Mohamed Adel Alwan, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0201

Mohamed Adel Alwan, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 11, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-34073

Frederick J. Goetz, Goetz & Eckland P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from an order denying pos tconviction relief, appellant Mohamed Adel
Alwan argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that, although
Alwan received deficient representation from his trial counsel in some respects, his Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel was not violated because he was not prejudiced by
his counsel’s performance. We affirm.
FACTS
This postconviction matter arises from Alwan’s conviction for attempted second-
degree intentional murder. 1 The facts underlying the conviction are drawn from his jury
trial and are described below and in our opi nion affirming Alwan’s conviction on direct
appeal, State v. Alwan, No. A16-0641, 2017 WL 562520 (Minn. App. Feb. 13, 2017).
The shooting and R.G.’s identification of Alwan to police
In November 2014, R.G. was hosting a part y with approximately ten people in his
rented hotel room in Bloomington when an ar gument broke out and R.G. asked some of
his guests to leave. Between a half hour and one hour later, several people returned to the
room. R.G. heard a knock on th e door and opened it. When he did, a man hit R.G. on the
head with a gun and then shot him twice, grazing R.G.’s hi p and hitting his forearm. The
shooter fled, and police were called.

1 The jury also found Alwan guilty of first-degree assault.

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At the scene, R.G. gave a description of the shooter to one of the responding police
officers. R.G. described the shooter as a “light-skinned Somali male, approximately 5 [feet]
10 [inches tall], with an Afro, wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and a black stocking hat.”
After police took R.G. to the hospital, R.G. gave a statemen t to a detective. R.G. again
described the shooter as a light-skinned male about five feet ten inches tall who had
“Afroish style” hair and had something “weird about his tooth,” such as a “chip.”
Two days later, the detective and another officer met wi th R.G. and showed him a
photo lineup. R.G. vacillated between two photos but ultimat ely identified the photo of
Alwan as that of the shooter. R.G. told the officers that “Illeg” had come back to the party
with a gun and shot him. R.G. again mentione d the shooter’s tooth, saying it was cracked
or broken. The officers thought R.G. seemed to be alert and oriented to time and place
when they met with him.
The detective learned from R.G. that the name “Illeg” “meant something about a
tooth.” Alwan, 2017 WL 562520, at *2. The detective also learned that Alwan went by the
nickname “Illeg,” and the detective personally observed that Alwan had a chipped tooth.
Evidence from the hotel and from party guests
Hotel employee D.K. was working at the fro nt desk the night of the shooting. While
working at the front desk, he would watch surveillance vide o of the hotel exits. On the
video, he saw a man leave the hotel at around 4:40 a.m. Less than an hour later, D.K. saw
the same man return and he bu zzed the man back into the hotel. D.K. saw the man walk
toward R.G.’s hotel room. D. K. observed that the man was a light-skinned Black male,
wearing a hooded sweatshirt, with his hair half in an Afro and half in braids. D.K. thereafter

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received a call about a shooting in R.G.’s room . D.K. started walking toward the elevator
to go to the room, and he saw the same man run down the stairs and out the back door. At
trial, D.K. identified the man that he saw at the hotel and in the video as Alwan, who was
sitting in the courtroom.
I.H., a guest at R.G.’s party, stated she recalled seeing at the party a light-skinned
Somali male approximately five feet ten inches tall with his hair half braided and half in
an Afro but testified that she did not see the shooting and did not know who shot the victim.
Another guest, H.M., identified Alwan as being at the party.
Trial testimony of L.G.
While Alwan was in jail awaiting trial, he spoke frequently wi th a fellow inmate,
L.G. At trial, L.G. testified to those conversations. L.G. testified that Alwan told him that
he was a Crip. L.G. went on to testify that the Crips are a well-known street gang and that
Alwan said he was an “active shooter” for the Crips. He testified that Alwan stated that he
does not fight, he shoots. L.G. further testified that Alwan told him that Alwan “cracked”
on R.G., meaning that he had shot him, in connection with money and gang violence. L.G.
testified that Alwan told him that the state did not have a case because Alwan was going to
send someone to threaten R.G. into retracting his statement.
According to the parties, L.G. testified while wearing an orange jumpsuit. On cross-
examination, defense counsel elicited testim ony that L.G. was in custody, had been
escorted to the courthouse, and had his lawyer present in the courtroom. Defense counsel
did not ask questions regarding why L.G.’s attorney was present or what charges L.G. was
facing. L.G. testified that he contacted pros ecutors to let them know he had information

