State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0186

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carter John Ibberson,
Appellant.

Filed February 8, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CR-19-12

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Roger H. Hippert, New Ulm City Attorney, Th omas L. Borgen, Assi stant City Attorney,
New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Pres iding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Carter John Ibberson seeks re versal of his conviction for violating a
harassment restraining order (HRO). He argue s that the HRO was invalid and that the
evidence at his jury trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Because Ibberson’s challenges to the validity of the HRO are not properly before us and
sufficient evidence supports the conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
Ibberson and J.H. were ro mantically involved for abou t one month. During the
relationship, Ibberson tracked J.H.’s wher eabouts through a location-based social media
application. He grew suspicious one night when he saw that J.H.’s ex-boyfriend was near
J.H.’s location. In distress, he called and text ed J.H. J.H. met with Ibberson in a parking
lot and ended their relationship. Ibberson became confronta tional and refused to let J.H.
leave. When J.H. tried to push Ibberson out of the way, Ibberson contacted the police,
reporting that J.H. had assaulted him. The res ponding officers told J.H. that she should
request a restraining order against Ibberson.
After the breakup, Ibberson called J.H., sent her text messages, and drove past her
house. J.H. blocked Ibbers on’s phone number, but he con tinued to contact her from
unknown phone numbers and through messaging applications. Additionally, Ibberson and
a friend went to J.H.’s house in the middle of the night and made noise outside J.H.’s
bedroom window-well.
Given these unwanted contacts, J.H. pe titioned the district court for an HRO,
summarizing Ibberson’s conduct in an affida vit accompanying her pe tition. The district
court granted J.H.’s petition, issuing an ex parte HRO prohibiting Ibberson from having
any contact with J.H. and ordering him to stay away from J.H.’s work and college campus.
The HRO also prohibited Ibberson from being within 100 yards of J.H.’s residence.

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A sheriff’s deputy attempted to serve the HRO on Ibberson several times but was
unable to make contact. Nevertheless, Ibbers on learned that there was an HRO and that
there was paperwork waiting for him at the sher iff’s office. When he reported to the
sheriff’s office, an employee in the records division handed him a copy of the HRO. The
employee filled out a “certificate of service of process” conf irming Ibberson’s receipt of
the HRO. That same day, Ibberson then file d a request for a hearing before the district
court.
A hearing was held a few weeks later. I bberson appeared without counsel, as did
J.H. and her parents. Ibberson first asked the district cour t to keep the HRO proceedings
confidential, but the district court declined and explained that the law does not provide for
confidential proceedings. Next, Ibberson asked the district court to modify the provision
requiring him to stay away from J.H.’s college campus so that he could continue to attend
sporting events there. The district court granted this request, but ordered Ibberson to stay
100 feet away from J.H. on campus. The modi fication was memorialized in an amended
order, and Ibberson was served with a copy.1
After the hearing, J.H. and her parents dr ove home. Once home, they saw Ibberson
drive past their house. They called the police. While waiting for the police to arrive, J.H.
saw Ibberson drive by the home once again.
The responding officer verified the HRO and called Ibberson’s phone to discuss the
situation. Ibberson answered, but he denied driving by J.H.’s home.

1 The amended order reflected the modified term and stated that all other terms of the HRO
remained in effect without specifying those additional terms.

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Based on the allegations of J.H. and her parents, Ibbers on was charged with
violating the HRO under Minnes ota Statutes section 609.748, subdivision 6(b) (2018).
Ibberson moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause and argued that he had
no knowledge that the HRO prohibited him fro m being within 100 yards of J.H.’s home
because he had not been served with a full copy of the HRO. At a hearing on Ibberson’s
motion, the district court heard testimony fro m two police officers, the sheriff’s office
employee who had provided Ibbers on with the original HRO, an d Ibberson. The district
court denied the motion, explaining in a writte n order that whether Ibberson received a
complete copy of the HRO was a fact question for a jury to determine.
Subsequently, Ibberson had a jury trial. The state called as witnesses J.H., her
parents, the sheriff’s office employee, and the responding police offi cer. The sheriff’s
employee testified about her normal practices in serving documents and keeping accurate
records. She acknowledged that sometimes she experienced problems with her scanner.
But, she testified, she served Ibberson with a copy of the HRO and filled out a certificate
of service confirming Ibberson’s receipt of the order. The employee acknowledged that
later, she mistakenly emailed an incomplete copy of the HR O to Ibberson’s attorney.
Because the copy she se nt the attorney omitted several pa ges, she subsequently sent the
attorney a full copy of the HRO.
Ibberson was the sole witne ss for the defense. He de nied driving past J.H.’s
residence on the day in question. Ibberson also ma intained that he ne ver received a full
copy of the HRO, and so he was unaware of the condition that required him to remain 100

