In re the Marriage of: James Patrick Pnewski, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0117

In re the Marriage of: James Patrick Pnewski, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Joan Susanne Pnewski,
Appellant.

Filed December 28, 2020
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-15-344

Bradley J. Haddy, Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for appellant)

James P. Pnewski, Cottage Grove, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kalitowsk i,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s denial of her post -dissolution motions,
appellant mother argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying her

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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motion to reduce respondent father’s spousal maintenance award, (2) abused its discretio n
by denying her motion to reduce her child support obligation, (3) erred by failing to
adequately address her motions related to legal custody decision -making, and (4) abused
its discretion by denying her motion for amended findings. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Joan Susanne Frederiksen1 and respondent James Patrick Pnewski were
married in 1997. In 2000, the parties’ first child was born. The parties have two more
children, born in 2002 and 2007, respectively.
On January 27, 2015, respondent petitioned for a dissolution of marriage, joint legal
and physical custody of the children, temporary and permanent spousal maintenance, child
support, sale and division of the marital homestead, and attorney fees. Appellant counter -
petitioned for sole legal and physical custody of the children and child support.
Following a bench trial, the district court issued its findings, order, judgment and
decree of dissolution on August 1, 2017. The district court awarded the parties joint legal
and physical custody of, and equal parenting time with, their c hildren. Finding that she
had unjustifiably self-limited her income, the district court imputed income to appellant.
The district court ordered appellant to pay child support and permanent spousal
maintenance to respondent. Finally, the district court o rdered the parties to engage in
mediation of all future disputes.

1 Appellant was granted a change of her last name from Pnewski to Frederiksen by the
district court in an order issued April 8, 2019 .

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On appeal from the district court’s judgment and decree, appellant argued that the
district court erred in (1) concluding that she had unjustifiably self-limited her income, (2)
calculating respondent’s monthly mortgage expense, and (3) including costs related to the
children in respondent’s personal monthly budget. On June 4, 2018, we issued an order
affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding for further proceedings. Pnewski v.
Pnewski, A17-1521, 2018 WL 2470362 (Minn. App. June 4, 2018) . We determined that
while the district court had not erred in finding that appellant had unjustifiably self-limited
her income or in calculating respondent’s monthly expenses, the district court had erred in
including child-related expenses in respondent’s personal budget. Id. at *3–5. On remand,
the district court issued an amended order correcting the amounts of both spousal
maintenance and child support.
On January 7, 2019, appellant filed a m otion for emergency relief, seeking a court
order compelling respondent to “cooperate in the investigative process for educational
opportunities” for one of the parties’ children and to pay one -half of the cost of a study -
abroad trip for another of the par ties’ children. That same day, appellant filed a separate
motion for a reduction of child support, a reduction of spousal maintenance, and other
relief. Respondent subsequently moved for an increase in spousal support. The district
court issued an order on June 19, 2019 denying both parties’ motions to modify spousal
maintenance. The June 19 order did, however, reduce appellant’s child support obligatio n
in light of the emancipation of the parties’ eldest child.
Appellant subsequently moved for amend ments to the district court’s most recent
findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, and child support worksheet. The district court

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issued an order on November 26, 2019, dismissing appellant’s motion as untimely and
denying it on the merits. Appellant now appeals from the district court’s orders of June 19
and November 26, 2019.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant’s brief appears to present four issues for our consideration: (1) whether
the district court abused its discretion by denying her motio n to reduce spousa l
maintenance, (2) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to
reduce child support, (3) whether the district court erred in concluding that there was no
legal basis for providing the additional relief she requested in her post-dissolution motion,
and (4) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion for amended
findings. For the reasons that follow, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the district
court committed any error in issuing i ts orders of June 19 and November 26, 2019.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
to reduce respondent’s award of spousal maintenance.

