In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of B. L. S. and S. L. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0179

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of B. L. S. and S. L. S., Parents.

Filed June 22, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-JV-19-139

Brice M. Norton, Norton Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant S.L.S.)

Carrie Ann Doom, McKinnis & Doom, P.A., Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent
B.L.S.)

Virginia Murphrey, Tenth District Public Defender, Elizabeth M. Hiljus, Assistant Public
Defender, North Branch, Minnesota (for respondent A.S.)

Jeff Edblad, Isanti Co unty Attorney, Robert C. Bieniek, Assistant County Attorney,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent Isanti County Family Services)

Laura Moore, Isanti, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of his parental rights to his children, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that appellant is palpably unfit to
be a party to the parent-child relationship. Because there was no abuse of discretion in the
conclusion that appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship and
that conclusion is an adequate basis for the termination of appellant’s parental rights , we
affirm.
FACTS
The marriage of a ppellant S.L.S. and B. L.S. was dissolved in 2015. They are the
parents of two sons , A., now 14, and B., now six (collectively, the children). From June
2017 to June 2018, the children spent 345 days in out -of-home care; they were then
returned to appellant. In January 2019, B.L.S. obtained an Order for Protection (OFP) for
the children and herself against appellant. It provided alternate weeks of parenting time
for each parent, and it prohibited appellant from going into or near B.L.S.’s residence.
In April 2019, respondent Isanti County Family Services (ICFS) filed a petition to
have A. and B. declared Children in Need of Protection or Services ( CHIPS). After an
emergency protective-care hearing, they were placed in out-of-home care with appellant’s
sister, where they remain. A. has expressed a wish to remain in that placement; B. was too
young to express a preference, but seems happy there. All agree the children are thriving.
Appellant was given 12 conditions he needed to meet before having further contact
with the children. The conditions were that he: (1) attend individual counseling; (2) comply

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with random drug screens; (3 ) if a screen is positive, complete a chemical-dependency
evaluation and follow recommendations; (4) maintain a safe and sober home; (5) comply
with ICFS case management plans; (6) participate in the children’s counseling; (7) follow
therapists’ recommendations for the children, as requested; (8) refrain from speaking
negatively about B.L.S.; (9) follow a ll recommendations from his 2017 neuro-
psychological evaluation; (10) complete an evaluation with a psychiatrist to determine if
medication is recommended; (11) comply with psychia trist’s recommendations; and
(12) register for domestic-violence programming and complete at least four classes.
Appellant admitted to the allegations in the CHIPS petition. An Out of Home
Placement Plan (OHPP) was developed for appellant and for B.L.S., and the January 2019
OFP was modified to provide that appellant would have to strictly comply with the 12
conditions before beginning family therapy or having parenting time.
In August 2019, when the children had been in out-of-home placement for 461 days,
ICFS filed termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions against both appellant and B.L.S.
In December 2019, B.L.S. executed a “Consent of Parent for the Adoption” of the children,
and a trial was held on the TPR of appellant. The district court then issued Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order terminating appellant’s parental rights.
He challenges the termination.
D E C I S I O N
“[Appellate courts] affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convi ncing evidence
and termination is in the best interests of the child . . . . ” In re Welfare of Children of

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S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted). Termination of parental
rights is governed by Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2018). “In any proceeding under this section
the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration . . . . Where the interests
of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to th e parent-child relationship.1 See id., subd.
1(b)(4) (providing that parental rights may be terminated if the parent is palpably unfit to
be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions determined by the court to be of a nature
or duration that renders the parent una ble, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care
appropriately for the child’s ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs). To prove that
appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship, ICFS must show a
consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the
hearing are likely to continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently

1 Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that two
other statutory c onditions for termination were met because (1) appellant neglected his
parental duties, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) , and (2) the reasonable efforts
made by ICFS to rehabilitate appellant had failed to correct the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). Because
we affirm the district court’s conclusion that appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent-child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) , and because that
conclusion independently provides a sufficient basis for term ination, we do not address
appellant’s other arguments. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b).

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detrimental to the child’s welfare. In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661
(Minn. 2008).
The district court found that B. has experienced trauma including repeated changes
of primary caregiver, unexpected changes in residence, witnessing chemical abuse and
aggressive acts by adults, and potential neglect and physical harm. B.’s therapist does not
recommend contact between B. and appellant and had a negative “visceral reaction” to the
suggestion that B . be placed with appellant. The district court did not find appellant’s
explanation of B.’s reference to appellant’s house as “Monster house” by saying that was
the title of B.’s favorite movie to be credible.
The district court found that appellant did not follow through on a planned phone
call to A., but did arrive unannounced at the clinic to speak with A .’s therapist, who said
he was unable to converse about what would be best for A. because appellant “focused on
how he has done nothing wrong, [and] how he has been falsely portrayed as a negative
person by everyone.” A. has stated, “I don’t feel safe with [appellant] at all” and is worried
about appellant getting custody. The district court also found that A. has come out as
bisexual to his family and his therapist, who heard appellant’s reaction: he told A., “[I]f
you are gay I’ll beat you half to death and then kill my self in front of you.” Both the
children themselves and their therapists have indicated that appellant is palpably unfit to
be a party to the parent-child relationship.
The district court found that appellant has not engaged with his children’s therapists,
denies that the children have mental -health issues, and sees their therapists as responsible
for his own situation or as barriers between himself and his children. The district court

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also found that appellant, “during his own therapy sessions[,] . . . reverts to blaming [B.S.],
Isanti County, and the Court for his plight” and concluded that he “will remain unable to
parent the child[ren] for the reasonably foreseeable future because of his continued
consistent failure to address his own mental health and unresolved chemical dependency
issues.”
Appellant challenges this conclusion, arguing that he addressed his mental -health
issues by working with D.M. , a doctor, on restorative parenting. His contact with D.M.
began in April 2019, and they met weekly . Eight months later, about a week before trial,
D.M. wrote to appellant’s social worker:
[Appellant] continues to be in that blaming place quite
often. . . . I have been trying to reach out to [A.’s] therapist to
see about possibly doing a phone call cont act at least.
[Appellant] does get easily unraveled and this is what we are
working on as it relates to his parenting as well. He has made
some progress when he has been in session [with D.M.] but he
will need to be able to transfer this to real life situations.

The social worker noted in her reply that appellant had been told that A. wanted contact
with him. Appellant had been given the phone number of A.’s therapist in October so this
could be arranged, but appellant could not find a time to meet the therapist, then failed to
return the therapist’s phone calls, and finally hung up on the social worker when she asked
whether he had called the therapist because he was “angry about the illegal things he
believes the court is doing to him.” The district c ourt observed that, at trial, appellant
testified that he stopped going to therapy because he was “too stressed” and wanted to
make himself happy again first.

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Appellant denies he has a chemical -abuse problem, although he tested positive for
methamphetamine in November 2019, shortly before the trial. The district court found that
appellant “has tried to evade his own chemical depende ncy issues through falsifying
[urinalysis tests].” This finding is supported by the testimony of one of appellant’s adult
daughters, who testif ied that she was present when appellant arranged to use a friend’s
urine for a urinalysis because the friend was sober.
The district court’s finding that appellant is palpably unfit to enter into the parent -
child relationship with his children is supported by clear and convincing evidence . See
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. Because one of the statutory conditions for termination of
parental rights has been met, the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating
appellant’s parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b).
Affirmed.