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yards away from J.H.’s home. But he admitted that he knew the HRO generally excluded
him from going to J.H.’s residence.
The jury found Ibberson guilty of violating the HRO. Following the verdict, the
district court sentenced Ibberson to 90 days in jail, but stayed execution of 87 days for one
year, and ordered Ibberson to serve three days in jail with two days of custody credit.
Ibberson appeals.
DECISION
I. Ibberson’s collateral ch allenges to the validity of the HRO are not properly
before this court.

Ibberson preliminarily challenges the validity of the HRO, raising two legal
arguments. First, he contends that the di strict court exceeded statutory authority by
imposing a geographic restriction as a term of the HRO. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
5(a) (2018) (providing permissible contents of an HRO). Second, he argues that because
he was not properly served with a full copy of the HRO, the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over him. Neither of these arguments is properly before us, however.
“As a general rule, a party’s failure to appeal the issuance of a court order precludes
a collateral attack on that order in a subsequent proceeding.” State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d
884, 889-90 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 20 09). Ibberson did not
appeal from the HRO proceedings. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (providing
60-day timeframe to appeal an appealable order). Rather, he now raises his challenges to
the HRO for the first time on direct appeal fr om his criminal conviction for violating the
HRO. Because the criminal proceeding is a subsequent and separate matter, Ibberson’s

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challenges to the HRO are impermissible collateral attacks. Thus, we do not consider his
arguments regarding the validity of the HRO. State v. Harrington, 504 N.W.2d 500, 503
(Minn. App. 1993) (refusing to consider collate ral attack on HRO in reviewing an appeal
taken from appellant’s criminal c onviction for violating the HRO), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 30, 1993).2
II. Sufficient evidence suppor ts Ibberson’s conviction.

Ibberson next argues that his conviction rests on insufficient evidence. Specifically,
he argues that the state failed to prove beyo nd a reasonable doubt that he knew the HRO
prohibited him from being within 100 yards of J.H.’s home.
An accused may only be convicted “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). In a criminal trial, the st ate bears the burden of
proving guilt. See State v. Peterson , 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Min n. 2004). The state can
only overcome the presumption of innocenc e with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every element of a charged offense. Id.
To convict Ibberson of the offense of vi olating an HRO, the state was required to
prove several elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b).
First, the state was required to prove that there was an existing court order restraining

2 Even if we did not view Ibberson’s argumen ts as collateral atta cks on the underlying
HRO, his first argument is still not be properly before us because the record reveals that it
was not raised in the district court. Leppink v. Water Gremlin Co., 944 N.W.2d 493, 501
(Minn. App. 2020) (“It is an elementary principle of appellate procedure that a party may
not raise an issue or argument for the first time on appeal and thereby seek appellate relief
on an issue that was not litigated in the district court.” (quotation omitted)).

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Ibberson from harassing J.H. See id. Second, the state had to establish that Ibberson
violated a term or condition of the order. See id. And third, the state was required to prove
that Ibberson knew of the order. See id. We recently examined this third element—the
knowledge requirement—in State v. Andersen , clarifying that “in a prosecution for
violating a harassment restraining order, the st ate must prove that the defendant knew all
the facts that would cause him or her to be in violation of the harassment restraining order.”
946 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Minn. App. 2020). Th us, the state was required to prove that
Ibberson knew the HRO prohibited him from being within 100 yards of J.H.’s home, which
was the condition that the state alleged he violated.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court performs “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction,” was su fficient to allow the ju ry to reach a guilty
verdict. State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 10 0 (Minn. 2012) (quo tation omitted). We
assume that “the jury believed the state’s w itnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). And
the reviewing court “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, ac ting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813
N.W.2d at 100.
A conviction based on circumstantial evid ence receives “heightened scrutiny” on
appellate review. State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Mi nn. 2010). Where the
evidence of one or more elements of an offense is entirely circumstantial, the more rigorous

