State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0105

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Derek William Jung,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-19-1232

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kiara Kraus-Parr, Kraus-Parr, Morrow, & Weber, Grand Forks, North Dakota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from an order granting respondent Derek William Jung’s motion to
suppress evidence, appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s
determination that police arrested Jung without probable cause. Based on this
determination, the district court suppressed all evidence seized after Jung’s arrest and
dismissed two counts of the state’s complaint—count three for fifth-degree drug possession
and count four alleging first-degree driving while impaired. The state also argues that the
district court erred when it found that the search warrants for Jung’s house and urine did
not provide an independent basis for the seizure of the evidence.
Because the district court misapplied the to tality-of-the-circumstances test and the
record establishes probable cause for Jung’s arrest, we conclude that the district court erred
by dismissing counts three and four and suppressing the evidence seized from Jung’s
vehicle, house, and urine as fruit of the poisonous tree. We therefore reverse and remand
and do not reach the state’s argument about whether an independent basis supported the
seizure of evidence obtained by warrant.
FACTS
The following facts are based on the evidence received during the contested
omnibus hearing.
On June 20, 2019, at around 11:15 a.m., Officer Nelson of the Crookston Police
Department and Officer Wagner of the Pine-to-Prairie Drug Task Force waited within sight
of Jung’s house in Gentilly as part of their investigation into Jung for the sale and
3
possession of methamphetamine and other controlled substances. Nelson and Wagner
planned for a third officer to obtain a search warrant for Jung’s house and that they would
execute the warrant while Jung was at home. Shortly after Nelson and Wagner began
surveillance of Jung’s house, a white GMC Denali- version sport utility vehicle (SUV)
drove away. Nelson verified that the SUV was registered to Jung, and Wagner confirmed
that Jung was driving. The SUV traveled westbound towards Crookston, followed by both
officers.
The informant
Before Nelson went to Jung’s house that day, he had received new information
about Jung from other officers who had interviewed M.D. Around 7:30 a.m. that same
day, police arrested M.D. for driving under the influence. At the time of her arrest, M.D.
told police that she had used methamphetamine two days earlier. M.D. consented to a
vehicle search, which revealed a baggie and a glass jar with tinfoil inside; the tinfoil later
tested positive for a trace amount of methamphetamine.
While in custody, M.D. asked what charges she was facing, stated she last had used
methamphetamine at 1:30 a.m. that morning and was still feeling the effects, and told
police that her preteen children were at home. Officers told M.D., “Whatever you can do
for us, will definitely help towards whatever your charges are going to be,” but that any
decision belonged to the prosecutor. M.D. then gave officers specific information about
persons selling methamphetamine and other drugs in the area, one of whom was Jung.
M.D. said she met Jung on a dating website, they dated for about four months, and
she knew that Jung had been released recently from prison. M.D. said Jung was selling
4
methamphetamine and that she had purchased methamphetamine from him. M.D. said she
only paid for drugs about half of the time because sometimes Jung would give her drugs
for free. M.D. said Jung gave her methamphetamine around 50 times in total and
they often used methamphetamine together. M.D. stated that Jung drives an SUV ,
specifically a “white Denali,” he lives in a blue house in Gentilly, and he stashes his drugs
under his bedroom nightstand. M.D. also told police that sometimes she would give
methamphetamine to Jung and had planned to give him a “t-shirt” the night before.1 M.D.
also stated that Jung’s supplier was named “Mikey,” Jung had just given Mikey money,
and that Jung and Mikey planned to make a trip soon to pick up methamphetamine.
M.D. consented to a search of her cell phone. She showed officers Facebook
messages between her and Jung in which they discussed M.D. giving methamphetamine to
Jung. In the same messages, Jung told M.D., “From now on text me on my phone cops
dont need a warrant to check fb.” Finally, M.D. also stated that she knew Jung was
“drinking, doing meth all the time, drivin g around drunk,” and that she had used
methamphetamine with Jung at his house within the last two days.
