State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0176

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

State of Minnesota,

R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs. Filed: August 4, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Nathan Ernest Hatch,

Appellant.

________________________

Christopher P. Renz, Gary K. Luloff, Chestn ut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for respondent Metropolitan Airport Commission.

Lynne Torgerson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cicely R. Miltich, Peter Magnus on, Assistant Attorneys Genera l, Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for amicus curiae Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison.

Thomas R. Ragatz, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assist ant Ramsey County Atto rneys, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.

Alina Schwartz, Campbell Knutson PA, Eagan, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Suburban
Hennepin County Prosecutors Association.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
Minnesota Statutes § 624.7 14, subd. 1a (2020), does not violate the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Affirmed.
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O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a
(2020), which requires individuals to obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public, violates
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant Nathan Ernest Hatch
was charged with carrying a pistol in a public place without a permit in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (the “permit-to-carry statute”). Hatch filed a pretrial motion to
strike down the statute, argui ng it violates the Second Amendm ent. The district court
denied the motion and later convicted Hatch of the charged offense. The court of appeals
affirmed his conviction. Becau se the permit-to-carry statut e does not violate the Second
Amendment, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties do not dispute the relevant fact s. On the evening of January 8, 2018,
Hatch was driving to work when his truck broke down in the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Airport Commission. When airpor t police officers stopped to assist him,
Hatch informed the officers that he might have a handgun in a backpack in the back seat
of his truck. He also confirmed that he did not have a permit to carry a pistol. After the
officers searched his truck and discovered a loaded, uncased pistol in the backpack, they
placed Hatch under arrest.
The Metropolitan Airport Commission char ged Hatch with carrying or possessing
a pistol without a permit in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a, a gross
misdemeanor. Hatch filed a pretrial motion to strike down the permit-to-carry statute,
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arguing that the requirement that an individual obtain a permit to carry a firearm violates
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to Hatch, the permit-
to-carry statute fails to survive strict scru tiny which requires a statute to be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest. The district court denied the motion. Hatch
then waived his right to a jury trial and submitted his case to the district court on stipulated
facts. The district court f ound Hatch guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to
180 days in the county workhouse but stayed execution of the sentence for 2 years.
On appeal, Hatch renewed his argument that the permit-to-carry statute violates the
Second Amendment because it fails to survive strict scrutiny. State v. Hatch ,
No. A20-0176, 2020 WL 6390933, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 2, 2020). By contrast, the State
argued the statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny, which only requires a statute to be
substantially related to an important governmental objective. Id. The court of appeals did
not resolve the parties’ dispute because it c oncluded the permit-to-carry statute survives
the more stringent standard of strict scrutiny. Id. at *3. We granted Hatch’s petition for
review.
ANALYSIS
The constitutionality of a statute is a ques tion of law that we review de novo. State
v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. 2013). Stat utes are presumed to be constitutional
and should only be struck down “when absolutely necessary.” Id. (quoting In re Individual
35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Minn. 2011)). Accordingly, we will “uphold a
statute unless the challenging party demonstrates that the statute is unconstitutional beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing State v. Yang, 744 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009)).
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The Second Amendment to the United States Constitu tion provides: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. 1 Hatch argues the
permit-to-carry statute violates the Second Am endment because it fails to survive strict
scrutiny. We disagree.2
To survive strict scrutiny, the challenge d law must be “justified by a compelling
government interest” and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Brown v. Ent. Merch.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel , 844 N.W.2d 13, 21
(Minn. 2014) (stating same). A law is narrowly tailored if it is the “least restrictive means”
for addressing the government’s articulated interest. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The narrow tailo ring requirement, however, “does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable . . . alternative, nor does it require a dramatic sacrifice of
the compelling interest at stake.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 135
(Minn. 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original).
Although strict scrutiny is “a demanding standard,” Brown, 564 U.S. at 799, the Supreme
Court has rejected “the notion that strict scrutin y is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”