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about an attempted murder and acknowledged that he was hoping to get a benefit from his
testimony but that nothing had been promised.
Trial testimony of R.G.
At trial, R.G. retreated from his previous statements to police regarding the shooter.
He said that the man who shot him was a Somali male, approximately five to six feet tall,
with long hair in a ponytail and light skin. R.G. said he could not remember telling police
anything about the shooter’s smile or teeth. He testified that, when he spoke with police at
the hospital on the night of the shooting, he wa s taking a lot of pain medication. He said
that, when he picked Alwan’s photo out of the photo lineup, he was under the influence of
medications, was confused about the ethnicities of the persons in th e photos, and picked
Alwan’s photo because it looked familiar. R.G. said that he knew who shot him and that it
was not Alwan. He said he knew Alwan as “Moe,” not “Illeg.” He denied being under any
pressure to give this testimony at trial. He explained that he did not inform anyone earlier
that Alwan was not the shooter because nobody had come to talk to him and because, since
he had been released from jail, he had been “on the run” due to active warrants.
Direct appeal
On direct appeal, Alwan argued, among other things, that the district court violated
his confrontation right by limiting his cross-examination of L.G. Alwan, 2017 WL 562520,
at *1. We rejected the argumen t, observing that Al wan’s trial counsel elicited from L.G.
that “he was in custody at the time he testified, that he had an ongoing case, that he told his
attorney about Alwan’s admission, that he was hoping for some kind of benefit, and that

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his attorney was present in the courtroom.” Id. at *5. Finding no error with any raised issue,
we affirmed Alwan’s convictions.
Postconviction petition
In 2019, Alwan filed a petition for postc onviction relief, arguing that his trial
counsel’s performance was constitutionally de ficient in three ways: (1) failure to
adequately investigate L.G.; (2) inadequate examination of L.G. fo r bias or motive and
failure to impeach L.G. based on his prior fe lony convictions; and (3) failure to object to
the introduction of L.G.’s gang-related testimony.
Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Alwan’s trial
counsel did not exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would exercise and that counsel’s performance therefore fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness on each complained -of deficiency in performance. In detailed
findings, the district court found that defe nse counsel had failed to perform adequate
discovery to uncover L.G.’s pr ior felony convictions and hi s previous cooperation with
authorities, as well as information about the serious penalties that L.G. was facing due to a
pending federal indictment a nd his consequent co operation with federal authorities. The
district court concluded that counsel therefore failed to adequately confront L.G. with his
past convictions as a challenge to his cred ibility or with his coop eration with federal
authorities as a motive to lie. In addition, the district court concluded that defense counsel
unreasonably failed to object to L.G.’s testimony regarding Alwan’s alleged participation
in a gang since the shooting was not alleged to have been gang-related.

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The district court concluded, however, that trial counsel’s objectively unreasonable
performance did not deprive Alwan of a fair trial. It reasoned that evidence of L.G.’s
credibility and motive to lie was presented to the jury and that other evidence establishing
Alwan as the shooter leaves no reasonable possibility that th e jury would have decided
differently had it known more about L.G.’s criminal history or his cooperation arrangement
with federal authorities.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assist ance of counsel, an appellant must show
that trial counsel’s representation “(1) fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel ’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding woul d have been different.” Petersen v. State, 937 N.W.2d 136,
139-40 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) (citation
omitted). When determining whether a defendant was prej udiced by counsel’s
performance, “we consider the totality of the evidence before the jury.” Pearson v. State,
891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017) (citation omitted). A court may dispose of a Strickland
claim on one prong without considering the other. Petersen, 937 N.W.2d at 140 (quotation
omitted).
The state does not challenge the district court’s determination that Alwan’s trial
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonabl e. Therefore, the only issue before us

