A20-0206 A20-0228 A20-0229

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A20-0205
A20-0206
A20-0228
A20-0229

Court of Appeals Thissen, J.

Keith Jacob Aili,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

Randall Duaine Bemis,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

Mark Allen Dziuk,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

Zachary Lourence Sheehy,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

vs. Filed: August 18, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

________________________
Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Tim Sime, Assistant
County Attorneys, Elk River, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.

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Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Chelsie M.
Willett, Assistant State Public Defenders, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondents/cross -
appellants.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The 2-year time limit prescribed by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2020),
which applies to a claim asserted in a postconviction petition brought under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3) (2020), runs from the date the Supreme Court of the United States
or a Minnesota appellate court announces an interpretation of law that forms the basis for
a claim that the interpretation is a new rule of law that applies retroactively to the
postconviction petitioner’s conviction.
2. Application of the 2 -year time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) , to
bar respondents’ postconviction petitions neither implicates separation of powers concerns
nor violates the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution.
Reversed.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
We must decide when the 2-year time limit prescribed by Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(c) (2020), for postconviction petitions asserting a claim for relief based on a new,
retroactive, interpretation of law, see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3) (2020), begins to
run. We conclude that the 2 -year time limit in subdivision 4(c) runs from the date the
Supreme Court of the United States or a Minnesota appellate court announces an
interpretation of law that forms the basis for a claim that the interpretation is a new rule of
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law that applies retroactively to the postconviction petitioner’s conviction . Because the
postconviction petitions at issue here were filed more than 2 years after that date, they are
untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
FACTS
This case involves a consolidated appeal of four district court orders that denied
postconviction petitions brought by respondents Keith Jacob Aili, Randall Duaine Bemis,
Mark Allen Dziuk, and Zachary Lourence Sheehy (collectively respondents) . Between
October 17, 2012 and August 28, 2015 , each respondent was charged with felony test
refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014). In each case, following respondents’
arrests for suspected driving while impaired , the State, without first obtaining a warrant,
demanded that respondents submit to a blood or urine test. Respondents refused to consent
to either test. Respondents pleaded guilty to test refusal and were convicted and sentenced
between February 7, 2014 and December 21, 2015.1
On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, holding
that blood test refusal convictions are valid under the Fourth Amendment only when the
requesting officer had a warrant or a warrant exception applied. 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
2160, 2185–86 (2016). On October 12, 2016, we decided State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d
224 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and applied the rule

1 Respondents were charged and convicted under prior versions of section 169A.20,
the test refusal statute, which criminalized a refusal to submit to a blood, breath, or urine
test in accordance with Minn. Stat. §§ 16 9A.51–.52 (2020). See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 2 (2014). In 2017, the Legislature amended section 169A. 20. See Act of July 1,
2017, ch. 83, art. 2, § 2, 2017 Minn. Laws 351, 355 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2 (2020)).
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announced in Birchfield to hold that the warrantless blood and urine test refusal convictions
under Minnesota’s test refusal statute were unconstitutional. We refer to the rule of law
distilled from these three cases collectively as the Birchfield rule. Johnson v. State
(Johnson I), 916 N.W.2d 674, 678 n.2 (Minn. 2018) ; see also Johnson v. State (Johnson
II), 956 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Minn. 2021) (“[T] he Birchfield rule says that test refusal by a
suspected impaired driver may be criminalized consistent with the Fourth Amendment only
when there is a warrant for the test or a warrant exception applies.”). On August 22, 2018,
we held that Birchfield announced a new rule that applied retroactively, noting that “there
will need to be case -by-case determinations to assess whether there was a warrant or an
exception to the warrant requirement sufficient to sustain test -refusal convictions under ”
the rule. Johnson I, 916 N.W.2d at 684.
In late 2019, respondents filed postconviction petitions, asserting that the Birchfield
rule rendered their test refusal convictions unconstitutional because the requesting officers
in their case s did not have warrants and no warrant exception s applied. Respondents
acknowledged that their petitions fell outside of the time limit prescribed by Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020), which bars the filing of postconviction petitions more than
2 years after the later of : (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence or
(2) disposition of the petitioner’s direct appeal. Id. Nevertheless, respondents asserted that
their petitions were timely under the subdivision 4(b)(3) retroactive new interpretation of
law exception. They interpreted Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), to mean that they had 2
years from the date we decided Johnson I (August 22, 2018), in which we announced that
the Birchfield rule was a new rule of law that applied retroactively , to bring their
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postconviction claims under subdivision 4(b)(3) . Respondents’ claims in district court
concerning the timeliness of their postconviction petitions under subdivision 4(b)(3) were
limited to statutory interpretation arguments. None challenged the constitutionality of the
statute on procedural or substantive due process grounds.2
Between December 2019 and February 2020, t he district courts summarily denied
all four postconviction petitio ns as untimely. The district court judge s concluded that
respondents had 2 years from the date we decided Thompson and Trahan (October 12,
2016), when we first applied the Birchfield rule in Minnesota, to file a petition for
postconviction relief under subdivision 4(b)(3).
In a consolidated appeal, the court of appeals reversed all four orders. Aili v. State,
No. A20-0205, Order at 4 (Minn. App. filed Nov. 12, 2020). The court concluded that its
decision in Edwards v. State , 950 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. granted/stayed
(Minn. Dec. 15, 2020), controlled. Aili, No. A20-0205, Order at 3. Edwards held that the
2-year time limit in subdivision 4(c) for postconviction claims invoking the exception for
a new interpretation of law based on the Birchfield rule began to run on August 22, 2018,
when we decided Johnson I and determined that the rule applied retroactively, rather than
October 12, 2016, when we decided Thompson and Trahan. Edwards, 950 N.W.2d at 315–
18. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that respondents had timely filed their
petitions. Aili, No. A20 -0205, Order at 3. After reversing the district court ’s decisions,
the court of appeals remanded for assessment of respondents’ claims in ac cordance with