The arrest
Nelson followed Jung in an unmarked vehicle for about four to six miles. Jung
rapidly accelerated and Nelson believed Jung knew he was being followed. Nelson then
saw Jung driving erratically as he swerved in his lane, crossed the fog line, drove onto the
shoulder, and then returned to his lane. Jung turned off the highway and onto an adjacent

1 A “t-shirt” is a term used to describe 1.75 grams of narcotics.
5
street. When they came upon road construction blocking the road, Jung rapidly turned into
a driveway. Nelson activated his emergency lights and pulled behind Jung’s SUV. Jung
parked partly on a driveway and partly in the road.
Nelson and Jung each exited their vehicles and met at Jung’s driver’s side door.
Nelson observed that Jung was “very nervous,” he had a “shaky ” voice, and appeared
“incredibly thin.” Nelson was familiar with Jung from a 2016 investigation during which
a search warrant was executed on Jung’s house and police seized approximately 62 grams
of methamphetamine and nearly $5,000 cash. After the 2016 search, police arrested Jung
for first-degree sale of methamphetamine. While those charges were pending, police again
arrested Jung, this time, on new charges after Nelson executed a controlled buy with the
assistance of a confidential informant. Jung was later convicted in the respective cases for
first-degree sale of methamphetamine and third-degree sale of methamp hetamine, and his
records of conviction were received into evidence at the omnibus hearing in this case.
Nelson also knew that Jung was on intensive supervised release following his release from
prison in fall 2018.2
Nelson also saw that Jung’s cell phone, sitting in the cup holder inside the SUV,
was displaying a contact named “Mikey,” which was the name that M.D. identified as
Jung’s drug supplier. Jung said he knew he was being followed and told Nelson that he
was on intensive supervised release and subject to searches. Nelson asked Jung about his

2 Nelson testified that, at some point before going to Jung’s house, Nelson asked Jung’s
parole agent for permission to search Jung’s house, but the agent refused. The record has
no additional information on Nelson’s request of the parole agent.
6
recent drug use and whether he would consent to a search of his SUV. Jung declined to
answer most questions and refused to allow the search. Nelson did not conduct field
sobriety tests because the street was under construction and workers were moving in their
direction.
Nelson arrested Jung for driving while impaired and for the possession and sale
of a controlled substance. During a search of Jung’s person incident to arrest, Nelson
found $370 cash. At the county jail, Jung refused to provide a urine sample. Jung’s
SUV was transported to the sheriff’s office and searched. On the floor of the SUV, Nelson
found a baggie containing a crystalline substance later tested and confirmed to be
methamphetamine, and, inside a drawstring bag on the passenger seat, Nelson found a
“whizzinator” (a device used to defeat urinalysis testing) and a pill later identified as
“Clonazepam” (a Schedule IV controlled substance).
The search warrants
At about 1:15 p.m. the same day, Deputy Brandon Larson applied for two search
warrants: one for a sample of Jung’s urine and the second for Jung’s house. The basis for
the warrant applications was (a) information received from M.D., (b) Jung’s intensive-
supervised-release status, (c) Nelson’s observations of Jung before and after the traffic
stop, (d) evidence obtained from searching Jung’s SUV, and (e) the criminal histories of
both Jung and M.D . A judge signed the warrants at 1:30 p.m., and police executed the
warrants that same day.
7
During the search of Jung’s house, law enforcement found methamphetamine, drug
paraphernalia, and a bottle of suspected urine in Jung’s bedroom. Jung’s urine sample,
obtained by warrant, tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
The next day, the state charged Jung with first-degree sale of 17 grams or
more of methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018) (count one),
third-degree sale of a narcotic under Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2018) (count two),
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1)
(2018) (count three), and first-degree driving while impaired (DWI) by a Schedule II
controlled substance under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2018) (“Driving While
Impaired” by a Schedule II controlled substance), .24, subd. 1(3) (2018) (“First-Degree
Driving While Impaired”), 152.02, subds. 3(d)(1)-(2) (2018) (classifying
methamphetamine as a Schedule II drug) (count four).
