Gail Marie Peterson, and o/b/o minor child, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0114

Gail Marie Peterson,
and o/b/o minor child, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Preston David Vaughn,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2020
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Martin County District Court
File No. 46-CV-19-1060

Gail Marie Peterson, Fairmont, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Preston David Vaughn, Fairmont, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this pro se appeal from the district court’s grant of a harassment restraining order,
appellant argues that the record does not sup port the district court’s findings of fact and
credibility determinations. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Preston David Vaughn and respondent Gail Marie Peterson are divorced
and share custody of their fi ve minor children. On October 14, 2019, Peterson filed a
petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against Vaughn on behalf of herself and
their eldest child. The petition contained numerous allegations and included an attachment
with nearly 100 pages of text and other electronic messages to Peterson from Vaughn.
At the evidentiary hearing on the HRO, Peterson appeared pro se and Vaughn was
represented by counsel. Peterson, Vaughn, their eldest child, and D.H., a friend who also
served as the couple’s mediator, all testified at the hearing.
Peterson testified that Vaughn repeatedly sent her harassing text messages. She
testified that he would send her messages that she is a bad mother who does not go to their
children’s events and that “people in the town are maybe laughing that I’m the preacher’s
wife that is just slutting arou nd, that I’m an adulterer.” Sh e also testified that he would
send her other messages trying to reconcile with her. She stated that they were allowed to
text each other about the children, but that she told him to stop te xting her about other

3
things. Additionally, she testified that Va ughn admitted he sent her text messages
pretending to be a different man and anonymously sent her flowers at work.
Peterson also testified about multiple incidents of in-person encounters with Vaughn
when he called her names in public and otherw ise made her feel harassed. She described
an incident after their divorce when he approached her at their children’s school during an
evening event and yelled at her in front of other people, “you’re bedding him, you’re
bedding him,” referring to Peters on and her current boyfriend. She said she told him to
leave, but he wouldn’t. She testified that he came to her work multiple times. Peterson
also testified that in August of 2019, Vaughn drove up when she was outside of an auto
body shop with some friends and “started flinging his hands around, yelling out the window
that I was an adulterer.”
Peterson testified that Vaughn had twice taken their children from her house, during
her parenting time, without her permission or letting her know. He also repeatedly came
to her house while she was at work and she would find him playing ball with their children
when she arrived home. This was also without her knowledge or permission. She testified
that Vaughn drove by her house multiple times a day and she believed that he follows her
and tracks where she goes in town. She testified that he also entered her home without her
permission, leaving a bag of their children’ s clothes in the garage on one occasion and
leaving a photograph on another.
Finally, Peterson testified that Vaughn sent an explicit picture of her via text to D.H.
Peterson saw the picture and stated it was “a naked picture of me, but with him blotting out

4
my breasts.” She testified that she had never consented to the photograph and did not know
it existed before D.H. showed it to her. A copy of the photo graph was submitted by
Peterson as an exhibit to her petition.
Vaughn admitted that he went to Peterson ’s house when she wa s not there. He
testified that “I like to see my kids as much as possible, and it hadn’t been an issue, so I’d
go over and stand on the sidewalk and play catch with the boys almost daily.” He said he
would be on the sidewalk instead of the yard because “just not to push an issue, just not to
– you know, I’m just trying to be cautious.” Vaughn testified that there was at least one
time that he took the children off of Peterson’ s property without her permission, but “I
wasn’t secretive about it.” Vaughn, in fact, posted on social media that he had “kidnapped”
his children. Vaughn admitted that he had en tered Peterson’s garage to leave the bag of
clothes and the photograph, but testified that he thought it was not a problem. Vaughn also
admitted that he drives past Peterson’s house multiple times a day.
Vaughn admitted that he took the explicit photograph of Peterson and sent it to D.H.
Vaughn testified that he set up cameras in their living room with out notifying Peterson
when they were living together. He testified that he “edited” the photograph before sending
it to D.H. by marking out Peters on’s breasts and he sent it b ecause he “was just trying to
express to [D.H.] some of the things that went on [in front of their children].” The
photograph is only of Peterson and Peterson denied, during her testimony, that she appears
naked in front of the children.

