State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0122

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Anthony James Harrell,
Appellant.

Filed September 14, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-6118

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ryan C. Young, Special As sistant Public Defender, Fredri kson & Byron, P .A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In this appeal following an earlier direct appeal and remand to the district court for
additional findings and a determination of the validity of an unannounced -entry search
warrant, appellant argues that the district court improperly concluded that the search -
warrant affidavit, after removing the affiant’s false statements, satisfied the reasonable
suspicion required for an unannounced entry. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Anthony James Harrell with
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1(2) (2016), and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016). The state filed these charges based on its
recovery of nearly 1,2 00 grams of marijuana, more than $15,000 in cash, a 9mm
Springfield handgun from a residence in March 2018 following the execut ion of an
unannounced-entry search warrant.
Officers based the search -warrant application for the residence on the following
information. A cooperating defendant (CD)1 informed an officer that a white male with
red hair had been selling large amounts of m arijuana from a specified residence and that
he had a firearm. The officer searched in CLEAR, a database that law enforcement uses
for investigations, for persons associated with the address. From several pages of results,

1 A cooperating defendant is an individual whose information has not yet proved to be
reliable.

3
the officer identified D.B. as the suspect based on him having a 2016 utility listing for the
address. The CD conducted a con trolled buy at the residence. The officer thereafter
showed a photograph of D.B. to the CD, who identified D.B. as the resident. The search-
warrant application included D.B.’s criminal history and the fact that he cannot possess
firearms. But D.B. resided in federal prison at the time and could not have been the
resident. After executing the search warrant, officers learned that appellant was the
resident, and he admitted that the marijuana and firearm in the home belonged to him.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence due to the officer’s misrepresentations
regarding D.B. in the warrant application. The district court granted a hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978),2 and denied
appellant’s motion. It expressed “serious concerns” about the officer’s “cursory research”
into a database on which he had not been trained, the “suggestive manner” in which the
officer had the CD identify D.B., and the “misleading way” in which the officer presented
the information in the affidavit as suggesting that the CD first identified D.B. and that the
officer then corroborated his identity in CLEAR. Nevertheless, it determined that the
warrant contained sufficient probable cause to search the residence. However, it did not
rule on the challenge to the unannounced-entry warrant.

2 Under Franks, the Fourth Amendment requires a district court to hold a hearing if “ the
defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” Id.

4
Appellant stipulated to the state’s evidence to preserve his challenge to the pretrial
ruling pursuant to Minn. R. Cri m. P. 2 6.01, subd. 4. Following a court trial, the district
court found appellant guilty of both possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. It sentenced him to 60 months ’
imprisonment on the firearm conviction.
Appellant argued in a prior direct appeal that the district court should have
suppressed the evidence due to intentional or reckless misrepresentations and omissions in
the warrant application that were material to both the probable cause to search the residence
and the reasonable suspicion for the unannounced entry. State v. Harrell, No. A18-1954,
2019 WL 4164895, at *1, *6 (Minn. App. Sept. 3, 2019). We affirmed the probable-cause
determination for the warrant i tself, concluding that “the misrepresentation and omission
stemming from the misidentification of the suspect -resident as D.B. were not material to
the probable-cause determination.” Id. at *5. But we remanded for a finding on whether
the officer deliberately and recklessly made the misrepresentations for purposes of the
unannounced entry provision and for a determination on whether the misrepresentations
were material to the reasonable suspicion required for the unannounced entry. Id. at *7.
On remand, the district court determined that the misidentification of appellant as
D.B. was immaterial to the reasonable suspicion for the unannounced entry , as the
remaining information in the warrant application, after removing D.B.’s na me and
information, is “that a male resident at [the residence] was selling drugs out of that location
and was in possession of a firearm” and “that the resident ‘utilizes the firearm as means of
protection for controlled substances sales.’” It determined that appellant therefore was

5
“likely to be in possession of and prepared to use firearms to protect his drug activity,”
which provided the basis for an unannounced entry. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that t he search -warrant application with the information about
D.B. removed lacks the particularized showing required for an unannounced entry ,
requiring suppression of the evidence seized in the search. We disagree.
A defendant seeking to invalidate a search warrant due to misrepresentations in the
search-warrant application must show that (1) the affiant deliberately or recklessly made
the misrepresentations and (2) the misrepresentations were material. See State v. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (discussing misrepresentations and omissions related
to probable cause to search residence).3 We review determinations of materiality de novo
and findings on deliberateness or recklessness for clear error. See id. If a misrepresentation
is immaterial, an appellate court need not reach the issue of whether the affiant made it
deliberately or recklessly. Id. at 329. Appellant challenges only the materiality prong.4
The U.S. and Minnesota Constitution s require a reasonableness inquiry into the
necessity of an unannounced entry. See Wilson v. Arkansas , 514 U.S. 927, 931 -34, 115
S. Ct. 1914, 1916-18 (1995); State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000). Officers

3 We note that no published case has applied Andersen to determine whether
misrepresentations in a search-warrant application invalidate reasonable suspicion for an
unannounced entry. Nonetheless, because we applied it to this issue in the prior appeal ,
and because appellant effectively asks us to invalidate the search warrant and suppress the
fruits of the search, we conclude that it is applicable here.
4 While the state argues that we can affirm on the first prong because appellant does not
challenge it, we address the dispositive second prong because the district court based its
holding on it, and appellant challenges it on appeal.

