Matthew Keely Hartley, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0103

Matthew Keely Hartley, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 8, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-16-17560

Timothy D. Webb, Evan H. Weiner, Neve Webb, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pr esiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Matthew Keely Hartley challenge s the postconviction court’s denial of
his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. He argues that the

2
postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims were procedurally barred. We affirm.
FACTS
We described the facts of Hartley’s case in our opinion deciding his direct appeal.
State v. Hartley , No. A17-1199, 2018 WL 1902115 (Minn. App. Apr. 23, 2018), review
denied (Minn. July 17, 2018). To summarize, early one morning in September 2016,
Hartley left a bar on his motorcycle, struck and killed an individual who was standing on
the opposite side of the road, left the scene without checking on the individual, and tried to
hide his motorcycle. The state charged Hartle y with three counts of criminal vehicular
homicide—based on gross negligence, driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene
after a collision.
At a pretrial hearing, the state informed the district court that it had offered Hartley
a plea agreement with a sentence “between 142 and a half and 166 and a half months,” or
roughly 12 to 14 years. Hartley rejected the offer and elected to proceed to trial. During the
trial, Hartley’s counsel became ill and had to go to the hospital. Hartley’s counsel was
diagnosed as having an ulcer. The trial resume d after a two-week delay, and the district
court denied Hartley’s request for a mistrial.
The jury acquitted Hartley of criminal vehicular homicide based on driving while
intoxicated but found him guilty of criminal vehicular homicide based on gross negligence
and leaving the scene. The district court sentenced Hartley to 120 months’ imprisonment,
Hartley appealed, and we affirmed the convictions. Id. at *1.

3
Hartley then petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming that he had received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in multiple respects. Along with his petition, Harley
also submitted several affidavits. One was hi s own, describing his concerns with his
counsel’s representation and asser ting that, before trial, he to ld his lawyer that he would
accept a plea agreement calling for an executed 90-month sentence. Another affidavit was
from a doctor, opining that, based on his review of the trial transcript, Hartley’s counsel
had “lost potentially a lot of blood” and that an ulcer that caused five days of hospitalization
“would likely have a signifi cantly adverse effect on a person’s cognition and ability to
perform mentally demanding tasks.” The pos tconviction court, without holding an
evidentiary hearing, denied Hartley’s petition as procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla,
243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976).
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Hartley argues that the postconviction court erred by dismissing his petition without
holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim th at he received ineffe ctive assistance of
counsel. When considering a petition for postconviction relief, “[u]nless the petition and
the files and records of the proceeding conclu sively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief, the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the petition.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04,
subd. 1 (2018). “Any d oubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing should be
resolved in favor of the defendant.” Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012).

4
An appellate court reviews the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). It reviews “a postconviction
court’s legal determinations de novo, a nd its factual findings for clear error.” Martin v.
State, 865 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 2015). An appellate court will not reverse a
postconviction court’s order “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
The postconviction court concluded that the Knaffla rule barred Hartley’s claims.
Under the Knaffla rule, “once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in the direct
appeal and all claims that were known or sh ould have been known but were not raised in
the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn.
2015) (emphasis omitted). “But [an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claim is not Knaffla-
barred when the claim requires examination of evidence outside the trial record or
additional fact-finding by the postconviction court . . . .” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1,
10 (Minn. 2013).
Hartley did not argue ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Instead, he
claimed that there was insuffici ent evidence to support his convictions, that the district
court abused its discretion by not granting a mist rial due to his counsel’s illness, and that
the district court made several evidentiary errors. Hartley, 2018 WL 1902115, at *2, *6-7.
But he contends that his ineffective-assi stance-of-counsel claims are nevertheless

5
reviewable via postconviction petition because they rely on affidavits and evidence outside
the trial record.
The state responds that Hartley knew about his claims before his direct appeal and
Knaffla thus bars Hartley’s claims. But the ques tion is not just whether Hartley knew or
should have known about his claims on direct appeal. Instead, the question also turns on
whether his ineffective-assist ance-of-counsel claims require additional evidence outside
the trial court record. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10. Hartley asserts that his counsel was
ineffective for three reasons: (1) his counsel was ineffective duri ng plea negotiations,
(2) his counsel’s medical cond ition constituted ineffective assistance, and (3) his counsel
made various trial errors. We examine each of Hartley’s claims in turn.
Plea offer
Hartley first argues that his counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations because
his counsel did not address the fact that th e state’s plea offer in cluded a sentence that
exceeded the statutory maximum. “The statutory maximum sentence is the absolute ceiling
on the district court’s sentencing discretion.” Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 596 (Minn.
App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). A defendant has a Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel when defense c ounsel provides advice about a plea agreement
offered by the state. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 540-41 (Minn. 2007). Ineffective
assistance of counsel prejudices a defendant if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant would have accepted the plea barg ain had the defendant received effective
representation. Id.