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The district court issued an HRO with respect to Peterson, but found that there were
not reasonable grounds to issue an HRO on behalf of the eldest child. In addition to the
form HRO, the district court included a detailed memorandum setting out its various
findings of fact and explaining the basis for the court’s credibility determinations and legal
conclusion. Specifically, the district court found that there were reasonable grounds to
conclude that Vaughn: (1) followed, pursued or stalked Peterson; (2) made uninvited visits
to Peterson; (3) made harassing phone calls and sent harassing text messages to Peterson;
(4) called Peterson abusive names; (5) broke into Peterson’s residence; (6) took pictures of
Peterson without permission; and (7) disseminated a private sexual image of Peterson. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
We review a district court’s issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Peterson
v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “A dist rict court’s findings of fact
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district court’s
opportunity to ju dge the credibility of witnesses.” Kush v. Mathison , 683 N.W.2d 841,
843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). We will reverse the
issuance of an HRO only if it is not supported by the evidence or if the district court
improperly applied the law. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). A district
court’s “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. “Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

6
mistake has been made.” Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.
1999) (quotation omitted).
A district court may grant a harassment re straining order when it “finds at the
hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3). Harassment u nder the HRO statute
includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwa nted acts, words, or gestures that have a
substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety,
security or privacy of another.” Minn. Stat . § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2018). A district
court must base its findings in support of a restraining order on testimony and documents
properly admitted. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844. “The dete rmination of what constitutes an
adequate factual basis for a harassment order is left to the discretion of the district courts.”
Id. at 846.
Vaughn argues that the district court ha d insufficient eviden ce to support the
findings of fact.1 Vaughn, however, fails to present evidence of clear error by the district
court. His argument is, in essence, that he should have been believed instead of Peterson.

1 Vaughn makes various claims that “the co urt made erroneous rulings upon conjecture,
supposition, and speculation motivated by a bias towards the petitioner, whether conscious
or sub-conscious.” He claims that several of the district court’s findings are “fabricated.”
And that “there was no merit to harassment cl aims concerning” multiple incidents raised
at the district court hearing. For these propositions, he quotes from the district court
transcript and does not cite a ny evidence or caselaw for the proposition that these claims
had no merit. An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported
by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
Since we find no error by the district court, we do not reach these claims.

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This is not a valid ground for reversal on appeal. See Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512,
514 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that, on appe al, appellate courts “neither reconcile
conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness cred ibility, which are exclusively the
province of the factfinder”).
Here, the district court’s findings of fa ct are supported by th e testimony presented
at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, Vaughn, himself, admits doing many of the things found
by the district court. While Vaughn attributes innocent motives to his actions, the district
court discounted those as part of its credibility findings. Fo r example, the district court
found that Vaughn’s po sting on social media that he ha d “kidnapped” his children when
he took them without permission demonstrated that he was aware he lacked Peterson’s
agreement and was doing something inappropriate.
The district court came to the same conc lusion about Vaughn’s testimony that he
thought it was okay to go to Peterson’s house when she wasn’t there in order to play ball
with the children. The distri ct court pointed to Vaughn’s testimony, that he would only
play with them on the sidewalk instead of th e yard because he was “just trying to be
cautious,” as evidence that Vaughn knew he was engaging in activity that Peterson would
not have approved.
Similarly, the district court found lacking in credibility Vaughn’s testimony that he
shared the photograph of Peterson with D. H. only because he was concerned about
Peterson’s conduct in front of their children. Weighing credibility is in the exclusive

8
province of the district court and Vaughn has provided no valid grounds for disturbing the
district court’s credibility determinations on appeal. Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 843-44.
Here, the district court found numerous grounds, any one of which could suffice to
support the issuance of an HRO. 2 The district court presente d a detailed rationale for its
credibility and other determinations in a supplemental memorandum to the standard HRO
form order. The district court’s findings are supported by ample evidence. The fact that
the district court carefully weighed the evidence can also be seen in its decision to decline
to grant an HRO on behalf of the eldest child, determining that the evidence did not support
this part of the petition. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the HRO
on behalf of Peterson.
Affirmed.

2 We note that Vaughn challenges the district court’s finding that he disseminated a “private
sexual image” of Peterson because he marked out Peterson’s breasts before sending the
image to D.H. We need not address this is sue, however, because we conclude that there
are numerous other grounds to support the gran t of the HRO. “Where a decisive finding
of fact is supported by suffici ent evidence and is adequate to sustain the conclusions of
law, it is immaterial whether some ot her findings are not so sustained.” Hanka v.
Pogatchnik, 276 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1979).