6
“must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the
particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Wasson,
615 N.W.2d at 320 (quotation omitted). This involves “a strong showing that an
unannounced entry is a necessity.” State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. App.
1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998). Even so, the required showing “is not high.”
Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320. It must be based on “more than an unarticulated hunch.” Id.
The warrant application must “point to something that objectively supports the suspicion
at issue.” Id. Boilerplate language is insufficient. Id. at 320, 322.
To determine if the misrepresentations here are material, we rev iew whether the
search-warrant application without them provides reasonable suspicion for an
unannounced entry. T he search -warrant application, with the misrepresentations
removed,5 states the following to justify the unannounced entry:
Your affiant know s from experience that parties
involved in the distribution of controlled substances often
possess firearms and ammunition as a means to protect
themselves and their drug distribution business. During the
course of this investigation your affiant received information
that the resident . . . has been observed in possession of a
firearm.

. . . .

An unannounced entry is necessary to prevent the loss,
destruction, or removal of the objects of the search, or to

5 In reviewing materiality in the prior appeal, we determined that the misrepresentations in
the search-warrant application involved the information identifying D.B. as the suspect -
resident and D.B.’s criminal history, but not information regarding the suspect -resident’s
activities. Harrell, 2019 WL 4164895, at *4.

7
protect the safety of the searches or the publi c because, [t]he
cooperating defendant in this case indicated that the target of
this investigation, [] is in possession of a firearm . The
cooperator further went on to indicate that [resident] utilizes
this firearm as a means of protection for his contro lled
substance sales. . . . Your affiant knows that an unannounced
entry allows officers executing the search warrant the element
of surprise while making entry to the residence. This element
of surprise allows the target of the investigation and other
person(s) less time to arm themselves. This makes the entry
safer for officers, person(s) inside of the residence, and the
general public.

(Emphases added.)
While the information from the CD lacks detail on when and where the CD saw
appellant possessing the firearm, the statement from the CD that “ [resident] utilizes this
firearm as a means of protection for his controlled substance sales ” suggests that the
firearm would be in the home, where the sales were taking place.
The statements here provide a similar amount of information regarding weapons or
the potential for violence as those in Wasson and State v. Barnes , 618 N.W.2d 805, 808
(Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001) , in which the unannounced
searches were upheld. In Wasson, officers had information about weapons specifically in
the home, even though the officers had seen the weapons there three months earlier. 615
N.W.2d at 322 -23. In Barnes, which appellant cites , we concluded that the appellant’s
gang affilia tion and prior record together with the level of suspected drug trafficking
provided reasonable suspicion for a n unannounced-entry warrant, even without specific
information about weapons in the residence . 618 N.W.2d at 812. Here, the information
from the CD created a link between the residence and the firearm that provided “more than

8
an unarticulated hunch” of appellant using a weapon to protect drug sales in the home .
Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320. The warrant application without the information about D.B.
therefore contained sufficient detail to meet the reasonable-suspicion standard, making the
misrepresentations in the application immaterial. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 327.
Appellant nonetheless argues that the search -warrant application is insufficient
because neither the presence of drugs nor firearms alone can satisfy the reasonable -
suspicion standard, citing to Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2001), and State
v. Botelho, 638 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Minn. App. 20 02).6 Appellant correctly cites caselaw
holding that drugs alone do not provide re asonable suspicion to justify an unannounced
entry. See Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320 ; see also Garza, 632 N.W.2d at 638 (concluding
general statement that “[p]ersons involved in Drug trafficking will destroy evidence . . .
[and] will use violence,” without “factual nexus to particularized facts of dangerousness”
related to residence does not justify no-knock warrant). But both drugs and weapons were
involved, and a connection exists between the two and the residence.
Further, Botelho involved a general statement in a search -warrant application that
drug dealers have a practice of being armed with weapons and that “people frequenting the

6 Appellant also relies on an unpublished case from this court and a decision from the Tenth
Circuit, but these cases are not precedential. See State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d 181, 191
(Minn. App. 2010) (stating federal court decisions may be persuasive b ut are not
precedential), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2010); Vlahos v. R&I Constr. of Bloomington,
Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 676 n.3 (Minn. 2004) (stating unpublished opinions from this court
are not precedential). Appellant further cites to State v. Amundson, 712 N.W.2d 560, 565
(Minn. App. 2006), vacated (Minn. Jan. 15, 2008) (mem.), but the supreme court vacated
this court’s holding in that case and remanded for us to reconsider it in light of recent
supreme court cases. We do not find Amundson precedential.

9
address having [sic] dangerous weapon criminal histories as well as histories reflective of
obstructing legal process.” 638 N.W.2d at 774 (alteration in original). The affiant based
that statement on the criminal histories of registered owners of the vehicles visiting the
residence, but the affiant had “ no specific knowledge that the individuals entering
appellant’s residence, or appellant, possessed weapons on their person.” Id. at 774-75. We
concluded that this information was “not suffi ciently particularized to support reasonable
suspicion of a threat to officer safety.” Id. at 779. In contrast, the warrant application here
contained information that the resident had a firearm that he used to protect his drug sales,
which occurred in the residence.
Because we conclude that the warrant application provides sufficient detail to meet
the reasonable-suspicion standard,7 we need not reach the state’s argument that an improper
unannounced entry does not require suppression.
Affirmed.

7 Although we conclude that the warrant application without the misrepresentations
provides reasonable suspicion for an unannounced entry, we share the district court’s
“serious concerns” about the misrepresentations in it and caution officer s to provide
accurate information to magistrates.