State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0085

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jamshid Abdugafarovi Akramov,
Appellant.

Filed February 16, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-6553

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney , Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Tracy
M. Smith, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
After a court trial, the di strict court found Jamshid Abdugafarovi Akramov guilty
of two offenses: hiring a child to engage in prostitution and electronic solicitation of a child

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to engage in sexual conduct. We conclude that the state’s evidence is sufficient to support
the convictions. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On Friday, February 2, 2018, at approx imately noon, Akramov texted a telephone
number shown in an advertisement in the “women seeking men” section of backpage.com.
The advertisement included a photograph of a female person and stated that she was 19
years old. The advertisement was not genuin e but, rather, was part of an undercover
operation in which law-enforcement officers posted the advertisement and monitored calls
and messages to the telephone number associated with the advertisement.
Akramov’s first text stated, “Hi sweetie!” An officer, posing as the female person
depicted in the advertisement, answered, “Hi how are u.” Akramov and the officer
exchanged text messages about prices and tim e periods. Akramov c hose a “quick visit,”
which the officer wrote would cost $80, which was less expensive than an hour or a half
hour. The officer sent a text saying, “I am young and dont feel like going to jail for doing
this you are going to be cool right?” Akram ov responded in the affirmative. The officer
then wrote, “perfect I am 15 will be 16 next month.” Akramov responded by writing that
the fictitious girl was six y ears younger than 21, the age he had (falsely) assigned to
himself. The officer wrote, “yeah i am cool if you are.” Akramov wrote, “Yes only I’m
scared me by your police.” Akramov and the officer continued to exchange text messages
about Akramov’s request for a video call, th e girl’s location, wh ether Akramov had a
condom, whether the girl wanted to meet fo r coffee, and Akramov’s suggestion that they
“do it in car.”

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At approximately 2:00 p.m., after a delay, the officer wrote, “you still coming?”
Akramov responded in the affirmative. Akramov asked additional questions about whether
the fictitious girl woul d “do out call” or “GFE,” meaning girlfriend experience. He also
wrote, “This is my first time and . . . I am so scared.” When Akramov again noted that he
was 21 while the girl was only 16, the officer wrote again that the girl was “almost 16.”
Akramov sent additional text messages stating that he had recently broken up with his
girlfriend, requesting additional photographs, and asking if the girl wanted a boyfriend. At
approximately 3:00 p.m., the officer wrote, “ok have a good day.” Eight minutes later,
Akramov resumed the text exchange, asking the girl whether she was working all night.
At approximately 6:00 p.m., Akramov and the officer made arrangements for Akramov to
meet the girl at 8:30 p.m.
At approximately 8:30 p.m., Akramov wr ote that he was on his way and asked for
the fictitious girl’s address. The officer directed Akramov to go to a nearby retail store and
told him to text again when he had arrived there. Akra mov did so, and the officer texted
him the name and address of a particular hotel. When Akramov texted again to say that he
had arrived at the hotel, the officer told him to go to room 140, knock on the door, and say
his name. Akramov wrote, “can you show up on the door pls want to see you.” The officer
reiterated that Akramov should say his name when he was outside the door to the hotel
room.
At approximately 9:20 p.m., Akramov follo wed the instructions he was given and
was arrested by police officers at the door to the hotel room. In a search incident to the

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arrest, the officers found on his person $85 in cash and the cell phone he had used to
exchange text messages with the undercover officer.
The state charged Akramov with hiring a chil d to engage in prostitution, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3) ( 2016), and electronic solicitation of a child to
engage in sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(1) (2016).
Akramov waived his right to a jury trial. The case was tried to the district court on one day
in August 2019. The state presented the testimony of four police officers who were
involved in the undercover inve stigation and introduced six ex hibits, including a copy of
the backpage.com advertisement and a tran script of the text messages exchanged by
Akramov and the undercover officer. Akram ov did not testify and did not present any
other evidence. In September 2019, the distri ct court filed a ten-page order in which it
found Akramov guilty of both charges. The district court stayed imposition of the sentence
for five years, placed Akramo v on probation, and ordered him to serve 60 days in the
county workhouse. Akramov appeals.
DECISION
Akramov argues that the evidence is in sufficient to support his conviction of both
offenses.
I. Hiring a Child to Engage in Prostitution
Akramov first argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the offense of hiring a child to engage in prostitution. The statute
under which Akramov was charged and convicte d states that a person commits the crime
if he or she “hires or offers or agrees to hire an individual who the actor reasonably believes