Jung’s motion
Jung moved to suppress all evidence obtained from his arrest, arguing the arrest was
not supported by probable cause and that the evidence obtained from his SUV, house, and
urine were “derivative, ” and moved to dismiss counts three and four. At an evidentiary
hearing, the district court heard testimony from Nelson, one of the officers who
interrogated M.D. and relayed information to Nelson, and received 28 exhibits.
The district court later issued a written order determining that Jung’s arrest was
unlawful and granting Jung’s motion for dismissal. The district court reasoned that M.D.
was an “unreliable witness,” and, after excluding her statements from consideration,
concluded that police had lacked probable cause to arrest Jung. The district court also
8
rejected the alternative argument that the state need only show the “lower standard of
reasonable suspicion” to search Jung’s SUV because he was on intensive supervised
release, determining that even if that standard applied, the state’s evidence failed to
establish reasonable suspicion in the absence of M.D.’s statements. Finally, the district
court found that the evidence seized from the search of Jung’s SUV, house, and urine was
the fruit of an illegal arrest and that the independent-source doctrine did not apply. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
To appeal a district court’s pretrial order, the state bears the burden of showing the
order had “a critical impact on the S tate’s case.” State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 94
n.2 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1). “The
critical-impact requirement is satisfied when a district court’s pretrial decision leads to the
dismissal of a charge.” State v. Gayles, 915 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Minn. App. 2018). Here, the
district court’s order suppressed evidence and resulted in the dismissal of counts three and
four. See Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94 n.2 (stating critical impact is shown when
suppression of evidence significantly reduces chance of successful prosecution). On
appeal, Jung does not dispute critical impact. Because the state has shown critical impact,
we consider the merits of the state’s appeal.
I. Jung was lawfully arrested based on probable cause.

The state argues that the pretrial order must be reversed because the district court
determined the arrest lacked probable cause by failing to correctly apply the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. Jung disagrees. “When reviewing a district court’s
9
pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘we review the district court’s factual
findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de
novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan,
742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). A district court’s legal determinations include
whether a search or seizure was justified by probable cause. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d
484, 487 (Minn. 2005). Appellate courts “may independently review facts that are not in
dispute and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” State
v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “To
determine whether this constitutional prohibition has been violated, [appellate courts]
examine the specific police conduct at issue.” State v. T imberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393
(Minn. 2008). Here, the police conduct at issue is a warrantless arrest. “Police officers may
arrest a felony suspect without an arrest warrant in any public place . . . provided they have
probable cause.” State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. 1998).
Probable cause exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the
totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a
specific individual has committed a crime.” State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343 (Minn.
2016) (quoting State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 247-48 (Minn. 2007)). The level of
proof required to establish probable cause is “more than mere suspicion but less than the
evidence necessary for conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). Minnesota courts must look to
“the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police have probable cause to
10
believe that a crime has been committed,” and a court generally will not suppress evidence
or invalidate an arrest once this objective standard has been met. State v. Perkins,
582 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn. 1998). “Probable cause is an objective inquiry,” that includes
“reasonable inferences that police officers draw from facts, based on their training and
experience, because police officers may interpret circumstances differently than untrained
persons.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016).
The district court determined that the initial traffic stop was lawful based on Jung’s
driving conduct, but also determined that Nelson’s subsequent arrest of Jung lacked
probable cause. The state argues on appeal that the district court used an improper
“divide-and-conquer approach” in granting Jung’s motion to suppress and, therefore, the
district court’s decision rests on legal error. In particular, the state argues that the district
court erroneously disregarded all of M.D.’s statements, minimized Jung’s criminal history,
and did not consider the experience of the arresting police officer. We consider the state’s
arguments in turn.
Controlling precedent prohibits courts from using a “divide-and-conquer” approach
to analyze probable cause and provides that the totality-of-the-circumstances test must be
cohesively applied to all relevant facts surrounding a search or seizure. See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018); State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487
(Minn. 2016) (stating courts must consider “the whole picture” when applying the
totality-of-the-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 -18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981))). This is because “the existence of
probable cause depends on all of the facts of each individual case.” State v. Williams ,
11
794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added); see State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1,
11 (Minn. 2004) (“[A] collection of pieces of information that would not be substantial
alone can combine to create sufficient probable cause.”). Accordingly, we must examine
whether the district court considered all of the relevant facts leading up to Jung’s arrest.
