George Mentonis, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0158

George Mentonis,
Appellant,

vs.

Abbott Laboratories Inc., et al.,
Defendants,

St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.,
Respondent.

Filed December 7, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-18-6009

David E. Schlesinge r, Laura A. Farley, Nichols Kast er, PLLP, Minnea polis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Jillian Kornblatt, Briana Al Taqatqa, Trevor Brown, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presid ing Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant George Mentonis sued respondent St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. (SJM)
alleging age discrimination following his disc harge as part of a company-wide reduction

2
in force (RIF). The district court granted SJM’s motion for summary judgment. Because
we agree that SJM presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
Mentonis and Mentonis has not presented genuine issues of material fact that the reason
for his discharge was pretextual or partially motivated by Mentonis’s age, we affirm.
FACTS
George Mentonis began working as a me dical sales representative for Pacesetter—
the company which would later be acquired by SJM—in 1986. Although SJM conducted
sales throughout the country, Mentonis largely did sales within New York City.1 Mentonis
continued in this position until his employment with SJM ende d in 2015. Following his
departure from SJM, Mentonis briefly worked in medical sales for Boston Scientific.
In June 2016, Mentonis was contacted by SJM regional director John Arancio about
the possibility of returning to SJM. Mentonis, age 65 years old at the time, returned to
employment as a sales representative with SJM in October 2016. Mentonis was given sales
territory in a portion of New York City and placed under the supervision of two regional
directors—Arancio and Steven Nystedt. Both Arancio and Nystedt reported to Robert
Biolsi, who became area vice president in No vember 2016. Menton is was paid SJM’s
standard sales representative base salary plus commission, and was assigned a $500,000
annual sales quota.

1 Although the events which gave rise to this action took place in New York and New York
law controls the analysis of Mentonis’s ac tion, this matter was venued in the Ramsey
County District Court pursuant to a forum- selection clause in Mentonis’s employment
contract.

3
Mentonis’s supervisors testified by depositi on that they began to have concerns with
his performance not long after he returned to work at SJM. On September 7, 2017, SJM
discharged Mentonis as part of an RIF. Both Biolsi and Arancio indicated that the decision
to discharge Mentonis was collaborative and was made in large part because of Mentonis’s
low sales numbers and the minimal disruption the elimination would have on the sales
region. Mentonis was 66 years old on the date of discharge.
Through his amended complaint, Mentonis ’s sole claim against SJM is for age
discrimination pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). SJM
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted SJM’s motion concluding that,
though Mentonis had stated a prima facie case of discrimination, evidence of Mentonis’s
poor sales performance and communication while at SJM constituted a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, and that the few stray or irrelevant comments
about his age alleged by Mentonis failed to show either pretext for discrimination or
discrimination even in part. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts “review a district cour t’s summary judgment decision de novo” to
determine “whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170
(Minn. 2010). “A motion for summary judgmen t shall be granted when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

4
The evidence is viewed “in th e light most favorable to th e party against whom summary
judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76
(Minn. 2002).
Though this case is subject to Minnesota procedural law pursuant to the parties’
forum-selection clause, New York caselaw and the NYCHRL control our analysis of the
underlying substantive issues. The NYCHRL provid es that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of
the actual or perceived age . . . of any person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
discharge from employment such person.” Admin. Code of City of NY § 8-107(a) (2018).
In recognition of the fact that “[i]t is not uncommon for c overed entities to have multiple
or mixed motives for their action,” Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112,
120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), the NYCHRL’s stated goal is to “prevent discrimination from
playing any role in actions relating to employment . . . .” Admin. Code of City of NY
§ 8-101 (2018) (emphasis added). Courts mu st construe the NYCHRL “broadly in favor
of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.”
Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr. , 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (quotation
omitted). The NYCHRL “explicitly requires an independent liberal construction” so as to
serve the “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” of the NYCHRL. Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d
at 115 (quotations omitted).
A defense motion for summary judgmen t pursuant to the NYCHRL must be
analyzed under both the standard McDonnell Douglas framework set forth by the United
States Supreme Court as well as the more lenient “mixed motive” framework. Hamburg

