State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0170

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesus Manuel Valdez,
Appellant.

Filed December 14, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-8209

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O . Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook , Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this appeal from a 33 -month presumptive se ntence for felony domestic abuse,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
dispositional departure. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Jesus Manuel Valdez was charged with two counts of felony domestic
abuse under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2018) (“violates an order for protection
issued by a judge or referee” and the violation is “within ten years of the first of two or
more previous qualified domestic violence -related offense convictions”) . The charges
arose after Valdez, who was subject to an order for protection prohibiting contact with
S.M.P, called S.M.P twice from jail and threatened to hurt her if she contact ed police.
Valdez entered straight guilty pleas to both charges . Before waiving his trial rights and
entering his pleas, Valdez acknowledged that he understood the following: the charges
against him, the presumptive prison commitment of 33 months, that if he pl eaded guilty
the court would decide the appropriate sentence after reviewing a presentence-investigation
report (PSI) and hearing the arguments of counsel, and that he waived his rights to a trial
and had sufficient time to speak with counsel . At the plea hearing, Valdez acknowledged
that he knew there was an order for prote ction prohibiting his contact with S.M.P . at the
times he called her . He also acknowledged his criminal record, which included prior
domestic-violence-related felony convictions for violating a no -contact order, domestic
assault, and terroristic threats.
The PSI report recommended a 33-month prison commitment, the presumptive term
for an individual with a criminal -history score of ten who commits a severity -level-four
offense. The investigating probation officer found no aggravating or mitigating facto rs
that would support a departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence. With respect to
a downward dispositional departure to probatio n, the PSI stated that “it is difficult to find

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[Valdez] particularly amenable to probation, considering he was under community
supervision when his cases occurred.” The PSI found that while Valdez had taken positive
steps by completing a chemical -dependency treat ment program, starting an anger -
management program, and complying with the conditional -release conditions, those steps
did “not outweigh the likelihood that [Valdez] is at risk to relapse and reoffend, as he has
shown by three separate criminal charges while under parole supervision .” The PSI also
reported that Vald ez had participated in chemical -dependency pr ograming but failed to
maintain sobriety and refrain from dangerous and threatening behavior.
At sentencing, Valdez moved for a downward-dispositional departure, arguing that
such a probationary sentence was warranted due to his participation in a chemi cal-
dependency treatment program, negative tests for alcohol and d rugs, participation in an
anger-management program, recent employment record, and remorse for his actions .
Valdez’s counsel argued that while his recent efforts did not “negate his record,” a
probationary sentence was warranted in recognition of the efforts he had made and to allow
him to continue with the chemical -dependency and anger -management programming.
Counsel urged the district court “to consider everything that Mr . Valdez [had] done since
the date of this incident in April to show [the district court] that he indeed [was] amenable
to treatment,” and noted that Valdez was “more than willing to participate in any additional
programs that probation recommend[ed].”
The district court denied the motion and imposed the presumptive guidelines
sentence of a 33-month executed prison term, noting that it had considered the arguments
and PSI in making its decision but did not find “significant and compelling reasons” to

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depart from the guidelines. The district court congratulated Valdez for taking “some very
positive steps,” but concluded these actions were insufficient to find “a reason to depart.”
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Valdez argues that the district court abused its di scretion by refusing to grant a
dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence . He argues that the district court
should have found that he was “particularly amenable ” to probation and treatm ent in a
probationary setting.
We review a district court ’s decision to grant or deny a departure from the
presumptive sentence for an abuse of discretion . State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08
(Minn. 2014). We will reverse a district court ’s refusal to depart from the presumptive
sentence only in a “rare case.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “prescrib[e] a sentence or range of sentences
that is presumed to be appropriate .” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted) . The
guidelines are intended to “maintai n uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and
predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2018). Therefore, departures
are discouraged unless “there are ‘identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances
to support a departure.’ ” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn . 2016) (quoting
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2015)). “Substantial and compelling circumstances
are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical
case.” State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).

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A district court may grant a downward dispositional departure from the sentencing
guidelines if the defendant is “particularly amenable to probation .” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at
309; see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7) (Supp. 2019). A finding that a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation may “be supported by the fact that the offender is
particularly amenable to a relevant program of individualized treatment in a probationary
setting.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(7). “[A] defendant’s particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a
stay of execution of a presumptively executed sentence .” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28,
31 (Minn. 1982). When considering whether to grant a dispositional departure, the district
court may consider factors such as “the defendant ’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his
cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” Id.
Here, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by not finding that
he was particularly amen able to probation because “substantial and compelling reasons,”
including “his remorse and cooperation, the support of family and community me mbers,
and his community resources for treatment and employment ,” support a probationary
sentence.
An examination of the record does not indicate that this is a rare or exceptional case
indicating that Valdez is particularly amen able to probation . See State v. Hennum, 441
N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn . 1989) (holding that the case qualified as a rare case justifying
reversal of the district court’s imposition of the presumptive sentence because of evidence
that the victim had physically and mentally abused the defendant). The record indicates
that the district court considered the reasons for and against departure . The district court

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considered Valdez’s sincere remorse, family support, current employment history, interest
in continuing chemical-dependency and anger-management programming, prior treatment
opportunities, and previous behavior while on probation , which included extensive
criminal activity. Ultimately, the district court concluded there were not substantial and
compelling reasons to depart on the basis of his amenability to probation.
Further, even if the record did support a finding that Valdez is particularly amenable
to probation, “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case does ‘not
obligate the court to place defend ant on probation or impose a shorter t erm than the
presumptive term.’” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting
State v. Wall, 343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984)); see also State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662,
664-65 (Minn . App. 2009) (“[T ]he district court has discretion to impose a downward
dispositional departure if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation, but it is not
required to do so .”); State v. Evenson, 554 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn . App. 1996) (“Even
assuming [a defendant] i s exceptionally amenable to treatment, his amenability does not
dictate the result .”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). Thus, in either scenario, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.