State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0080

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Arnold Lindeman,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-18-221

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jessica J. Fralich, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Following a bank robbery in which two bank tellers were sprayed with bear mace,
police spotted appellant William Lindeman wa lking with a black garbage bag from his
house into the woods on his property. Af ter Lindeman returned empty handed, police

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searched the black bag and a nearby cooler, which contained bundles of cash, weapons,
and clothes matching the description of the bank robber. Lindeman moved to suppress this
evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illega l search. The district court denied the
motion. Lindeman appeals that decision, and also contends the district court improperly
gave two convictions for aggravated robbery that should instead be considered a single
crime with a single conviction. Because the ite ms were found in an “open field” outside
the scope of the Fourth Ame ndment, and the sentencing gu idelines allo w for multiple
convictions for aggravated robbery, we affirm.
FACTS
A man described as five foot seven and st ocky, later determined to be appellant
William Lindeman, robbed a bank in Orr in March 2018. 1 Donning a grey ski mask and
black goggles, Lindeman approached the teller’s counter and sprayed both tellers with bear
mace in order to access the cash drawer and take the money. He fled the scene on an ATV
with a cooler mounted on the back. An ey ewitness reported that a male matching the
description of the suspect drove up the driveway of Lindeman’s property shortly after the
bank robbery. Lindeman’s property is 12-and-a-half mostly wooded acres. Other than his
house, there are no structures, fences, retain ing walls, or other artificial barriers on his
property. The driveway is several hundred yards long and curves from the house down to
a state highway.

1 The facts described are a summary of those provided at a contested omnibus hearing.

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Officers from multiple law enforcement departments arrived roughly half an hour
after the robbery, but initially remained at th e driveway’s end. An ATV was parked in
plain view outside Lindeman’s home. As officers planned on how best to approach the
property, an officer spotted a man walking down the driveway carrying a black garbage
bag, and then heading into th e adjoining woods. The office rs approached the man, now
identified as Lindeman, as he returned from the woods no lo nger holding the black bag.
The black bag could be seen from the driveway. It was placed on the ground in the woods
roughly 200 yards from Lindeman’s house and 100 yards from the highway. An officer
followed boot prints in the snow to the black bag where he spotted a white blanket covering
an unknown object. Believing it could possib ly cover a person involved in the robbery,
the officer lifted the blanket to reveal a gree n cooler, which he also opened. A search
warrant was then obtained for the house and other items, including the cooler. The black
bag and cooler were later seized and sear ched. The black bag contained a ski mask,
goggles, and clothes matching the descripti on of those worn at the bank robbery. The
cooler contained a loaded 9mm handgun, chemical spray (bear mace), $8,077 in cash, and
a loaded rifle.
Lindeman was arrested and charged with one count of first-degree aggravated
robbery. Minn. Stat. § 609.245 , subd. 1 (2016). In an ame nded complaint, an additional
count of first-degree aggravated robbery was added to reflect one count of aggravated
robbery for each of the bank tellers who was sprayed with mace.
Before trial, Lindeman objected to the observation of the blac k bag in the woods,
the removal of the white blanket covering th e cooler, and the opening of the cooler as

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infringements of his Fourth Amendment prot ections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Following a contested omnibus heari ng in July 2019, the district court denied
Lindeman’s motion to suppress the evidence. The district court concluded that the ATV
was within the curtilage of Lindeman’s home but that it was in the plain view of the
driveway.2 As for the cooler and bl ack bag, the district court determined that those items
were found in an “open field,” ultimately concluding that their discovery was not a search.3
Following a jury trial, the jury found Lindeman guilty of two counts of first-degree
aggravated robbery for each of the bank telle rs. The district court imposed concurrent
sentences of 48 months and 58 months. Lindeman appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, Lindeman raises two issues. First, he argues that the district court erred
by denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant, which we view
through the lens of the Fourth Amendment. Second, he contends that the district court
improperly imposed multiple convictions for ag gravated robbery, ar guing that spraying
two bank tellers with bear mace constitutes the same course of conduct. We address each
issue in turn.

2 Lindeman is not appealing the discovery of the ATV.
3 The district court alternatively concluded that the items were protected by warrant
exceptions due to exigent circumstances and the independent-source doctrine.