5
v. New York Univ. Sch. of Med. , 62 N.Y.S.3d 26, 32 (N.Y . App. Div. 2016) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct . 1817 (1973)). The mixed-
motive framework is applicable as “[u]nder Administrative Co de § 8-101, discrimination
shall play no role in decisions relating to em ployment, housing or public
accommodations.” Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 120 (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted).
The McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive frameworks are each comprised of three
prongs, the first two prongs of which are identical. Hamburg, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 32. First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Second, the burden
shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrat e a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment decision. Id. At this point, the two frameworks diverge as the NYCHRL
provides an alte rnative method to McDonnell Douglas by which a plaintiff may
demonstrate discrimination.
Pursuant to prong three of McDonnell Douglas , the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the em ployer’s provided reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Hamburg, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 32. The burden is on the plaintiff to show “both that the stated
reasons were false and that disc rimination was the real reason.” Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d
at 35 (quotation omitted). However, under prong three of the mixed-motive analysis, the
plaintiff need only provide evidence showing that “unlawful discrimination was one of the
motivating factors, even if it was not the sole motivating factor, for [the] adverse
employment decision.” Hamburg, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 32 (quotation omitted). A defense
motion for summary judgment under the NYCHRL should be granted only if no jury could

6
find the defendant liable under the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis or the mixed-
motive analysis. Id.
The existence of the first two prongs of both tests—a prima facie case and a
proffered nondiscriminatory r eason for discharge—is not seri ously contested by either
party. Indeed, the prima facie burden placed upon plaintiffs under the NYCHRL has been
described as de minimis and has been met by Mentonis. Id. at 33. Furthermore, the reasons
proffered by SJM for Mentonis’s disc harge—poor sales performance and
communication—clearly satisfy their burden under the second prong.
Therefore, the issue before this court is wh ether there is a triable issue as to whether
SJM’s justification for discharge was a pretex t for discrimination or whether they were
motivated, at least in part, by discriminatory bias.
I. There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the McDonnell Douglas
pretext prong.

To withstand summary judgm ent on this prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
Mentonis must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SJM’s proffered
reasons for discharge were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 33, n.7. A reason is
pretextual if it is “false, incomplete, or misleading.” Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
Evidence of pretext necessarily raises questions of fact which can be answered only by the
jury. Id.
Mentonis argues that the district court erred in its McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis. In support of his argument that there is a fact issue regarding pretext for
discriminatory intent, Mentonis points to allegedly discriminatory statements made by

7
Nystedt (who was not involved in Mentonis’s discharge) and several of his non-supervisory
peers at SJM, statements by Arancio, SJM’s allegedly skewed calculation of Mentonis’s
sales performance data, disputes regarding a purported January 2017 meeting between
Mentonis and Biolsi, a summer 2017 “memor andum of expectation,” and, finally, a
meeting between Mentonis and Biolsi in Au gust 2017 which took place shortly before
Mentonis’s discharge.2 Mentonis argues that he has provided sufficient evidence to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to whet her SJM’s reasons for discharge were a pretext
for discrimination when this evidence is viewed in the totality of th e circumstances. For
the reasons below, we disagree.
A. Statements made by non-decision-m akers do not create genuine fact
issues suggesting pretext for discrimination.

Mentonis alleges that a number of his peers at SJM made age-related jokes and
remarks such as asking Mentonis if he still wa nted to “carry the bag” or asking “you still
here?” when Mentonis arrived at meetings. Mentonis also allege s that Nystedt made
similar comments such as “you still want to be here?” However, there is no evidence that
Mentonis’s non-supervisory p eers were involved in the deci sion to discharge Mentonis,
and Nystedt—though he did play some role in the RIF overa ll—was not involved in the
decision to discharge Mentonis. Comments such as these, made by non-decision-makers—

2 Mentonis’s briefing also indicates that Arancio and Nystedt on multiple occasions
specifically asked Mentonis why he would want to keep “carrying the bag” (i.e., keep
working as a salesperson). This assertion appears unsupported by the record. However,
these allegations would not be determinative even if they were found in the record because
all allegations of ageist statements by Arancio and Nystedt are of limited probative value,
for the reasons discussed herein.

8
i.e., a person “uninvolved in the decision to terminate”—are of little probative value.
Radler v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc. , 41 N.Y.S.3d 88, 89 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016).
Mentonis suggests that these comments are nevertheless relevant, and contribute to
the evidence which points to discrimination not only by decision-makers but by SJM as a
whole. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc. , 983 F.2d 1204, 1207-10 ( 2d Cir. 1993) (holding
statements by non-decision-make rs were relevant to claim under EEOC as evidence of
“pervasive corporate hostility” because plain tiff’s “actions became a matter of open
discussion in management circle s” causing her to become a “ persona non grata ” within
her place of employment). However, New York caselaw, including Radler and Forrest v.
Jewish Guild for the Blind , 819 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 2004), is clear regarding the limited
probative value of non-decision-maker comments—the non-binding federal caselaw cited
by Mentonis does not affect or modify that clear precedent.
These comments are of limited probative valu e and do not contribute to creating a
genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext for discriminatory intent.
B. Statements by Arancio—who hired Mentonis—do not create a genuine
fact issue suggesting pretext for discrimination.