The district court began its evaluation of the totality of the circumstances by
reviewing M.D.’s statements to police and concluding that she was “an unreliable witness.”
The district court then assessed probable cause “[w]ithout [M.D.]’s statements” and
considered five pieces of evidence: (1) Jung’s criminal history; (2) Jung’s parole agent’s
refusal to authorize a search of Jung’s house; (3) Jung’s driving conduct before the traffic
stop; (4) Jung’s nervous demeanor and skinny appearance, and (5) Nelson’s testimony that
Jung’s cell phone was open to a contact page for “Mikey” during the traffic stop. The
district court reasoned that Jung’s previous convictions alone did not establish probable
cause because the “alleged traffic violations were petty -offense level violations” and
“[b]eing nervous and shaky can be reasonable due to a traffic stop.” Considering only these
five circumstances, the district court determined that Nelson arrested Jung without
probable cause.
This analysis is problematic because the district court did not examine the
circumstances in totality; it reviewed each circumstance in isolation. The district court
separately analyzed M.D.’s statements, determined that she was reliable in some respects
and unreliable in other respects, then excluded all of the information M.D. provided when
determining whether probable cause supported Jung’s arrest. The district court’s order
stated that it considered the circumstances “collectively,” but its order reveals a piecemeal
12
analysis of M.D.’s statements and other evidence. This was error. All of the facts should
have been considered as part of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Jung’s arrest.
Thus, the district court’s analysis fails to adhere to established precedent. This was the
court’s principal error, which infected the district court’s analysis of the reliability of
M.D.’s statements and the other circumstances leading to Jung’s arrest.
M.D.’s statements
Before addressing the reliability of M.D.’s statements, we consider the context of
Jung’s arrest. Nelson testified that he arrested Jung for the sale and possession of drugs and
for DWI. Nelson testified that he had probable cause to arrest Jung based on M.D.’s
statements about Jung’s recent use of methamphetamine; Jung’s driving conduct in which
he weaved within his lane, crossed the fog line, and drove on the shoulder; Jung’s nervous
demeanor upon questioning; and his “incredibly ” thin appearance. Nelson also testified
that Jung drove evasively, quickly exited his SUV after the stop, refused to answer
questions, and that methamphetamine remains in a person’s system for 72 hours.
The reliability of an informant’s statements turns on the totality of the
circumstances, much like an analysis of probable cause. “When police rely on information
provided by an informant, ‘all of the stated facts relating to the informer should be
considered in making a totality -of-the-circumstances analysis. ’” State v. Cook,
610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 2000) (quoting State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700,
703 (Minn. 1990)), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Law enforcement may reasonably
rely on information provided by an informant when the information has sufficient
“indicia of reliability.” In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691-92 (Minn. 1997). We
13
determine the reliability of information by examining “ the informant and the informant’s
source of the information and judge them against ‘all of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695). Relevant factors include whether the
information was corroborated, whether the information was voluntarily provided, whether
any statements were against the informant’s penal interests, and whether the informant has
an established history of informing. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999)
(corroboration); McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704 (voluntariness and statements against
interest); State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985) (informant history).
Rather than examining the reliability of M.D.’s statements under the totality of the
circumstances, the district court examined factors in isolation. The district court determined
six factors showed that M.D.’s information was reliable: (1) she gave her statements
directly to law enforcement and was not anonymous; (2) she consented to a search of her
cell phone, which had incriminating texts; (3) she made several statements against her own
penal interest (e.g., admitting that she used methamphetamine before driving that day and
that she had provided methamphetamine to Jung more than once); (4) her “specific
information” about Jung’s drug use and sales was based on personal knowledge; (5) she
had contact with Jung within the last two days; and (6) law enforcement corroborated
information she provided—including Jung’s address and vehicle, Jung’s criminal history,
Jung’s recent release from prison, and the text messages on M.D.’s cell phone.3

3 The district court stated that the text messages between M.D. and Jung discussing
methamphetamine provided “limited corroborative value” because “[a]t best” the messages
only showed that M.D. sold Jung methamphetamine about six days before his arrest.
