In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Cody Jerome Kaiser.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0152

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Cody Jerome Kaiser.

Filed August 10, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-PR-19-261

David A. Jaehne, West St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather D. Pipenhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent Dakota County)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his indeterminate commitment as mentally il l and dangerous,
arguing that he showed sufficient improvement that he should not have been committed.
Because the district court did not clearly err in finding that appellant is mentally ill and
dangerous, we affirm.

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FACTS
In April 2019, Dakota County filed a petition for judicial commitment of appellant
Cody Kaiser. The petition arose after appellant threatened his father and sister with a knife
multiple times, assaulted his sister with a hammer, and choked his father. After an initial
commitment hearing, the district court issued an order in June 2019, civilly committing
appellant as mentally ill and dangerous, based on the reports and testimony of two court -
appointed examiners.
The district court held a 60 -day review hearing on November 1, 2019. 1 Dr. Jason
Lewis, a forensic examiner at appellant’s treatment facility, testified at the hearing. He
also conducted a 60-day evaluation of appellant and submitted a report to the district court.
Dr. Lewis testified that appellant had achieved some stabilization since his hospitalization,
but that he continued to demonstrate disorganized thought s and delusional ideation.
Dr. Lewis stated that, even though appellant had expressed insight as to his mental illness
and his need for medication, such insight appeared to be “impression management,” so that
appellant could “look good on paper” and avoid being committed. Based on appellant’s
history and ongoing symptoms, Dr. Lewis opined that appellant’s prognosis was “marginal
to poor.” He therefore concluded that appellant was mentally ill with schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type, and that, as a result of that illness, appellant represented a danger to
the public or himself.

1 The review hearing was originally scheduled for August 2019, but the district court twice
continued the hearing. Appellant does not challenge this delay in the review hearing.

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Dr. Lewis testified that appellant was in need of further psychiatric care and
treatment for the foreseeable future, that appellant needed to continue treatment in a secure
treatment setting, and that appellant’s current treatment facility provided the type of
treatment that appellant needed. On cross-examination, Dr. Lewis conceded that treatment
in a community-based setting may be appropriate for appellant. He clarified, however, that
he did not know whether any treatment facility existed that both had a community-based
setting and was secure and met the other requirements for appellant’s treatment. On
redirect examination, Dr. Lewis concluded that appellant’s current treatment facility was
the least restrictive alternative for appellant.
The two court-appointed examiners who testified at the initial commitment hearing
also testifie d a t the review hearing. Both examiners opined, based on their review of
appellant’s medical records and Dr. Lewis’s 60 -day evaluation, that appellant was still
mentally ill and dangerous. They conceded, however, that they had not spoken with
appellant s ince his initial commitment and had not reviewed his most recent medical
records. And one examiner recognized that appellant had shown improvement since his
initial commitment.
Appellant’s father testified at the review hearing. He stated that he had vi sited
appellant at the treatment facility about once per week and that appellant had shown
improvement since his initial commitment. Specifically, appellant’s father believed that
appellant’s “thoughts are organized,” that appellant was “a lot more willin g to take
medication,” and that he had “accepted his illness now” and knew he had to take medication

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to cope with his illness. Appellant’s father does not have any training as a psychologist or
psychiatrist.
Finally, appellant testified at the review hearing. Appellant recognized that he had
schizoaffective disorder and that he had to take medication for the rest of his life in order
to manage his mental illness. He claimed that he had not had any delusional thoughts since
May 2019. Additionally, ap pellant entered into evidence a discharge plan that he had
prepared for himself. He testified that he was willing to participate in inpatient treatment
if required, but he did not believe that such treatment was necessary.
On November 26, 2019, the distr ict court issued an order indeterminately
committing appellant as mentally ill and dangerous. In reaching that determination, the
district court found credible the testimony of Dr. Lewis and the two court -appointed
examiners. It found that appellant’s pr oposed discharge plan was not “compelling or
viable” under the circumstances. The district court concluded that there had been “no
significant changes in [appellant’s] condition or diagnosis” since appellant’s initial
commitment, and that there remained c lear and convincing evidence that the statutory
requirements for commitment as mentally ill and dangerous were satisfied. The district
court also determined that there would be “a clear danger to public safety” if appellant did
not receive treatment in a secure facility and that appellant’s current treatment facility was
the least restrictive alternative for meeting appellant’s treatment needs and for protecting
the public.
This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
On appeal from a district court’s order of co mmitment, we review whether the
district court complied with the statute and whether its findings of fact support the
commitment. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the district court’s deci sion, do not set aside findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, and give the district court the opportunity to judge the
credibility of witnesses. Id. We look to the record as a whole when determining whether
the findings are clearly erroneous . In re Civil Commitment of Ince , 847 N.W.2d 13, 22
(Minn. 2014). “Where the findings of fact rest almost entirely on expert testimony, the
[district] court’s evaluation of credibility is of particular significance.” Knops, 536 N.W.2d
at 620.
The district court must commit a patient to a secure treatment facility if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the patient is “mentally ill and dangerous to the public.”
Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a) (2018). A patient is “mentally ill and dangero us to the
public” when he is “mentally ill” and “as a result of that mental illness presents a clear
danger to the safety of others.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2018). A clear danger to
the safety of others is demonstrated by the facts that (1) “the person has engaged in an overt
act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another” and (2) “there is a
substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious
physical harm on another.” Id.
When a patie nt is committed as mentally ill and dangerous, the treatment facility
must file a written treatment report with the district court within 60 days after commitment,

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and the district court must hold a hearing to make a final determination as to whether the
patient should remain committed as mentally ill and dangerous. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18,
subd. 2(a) (2018). “If the court finds at the final determination hearing . . . that the patient
continues to be a person who is mentally ill and dangerous, then the cou rt shall order
commitment of the proposed patient for an indeterminate period of time.” Id., subd. 3
(2018).
Appellant argues that he had shown significant improvement since the initial
commitment hearing so as not to be indeterminately committed as ment ally ill and
dangerous. He points to the testimony of Dr. Lewis and one of the court -appointed
examiners that appellant’s condition was improving. In making this argume nt, appellant
does not dispute that he meets the first requirement for being mentally ill and dangerous—
that he has engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to
another. But he appears to dispute that he meets the second requirement—that there is a
substantial likelihood that he will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm
on another.
It is true that two examiners testified that appellant had shown improvement since
his initial commitment. But we must look at the entire record when determining whether
the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous, not just portions of the record. See Ince,
847 N.W.2d at 22. At the review hearing, Dr. Lewis also testified that appellant
demonstrated disorganized thoughts and delusional ideation and that appellant’s insights
into his mental illness appeared to be impression management designed to avoid being
committed. Dr. Lewis concluded that, despite appellant’s improvement before the review

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hearing, appellant still represented a danger to the public or himself based on his history of
violence. And the two court-appointed examiners opined that appellant remained mentally
ill and dangerous, based on their review of Dr. Lewis’s 60 -day evaluation and appellant’s
medical records. In concluding that appellant continued to represent a threat to public
safety, the district court relied heavily on the testimony of the three examiners and found
their testimony to be credible. The district court’s evaluation of cre dibility is especially
important when its findings of fact are based on expert testimony. Knops, 536 N.W.2d at
620. On this record, there is no basis for concluding that the district court clearly erred in
finding that there is a substantial likelihood t hat appellant will engage in acts capable of
inflicting serious physical harm on another.
Therefore, the district court’s finding that appellant continued to be mentally ill and
dangerous, thus requiring indeterminate commitment, is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.