6
Hartley claims the state’s only plea offer was an executed sentence of 150 months,
which Hartley, in his affidavit, states that his attorney told him came in response to
Hartley’s offer of an executed sentence of 90 months. The state did describe its plea offer
on the record before trial, stating that it was seeking between 142.5 and 166.5 months’
imprisonment. Hartley suggests that the state’s offer reflected a 30-month reduction from
a statutory maximum of 15 years (180 months ), based on the state’s mistaken belief that
Hartley had a qualified prior diving offense that would have increased the statutory
maximum sentence from 10 years to 15 years. 1 He claims that, if the state had offered a
30-month reduction from the actually applic able 10-year (120-month) statutory
maximum—i.e., if the state had offered 90 months—he would have accepted the plea
agreement.
The postconviction court concluded that Hartley “knew of the disparity between the
State’s earlier offer and the lawful sentence imposed when he appealed, and the Court of
Appeals could have decided it on the record.” The postconviction court noted that the
misunderstanding in Hartley’s case is distinguishable from the misunderstanding in Leake2

1 Under the criminal-vehicular-homicide statute, the maximum prison sentence is ten years
(120 months). Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1 (2016). But if a pe rson is convicted of
criminal vehicular homicide for operating a vehicle in a negligent manner while under the
influence of alcohol and that person has a qualified prior driving offense within ten years,
the maximum prison sentence increases to 15 years (180 months). Minn. Stat. § 609.2112,
subd. 1(b). Hartley did not have a qualified prior driving offense, so the maximum sentence
he was facing before trial was 120 months.

2 In Leake, the district court observed, the defe ndant rejected a plea offer under the
mistaken belief that he faced a shorter sent ence than that which was ultimately imposed,

7
and that there is nothing in the record indi cating that the state would have offered a
similarly reduced sentence or that Hartley would still have counteroffered 90 months.3
The trial record contains the state’s plea offer, Hartley’s rejection of the plea offer,
and a presentence investigation report. The pr esentence investigation report explains that
Hartley did not have a qualified prior drivin g offense and that the ten-year statutory
maximum applied. Based on these facts in the record, Hartley knew or should have known
at the time of his direct appeal that this ma ximum was less than the state’s earlier offer.
The trial record also shows th at, after the state described its plea offer on the record,
Hartley’s counsel did not point out the statutory maximum to either the district court or the
state. We therefore conclude that the allege d error of Hartley’s trial counsel—failing to
inform the state of the ap plicable statutory maximum during plea negotiations—was
reviewable on the trial record. Knaffla thus bars Hartley’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel based on that alleged error.
Counsel’s health problems
Hartley also claims that his counsel’s h ealth issue during the trial impacted his
effectiveness. Hartley claims that he has new testimony, not available at trial, in the form
of an expert’s affidavit that his counsel’s h ealth issue “would likel y have a significantly

see Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 539, whereas, here, Hartley rejected in plea negotiations a longer
sentence than that which could have actually been imposed.

3 The postconviction court also pointed out in a footnote that Hartley continued to disclaim
responsibility for the act in his presentence investigation, indicating that he was not
predisposed to plea bargain.

8
adverse effect on a person’s co gnition and ability to perform mentally demanding tasks.”
He also points out that the tr ial record did not contain Har tley’s own observations of his
trial counsel’s condition.
The trial record shows that, on the third da y of trial, Hartley’s counsel told the
district court, “I don’t know what but there’ s something wrong with me,” and that he felt
“super lightheaded.” The next day, the district court told the parties that counsel’s brother
had informed it that Hartley’s counsel had been taken to the hospital in an ambulance, that
“[h]e lost potentially a lot of blood,” and that he had “a serious medical condition.” At a
subsequent hearing, the district court stated that Hartley’s counse l was doing better and
expected to get out of the hospital in a day or so. Hartley stated on the record that he was
concerned because he had not been able to speak with his counsel while he was in the ICU.
Hartley’s counsel then returned the next week and informed the court that he had been in
the hospital five or so days and that “[h]ealth wise, thinking wise, I’m fine.” He moved for
a mistrial, however, which the district court denied.
The postconviction court concluded that this claim is the “same complaint under a
different guise” as the claim that Hartley rais ed on direct appeal when he challenged the
district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. The postconviction court went on to
conclude that this court could have reviewed the effectiveness of Hartley’s trial counsel
because the trial record reflected that his counsel had lost a lot of blood, had been in the
hospital for several days, and had ultimat ely been diagnosed with an ulcer. The