14
The district court also found that six factors showed M.D.’s information was
unreliable: (1) she provided information only after she was arrested; (2) law enforcement
told M.D. that any information she provided might impact her charges; (3) she was under
the influence of drugs during her interviews with police; (4) although M.D. provided “clear
and responsive answers” during the interviews, the district court found the information she
provided was “vague and inconsistent” at times; (5) she had no prior experience working
with law enforcement; and (6) she had a prior conviction for providing false information
to police. The district court also found that M.D. was “attempting to curry favor with law
enforcement to better her position” and concluded that she was “an unreliable witness.”
We conclude that the district court erred when it excluded all of M.D.’s statements
from its probable-cause analysis. First, the district court found that M.D.’s statements were
reliable, in part, because she did not make them anonymously. See State v. Lindquist,
205 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Minn. 1973) (explaining that an informant who is not anonymous
is more likely to be honest because he or she likely knows that police could arrest him or
her for making false reports). Second, the district court determined that some of M.D.’s
statements were corroborated—the make, model, and color of Jung’s vehicle, Jung’s home
address, and criminal record—as these facts were independently verified by law
enforcement. See Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (stating corroboration supports informant
reliability).
Third, t he district court found that M.D.’s statements were based on “her own
personal knowledge” of Jung’s recent use and acquisition of methamphetamine. Personal
15
knowledge is another factor supporting an informant’s reliability. See Wiley, 366 N.W.2d
at 269 (stating recent personal observation favors informant reliability).
Fourth, M.D. incriminated herself by stating she had used methamphetamine in the
last two days because she was under arrest for DWI at the time she made the statements.
And by consenting to a search of her cell phone, which had text messages between her and
Jung discussing the exchange of methamphetamine within the last six days , M.D.
incriminated herself in the sale and possession of methamphetamine. See McCloskey,
453 N.W.2d at 704 ( noting that statements against interest demonstrate informant
reliability). While the district court may be correct that M.D. was trying to “curry favor”
with law enforcement, all informants do this to some degree. “That the informant may be
paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of having
admitted criminal conduct.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S. Ct. 2075,
2082 (1971).
Lastly, the district court erred in citing M.D.’s prior conviction for giving false
statements to police. Probable cause hinges on “the information the police took into
consideration when making the arrest.” See Walker, 584 N.W.2d at 769. The record does
not establish that Nelson was aware of M.D.’s prior record when he arrested Jung.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by not determining
the reliability of M.D.’s statements under the totality of the circumstances. And, for
purposes of probable cause, M.D. was not so unreliable that all the information she
provided about Jung should have been ignored by Nelson at the time of the arrest. At a
minimum, M.D.’s statement that she and Jung had used methamphetamine together in the
16
last two days was relevant to Jung’s arrest for DWI and the district court erred by not
considering this information when determining probable cause.
Other circumstances known to law enforcement at the time of Jung’s arrest
The district court’s reasoning as to other circumstances known to Nelson at the time
of Jung’s arrest is also misguided. First, t he district court stated that Jung’s prior
convictions alone cannot establish probable cause. Indeed, prior convictions alone do not
establish probable cause, but they are a relevant factor. State v. Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d 51,
56 (Minn. App. 1996) (stating that a defendant’s criminal history may be properly
considered as “one factor in the totality of relevant circumstances”). Yet, the district court’s
analysis did not mention that Jung’s prior convictions were for the sale of
methamphetamine from the same house in Gentilly and that Nelson was involved in both
of Jung’s previous cases. See Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771 (stating “an appellate court must
give due weight to reasonable inferences drawn by police officers” (quotation omitted)).
Second, while the district court correctly noted that Jung’s nervous behavior and
shaky voice might be reasonable during a traffic stop, these facts must not be considered
in isolation. Rather, a court considers these facts alongside the other relevant circumstances
in the totality. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 353 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that
nervousness may be validly considered alongside the other relevant circumstances to
justify a search or seizure). In other words , Jung’s nervousness should be considered
together with M.D.’s statement that Jung had been using methamphetamine recently.