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to be under the age of 16 year s but at least 13 years to enga ge in sexual penetration or
sexual contact.” Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we ordinarily
undertake “a painstaking analysis of the reco rd to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most fa vorable to the conviction, wa s sufficient” to support the
conviction. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “We
will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the
factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict.” State v. Palmer, 803
N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). A verdict will not be overturned if the
factfinder, “acting with due regard for the pr esumption of innocence and the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could r easonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
A.
Akramov argues that, for three reasons, the st ate’s evidence is insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he “hired” a person between the ages of 13 and 15 to engage
in sex: first, he never made a payment; second, any agreement about a sum of money
occurred before he learned of the supposed age of the fictitious girl; and third, his
communications with the girl did not incl ude specifics about the sexual acts to be
performed. In response, the state argues that Akramov solic ited the girl by making the
initial inquiry, by requesting a “quick visit,” by asking for her location after she wrote that
she was only 15 years old, by exchanging text messages about topics of a sexual nature,
and by arriving at the designated hotel room and attempting to open the door.

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The first part of Akramov’s argument is without merit because the statute prohibits
not only hiring but also offering to hire and agreeing to hire. See Minn. Stat. § 609.324,
subd. 1(b)(3). Even if Akramov never paid money to the fictitious girl, his words and
conduct constitute both an offer to hire and an agreement to hire the girl. The word “hire,”
as used in this context, means “to engage the labor or services of another for wages or other
payment,” and “an act of solic iting prostitution is complete when the original offer is
made.” State v. Suspitsyn , 941 N.W.2d 423, 428 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotations and
alterations omitted), review denied (Minn. May 27, 2020). Acco rdingly, it is immaterial
that Akramov never actually made payment.
The second part of this argument is without merit because Akramov followed
through on his earlier agreement to hire the fictitious girl ev en after being informed that
she was only 15 years old. He indicated some hesitation after learning of the girl’s age,
referencing both the apparent age difference be tween them and the prospect of “police.”
That occurred at approximately 12:30 p.m. Yet Akramov la ter resumed the exchange of
text messages and continue d communicating with the girl for several hours until he
eventually went to her hotel room.
The third part of this argument is without merit because the evidence clearly shows
that the agreement between Akramov and the fictitious girl was for “sexual penetration or
sexual contact,” even if the particular type or form of penetratio n or contact was not
specified. See Minn. Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3). The state introduced direct evidence
consisting of the transcript of the text messages exchanged by Akramov and the undercover
officer as well as the trial testimony of police officers about the well-accepted meanings of

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the statements made in the text messages, wh ich proved that Akramov sought to hire the
girl for sexual services.
B.
Akramov also argues that the state’s evid ence is insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intend ed to engage in sexual penetration or sexual conduct as
opposed to intending merely to interact with the fictitious girl without any sexual contact.
A state typically proves a defendant’s stat e of mind with circumstantial evidence.
See State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 20 10). If a conviction depends on
circumstantial evidence, this court uses a heightened standard of review. Id. at 473; State
v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 30 9 (Minn. App. 2013). In such a case, we apply a two-step
test to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn.
2014). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. (citing State v. Andersen , 784
N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)). “In identifying the circumstances proved, we assume that
the [factfinder] resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent with the
[factfinder’s] verdict.” Id. (citing Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 329). Second, we “examine
independently the reasonableness of the in ferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved,” and then determine whether “the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
(quotations and alteration omitte d). We consider the eviden ce as a whole rather than
examine each piece in isolation. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332.
In this case, the relevant circumstances proved are stated above. Akramov contends
that the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference that he intended to hire, offer

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to hire, or agree to hire a person less than 16 y ears old to engage in sex. In response, the
state argues that the context of the entire exchange of text messages supports the inference
that Akramov intended to engage in sexual penetration or sexual conduct. We agree with
the state that the circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that he intended
to hire, offer to hire, or agree to hire a person less than 16 years old to engage in sex. The
circumstantial evidence shows that Akramov understood that the fictitious girl would
charge him $80 for a “quick visit.” The stat e’s witnesses testified that the term “quick
visit” commonly is used in this context to describe a sexual encounter lasting
approximately 15 minutes. Many of Akramov’s subsequent text messages were sexual in
nature. Akramov followed through on the sex-oriented discussion in the text messages by
going to the fictitious girl’s hotel room with enough cash in his pocket to pay for a “quick
visit.”
The next question is whether “the circumst ances proved are . . . inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation omitted).
Akramov contends that the circumstantial evidence is consistent with a rational hypothesis
that, after learning of the fictitious girl’s young age, he changed his mind and thereafter
sought something other than sexual penetration or sexual conduct, such as companionship
without sexual conduct. He contends that he “vacillated” as to whether or not to meet the
girl and was “uncertain” about it. That may have been true in mid-afternoon. But Akramov
later decided to go to the girl’s hotel room , without any express agreement for something
other than a “quick visit,” which indicates that he intended to follow through on the prior
agreement. Akramov arrived at the hotel room with $85 in his pocket, just enough to pay