An award of spousal maintenance may be modified if the terms of the award have
become unreasonable or unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a) (2018). We review the
district court’s decision not to modify an existing maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997). “A district court abuses
its discretion in making such a decision if it makes findings of fact that are not supported
by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to
logic and the facts on record. ” Madden v. Madden , 923 N.W. 2d 688, 696 (Minn. App.
2019).

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Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in three ways in denying
her motion for a reduction of spousal support. First, she argues that the district court
erroneously included projected mortgage and utility payments in respondent’s monthly
budget. Second, she argues that the district court incorrectly calculated respondent’s
monthly income. Third, she argues that the district court erred in concluding that her
income remains intentionally self -limited. For the reasons that follow, all of appellant’s
arguments fail.
A. Respondent’s Budget
First, appellant argues that the district court “abused its discretion by awarding
permanent spousal maintenance based upon a budget that included a speculative mortgage
and utilities expenses.” In essence, she is arguing that it was clearly erroneous for the
district court, in its consideration of respondent’s need for maintenance, to include $1,750
for a mortgage payment and $230 for a utility payment in respondent’s monthly budget
when he was currently paying $1,075 for rent and, presumably, less than $230 for utilities.
In its original judgment and decree, the district court awarded respondent spousal
maintenance on the basis of a modified version of the monthly budget that he submitted to
the court. Included in the modified budget used by the district court were a $1,750
mortgage payment and a $230 gas and electricity payment. This modified budget, and the
amounts for mortgage and utility payments that it included, were based on the standard of
living established by the parties during their 20-year marriage. On appeal, we held that the
district court’s decision to award spousal maintenance on the ba sis of this budget was not
an abuse of discretion. Pnewski, 2018 WL 2470362, at *4.

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Appellant subsequently moved for a reduction in spousal maintenance, in part on
the basis of respondent’s budget. The district court denied appellant’s motion, conclud ing
that she had failed to prove that the maintenance award was rendered unreasonable or unfair
by changes in respondent’s budget.
The district court’s continued inclusion of a $1,750 mortgage payment and a $230
utility payment in respondent’s monthly budget was not an abuse of discretion. The
standard of living established during the parties’ marriage had not changed, and could not
have changed, between the time of the original judgment and decree on August 1, 2017,
and that of appellant’s motion for modification.
Appellant argues that this court’s decision in Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.
App. 1989) , makes the continued inclusion of the $1,750 mortgage payment in
respondent’s budget improper because respondent is not currently making such a payment.
Appellant’s reliance on Rask is misplaced. In Rask, the maintenance obligee had originally
been awarded $2,000 in permanent monthly maintenance based in part on her statement
that she intended—at some indefinite point in the future—to purchase a house sec ured by
a mortgage that would require monthly payments of approximately $610. Id. at 851, 854.
That mortgage payment was not tied to an amount that the former spouses had previously
paid towards the mortgage on a marital home. See id. at 854. Here—unlike in Rask—the
$1,750 mortgage payment that was included in respondent’s monthly budget was based on
the monthly mortgage payment the parties had made on the for mer marital home.
Accordingly, Rask is inapposite, and the conclusion there —that the district court abused

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its discretion by awarding spousal maintenance based on a budget that included a mortgage
payment that was not currently being made—does not req uire the same conclusion here.
B. Respondent’s Income
Second, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
respondent permanent spousal maintenance “in excess of his real need by miscalculating
his actual income and not factoring in lost income.” Appellant ap pears to argue that the
district court mis calculated respondent’s monthly income at the time of the original
judgment and decree by using respondent’s W -2 income rather than his gross income, and
that it further erred by declining to impute income to respondent on the basis of his alleged
voluntary underemployment.
In its original judgment and decree, the district court did in fact base the amount of
respondent’s spousal maintenance award on his gross income. The district court also
declined to impute inc ome to respondent because it found that he was not voluntaril y
underemployed in bad faith. Appellant did not argue that respondent’s income was
miscalculated in her original appeal. See Pnewski, 2018 WL 2470362, at *2-5.
Following her first appeal, appellant moved for a reduction in spousal maintenance
in part on the basis of respondent’s income. The district court denied appellant’s motion,
concluding that the maintenance award was not rendered unreasonable or unfair by changes
in respondent’s income.
That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion . At the time of appellant’s motion
for a reduction of maintenance, respondent remained employed by the same employer, and
in the same position, as he had been at the time of the original judgment and decree. The

