State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0163

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cedric Antonio English,
Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Waseca County District Court
File No. 81-CR-18-586

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Rachel V. Cornelius Andr oli, Waseca County Attorn ey, Waseca, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Br atvold, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant argues that the
district court erred by failing to obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Because we
conclude that the particular facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate a valid waiver,
we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, the state charged appellant Cedric Antonio E nglish with multiple
counts of various degrees of controlled subs tance crimes. The co mplaint alleged that
English sold narcotics to a police informant in several controlled purchases between March
23, 2018, and April 25, 2018. The district court appointe d a public defender. While
represented by the public defender, English successfully moved to dismiss one count of
conspiracy to commit first-degree controlled substance sale for lack of probable cause.
In January 2019, after appearing with a public defender for six proceedings over the
course of six months, English submitted a petition to proceed pro se, seeking to discharge
the public defender. English indicated in the petition that he had discussed the decision to
proceed pro se with the chief public defender in the judicial district. Before any hearing
on the petition, the district court entered an order accepting English’s wa iver of counsel.
The district court observed that English had discussed his legal rights with the chief public
defender. The district court indicated in the order that English’s “voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel” would be “f ormally entered on the re cord, as required by
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4)” at the next scheduled hearing. The district court also

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entered a separate order appointing advisory counsel based on the district court’s “concerns
about the complexity of the case based on the charges.”
English did not appear for the next schedule d hearing. The district court issued a
warrant, and English was ultimately brought in to custody and appeared for a hearing in
August 2019. Advisory counsel was present. The district court did not conduct an on-the-
record colloquy with English about his decision to waive his right to counsel. Instead, the
district court explained the role of advisory counsel to English and asked whether English
understood. English said that he did.
Acting pro se, English filed motions to dismiss the remaining charges. At a hearing
to address the motions, the district court obs erved that advisory counsel was present and
asked English whether he wanted to continue pro se.1 English said that he did.
English waived his right to a jury trial2 and proceeded to a court trial on one count
of conspiracy to commit second-degree drug sale and two counts of third-degree drug sale.
At the trial, the state’s primary witness was the informant who participated in the controlled
purchases. The informant testified that she gave English money in exchange for
methamphetamine on April 10, 2018 and on April 25, 2018. The district court found
English not guilty of conspiracy to commit second-degree controlled substance sale, but
guilty of both counts of thir d-degree controlled substance sa le. The district court later
sentenced English to concurrent sentences of 45 months and 57 months.

1 English ultimately withdrew his motions to dismiss after speaking with advisory counsel.
2 English’s jury-trial waiver is not at issue in this appeal.

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English appeals, arguing that the district court failed to secure a valid wavier of
counsel.
DECISION
English argues that his waiver of counsel was invalid because the district court failed
to inform him of the dangers of waiving counsel and failed to conduct an “intense inquiry”
into his decision. English also raises several issues in a pro se supplemental brief. We first
address English’s waiver-of-counsel argument before turning to the arguments he raises in
his pro se supplemental brief.
I. Waiver of Counsel
We review a finding that a defendant validly waived his right to counsel for clear
error. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 1998). “A finding is clearly erroneous
when there is no reasonable evid ence to support the finding or when an appellate court is
left with the definite and firm c onviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Rhoads, 813
N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012 ). But when the f acts are undisputed, we review de novo
whether a waiver of counsel was valid. Id. The denial of the right to counsel is a “structural
error” that requires reversal and is not subject to harmless-error review. Bonga v. State,
765 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. 2009).
Generally, a defendant must submit a writt e n w a i v e r o f c o u n s e l . M i n n . S t a t .
§ 611.19 (2018). The decision to waive the right to counsel “must be made knowingly and
intelligently.” Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 885 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835,
95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975)). “[T]o ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver-
of-counsel, district courts should comprehe nsively examine the defendant regarding the

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defendant’s comprehension of the charge s, the possible punishments, mitigating
circumstances, and any other f acts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of the
consequences of the waiver.” Id. at 885-86 (quotation omitted).3 “A district court’s failure
to conduct an on-the-record inquiry regardin g waiver, however, does not require reversal
when the particular facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate a valid waiver.” Id. at
886. “[W]hether [a waiver of the right to counsel] is valid depends upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.” Id. at 889 (quotation omitted).
Minnesota caselaw has identified several ci rcumstances that might be relevant to
whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid despite a district court’s failure to
conduct a thorough on-the-reco rd inquiry. One important consideration is whether the
defendant was represented by counsel be fore deciding to proceed pro se. See State v.
Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d 823, 828 (Minn. App. 2007 ) (recognizing that in previous cases
affirming waiver of counsel despite district court’s failure to conduct on-the-record
colloquy on the decision, th e defendants had “either exte nsive contact with defense
attorneys or stand-by counsel or both”). “When a defendant has consulted with an attorney
prior to waiver, a trial court could reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance

3 The “comprehensive examination” contemplated in Rhoads is set forth in Minn. R. Crim.
P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), which requires the district court, before accepting waiver of counsel, to
advise the defendant of (1) the nature of the charges, (2) all offenses within the charges,
(3) the range of allowable punishments, (4) that there may be defenses, (5) that mitigating
circumstances might exist, and (6) any other “facts essential to a broad understanding of
the consequences of the waiver of the righ t to counsel, including the advantages and
disadvantages of the decision to waive counsel.” Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 886 n.6.

