State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0094

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cole Leo Dumont,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-16-4313

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Cecilia A. Knapp, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s de nial of his postconviction petition, appellant
argues that the district court erred in deny ing his petition to withdraw his guilty plea and
vacate his conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender. Because appellant’s

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out-of-state conviction does not require him to register as a predatory offender in
Minnesota, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On June 7, 2017, appellant Cole Leo Dumont entered an Alford guilty plea to the
charge of failure to register as a predatory offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 244.166,
subd. 5(a) (2016). This charge stemmed from appellant’s 2001 North Dakota misdemeanor
conviction for corruption of a minor and the state’s allegation that he did not properly
comply with predatory registration requirements in Minnesota. The Minnesota complaint
alleges that the North Dakota conviction would have constituted a “registerable offense” if
committed in Minnesota. Appe llant subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief
seeking withdrawal of his gu ilty plea and the resulting conv iction, arguing that his North
Dakota conviction did not qualify as a regist rable offense. The district court denied
appellant’s petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“[A] court must allow withdrawal of a gu ilty plea if withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). “A manifest injustice exists if a gu ilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be accurat e, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 94 (citation
omitted). The burden rests on the defendant to establis h the plea was invalid, and
“[a]ssessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review
de novo.” See id. at 94. Appellate courts “review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo.” State v. Defatte, 928 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 2019).

3
The issue presented is whether appellant was required to register as a predatory
offender in Minnesota as a result of his 2001 North Dakota conviction for corruption of a
minor. In Minnesota, a person must register as a predatory offender if:
charged with . . . an offense in another state that would be a
violation of a law described in [Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1b(a)] if committed in this state and convicted of . . . that
offense or another offense aris ing out of the same set of
circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b)(1) (2016).
Resolution of this issue derives squa rely from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
recent holding in State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 2020).1 In Martin, the supreme
court for the first time examin ed “how to determine whethe r an out-of-state conviction
qualifies as a violation of Minnesota law under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b)(1).”
941 N.W.2d at 123. The test Martin created is as follows:
We will compare the elements of the out-of-state offense to the
elements of the Minnesota offense. An out-of-state conviction
would be a violation of a Minnesota offense requiring
registration if proving the elements of the out-of-state offense
would necessarily prove a violation of that Minnesota law. But
if the elements of the out-of-s tate offense could be proven
without proving a violation of Minnesota law, then the out-of-
state conviction would not be a violation of a Minnesota
offense requiring registration.

1 Because Martin was released after th e district court ruled on appellant’s petition for
postconviction relief, the district court did no t have the benefit of the supreme court’s
reasoning in that matter. We also note that the district court correctly interpreted our prior
unpublished caselaw regarding analysis of out-of-state conv ictions for the purposes of
predatory offender requirements, State v. Hanson , 2012 WL 538967, at *2 (Minn. App.
Feb 21, 2012) (“[C]ourts must compare the el ements of the out-of-state offense and the
underlying facts supporting the conviction to the elements of the Minnesota offense.”).

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Id. at 124 (emphasis added). This test does not, therefore, involve the facts related to the
underlying out-of-state offense—only the elements are considered. Id. at 125-26.
Corruption of a minor in North Dakota requ ires proof that (1) the adult defendant
engaged in a sexual act with another person, and (2) the other person was a minor 15 years
of age or older. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05 (1999). “Sexual act” is defined as “sexual contact
between human beings,” sexual contact being defined as “any touching of the sexual or
intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive
desires.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-02 (1999). The statute states that such contact “occurs upon
penetration, however slight.” Id.
We agree with the parties that the only Mi nnesota offense requiring registration that
could arguably be proven by the elements of North Dakota’s corruption-of-a-minor statute
is third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in vi olation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b)
(2016). A defendant is guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to
subdivision 1(b) when (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration with another, (2) the
other person was 13-15 years old, and (3) the defendant is more than 24 months older than
the other person. Id.
There are clear differences between the elements of the North Dakota and
Minnesota offenses. Whereas the North Dakot a statute requires that the complainant be
15-17 years old, the Minnesota statute requires that the complainant be 13-15 years old.
Additionally, though the Minnesota statute requi res that the defendant be more than 24
months older than the compla inant, the North Dakota statute has no such age-difference
requirement. Therefore, proving the North Da kota elements for corruption of a minor

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would not necessarily prove the elements of Minnesota’s third-degree criminal-sexual-
conduct offense.
Respondent nevertheless argues that appellant’s North Dakota conviction qualifies
as a registerable offense becau se, at the time of appellant’s North Dakota offense, the
complainant in that matter was between 14-15 years old and appellant was 18-19 years old,
thus factually satisfying the age and age-difference requirements of the Minnesota statute.
We disagree that such facts ar e sufficient to establish a regi strable offense in Minnesota.
Martin clearly directs that we must look solely at “the elements of the out-of-state offense”
and “the elements of the Minn esota offense.” 941 N.W.2d at 124. That the ages of
appellant and the complainant in his North Dakota offense for which he was convicted
would have factually satisfied the elements of the Minnesota statute is, therefore,
irrelevant.
2
In summary, because a person may be conv icted of corruption of a minor in North
Dakota without necessarily proving the elements of third- degree criminal sexual conduct
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) , appellant’s North Dakota conviction is not
an offense requiring registra tion in Minnesota. This c onclusion necessitates granting
appellant’s petition for postconvi ction relief. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the

2 Moreover, whereas the North Dakota statute describes a “sexual act,” the Minnesota
statute requires “sexual penetration.” Though the North Dakota statute states such contact
“occurs upon penetration, however slight,” that statute defines sexual contact as “ any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-02 (emphasis added).
This difference also indicates that the No rth Dakota corruption-of-a-minor offense does
not necessitate registration in Minnesota.

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district court to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment of
conviction.
Reversed and remanded.