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district court’s finding that respondent’s earning capacity was largely unchanged is
supported by his affidavit setting forth his gross bi-weekly pay. The district court’s find ing
is also supported by respondent’s original trial testimony that he is unable to increase his
earnings by working additional overtime, picking up additional shifts, or finding a new,
higher-paying position in his field of employment.
Appellant offered to the district court no reason why respondent’s earning capacity
would have increased since the time of the original judgment and decree. Instead, appellant
focused on an involuntary two -hour-per-week reduction in respondent’s work schedule —
and an attendant decrease in bi-weekly pay—and claimed that these changes were evidence
of respondent’s underemployment. But an involuntary reduction in work hours, and an
involuntary decrease in pay, do not support appellant’s argument that respondent is
voluntarily underemployed.
C. Appellant’s Income
Third, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
spousal maintenance to respondent because it failed to accept and consider new and
ongoing evidence that appellant did not intentionally self -limit her income. Appellant
contends that her efforts to find higher-paid employment demonstrate that she is no longer
voluntarily underemployed and that the district court thus erred by denying her motion for
a reduction in spousal maintenance.
Appellant’s voluntary underemployment has been an issue throughout the litigatio n
between these parties. Appellant was a financial analyst with Woodbury Financial
Services, earning roughly $100,000 per year , during the majority of the parties’ marriage.

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Her position was terminated in February 2014, and she was unemployed for roughly 14
months. In April of 2015, during the original dissolution proceedings, she took a job as a
financial analyst with Thomson Reuters. This position began with a salary of $80,000.
She left her position with Thomson Reuters after a week upon being told t hat she would
sometimes be expected to work in excess of 40 hours per week.
Following her resignation from Thomson Reuters, appellant took a job in July of
2015 as a project manager with Craftsman Home Improvements. This position initially
paid roughly $39,000 per year. Appellant’s income has since increased to roughly $60,000
per year. She was employed with Craftsman at the time of both the trial and her post -
dissolution motions.
In its original judgment and decree, the district court found that appella nt had
unjustifiably self-limited her income. This was based in part on the district court’s find ing
that appellant refused to work more than 40 hours per week on a regular basis —as is
apparently often required of salaried financial analysts —and the fact that this refusal
limited her ability to find employment compensated at a rate commensurate with her
earning history. After finding that appellant was voluntarily underemployed, the district
court imputed income to her in the amount of $86,000—the amount of her base salary with
Woodbury Financial Services. We upheld this imputation of income on appeal. Pnewski,
2018 WL 2470362, at *4.
Following her original appeal, appellant moved for a reduction in spousal
maintenance, in part on the ground that she was no longer voluntarily underemployed. The
district court denied her motion, concluding that the maintenance award was not rendered

10
unreasonable or unfair by changes in circumstance. This conclusion was based in part on
the district court’s finding that appellant remained voluntarily underemployed.
This finding is not clearly erroneous. Although appellant offered evidence of her
ongoing job search when filing her motion for a reduction in spousal maintenance, she
indicated in an affidavit filed at that time that she remained unwilling to work overtime on
a regular basis. The record is also devoid of any evidence that she was attempting to
acquire and maintain the skills necessary for ongoing employment as a financial analyst.
Based upon this record, t he district court’s finding that appellant remained voluntarily
underemployed is not clearly erroneous.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
to modify her child support obligation.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion
to modify child support in light of the parties’ respective incomes. In the portion of her
brief appearing under this heading, appellant claims that the district court erred in sev eral
respects in ordering her to pay child support to respondent following the 2017 trial. But
appellant is challenging the district court’s orders of June 19 and November 26, 2019, not
the original judgment and decree. The appropriate question here is w hether the district
court erred in denying her motion to reduce her child-support obligation.
A child-support obligation may be modified if its terms have become unreasonab le
or unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). We review the district court’s de cision not
to modify an existing child support obligation for abuse of discretion. Shearer v. Shearer,
891 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. App. 2017).

