnesota
statutes and the Minnesota Constitution, arguing based on these uses that reading the word
to mean “more than two, bu t less than many” would lead to absurd resu lts in these
provisions. Under the “more than two but less than many” interpretation, they contend, all
of the statutes that use “several,” and the governor’s line item veto provision in the state
constitution, would no longer a pply when the provisions are a pplied to two of something
(or for that matter, to “many”), be they items of appropriation,5 defendants in an equitable
action,6 phases of a project, 7 or credit card numbers 8, to name a few examples given by
appellants. For example, the governor would be able to veto portions of a bill that makes
one appropriation of money, or three or more, but fewer than “many” appropriations, but
not two. The issue we face in this case, of course, is limited to the interpretation of Minn.
Stat. § 542.10; those other prov isions are not before us. Bu t this analysis of the word

5 See Minn. Const. art. IV, § 23 (stating that “[i]f a bill presente d to the governor
contains several items of appropriation of m oney, he may veto one or more of the items
while approving the bill”).

6 See Minn. Stat. § 549.07 (2020) (providing that when there are “several” defendants
in an equitable action, the court has discretion in awarding costs).

7 See Minn. Stat. § 16E.03, subd. 1(g) (2020) (stating that breaking a project into
“several phases” does not affect the cost thre sholds, which must be computed on the full
cost of all phases).

8 See Minn. Stat. § 609.893, subd. 3(b) (2020) (when classifying an offense, allowing
the aggregation of certain criminal offenses under a scheme or course of conduct involving
“the same credit card number or several credit card numbers”).

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“several” across various statutes and the Minnesota Constitution suggests that this term is
often used within the legal context to indicate separate subjects, and we thus need not be
concerned with any potential grammatical redundancy.
Finally, and most persuasively, it appear s highly improbable that the Legislature
would include direction on pr oper transfer procedures in cases where there is only one
defendant, three or more defendants, but not two defendants, especially if the omission is
not made explicitly. Not only do es the statute not compel th e interpretation the court of
appeals reached, it compels appellants’ interpretation unambiguously. Thus, we conclude
that “several” unambiguously means “separate.”
Review of our precedents further supports our conclusion. Although we have never
expressly defined the word “several,” our ca se law provides useful insights into how we
have interpreted other components of Minn. Stat. § 542.10. In Dworsky v. Herbst ,
95 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1959), multip le defendants were sued to recover unpaid rent for a
property in Anoka County. One defendant was served with the summons and complaint,
and another was not. Id. at 20. The defendant who had no t been served wi shed to join
with the defendant who had been serv ed in demanding a venue transfer. Id. at 21. The
question before the court was the following: “What are the rights of a defendant named in
a summons and complaint but not yet served w ith summons to join with a defendant who
has been served in a demand for a change of venue under § 542.10?” Id.
We determined that the purpose of the statute was to give defendants a “measure of
control over the place of trial.” Id. at 25. Accordingly, we held that “the demand and
affidavit are sufficient to comp ly with the statutory requirem ents if a defendant who has

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not yet been served with a summons may join with one who has been so served.” Id. at 23.
Although we did not specifically address wh ether “several” means separate, there were
only two defendants in Dworsky. Id. Thus, it is unlikely that Dworsky would have been
decided as it was if “several” did not mean separate.
In State ex rel. Johnson v. Mills, 245 N.W. 431 (Minn. 1 932), we were asked to
define the word “majority” in the same statute.9 We determined that “when there is more
than one defendant the venue can be changed only by demand in which the majority unite.”
Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Additionally, we observed that “[t]he statute does not permit
one of two or more defendants alone to change the venue.” Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
Both statements are examples of when we have treated the word “several” as inclusive of
cases where there are only two defendants.
Amicus Minnesota Association of Justice argues that Mills is not binding because
we were not asked to define “several,” but in stead, “majority.” It asserts that because the
court did not “apply its judicial mind” to the precise definition of “several,” Mills is not
instructive. See Fletcher v. Scott, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (Minn. 1938) (stating that the rule of
stare decisis applies only when “the judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the
precise question”). While the Association is correct that our comments on these definitions
were dicta in Mills, a clear understanding of the word “several” is highly relevant to what

9 The relevant part of the statute at issue in Mills reads identically, with the exception
of a comma, to the current version of section 542.10. See Mason’s Minn. Stat. ch. 77,
§ 9215 (1927) (“If there are several defendants residing in different counties, the trial shall
be had in the county upon which a majority of them unite in demanding, or, if the numbers
be equal, in that whose county seat is nearest.” (emphasis added)).