1 The Minnesota Constitution contains no express right to keep and bear arms.

2 The issue of whether statutes regulating fir earms are subject to strict or intermediate
scrutiny is an open question in Minnesota. See Craig, 826 N.W.2d at 798 (“Because we
do not adopt an applicable level of scrutiny, we hold that the court of appeals erred in doing
so and vacate the court’s determination in that regard.”). Because the permit-to-carry
statute survives the more stringent standard of strict scrutiny, we need not answer this open
question. For the same reason, we need not decide whethe r the conduct regulated by the
permit-to-carry statute is categorially unpr otected by the Second Amendment under the
historical approach adopted in Craig, 826 N.W.2d at 795.
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Hatch does not dispute that the permit- to-carry statute serves a compelling
government interest in ensuri ng public safety. The govern ment’s compelling interest in
protecting the general public from gun violence is self-evident. See State v. Paige ,
256 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. 1977) (explaining that the pur pose of the permit-to-carry
statute is “to prevent the posse ssion of firearms in places wh ere they are most likely to
cause harm in the wrong hands, i.e., in public places where their discharge may injure or
kill intended or unin tended victims”); see also Minn. Stat. § 624.714 , subd. 22 (2020)
(declaring the provisions of se ction 624.714 to be “necessa ry to accomp lish compelling
state interests”). Hatch instead contends that the permit-to-carry statute fails strict scrutiny
because it is not narrowly tailored.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the permit-to-carry statute is narrowly
tailored to serve the co mpelling governmental interest in ensuring public safety. The
Supreme Court has explained that a statute is narrowly tailored “[s]o long as the means
chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.”
Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). Although the imposition of
criminal penalties for noncompliance may be a relevant factor to consider, see District of
Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 633–34 (2008) (s uggesting that the imposition of
“significant criminal penalties” as opposed to a “small fine and forfeiture of the weapon”
may deter persons from using guns to protect themselves and therefore might infringe on
the core of the Second Amendmen t), it is not determinative. See Heller v. District of
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Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 273–74 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that a “de minimis burden”
imposed by a firearm registration requirement is valid even if noncompliance may result
in “criminal penalties”). A statute can theref ore be narrowly tailored in its scope even
when it imposes criminal penalties for noncompliance. See State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d
629, 644 n.10 (Minn. 2020) (rejecting appellant’s argument that a statute criminalizing the
nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images could have been more narrowly
tailored by providing only civil remedies).
Minnesota Statutes section 624.714 lays out the requirements for carrying a
handgun in public as well as the penalties for noncompliance with the statute. Under
subdivision 1a, a person commits a gross misdemeanor if he “carries, holds, or possesses a
pistol in a motor vehicle, snowmobile, or boat, or on or about the person’s clothes or the
person, or otherwise in possessi on or control in a public pl ace . . . without first having
obtained a permit to carry the pistol.” Mi nn. Stat. § 624.714, su bd. 1a. A second or
subsequent conviction is a felony. Id.
To receive a permit to carry, a person is re quired to submit an application to the
sheriff in the county wher e the person resides. Id., subd. 2(a). “A sheriff must issue a
permit to an applicant if the person” has completed gun safety training, is at least 21 years
old, is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States, has completed an application
for the permit, is not prohibite d by law from possessing a fir earm, and is not listed in the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension’s criminal gang investigative data system.
Id., subds. 2(b)(1)–(5) (emphasis added). The only reason that a sheriff may deny a permit
application (aside from failing to satisfy the statutory criteria) is if “there exists a
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substantial likelihood that the ap plicant is a danger to self or the public if authorized to
carry a pistol under a permit.” Id., subd. 6(a)(2)–(3). If a sheriff denies a permit
application, the applicant has a right to appeal the denial by filing a petition with the district
court. Id., subd. 12.
The permit-to-carry statute also provides for certain circumstances where a person
may lawfully carry or possess a pistol without a permit. No permit is required to possess a
pistol in one’s home, place of business, or on land that a person owns. Id., subd. 9(1). Nor
is a permit required to carry a pistol in public for the purpose of repair. Id., subd. 9(2). A
pistol may be carried without a permit betw een one’s home and pl ace of business. Id.,
subd. 9(3). A permit is not requi red to carry a pistol “in the woods or fields or upon the
waters of this state” for hunting or target shooting. Id., subd. 9(4). And an unloaded pistol
secured in a “closed and fastened case” may be transported in a vehicle without a permit.
Id., subd. 9(5).
The statutory requirements to receive a permit to carry are not substantially broader
than necessary to ensure public safety. As we have stat ed before, “it is not difficult to
obtain a permit to carry a pistol” in Minnesota. See State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d. 816, 821
(Minn. 2012) (noting the “min imal requirements for eligib ility” to receive a permit to
carry). Indeed, it is ha rd to imagine a less restrictive firearm permitting scheme than the
one provided by the permit-to-carry statute and its related provisions. Law-abiding citizens
over the age of 21 need only show that they have passed a gun safety course and that they
are not a danger to themselves or others to receive a permit to carry a handgun in public.
In addition, the statute creates a presumption in favor of the applicant receiving the permit,
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further demonstrating the ease by which an individual seeking to exercise their Second
Amendment rights can do so. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2 (stating that the sheriff
“must issue a permit” if the applicant meets the statutory requirements). In short, the
minimally burdensome require ments of Minnesota’s firearm permitting statute are
sufficiently close to the government’s interest i n e n s u r i n g p u b l i c safety to satisfy the
narrow tailoring requirement.
Considering the undisputed co mpelling governmental intere st in ensuring public
safety and the narrowly tailored provisions of the statute to achieve that interest, we
conclude that the permit-to-carry statute withstands strict scrutiny. We therefore hold that
the permit-to-carry statute does not violate the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.