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Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion
to reduce child support for tw o reasons. First, she contends that the district court used the
wrong income figure in determining respondent’s income for purposes of establishing
appellant’s child support obligation because it used respondent’s W-2 income and not his
gross income. Second, she argues, again, that her income is not intentionally self-limited.
While appellant is correct that the district court’s original child support calculatio n
was based on incorrect income information for respondent, that issue was resolved when
the district court amended appellant’s child support obligation to reflect respondent’s
correct income amount, which it did in its June 19, 2019 order. As to appellant’s income,
the district court ’s finding that she remains voluntarily underemployed is not clearly
erroneous, a s is discussed above. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to deny appellant’s motion to reduce her child-support obligation.
III. The district court did not err as a matter of law in concluding that there
was no legal basis for providing the additional relief appellant requested.

Appellant argues that the district court a bused its discretion by failing to a ddress
ancillary issues related to the parties’ joint legal custody of their minor children. She argues
that the district court should have issued orders regarding (1) outstanding expense
reimbursements owing between the parties, (2) the allocation of dependent tax exemptio ns,
(3) division of the parties’ personal property, (4) a study-abroad trip for one of the parties’
minor children, and (5) educational opportunities for another of the parties’ minor children.
Appellant further argues that the district court constructively awarded respondent sole legal

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custody of the parties’ minor children by declining to issue such orders in the face of
respondent’s alleged refusal to cooperate in making legal custody decisions.
Appellant filed a motion for emergency relief on January 7, 2019, seeking a court
order compelling respondent to “cooperate in the investigative process for educational
opportunities” for one of the parties’ minor children and to pay one-half of the cost of a
study-abroad trip for another of the parties’ minor children. Her motion also sought
clarification of the division of dependent tax exemptions. That same day, appellant filed
her motion for a reduction in child support and spousal maintenance. That m otion also
included a request for a determination of reimbursement amounts owing between the
parties. Finally, appellant indicated i n the affidavit filed with her motion that there were
items of personal property that the parties had not yet divided and requested that the district
court officially recognize an agreement regarding those items that the parties had reached
of their own volition.
In its June 19, 2019 order, the district court concluded as a matter of law that
appellant had not “provided a sufficient legal basis to grant relief requested on the ancillary
issues in [her] motions,” and accordingly denied all of her motions related to legal custody
decision-making, expense reimbursements , dependent tax exemptions, and personal
property. This court reviews such legal conclusions de novo. Modrow v. JP Foodservice,
Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003).
The district court did not err as a matter of law by concluding that appellant had
failed to provide a legal basis on which her requested relief could be granted. All of the
issues identified above were dealt with in the district court’s original judgment and

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decree—the district court or dered the parties to reimburse each other for outstand ing
expenses; it set a schedule for the allocation of dependent tax exemptions; it provided for
the division of personal property; and most importantly, it awarded the parties joint legal
custody of the ir minor children, with the division of decision -making responsibility that
goes along with such an arrangement. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2018). That
original judgment and decree remains controlling.
Ultimately, the legal custody issues appellant references in her brief are matters on
which parents—even those who are former spouses —must reach agreement. It is not the
district court’s role to act as legal custodian of the parties’ children or to make decisions
regarding their travel or educa tion. In the face of the parties’ disagreements over such
issues, the district court could only do precisely what it did: remind the parties that the
original judgment and decree remains in effect and order them to follow it, including by
making legal custody decisions jointly.
If a dispute arises between the parties to this case, the original judgment and decree
requires the parties to engage in mediation of that dispute. And if either party refuses to
comply with the original judgment and decree—or any subsequent court order—the proper
response is to bring a motion to hold that party in contempt, a s the district court pointed
out. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 309.01; see also Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 3 (2018).
Without the filing of a contempt motion, the district court was without grounds to force
either party to comply with its original judgment and decree —or more precisely, to punish
them for not doing so. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 309.01(a).