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circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies. See id. at 473-75. Because the state’s
evidence of Ibberson’s knowledge was circ umstantial, we apply the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review in considering his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the knowledge element of the offense. See State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257,
264 (Minn. 2016) (applying standard of review for circumstantial evidence in considering
sufficiency of evidence of defendant’s intent).
The circumstantial-evidence test requires a two-step process. First, the appellate
court must “identify the circumstances proved” at trial, deferring “to the jury’s acceptance
of the proof of these circumstances and rejecti on of evidence in the record that conflicted
with the circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Andersen , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329
(Minn. 2010). In doing so, the appellate court must “cons true conflicting evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses
and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” State v. Tscheu , 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn.
2008). Second, the court must “independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences
that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a
hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. McAllister , 862 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). “In the second step, we give no deference to the jury’s choice between
reasonable inferences.” State v. Davenport, 947 N.W.2d 251, 266 (Minn. 2020).
In considering Ibberson’s challenge to the evidence of his knowledge, we first
identify the circumstances proved concerning this element of the offense. See Griffin, 887
N.W.2d at 264. Those circum stances are the following: J. H. petitioned for an ex parte
HRO alleging that Ibberson had repeatedly made unwanted contact with her, including

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appearing outside of her bedroom window in the middle of th e night. The district court
issued an ex parte HRO proh ibiting Ibberson from harassing or contacting J.H., ordering
him to stay more than 100 yards away from J.H.’s residence, and excluding him from J.H.’s
work and college campus. When Ibberson lear ned of the HRO, he went to the sheriff’s
office to retrieve a copy. A records empl oyee handed Ibberson a copy of the HRO and
filled out a certificate of service. The distri ct court held a hearing at Ibberson’s request,
which J.H. and her parents attended, along with Ibberson. Upon returning home from the
hearing, J.H. and her parents saw Ibberson driv e past their home. J.H. called the police.
While waiting for an officer to arrive, J.H. saw Ibberson drive by a second time. The
responding officer called Ibberson, and Ibberson denied driving by the residence. He later
admitted that he understood an HRO was in place that prohibited him from contacting J.H.
or going to her residence.
Next, with these circumstances in mind, we consider whether all reasonable
inferences are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 331. More precisel y, we must determine whether the
reasonable inferences from th e circumstances proved only support the conclusion that
Ibberson knew the HRO required him to stay 100 yards away from J.H.’s residence, and
are not consistent with some alternative theory of innocence.
Ibberson argues that the evid ence was also consistent with the theory that he never
received a full copy of the HRO. He points to the testimony of the records employee who
served him with the HRO; this witness testified that her scanner occasionally
malfunctioned and that she later sent a partial copy of the HRO to Ibberson’s attorney but

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then corrected her mistake. Ibberson argues the employee’s testimony, in conjunction with
his own testimony that he never received the page of the HRO containing the geographic
restriction at issue, supported an alternative theory of innocence.
We disagree. Considering the “conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict,” Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858, we must assume that the jury rejected Ibberson’s
testimony and accepted the testimony of the sheriff’s department employee that she served
him with a copy of the HRO. The circumstances proved, an d the inferences therefrom,
which include the inference that Ibberson wa s served with a copy of the HRO containing
the geographic restriction, are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence. They
are only consistent with the conclusion that Ibberson knew the HRO prohibited him from
being within 100 yards of J.H.’s residence.
Beyond the evidence of Ibberson’s knowledge , our thorough review of the record
convinces us that the trial evidence was otherwise sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Ibberson engaged in a pattern of unwanted contacted with J.H., including an uninvited visit
to her home in the middle of the night, which prompted J.H. to obtain the HRO. Ibberson
was served with the HRO at th e sheriff’s office. According to J.H. and her parents,
Ibberson drove by J.H.’s home immediately after the HRO hearin g in the district court.
This conduct violated the geographic restric tion of the HRO. And when contacted by a
police officer, Ibberson denied driving past the residence, suggesting consciousness of
guilt. Because the evidence at trial estab lished beyond a reasonable doubt that Ibberson
violated the HRO, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.