9
postconviction court thus held that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based largely
on the same information from the trial record was procedurally barred.
We need not decide whether this ine ffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was
Knaffla barred because it fails for another reas on—the petition, files, and records
conclusively show that Hartley is not entitled to relief. See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant must show that the
appellant’s “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
that a reasonable probability ex ists that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s errors.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted)
(applying the test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)).
These two prongs are known as the performance and prejudice prongs, and appellate courts
need not address both prongs if one is determinative. Id.
Hartley’s counsel suffered from a health condition that may have impacted his
subjective performance. But th e standard for ineffective- assistance-of-counsel is an
objective standard of reasonableness. Hartle y’s counsel’s health issue alone does not
support an ineffective-assistance claim be cause it does not dem onstrate how his trial
counsel’s performance was objectively unreas onable or how his counsel’s performance
prejudiced Hartley. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying relief
to Hartley based on the health of his counse l, whether that claim was procedurally barred
under Knaffla or not. And, with respect to the objective reasonableness of Hartley’s

10
counsel’s representation, we address Hartley’ s specific complaints about his lawyer’s
representation in the next section.
Alleged trial errors
Finally, Hartley claims that counsel provi ded ineffective assistance of counsel by
committing a number of trial errors, including fa iling to (1) have an expert testify on the
victim’s blood-alcohol content, (2) obtain video from the bar that both Hartley and the
victim had been to that night, (3) request a ju ry instruction on a lesser offense of careless
driving, (4) effectively cross-examine the state’s expert, (5) get Hartley’s cell-phone
records admitted into evidence, and (6) use visual aids. The postconviction court concluded
that Hartley’s affidavits, filed with his pe tition, “provide no evidence indicating the trial
record did not ‘fully inform’ the appeals court on the issues.” The postconviction court thus
dismissed these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as Knaffla barred.
Again, whether or not these claims are pr ocedurally barred, the petition, files, and
records conclusively show that Hartley is not entitled to relief. Appellate courts generally
“will not review ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on trial strategy.” Sanchez-
Diaz v. State , 758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008 ). “Such trial tactics should not be
reviewed by an appellate court, which, unlik e the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.”
State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986). “What evidence to present to the jury,
including which witnesses to call, represents an attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics
and lies within the proper di scretion of trial counsel.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627,
633 (Minn.1999). Decisions about how to cro ss-examine witnesses ar e matters of trial

11
strategy. See State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 716-17 (Minn. 2003) (rejecting ineffective-
assistance claim based in part on the manner of cross-examination); State v. Irwin , 379
N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that the manner of cross-examination is a
tactical decision and that “failure to conduct cross-examination in a certain manner” does
not demonstrate inef fective assistance), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986). The trial
errors alleged by Hartley all fall within the trial-strategy category.4
In some instances, a defendant may challenge his counsel’s trial-strategy decisions
when counsel makes the deci sions based on something ot her than reasoned strategic
judgment. E.g. State v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 506-08 (Min n. 2013) (stating that, while
investigations are part of trial strategy, an ineffective-assistance claim was reviewable
because trial counsel’s failure to obtain phone records was not a considered and rejected
course of action, but an unreasonable failure to investigate a central part of counsel’s theory
of the case). But, while Hartley contends that the claimed trial errors resulted in prejudice
to his case, Hartley does not allege facts that would demonstrate that his counsel based his
decisions on something other than reasoned judgment. While his counsel did suffer from
an ulcer during trial, that fact alone does not show that every decision made by his counsel
was compromised. And, after counsel had recovered and returned to court, he informed the

4 The decision whether to request a lesser-offen se instruction similarly reflects a strategic
choice, with counsel needing to weigh the risk s and benefits of adding another crime of
which the jury might find his c lient guilty. Even if such a re quest is not trial strategy,
however, we determined in Hartley’s first a ppeal that there was su fficient evidence to
support Hartley’s convictions, so we discern no prejudice arising from his counsel’s failure
to request a lesser-offense instruction.

12
district court that he was feeling fine “[h]ea lth wise, thinking wise.” Furthermore, unlike
in Nicks, Hartley’s allegations and affidavits do not suggest that his counsel failed to review
or investigate key evidence that was central to the defense’s theory of the case. Instead,
Hartley describes the evidence that his counsel failed to pr ovide by stating that it “would
have been helpful,” could ha ve bolstered his defenses, or could have impeached the
reliability of certain witnesses. In addition, even though Har tley claims that his counsel
failed to rebut the state’s claim that he had been drinking that night by failing to introduce
video and cell-phone records, his counsel obtained an acquittal of th e charge connected
with alcohol. We conclude that the trial counsel’s strategic choices are not reviewable here,
so the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hartley’s petition based on these
alleged trial errors.
Affirmed.