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and the risks of proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.”
Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276 (quotation omitted). But when defense counsel makes only
brief, limited appearances with the defendant, we have concluded that prior representation
did not obviate the need for a more thorough inquiry. See Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d at 830
(concluding that prior representation did not lessen the need for a thorough colloquy when
the defendant’s “previous attorney made only a brief scheduling appearance before the
district court and did not con tinue to represent [the defenda nt] at the pretrial hearing a
month later, nor during the time leading up to the stipulated-facts trial two months after
that”).
Another factor relevant to the analysis is the defendant’s fa miliarity with the
criminal justice system. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276. A defe ndant’s history of felony
convictions and his familiarity with criminal trial may diminish the need for a detailed, on-
the-record colloquy regarding the defendant’s choice to waive counsel. Id.
Other relevant circumstances include the defendant’s intelligence, education level,
and age. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn. 1997); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d
633, 636 (Minn. 1977).
English was represented by counsel at six hearings over the course of six months
before he submitted his petition to proceed pro se. English asse rts that this circumstance
should not weigh in favor of a valid waiver because he wa s only represented “for a few
months” and that the hearings in which co unsel was present were “short and mainly
ministerial in nature.” We are not persuade d. English was represented for a significant
amount of time. While the hearings were generally short, they were not all ministerial. At

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one hearing, the district court addressed English’s motion to dismiss the first-degree count.
At another hearing, English made an important decision—to waive his right to a speedy
trial. Moreover, English discussed his decisi on to waive counsel with the chief public
defender before submitting the petition. That English was represented by an attorney and
that English discussed his decision to waive counsel with the chief public defender weigh
in favor of concluding that English’s waiver was valid. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276.
English also had a relatively extensive criminal history. From 1994 to 2018, English
had been convicted of eight felony offenses . The most recent felony conviction occurred
in 2018, and all other convictions occurred in 2008 or earlier. English’s criminal history
suggests a familiarity with the criminal justice system, which weighs in favor of concluding
that English’s waiver was valid. Id.
Finally, we observe that English reiterate d his request to proceed pro se at a
subsequent hearing and was made aware of the option of having advisory counsel take over
the case for him.4 A waiver may be valid when the defendant chooses not to avail himself
of representation despite numerous opportunities to do so. See Finne v. State, 648 N.W.2d
732, 736 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2002 ). We conclude that
English’s decision to decline th e opportunity to have advisory counsel take over the case
is a circumstance suggesting that English’s waiver was valid.
English suggests that the record does not demonstrate that his waiver was knowing
or intelligent because the petition to proceed pro se indicated that he was charged with first-

4 English did, however, ask that his advisory counsel make remarks on his behalf at the
sentencing hearing.

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degree controlled substance sale, when that charge had in fact been dismissed. But English
had been charged with first-degree controlled substance sale. When we consider the
circumstances as a whole, we cannot conclude that this not ation in English’s petition to
proceed pro se demonstrates that his waiver was invalid.
Ultimately, we are troubled by the district court’s failure to conduct a more thorough
on-the-record inquiry regarding English’s decision to waive coun sel. We strongly
encourage district courts to engage in the appropriate on-the-record colloquy when a
defendant wishes to waive his or her right to counsel. But viewing the particular facts and
circumstances of this case, including the facts that English was previously represented, that
he discussed his decision with an attorney, and that English had significant experience with
the criminal justice system, we conclude that English’s waiver was valid.
II. English’s Pro Se Arguments
In English’s pro se supplemental brief, he challenges the credibility of the informant
who testified at trial and alleges that the state failed to comply with several discovery rules.
We find no merit to English’s arguments.
English appears to assert that the ev idence supporting hi s convictions was
insufficient solely because the informant was not credible. But it is not our role to assess
the credibility of a witne ss or reweigh evidence. State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 435
(Minn. 1997). English’s argument regarding the informant’s credibility is unavailing on
appeal.
English next contends that the state failed to notify him of scientific tests that the
state conducted on the controlled substances at issue. See State v. Hochstein, 623 N.W.2d

9
617, 621 (Minn. App. 2001) (discussing state’ s obligation under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01,
subd. 1(4), to notify defendant before conducting tests that may preclude further tests or
experiments). While English raised this issue before the district court, there is no evidence
that the state actually failed to notify English before conducting any tests. The record does
not support English’s argument.
English asserts that the stat e failed to disclose certain evidence. But English only
vaguely identifies evidence that he claims he did not receive. English’s vague assertions
that the state failed to disclo se evidence, without citation to legal authority or support in
the record, are insufficient to prevail on appeal. See State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719
(Minn. 2002) (indicating that allegations of error not supported by “argument or citation to
legal authority in support of the allegations” are waived).
English does specifically identify one item of discovery that the state purportedly
did not disclose—the contract that the info rmant signed with law enforcement to become
an informant. English claims that he was prejudiced by the st ate’s failure to disclose the
informant’s contract because he was unable to question the informant openly about her
drug use and her involvement with another witness who was implicated in the alleged drug-
sale conspiracy. But in fact, English did cr oss-examine the informant about her drug use
and her involvement with the other witness. Because English fails to articulate how he was
actually prejudiced by the alleged disc overy violation, his argument fails. See State v.
Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 490-91 (Minn. 20 05) (indicating that a defendant must
demonstrate that an alleged discovery violation resulted in prejudice to prevail on appeal).

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In sum, we conclude that the particular facts and circumstances of this case
demonstrate that English’s waiver of counsel was valid. Despite this disposition, we stress
the importance of conducting an on-the-record inquiry into a defendant’s decision to waive
counsel. We also conclude that English fails to raise any meritorious argument in his pro
se supplemental brief.
Affirmed.