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we have previously said is our understanding of the word “majority.” Without a sense of
the possibilities for the scope of “several,” it would be difficult for us to be clear on what
would ultimately constitute a majority for statutory purposes. Therefore, Mills provides
strong persuasive authority that supports appellants’ definition.
Our decision in State ex rel. Williams v. District Court of Douglas County, 245 N.W.
379 (Minn. 1932), is also instructive. In Williams, a district court transferred the venue of
a case after one defendant purported to join with another defendant in demanding a change
of venue under what is now section 542.10. Id. at 380. We held that the transfer was
improper because the demand was made more than 20 days after the initially demanding
defendant was served w ith the summons and therefore was not timely. Id. While we
ultimately resolved the case on timeliness grounds, we discussed in dicta a hypothetical in
which two defendants could make up a sufficient majority. Id. Specifically, we stated that
the two defendants could have joined in a de mand to transfer venue within 20 days after
the first defendant was served with the summons. Id. Thus, while Williams is not
dispositive, it reflects our history of treatin g the word “several” as including only two
defendants.
Appellants and amicus also rely on Misgen v. Herda, 108 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1961),
but Misgen is largely inapposite. There, we held that affidavits lis ting the county of
residence for all defendants are requi red in a multiple-defendant case. Id. at 626. In so
doing, we used the wo rd “multiple” eight times through out the opinion, even though the
statutory word then, as now, was “several.” Id. Appellants and amicus curiae Minnesota
Defense Lawyers Association assert that Misgen demonstrates th at “multiple” and

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“several” each simply mean “more than one.” Although Misgen provides some
circumstantial support for this position, it is not dispositive because the issue in Misgen
had nothing to do with defini ng the statutory language, but ra ther, whether an affidavit is
required in a multiple-defendant case.10
For his part, respondent identifies two cases where we have used the word “several”
interchangeably with th e word “multiple.” See Donovan v. Dixon , 99 N.W.2d 783, 785
(Minn. 1959); First Nat’l Bank v. F.M. Distribs., Inc., 124 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. 1963)
(quoting Donovan, 99 N.W.2d at 785). Respondent contends that our interchangeable use
of these words represents a “numerical” in terpretation that is commonly understood to
mean “more than two.” But Donovan and First National Bank are, likewise, not
dispositive. Although we did use the word “multiple” in place of the word “several,” it is
not clear how this use precludes an interpreta tion that “several” simply means more than
one defendant. “Multiple” is arguably more commonly understood to mean a pure
multiplicity, which is consistent with appellants’ definition of “separate.”
Respondent, and the court of appeals, relies on dicta in Riddle v. Ringwelski ,
451 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. App. 1990), to reinforce this numerical argument. Riddle does
offer some support for respondent’s argument because the court, citing to Black’s Law
Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), stated there that tw o defendants likely would not constitute
“several” for purposes of section 542.10. Id. at 373 (noting that “several” means “more

10 Respondent characterizes hi s proposed definition as the “numerical” definition, but
makes no attempt to explain how we should read appellants’ definition if not numerically.
Respondent’s implication seems to be that the word “separate” suggests a divisible state of
being, not a numerical descriptor.

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than two”). But the court of appeals in Riddle was not asked to defi ne “several,” and it
decided the case entirely on timeliness grounds. Id. Further, the entire definition from
Black’s reads, “[M]ore than two, often used to designate a number greater than one.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 11 Thus, when read in its entirety, the definition
weighs equally in favor of appellants’ proposed definition. Consequently, Riddle offers
little support for respondent’s position.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that “several” means “separ ate.” The statute
unambiguously compels this interpretation, as the context confirms that it is the only
reasonable interpretation. Further, a review of our precedents indicates that this
interpretation is consistent with how we ha ve interpreted the word “several” in venue
statutes, albeit in dicta. We clarify today th at “several” means “separate” for purposes of
Minn. Stat. § 542.10.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and grant
the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Reversed; writ of mandamus issued.

11 This edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “several” as “Separate;
individual; independent; severable.”