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involves the second prong of Strickland: whether there is a reasonable probability that, but
for Alwan’s trial counsel’s constitutionally deficient errors, Alwan would have been found
not guilty. We review postconviction decisions for an abuse of discretion. Peltier v. State,
946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). Reviewin g courts uphold factual determinations if
supported by sufficient evidence and review issues of law de novo. Id. However, the two-
part Strickland analysis is subject to de novo review as it involves mixed questions of law
and fact. Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 600 (quotation omitted).
Alwan argues that his counsel’s failure s to adequately investigate and cross-
examine L.G. prejudiced him because L.G. was “the most important witness against” him
at trial. Alwan contends that, without L. G.’s testimony, the state’s case was not
overwhelming. He cites R.G.’s denial at tr ial that Alwan shot him; the absence of
surveillance footage showing the shooting itself; the abse nce of physical evidence
connecting Alwan to the shooting; the presence of others, in addition to Alwan, at the
scene; and inconsistencies between descrip tions of Alwan’s hairstyle and his actual
hairstyle.
The state counters that its case did not rest solely on L.G.’s testimony, asserting that,
even without L.G.’s testimony, the evidence established Alwan as the shooter. The state
cites R.G.’s picking Alwan out of the photo lineup; R.G.’s de scription of the shooter to
police, which, the state asserts, matched Alwan and the surveillance footage; R.G.’s
description of a chipped tooth; R.G.’s identif ication of the shooter as “Illeg” and R.G.’s
description of the term “Illeg” as relating to a tooth; and Alwan’s actual chipped tooth. In
addition, the state cites the evidence of D.K.’s identification of Alwan as the man who left

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the hotel, returned, walked toward R.G.’s room, and ran down the stairs and out the back
door after the shooting, as well as eviden ce from other guests that established Alwan’s
presence at the party that night. The state argues that in light of this evidence, and
considering that the jury already knew that L.G. was a jailhouse informant who had some
reason to cooperate with aut horities, there is no reasonabl e probability that additional
evidence challenging L.G.’s credibility and motives would have led to a different result.
We agree with the state. While the benefit that L.G. could possibly have received in
exchange for his testimony was indeed substantial and the jury was not made aware of its
full extent, the jury did know that L.G. was in custody, was facing charges, and was hoping
to receive some benefit in exchange for testifying. Thus, the jury had a basis to know that
L.G. had an incentive to tes tify favorably for the state when it evaluated the reliability of
his testimony. And, while the jury did not learn of L.G.’s past felony convictions, the fact
that L.G. was a jailhouse informant gave them some reason to question his credibility. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 588 (Minn. 1996) (denying a new trial on the ground
of prosecutorial misconduct when a reasonabl e jury would not have reached a different
result if it had learned of state’s witness’s plea bargain, when the witness’s credibility had
been impeached by other methods). Moreover, even if the jury would have entirely
discounted L.G.’s testimony, th e jury was presented with ot her compelling evidence that
Alwan was the shooter at the hotel, includi ng testimony from other guests placing Alwan
at the party, the surveillance footage of—and D.K.’s testimony identifying Alwan as—the
person entering and leaving the hotel shortly before and immediately after the shooting,

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and R.G.’s statements to police shortly after the shooting identifying Alwan as “Illeg” and
“Illeg” as the person who shot him.
Alwan also argues that defense counse l’s failure to keep out L.G.’s testimony
regarding gangs also prejudiced him because the testimony was inflammatory and not
relevant. But, even assuming that L.G.’s testimony relating to ga ngs would have been
excluded had it been objected to , we conclude that there is no reasonable probability of a
different result in light of the totality of the evidence we just described.
For the same reason, we reject Alwan’s argument that, together, defense counsel’s
deficiencies demand reversal. A “reasonable probability” of a different outcome means a
probability “sufficient to underm ine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Smith , 476
N.W.2d 511, 514 (M inn. 1991) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).
Given the evidence from other witnesses, including the testimony of police officers, other
party guests, and the hotel employee, we conclude that defense counsel’s deficiencies, even
considered together, do not undermine confidence in the outcome of this trial.
In sum, because Alwan has not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the
result of the proceeding would have been different but for the deficiencies in trial counsel’s
performance, he has not satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test.
Affirmed.