Dwaine C. Ratfield, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0135

Dwaine C. Ratfield, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

South Harbor Township,
Respondent,

Robert Zuckerman, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 14, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge*

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-19-1366

Richard W. Curott, Curott Law Office, Milaca, Minnesota (for appellants)

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota; and

David Meyers, Rinke Noonan, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respon dent South Harbor
Township)

Robert T. Ruppe, Michael C. Couri, Couri & Ruppe, P.L.L.P., St. Michael, Minnesota (for
respondents Robert Zuckerman and Joby Properties)

Considered and decided by Re yes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
This is the third appeal arising from the recording of a cartway order in 2006. In
2018, appellant-landowners Dw aine C. Ratfield, et al., filed a complaint against
respondent-township and respondent-cartway-petitioners seeking to renew a 2008 damages
award order. The district court dismissed th e complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. We reverse and remand for renewal of the 2008 judgment.
FACTS
Respondents Stephen, Robert, and Mi chael Zuckerman and Joby Properties
(collectively the Zuckermans) own land at the tip of a penins ula that protrudes into Lake
Mille Lacs in South Harbor Township. The Zuckermans ha ve a prescriptive easement
granting use of a ten-foot driveway that they ha ve used and continue to use. In 2003, the
Zuckermans filed a petition with the township to establish a cartway that would expand the
driveway to a width of two rods, or 33 feet, and connect the Zuckermans’ land to the sole
public road serving the peninsula. The pr oposed cartway route would traverse several
parcels of land, including land owned by the nine appellants in this case. In 2006, the
township granted the petition, recorded the cartway, and awarded general damages to the
affected landowners.
The affected landowners appealed the townsh ip’s decision to the district court. In
July 2008, the district court affirmed the cartway order but ordered specific damages for
eight of the affected landowners. The affected landowners appealed to this court, which
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affirmed the cartway order. Ratfield v. South Harbor Township , A09-0586, 2010 WL
696114 (Minn. App. Mar. 2, 2010).
The Zuckermans never opened the cartway and never paid the damages awarded in
2008. Nevertheless, in May 2014, seven affected landowne rs asked the district court
administrator to docket the district court’ s 2008 damages award order as a monetary
judgment against the township. The township objected, and the district court rescinded the
docketed judgment, reasoning that the 2008 da mages award order did no t give rise to an
enforceable monetary judgment but, rather, set forth the damages owed if the Zuckermans
acted on their right to open the cartway. 1
In June 2016, two of the affected landowners, the Ratfields, commenced an
independent action against the Zuckermans and the township, in which they sought
payment from the Zuckermans fo r the cartway damages that were awarded in 2008 and
argued that the township failed to provide a ny security or guaranty of payment for the
affected landowners. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice, and this court
affirmed. Ratfield v. Zuckerman , A17-0214, 2017 WL 3863855 (Minn. App. Sept. 5,
2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017).
In July 2018, nine of the affected landowners (appellants) initiated an action by
complaint against the Zuckermans and the township, seeking to renew the district court’s
2008 damages award order under Minnesota Statutes section 5 41.04 (2018). The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for fa ilure to state a claim upon which relief

1 In 2018, another affected landowner attemp ted to docket a monetary judgment against
the township. The district court again rescinded the docketed judgment.
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could be granted under rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
In November 2019, the district court gr anted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
concluding that the 2008 damages award order was not a monetary judgment and that any
attempt to argue that a monetary judgment exists is statutorily and procedurally barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, the statute of limitations, and the district court’s prior orders in
2014 and 2018.
The appellant-landowners appeal.
D E C I S I O N
Appellants, who own burdened land parcels, argue that the district court erred by
dismissing their complaint against the Zuckermans and the town ship for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, appellants contend that the district
court erred by determining that appellants are not entitled to renew the 2008 damages
award order. Appellants argue that denying their request to rene w the judgment would
result in an unconstitutional taking without compensation.2
Appellants filed a complaint seeking to re new a 2008 order of the district court,
which set forth specific damages that the Zu ckermans must pay in order to open the