Mentonis argues that a number of remark s by Arancio are evidence of pretext for
age discrimination. Specifically, Mentonis testified in a deposition that Arancio made a
number of age-related comments to him such as “well you still want to do this?” and “do
you really want to work this hard in this st age of your life?” Ment onis also points to
remarks made by Arancio in Mentonis’s 20 16 year-end performan ce review, including

9
Arancio’s notes that Mentonis was a “very senior sales rep” who should “mentor some of
the younger reps in the region” as evidence of Arancio’s age-related bias.
The limited probative value these argua bly innocent and objectively factual
comments made by Arancio is lessened by the fa ct that although Arancio did decide to
discharge the 66-year-old Ment onis, he was also the indivi dual who decided to hire
Mentonis at the age of 65. The same-actor doctrine recognizes that it is difficult to impute
a decision to discharge an employee with di scriminatory intent when the same person
makes the decision both to hire and to fire. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Health Mgmt. Corp. of
Am., 800 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83,
91 (2d Cir. 2000); Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997). This
inference against the existence of discriminato ry intent is stronger when, as here, the
discharge occurs soon after the hiring. Dickerson, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
Mentonis argues that this doctrine is in apposite due to the passage of New York
City’s Restoration Act of 2005. The Act amended the NYCHRL to include its current
requirement that its provisions be “construe d liberally.” New Yo rk, N.Y., Local Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 2005, § 8-130 (2005). Mentonis, in support of his argument that
the doctrine no longer applies, directs us to Rollins v. Fencers Club, Inc., 8 N.Y.S.3d 202
(N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Our review of Rollins suggests the same-a ctor doctrine remains
intact.
In Rollins, the New York appellate division affirmed the denial of a defense motion
for summary judgment in the context of alleged age discrimination pursuant to the
NYCHRL. Rollins, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 204-05. In so doing, the court held that an inference of

10
discrimination was not negated simply because the plaintiff was both hired and fired while
a member of the protected class, but only because the primary driver behind the plaintiff’s
discharge was not involved in th e original decision to hire. Id. at 204. Implicit in this
decision is that the same-actor doctrine—which applies when the same individual hires and
fires—is still relevant in analyzing evidence of age discrimination despite the Restoration
Act’s requirement that the NYCHRL be viewed liberally.
Arancio began to pursue Mentonis for em ployment at SJM in 2016, when Mentonis
was 65 years old. Applying the same-actor doctrine to Arancio necessarily creates a strong
inference that discrimination was not a factor in his decision to discharge Mentonis.
Dickerson, 800 N.Y.S.2d at 394. This inference, which is enhanced due to the short period
of time between when Arancio recruited Mentonis and when he decided to discharge him
(a little more than a year), “strongly suggest[s] that invidious discrimination was unlikely.”
Grady, 130 F.3d at 560.
C. SJM’s calculation of Mentonis’s sa les data does not create a genuine
issue of fact suggesting pretext for discrimination.

Mentonis also challenges SJM’s calculatio n of his sales numbers and argues that
SJM’s failure to accurately represent his sa les performance shows an intentional skewing
of data thereby evincing pretext for discriminatory intent. SJM, in response, provided data
showing that Mentonis’s total sales through Se ptember 2017 amounted to $281,306.77.
This was the lowest among similar sales employees in the region. Nonetheless, Mentonis
claims this data is misleading because SJM failed to:
 account for sales Mentonis would have made through the day
he was discharged;

11

 consider that Mentonis did not finish the month of September;

 indicate the date the decision to discharge Mentonis was made
and provide evidence regarding Mentonis’s sales data as of that time;
and

 look at Mentonis’s performance as a ratio of sales to his
$500,000 quota, rather than total sales amount.