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I. The district court did not err in refusin g to suppress the evidence found in an
open field.

Lindeman challenges the district court’s conclusion that the discovery of the black
plastic bag and blanket-covered cooler was permissible because it took place in an “open
field.”
When reviewing a district court’s pretri al order on a motion to suppress evidence,
this court reviews “the district court’s fact ual findings under a clearly erroneous standard
and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496,
502 (Minn. 2008). When the facts are not in dispute, as is the case here, “we review a
pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo and determine whether the police articulated
an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867,
871 (Minn. 2011).
The United States Constituti on guarantees an individua l’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, an unlawful search
or seizure under the Fourth Amendment o ccurs when an indi vidual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is invaded. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507,
512 (1967). And evidence unconstitutionally seized must be suppressed. State v. Jackson,
742 N.W.2d 163, 177-78 (Minn. 2007). The special protection by the Fourth Amendment
only applies to “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and is not extended to “open fields,”
a broad term that has been applied to a rang e of circumstances, including wooded areas,
deserts, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs and open waters, or even when
the evidence discovered was not in plain view. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-

6
77, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 (1984); see also State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Minn.
1989). But the Fourth Amendment does apply to the curtilage of a home. State v. Crea,
233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1975). Curtila ge is an area imme diately and intimately
connected to the home, providing a reasonable expectati on of privacy to the resident.
State v. Chute, 908 N.W.2d 578, 584-85 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 413 (2018)
(citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134-39 (1987)). Accordingly,
we look to whether the area in which Lindeman’s items were found was within the curtilage
of his home. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.
To determine whether this ar ea is located within the cu rtilage of the property—as
opposed to an open field—we consider whether it harbors the “intimate activity associated
with the sanctity of a [person’s] home and the privacies of life.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180,
104 S. Ct. at 1742; see also State v. Lewis , 270 N.W.2d 891, 897 (M inn. 1978) (holding
that “the driveway to a house is part of its curtilage for purposes of executing a search
warrant”). And while most boundaries of cu rtilage are “clearly marked,” exceptions
abound. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 n.12. Minnesota courts utilize a
four-factor analysis to determine the extent of curtilage, particularly when the boundaries
are not clear. To do so we weigh (1) the proxi mity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to
protect the area from observation by people passing by. State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634,
636-37 (Minn. 1987) (citing Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139).

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Turning to the first factor—proximity—t he record shows that the evidence was
relatively far from the home. The black bag and cooler were estimated to be 200 yards
from the house, twice as far as th ey were to the major highway. In contrast, the barn in
question in Dunn was 60 yards from the house, which was described by that court as a
“substantial distance.” 480 U.S. at 302, 107 S. Ct. at 1140. We discern that the distance
between the items and the hous e supports no inference that the woods “should be treated
as an adjunct of the house.” Id.
But Lindeman argues that because the items were close to the driveway, which is
within the curtilage, this fact suggests that the items were also within the curtilage. We are
not convinced. Lindeman does not point to— nor does caselaw support—a holding that
because an area of property is touching curtilage, the curtilage expands to that area as well.
And for good reason. Such an argument would endlessly extend curtilage, and this first
factor considers the proximity “to the home,” not to other areas within the curtilage. Id. at
301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139.
Second, none of the items in question were found in an enclosed area. There were
no structures, fences, retaining walls, or other artificial boundaries on Lindeman’s
property.4

4 Still, Lindeman argues that his home, located in a rural, remote, wooded area, should not
be held to the standards of an urban or su burban community. Lind eman cites to a Sixth
Circuit case to explain that natural barriers such as woods and hedges are entitled to the
same protection as those formed by artificial barriers. Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin ,
150 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1998). But that case dealt with a cleared backyard framed by
trees, unlike the wooded area here. As a result, it is unpersuasive.

