State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0084

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dennis Rioba Nyandiekda,
Appellant.

Filed November 9, 2020
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19WS-CR-19-6209

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Alina Schwartz, Assistant Eagan City Attorney, Campbell Knutson Professional
Association, Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that his guilty ple a to driving under the influence of alcohol was
inaccurate and that reversal and remand for plea withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 9, 2019, a state trooper stopped appellant Dennis Rioba Nyandiekda for
speeding, observed signs of Nyandiekda’s intoxication, heard him admit to drinking, and
learned that Nyandiekda had two qualifying impaired-driving incidents on his record. The
state charged Nyandiekda with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn.
Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), .25, subds. 1(a), 2 (2018), and he later agreed to plead guilty.
At his plea hearing, Nyandiekda testified that he had reviewed and signed a written
plea petition, which contained the following handwritten description: “I am pleading guilty
because on [April 9, 2019,] in the city of Eagan, I operated a motor vehicle after consuming
alcohol [and] that consumption impaired my ability to operate that motor vehicle. I have
a prior in 2018 and 2017.” The district court received the written plea petition and
examined Nyandiekda as follows:
Q: [W]ere you operating a motor vehicle in the city of
Eagan, Dakota County, Minnesota?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: You came to the attention of a police officer because
you were driving i n excess of the speed limit. Would
you agree?
A: Yes.

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Q: In fact . . . they say that they clocked you going 97 in a
70. Would you agree?
A: Yes.
Q: Upon having stopped the vehicle having contact with
you, they could smell an odor of a[n] alcohol beverage.
Would you agree?
A: Yes.
Q: Had you been consuming alcohol before you drove?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you not sure?
A: Yes. No, I—I am sure.
Q: Okay. So you were drinking before you were driving?
A: I had had a drink earlier, yes.
Q: And would you agree that the alcohol impaired your
ability to drive?
A: Yes.
. . . .
Q: Sir, you would agree that you have two prior DWI
convictions?
A: Yes.
Q: One is from June 5, 2018, and the other one is from
October 21, 2017?
A: Yes.
The district court accepted Nyandiekda’s plea, adjudicated the conviction, and placed
Nyandiekda on supervised probation. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Nyandiekda urges us to reverse his conviction and remand for plea withdrawal ,
arguing that his guilty plea was inaccurate and therefore invalid. We review the validity
of a guilty plea de novo. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 214 -15 (Minn. App. 2015),

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review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). A defendant must be permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea when it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Raleigh , 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea is invalid, and a manifest injustice exists, if the
plea is inaccurate. See State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). “A ccuracy
requires that the plea be supported by a proper factual basis[:] that there must be sufficient
facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge
to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003)
(quotation omitted). The district court typically satisfies the accuracy requirement by
asking a defendant to explain the circumstances of his offense, and it must be “particularly
wary” of using leading questions to develop a factual basis. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
The pertinent elements of second-degree driving under the influence of alcohol are
(1) that the defendant drove a motor vehicle, (2) while under the influence of alcohol, and
(3) with two “qualified prior impaired driving incident[s] within the ten years immediately
preceding” the offense. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.03, subd. 3(1), .20, subd. 1(1), .25,
subd. 1(a) (2018). “A person is under the influence when a person does not possess that
clearness of intellect and control of himself that he otherwise would have.” State v. Ards,
816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Nyandiekda argues that the district court failed to develop an adequate factual basis
because it asked Nyandiekda only a sh ort series of leading questions. Although we
discourage the use of leading questions, “a defendant may not withdraw his plea simply
because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record contains sufficient evidence
to support the conviction. ” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 -95. Here, the plea colloquy is

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supplemented by the written plea petition, signed by Nyandiekda, in which Nyandiekda
admitted (1) “I operated a motor vehicle af ter consuming alcohol,” (2) “consumption [of
alcohol] impaired my ability to operate that motor vehicle,” and (3) “I have a prior in 2018
and 2017.” The plea petition contains affirmative admissions to each element of the crime
independent of the district court’s leading questions. The plea colloquy and written
petition, considered together, established an adequate factual basis.
Nyandiekda poses questions that the district court could have asked to better
develop additional context. But we do not review whether the district court could have
developed a more detailed factual basis; we instead consider whether there are “sufficient
facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge
to which he desires to plead guilty.” Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349 (quotation omitted) .
Here, Nyandiekda admitted sufficient facts to support the conclusion that he drove while
under the influence of alcohol within ten years of two qualifying impaired -driving
incidents.1 His guilty plea was therefore accurate, and reversal is not necessary to correct
a manifest injustice.
Affirmed.

1 This case is unlike those cited by Nyandiekda where the supreme court has reversed and
remanded for plea withdrawal. See Shorter v. State , 511 N.W.2d 743, 744, 746 (Minn.
1994) (reversing postconviction court and remanding where factual basis was established
solely on leading questions and the police department found exculpatory evidence after the
plea, admitting that the original investigation was incomplete ); State v. Hoaglund , 240
N.W.2d 4, 4-5 (Minn. 1976) (concluding that district court and attorneys failed to ask any
questions regarding a necessary element of the offense).