Mentonis argues that SJM relied on “self-s erving sales numbers that misrepresent
Mentonis’s sales in relation to his peers,” and that this decision serves as evidence of bad
motive and pretext. We are not persuaded.
Presuming the facts alleged by Mentonis to be true, they do not create a triable issue
because an age discrimination plaintiff “m ust do more than challenge the employer’s
decision as contrary to ‘sound business or economic policy,’ since such an argument does
not give rise to the inference that the employee’s discharge was due to age discrimination.”
Bailey v. New York Westchester Sq. Med. Ctr., 829 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(quotation omitted). This ru le specifically contemplat es situations in which a
discrimination defendant may base an empl oyment decision on even patently unsound
business judgment, yet win on summary judgment. Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 36; Bailey,
829 N.Y.S.2d at 35; Kelderhouse v. St. Cabrini Home, 686 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (“[A] challenge by a discharged employee to the correctness of an employer’s
decision does not, without more, give rise to the inference that the employee’s discharge
was due to age discrimination.”).
As such, even if we were to assume, as Mentonis argues, that SJM made its decision
to discharge Mentonis based on flawed, in accurate, or no information, this does not

12
demonstrate a discriminatory pr etext “as long as [the decision was] made in good faith.”
Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (quotation omitted); Bailey, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 35. Furthermore,
the decision to discharge Mentonis fits precis ely within the business decisions stated by
Arancio and Biolsi as reasons for discharging Me ntonis. It is undisputed that Mentonis’s
book of business was substantia lly smaller than the average in his region and it naturally
follows that his discharge was substantially less disruptive than discharge of an employee
with larger sales numbers would have been. Making calculations in the way they did, while
challenged by Mentonis as “self-serving,” was a choice SJM was entitled to make. Without
actual evidence that the calculation of his sales was made in bad faith, Mentonis’s
disagreement with SJM’s sales data calculations by itself does not give rise to an inference
of bad motive or pretext. Melman, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 36. Ment onis has presented no such
evidence.
D. Disputes over the occurrence of a January 2017 meeting between
Mentonis and Biolsi and a summer 2017 “memorandum of expectation”
do not create a genuine issue of fact suggesting pretext for
discrimination.

Mentonis also claims that pretext fo r discrimination is shown by two different
incidents. First, a January 2017 meeting between Biolsi and Mentonis, which Mentonis
claims did not occur and of which he believes Biolsi “manufactured,” during which Biolsi
claims to have formed an initial negative impression of Mentonis. Second, a summer 2017
“memorandum of expectation” which, alth ough it was never delivered to Mentonis,
describes concerns with Mentonis’s poor co mmunication and integration with his sales
team. Neither incident creates triable fact issues of discrimination.

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Mentonis’s suggested inference that Bi olsi “manufactured” the January 2017
meeting to “justify his bias against Mentonis” is conclusory, speculative, and unsupported
by the record. Furthermore, Mentonis has not provided any evidence regarding what was
in the “memorandum of expectation” nor what relevance it had to the decision of SJM to
discharge him. Such conclusory arguments ar e insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to pret ext for discrimination. See Patton v. Newmar Corp. , 538 N.W.2d
116, 120 (Minn. 1995) (determining “bare conclusions” supported by “few facts beyond
those which could be expected to be contained in the complaint” insufficient to withstand
summary judgment).
E. Stray comments by Biolsi, without mo re, do not constitute evidence of
pretext for discrimination.

Mentonis urges this court to view his claims of pretext “in the totality of the
circumstances.” Mentonis argues that even if the individual instances he has alleged do
not suggest a discriminatory pretext, th e entire record when viewed collectively
demonstrates a triable issue of fact as to whether SJM offered pr etextual reasons for
discharge to mask their ageist discriminatory bias.
We note that the “totality of the circumst ances” is not a formal legal framework
articulated or used by New York courts in the context of the NYCHRL, nor in the broader
McDonnell Douglas discrimination framework. Rather, the question is simply whether all
the evidence Mentonis has provided is sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether the
reasons for discharge proffered by SJM were a pretext for discrimination. Melman,
946 N.Y.S.2d at 35.

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However, it is correct that individual comments—which may be legally insufficient
to demonstrate discrimination alone—may become convincing when viewed in light of all
the other evidence presented. See Godbolt v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 981 N.Y.S.2d 694,
696 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (stating indi vidual remarks can constitute evidence of
discrimination if there is some additional evidence a nd nexus between comments and
challenged employment decision). Regardless, as outlined above, nearly all the purported
pretext evidence provided by Mentonis is of limited proba tive value. As such, even
viewing all the allegations collectively, the ev idence presented is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact as to pretext for discrimination.
The one allegation not a ddressed above involves an August 2017 conversation
between Biolsi and Mentonis, during which Bi olsi allegedly made several age-related
remarks. Though Mentonis and Biolsi agree that this meeting occurred, they disagree on
the substance of their conversation. Mentonis testified that Biolsi made references to how
long Mentonis had been working, whether he wanted to retire, and whether he wanted to
spend time with his grandchildren. Biolsi’s remarks, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Mentonis, could be viewed by a jury as disc riminatory. However, having
rejected the other alleged evidence of discrimination discussed above, Biolsi’s comments,
although made by a decision-maker, now stand alone as mere stray remarks.
Stray remarks by a decision-maker, without more, do not constitute evidence of
discrimination. Melman , 946 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40 (citing Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc. ,
151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998)); Godbolt, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 696. Consistent with Melman
and Godbolt’s instruction that “more” is needed to constitute evidence of discrimination,