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Nor does the nature of the use of the area where the items were found weigh in favor
of a curtilage assessment. See United States v. Wells , 648 F.3d 671, 673, 679 (8th
Cir. 2011) (stating that a fenced-in backyard obscured from public view is within the
curtilage). This court looks to examples like fire pits, evidence of recreational activities,
livelihood, or other activities “closely related to the home and associated with the privacies
of life” when considering this factor. Chute, 908 N.W.2d at 585. Here, the wooded area
appeared unused and Lindeman offers no examples of a discernable use of this area that
would suggest it is within the curtilage of his home.
Finally, with regard to the fo urth factor, there is no ev idence that Li ndeman took
steps to obscure the wooded area from the public. One result of this lack of protection: the
black bag was visible from the highway.
Weighing the four factors, we are convinc ed that the items were not found within
the curtilage. Taken as a whole, the items appear to be in an area that no reasonable officer
would mistake for an area meant for intimate activity necessitating privacy. Without this
showing, the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue, and the
district court properly concluded that Lindeman’s constitutional rights were not violated as
to justify a motion to suppress.5

5 Lindeman also argues that the items searched were not protected by either the exigent-
circumstances exception or the independent-source doctrine. Similarly, Lindeman cites to
United States v. Mallory , 765 F.3d 373 (3d Cir. 2014) to say that because the officers
secured the premises before searching the cooler, the exigency of the moment was abated
and the warrant requirement reattached. However, because the area where these items were
found was an open field, we need not address those arguments. See State v. Henning ,
666 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 2003) (stating that because the court reached a conclusion on
one Fourth Amendment issue, it did not need to reach the other raised arguments).

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II. The district court properly entered multiple convicti ons for aggravated
robbery because Lindeman caused bodily harm to two separate victims in the
same course of conduct.

Next, Lindeman contends that the court erred when it entered two convictions for
two counts of aggravated robbery. The robbe ry, he asserts, was a “single behavioral
incident,” for which he can only be convict ed once under Minnesota Statutes section
609.04 (2016). “Whether a defendant commits multiple-victim crimes is a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Skipintheday , 717 N.W.2d 423, 426
(Minn. 2006).
Under section 609.04, “a defendant can not be convicted twice for the same
offense against the same victim on the basis of the same act.” State v. Goodridge ,
352 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Minn. 1984) (emphasis added). If the defendant commits the same
offense against multiple victims as part of the same behavioral incident, then multiple
convictions are permissible. State v. Mendoza, 297 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1980). While
the multiple-victims exception is more commonly used in cases involving multiple
sentences, Minnesota courts also recogniz e the exception’s application to multiple
convictions, particularly when th ey are crimes against persons. See, e.g., State v. Notch,
446 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. 1989); State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1987).
Turning to this case, Lindeman was convicted for aggravated robbery for separately
spraying two different tellers with bear mace during the same robbery. Minn.
Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1. For a conviction of aggravated robbery, the property that is taken
does not have to be from the person that rece ives bodily harm, because simple robbery is
defined as being in the presence of another. Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2016). As applied to

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Lindeman, while he only took the property of the bank, he did so in the presence of two
individuals who he then sprayed with bear mace in order to gain access to the cash drawers.
Unlike convictions for simple robbery, conc urrent sentences for multiple first-degree
aggravated-robbery convictions are perm issive under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(1)(ii), 6 (2016). Despite occurring during the
same robbery, both the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and the multiple-victims rule
allow for multiple convictions.
To attempt to convince us otherwise, Lindeman cites to a case where the Minnesota
Supreme Court reasoned that it could not allow three burglary convictions “simply because
three people were present in the house when it was burglarized.” State v. Hodges ,
386 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1986). In Hodges, the supreme court stated that because the
crime of burglary is classified in the criminal code as a property crime, a burglary of a
dwelling with multiple people should only justify one burglary conviction for the purposes
of section 609.04. Id. But, it added that “[u]nder th is approach, the commission of other
crimes, such as assault or robbery” could justify additional convictions and sentences per
victim. Id. (emphasis added). We are not persuaded with Lindeman’s reliance on Hodges,
as he was convicted of aggravated robbery—a crime against a person—instead of burglary.
Additionally, the amended complaint charged two counts of robbery—for each act against
one of the bank tellers—and th e jury verdicts reflect that they found him guilty for
aggravated robbery against each individual teller.

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Because two convictions are permitted for first-degree aggravated robbery, the
district court acted appropriately when ente ring judgments of conviction for both counts
and imposing concurrent sentences.
Affirmed.