Third, the district court relied on the fact that Jung’s parole agent denied Nelson’s
request to search Jung’s house. Yet, the record contains no information about when or why
17
the parole agent refused to search Jung’s house. And the parole agent’s position regarding
a search of Jung’s house is of no consequence to ascertaining whether Nelson had probable
cause to arrest Jung for DWI.
Fourth, by failing to correctly apply the totality -of-the-circumstances test, the
district court erred in its ultimate conclusion that Nelson unlawfully arrested Jung without
probable cause. Nelson testified that he arrested Jung for DWI based on M.D.’s statements,
Jung’s erratic and evasive driving conduct, as well as Jung’s nervous demeanor and
noticeably thin appearance. See State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 48-49 (Minn. App. 2004)
(recognizing erratic driving and nervous behavior, among other things, supported
warrantless arrest for controlled-substance DWI) , review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004).
Nelson also testified that he was familiar with Jung’s 2016 convictions for drug sales and
he knew Jung was on intensive supervised release from prison. Minnesota courts have
recognized that these circumstances may validly support a warrantless arrest for DWI. See
Lieberg, 553 N.W.2d at 56 (stating that a defendant’s criminal history may be properly
considered as “one factor in the totality of relevant circumstances”); see also State v. Olson,
436 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn.1989) (stating that probable cause depends on “the particular
circumstances, conditioned by [officers’] own observations and information and guided by
the whole of their police experience”), aff’d sub nom. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
Combining M.D.’s statement that she and Jung had used methamphetamine in the
last two days with Jung’s criminal history, his driving conduct, evasive behavior, nervous
demeanor, thin appearance, and Nelson’s knowledge as a trained police officer that
18
methamphetamine remains in the body for 72 hours—there was sufficient probable cause
to arrest Jung for DWI. Specifically, it was objectively reasonable for Nelson to “entertain
an honest and strong suspicion,” Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 150, that Jung was driving with
methamphetamine in his system, which is a crime. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7)
(“Driving While Impaired” by a Schedule II controlled substance), .24, subd. 1(3)
(“First-Degree Driving While Impaired”), 152.02, subd. 3(d)(1)-(2) (classifying
methamphetamine as a Schedule II drug); see also Walker, 584 N.W.2d at 766 (stating
existence of probable cause permits warrantless arrest for felony -level conduct). Thus,
there was ample probable cause for Nelson to arrest Jung for DWI. 4
II. The district court erred by excluding evidence from the search of Jung’s SUV,
house, and urine.

In Jung’s motion to dismiss, he sought to suppress evidence seized as a result of his
arrest and did not otherwise challenge the inventory search of his SUV or whether probable
cause supported the search warrants issued for Jung’s house and urine. The district court
granted Jung’s motion and suppressed all “evidence obtained by searching [Jung]’s
vehicle, house and urine” as fruit of the poisonous tree after first concluding that Jung’s
arrest was “improper.” On appeal, the state argues the district court erred in concluding
that the independent- source doctrine was inapplicable to the search warrants. Jung
responds that “the district court did not err when it determined the independent source

4 We do not consider the parties’ arguments and the district court’s analysis regarding
whether Nelson had alternative grounds to arrest Jung because he was a parolee subject to
searches under Minn. Stat. § 244.15 (2018), and State v. Heaton, 812 N.W.2d 904 (Minn.
App. 2012), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2012).
19
exception did not apply” to the warrants. Given our determination that Jung’s arrest was
lawful—we need not consider whether this exception applies.
It is well established that “the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally
limited to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24,
36 (Minn. 2016). This rule “also extends to the ‘fruits’ of an illegal search or seizure.” Id.
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963)
(discussing scope of the fruit-of -the-poisonous-tree doctrine)). But in the absence of any
illegal search or seizure, the exclusionary rule and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
are inapplicable. See id. Thus, we conclude the district court erred in applying the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine because Jung’s arrest was not an illegal seizure.
Consequently, there is no basis to have suppressed all evidence seized from the inventory
search of Jung’s SUV and the execution of the search warrants on Jung’s house and urine.
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.