15
the stray-remarks doctrine may be overcome if “other indicia of discrimination” are
properly presented and the comments can no longer be deemed “stray.” Danzer, 151 F.3d
at 56.
Danzer is one example of a case in which this burden was met. In Danzer, a plaintiff
alleging age discrimination presented evidence that employees were required to chart their
ages, were told by a supervisor that one of the goals was to “get some younger people on
board” (to raise the IQ of the staff), and were referred to as a bunch of “alta cockers,” a
Yiddish derogatory term meaning “old fogies.” Id. at 53. The defendant argued that the
derogatory Yiddish could not be considered, as it was a mere “stray remark.” Id. at 56.
However, the court held that th is remark could no longer be considered “stray,” as other
indicia of discrimination—the charting of ages, statements regarding hiring younger people
to raise the IQ of the staff, etc.—had been presented by the plaintiff. Id.
Conversely, the plaintiff in Godbolt failed to provide the additional evidence
required to overcome the stray remarks doctrine. In that case, the plaintiff presented the
court with “one remark made in an email exchange that took place weeks after the decision
to terminate him was made and that concer ned the resolution of his union’s grievance
following the termination.” Godbolt, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 696. Po tential criminal-history
discrimination was shown in the email when an employee of the defendant “declined to
reconsider the penalty because of the nature of plaintiff’s [criminal] convictions.” Id.
Because the plaintiff had failed to provide any other evidence of discrimination, the court
concluded the remark was stray. Id.

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Viewed in light of the above caselaw and this court’s conclusions regarding the very
limited probative value of the other evidence presented by Mentonis, the comments made
by Biolsi in August 2017—which stand alone as the only purportedly discriminatory
comments to have been made by a decision- maker who was not also involved in the
decision to recruit Mentonis—are stray. None of the other evidence discussed above serves
as evidence of discrimination sufficient to ra ise Biolsi’s comments above the level of
“stray.”
As such, Mentonis has failed to make the required showing under the McDonnell
Douglas framework pretext analysis. The evidence presented—even when viewed in the
light most favorable to Mentonis—fails to “form a quantum of proof sufficient to support
a finding that the legitimate reasons [SJM] pr offered” for discharge were a pretext for
discrimination. Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
II. There is insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact pursuant
to the mixed-motive framework.

As noted above, the first two prongs of the mixed-motive framework are identical
to those of the McDonnell Douglas framework. The third prong of the mixed-motive
framework requires that a plaintiff provide ev idence from which a ju ry could find that
“unlawful discrimination was one of the motiva ting factors, even if it was not the sole
motivating factor, for [the] a dverse employment decision.” Id. a t 4 1 . P u r s u a n t t o t h e
mixed-motive framework, discrimination can pl ay “no role” in employment decisions.
Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 121. If a plaintiff ca n prove that unlawful discrimination was a

17
motivating factor, they do not need to disprove the legitimate motivating factor(s) proffered
by the defendant. Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 40-41.
Mentonis correctly notes that the mixed-motive framewo rk places a lesser burden
on discrimination plaintiffs than the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. Bennett,
936 N.Y.S.2d at 116. The mixed-motive framework’s burden is lesser only in that it does
not require a discrimination plaintiff to prove the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons were “false, mislea ding, or incomplete.” Id. at 123. A discrimination plaintiff
attempting to withstand summary judgment under either framework must still demonstrate
that discriminatory intent was a motivation for the employment decision, either in whole
or in part. Melman, 946 N.Y.S.2d at 39. However, Mentonis has failed to create a genuine
issue of material fact even under this framework.
As detailed above, the sum of the eviden ce presented supporting a finding of
discrimination consists of a few stray comments made by Bi olsi during the August 2017
conversation. As such, Mentonis has failed to present evidence “both that the stated
reasons were false and that disc rimination was the real reason.” Id. at 31 (quotation
omitted). Consequently, he has also failed to present evidence sufficient to show that the
true reason for discharge was discriminatory even in part, as required under the mixed-
motive analysis. Id. at 41. Because Mentonis cannot provide that the decision to discharge
him was discriminatory, he also cannot prove it was discriminatory in part. Hence,
Mentonis has not presented a triable issue pursuant to the mixed-motive framework.
Affirmed.