2 Indeed, the Zuckermans’ attorn ey stated at oral argument th at he believes that the 2008
damages award is void and that his clients are entitled to open the cartway without paying
damages. This position conflicts with long-established state and federal constitutional law,
which prohibits gove rnmental authorities from cond emning private property without
providing just compensation to the affected landowners. Minn. Const. art. I, § 13; U.S.
Const. amend. V; Minnesota Sands, LLC v. City of Winona, 940 N.W.2d 183, 200 (Minn.
2020).
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cartway. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (2018). The Zuckermans and the township
moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted because the 2008 damages award order was not a judgment subject to renewal.
The district court agreed, reasoning that this court previously determ ined that the 2008
damages award order was not a monetary judgment and concluding that any current attempt
to collect on that order was therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by the six-
year statute of limitations for collections. Mi nn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(4) (2018). Thus,
the district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, appellants argue that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint
for failure to state a claim. This court revi ews de novo “whether a complaint sets forth a
legally sufficient claim for relief.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn.
2014).
Under Minnesota law, a civil judgment surv ives for a period of ten years after
judgment is entered. Minn. Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1 (2018); see also Dahlin v. Kroening ,
796 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 2011). All actions “maintained upon a judgment or decree”
must be initiated within ten years after the entry of judgment. Minn. Stat. § 541.04. This
ten-year timeline is extended if the judgment is renewed. Dahlin, 796 N.W.2d at 505.
Although the procedure for renewing a judgment is not specifically prescribed by statute,
caselaw permits parties to bring actions for renewal so long as th e action is commenced
within ten years after entry of the original judgment and complies with all the requirements
for commencing an action under the rules of civil procedure. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith,
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737 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. App. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.
2008).
Here, appellants initiated the action to renew the 2008 damages award order by
complaint, which was filed with the district court and served on the Zuckermans and the
township within ten years of entry of judgment. The township and the Zuckermans do not
argue that the complaint was pr ocedurally defective; rather, they contend that the 2008
damages award order is not a judgment subject to renewal.
The rules of civil procedure define “judgmen t” as “the final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.01. The 2008 damages
award order establishes that the Zuckermans may open a cartway that crosses appellants’
land as soon as the Zuckermans pay $214,437 in specific damages. Because neither party
appealed the district court’s calculation of damages, this order remains the district court’s
final determination of the rights of th e parties as to specific damages. See Ratfield, 2010
WL 696114, at *1-2.
During the earlier appeal, we emphasized th at the 2008 damages award order is a
judgment detailing the damages owed upon opening of the car tway but is not currently
enforceable as a monetary judgment becau se the cartway had not been opened. See
Ratfield, 2017 WL 3863855, at *4.
This remains true today. The 2008 damages award order is not a monetary
judgment, but it is a judgment for purposes of determini ng the rights of the parties. The
township order establishing the cartway, which was filed with the county recorder on April
18, 2006, allows the Zuckermans to expand their existing 10-foot access to a width of two
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rods (33 feet) upon payment of damages. The district c ourt judgment that appellant-
landowners seek to renew establishes the spec ific damages that must be paid before the
cartway can be opened.3
The 2008 damages award order is a judgm ent subject to renewal under Minnesota
Statutes section 541.04. Thus, the district court erred by dismissing the action, and we
reverse and remand with instructions to renew the judgment.
Reversed and remanded.

3 During a hearing on May 16, 2014, it is clear from the transcript that the district court and
the respondents did not believe that the 2008 judgment was a money judgment. It was
acknowledged at that hearing that the damages would only be payable when the cartway
was opened. In fact the distri ct court judge seemed to believe that the right to open the
cartway existed in perpetuity and could trigger the obligation to pay those damages in the
future even without a renewal of the judgment every ten years.