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IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for amended findings.

Finally, by arguing that the district court committed several errors in its June 19,
2019 order, and by appealing from the district court’s November 26, 2019 order deny ing
her motion to amend the June 19 order , app ellant’s brief implicitly raises the issue of
whether the district court erred in denying her motion to amend the June 19 order.
Appellant does not explicitly argue that the district court erred in denying her motion to
amend. However, because she appeal s from both the June 19 and November 26, 2019
orders, we consider the question here.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for amended findings for an abuse
of discretion. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 14, 2006) . In denying appellant’s motion for amended findings, the district
court concluded that the motion failed for two reasons: first, because it was untimely, and
second, because it was, in reality, an improper motion for reconsideration and not a motion
for amended findings. We review such legal conclusions de novo. Modrow, 656 N.W.2d
at 393.
As to timeliness, a motion for amended findings must be served and heard no later
than the time allowed for a motion for a new trial under rule 59.03 of the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. Rule 59.03 requires a motion for a new trial
to be served within 30 days, and heard within 60 days, of the date when notice of the filing
of the decision or order is given. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03. Here, notice of the filing of the
June 19, 2019 order was given on June 19. Appellant was required to file a motion for

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amended findings by July 19, 2019, and a hearing on the motion had to be held by August
18, 2019. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52. 02, 59.03. Because August 18, 2019 was a Sunday, the
deadline for a hearing extended to August 19. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(a)(1)(C).
Appellant timely filed her motion for amended findings on July 19, 2019. The
hearing on that motion, however, was no t held until August 30, 2019. There is no
indication that appellant sought permission to extend the 60 -day deadline. Under these
circumstances, the hearing was untimely, and the district court’s conclusion to that effect
was not in error. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(a)(1)(C), 52.02, 59.03.
As to the nature of appellant’s motion, “a proper motion for amended findings must
both identify the alleged defect in the challenged findings and explain why the challenged
findings are defective.” State ex rel. Fort Snelling State Park Ass’ n v. Minneapolis Park
& Recreation Bd. , 673 N.W.2d 16 9, 178 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar.
16, 2004). A motion for amended findings that merely reargues a prior motion is really a
motion to reconsider. Lewis v. Lewis , 572 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 1997), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).2 Importantly, “[m]otions to reconsider are prohibited except
by express permission of the court.” Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11.
In her motion for amended findings, appellant advanced no legal arguments other
than those previously made in her motion for reductions of child support and spousal
maintenance. In fact, appellant’s counsel admitted that the motion for amended findin gs

2 Madson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 612 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 2000), overruled Lewis in
part, but Lewis remains good law on the necessary components of a motion for amended
findings. Fort Snelling, 673 N.W.2d at 178 n.1.

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contained no new legal arguments at the motion h earing. Therefore, appellant’s motion to
amend is properly viewed as a motion for reconsideration. See Lewis, 572 N.W.2d at 315.
Because there is no indication that appellant or her counsel sought permission to file a
motion for reconsideration, conside ration of appellant’s motion was prohibited under the
General Rules of Practice for the District Courts, and the district court’s conclusion to that
effect was not erroneous. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motions
to reduce her spousal maintenance and child support obligations. The district court also
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for amended findings when such
motion was untimely and was, in reality, an improper motion for reconsideration. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(a)(1)(C), 52.02, 59.03; see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.11; Lewis,
572 N.W.2d at 315. Finally, the district court did not err by refusing to rule on appellant’s
ancillary issues related to the parties’ joint legal custody of the minor children, where those
issues were controlled by the original judgment and decree, appellant gave no legal basis
for her motion, and the parties, contrary to the requirement of the judgment and decree,
had failed to mediate their dispute.
Affirmed.