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the agreed upon price of $80. Akramov’s sugg ested inference that he went to the girl’s
hotel room intending to do something other than pay her $80 for sexual services (which he
does not identify with specific ity) simply is not a rational hypothesis in light of the
circumstances proved.
Thus, the evidence is suffici ent to support Akramov’s co nviction of hiring a child
to engage in prostitution.
II. Electronic Solicitation of a Child
Akramov also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the offense of electronic solicitation of a child to engage in sexual
conduct. The statute under which Akramov was charged and convicted states that an adult
person commits the crime if he or she “uses . . . an electronic communications system, or
a telecommunications, wire, or radio communica tions system, or other electronic device
capable of electronic data storage or transmission . . . , with the intent to arouse the sexual
desire of any person” to “solicit[] a child or someone the person reasonably believes is a
child to engage in sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subds. 2a, 2a(1).
A.
Akramov argues that the state’s eviden ce is insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he “solicited” the fictitious girl to engage in sexual conduct.
The word “solicit,” as used in section 609.352, is defined within the statute to mean
“commanding, entreating, or a ttempting to persuade a spec ific person in person, by
telephone, by letter, or by computerized or other electronic means.” Minn. Stat. § 609.352,

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subd. 1(c) (2016). The words within this defi nition have the following more particular
meanings:
“Entreat” is defined as “[t]o make an earnest request of.” [The
American Heritage Dictionary 457 (2d Colleg e ed. 1982).]
“Earnest” is defined as “[m]arked by or showing deep sincerity
or seriousness.” Id. at 434. Regarding an attempt to persuade,
an “attempt” is defined as “[a]n effort or try.” Id. at 139.
“Persuade” means “[t]o cause (someone) to do something by
means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty.” Id. at 926.
“Command” means “[t]o direct with authority; give orders to.”
Id. at 296.

State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. 2003) (footnote omitted). Akramov contends
that, after learning that the fictitious girl was 15 years old, “he di d not command, entreat,
or attempt to persuade [the girl] to engage in sexual conduct.”
We reject Akramov’s argument for reasons that are similar to the reasons stated
above with respect to his argument that he did not hire, offer to hire, or agree to hire a child
for sex. See supra part I.A. The state’s direct ev idence shows that Akramov initiated
communications with the fictitious girl with a text message stating, “Hi sweetie!” He
thereafter engaged in a long series of text messages for the ultimate purpose of engaging
in sexual conduct with a person whom he belie ved to be a 15-year-old girl. His text
messages, which were admitted into evidence verbatim in written form, are within the
dictionary definitions of the te rms “entreat” and “attempt to pers uade.” It is true that the
advertisement indicated that the poster’s age was 19, not 15. But Akramov was informed
that the girl was only 15 years old approximate ly 15 minutes after the first text message.
He expressly acknowledged that the girl was younger than 16. Nonetheless, he continued

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to exchange text messages over a period of approximately nine hours, until he was arrested
at the door to the girl’s hotel room.
B.
Akramov last argues that the state’s evid ence is insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had “the intent to arouse the sexual desires of any person.” In
response, the state argues that the context of the conversation clearl y shows an intent to
arouse, given the sexually charged nature of the text messages.
To satisfy its burden on this particular i ssue, the state may prove that a defendant
intended to arouse the sexual desires of any person, including the defendant himself. See
State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 922 (Minn. 2017). Because proof of Akramov’s intent
requires inferences from the state’s circumst antial evidence, we apply the standard of
review applicable to circumstantial evidence. See Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473-74.
Akramov acknowledges that he made 13 statements that “could be considered
sexual.” Included among them are statements such as “I really want to see you,” “you have
beautiful smile,” a statement that they should “do it” in a car, a comment that he would like
to stay overnight with her in the hotel ro om, and a comment about the penises of the
fictitious girl’s customers. Akramov contends that, even if these statements could be read
to indicate that he intended to arouse sexual desires, “there is an equally reasonable
inference that [he] was only intending to take pa rt in a discussion re lated to meeting [the
girl] at the hotel.”
The pertinent question is whether “the ci rcumstances proved are . . . inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation

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omitted). Akramov does not suggest that he intended to achieve any particul ar purpose
other than arousing sexual desire as a prelud e to sexual activity. In the absence of a
suggestion of a particular n on-sexual purpose, we cannot interpret the text messages as
anything other than an attempt to arouse sexual desire. Consequently, there is no rational
hypothesis except that of guilt, given the circumstances proved.
Thus, the evidence is su fficient to support Akramov’ s conviction of electronic
solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct.
Affirmed.