2 Respondents have never expressly asserted a substantive due process claim in this
case.
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the Birchfield pleading standard that we established in Fagin v. State , 933 N.W.2d 774
(Minn. 2019). Aili, No. A20-0205, Order at 3–4.
We granted the State’s petition for review of the court of appeals’ decision
reinstating respondents’ petitions.3
ANALYSIS
I.
Respondents assert that their pos tconviction petitions are timely under the
retroactive new interpretation of law exception set forth in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
4(b)(3). Therefore, we must decide when the 2-year time limit prescribed by Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(c), began to run on claims asserting the exception in subdivision 4(b)(3).
This question requires us to interpret the language of Minnesota’s postconviction statute,
an issue of law, which we review de novo. Vill. Lofts at St. Anthony Falls Ass’n v. Hous.
Partners III-Lofts, LLC, 937 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Minn. 2020); see Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d
831, 833 (Minn. 2011) (“ In reviewing a postconviction court’ s denial of relief, issues of
law are reviewed de novo.”).
A.

Resolving this question requires an understanding of the time limit provisions of
Minnesota’s postconviction statute and our jurisprudence on the retroactivity of new rules

3 We also granted respondents’ cross-petition for review of the court’s remand order.
Respondents observed that, in its answer, the State failed to assert that a warrant or warrant
exception existed at the time the State demanded that respondents undergo blood or urine
tests. Thus, respondents claimed, the State waived its ability to contest the merits of the
petitions by failing to satisfy the Birchfield pleading standard outlined in Fagin and that,
consequently, no remand was warranted as a matter of law. Because of our resolution of
the case, however, we do not reach the issues raised in respondents’ cross-appeal.
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of law following the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 (1989 ).
See Danforth v. State , 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009) ( electing to apply the Teague
standard to assess the finality of Minnesota state court convictions).
We begin with Minnesota’s postconviction statute. See generally Minn. Stat.
§§ 590.01–.11 (2020). In 2005, the Legislature imposed time limits on when an individual
may petition for postconviction relief. See Act of Aug. 1, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005
Minn. Laws 901, 1097–98 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 ( 2020)).
The principal time limit requires that a petition for postconviction rel ief be filed within
2 years after a conviction becomes final. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (providing that
postconviction petition must be filed within 2 years after the later of “the entry of judgment
of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed” or “an appellate court’s disposition of
petitioner’s direct appeal”).
The Legislature, however, carved out a series of exceptions from this principal time
limit. See id., subd. 4(b). One of those exception s—the retroactive new interpretation of
law exception—is at issue here. It provides that a district court may hear a postconviction
petition filed later than 2 years after the initial judgment of conviction or sentence becomes
final if “ the petitioner asserts a new interpretat ion of federal or state constitutional or
statutory law by either the United States Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate court and
the petitioner establishes that this interpretation is retroactively applicable to the
petitioner’s case.” Id., subd. 4(b) (3). The Legislature also specified that “[a]ny petition
invoking an exception provided in [subdivision 4(b)] must be filed within two years of the
date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c).
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In Sanchez v. State, we stated that the 2-year time limit in subdivision 4(c) “clearly
and unambiguously” applies to “all of the exceptions in subdivision 4(b),” which includes
subdivision 4(b)(3), the retroactive new interpretation of law exception. 816 N.W.2d 550,
556 (Minn. 2012). We further stated that the subdivision 4(c) time limit begins to run when
a petitioner objectively “knew or should have known” that his claim under a subdivision
4(b) exception arose. Id. at 558–59. We have not, however, directly addressed the issue
of when a petitioner knows or should know that a subdivision 4(b)(3) “claim arises,” thus
triggering the 2-year time limit in subdivision 4(c). Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c).
Importantly, the 2-year time limit in subdivision 4(c) runs from “the date the claim
arises.” Id. (emphasis added). That standard does not mean that a postconviction petitioner
knew or should have known he would prevail in establishing one of the five exceptions set
forth in subdivision 4(b), but rather that the petitioner knew or should have known of the
information that would allow him to assert a claim that an exception applied. For instance,
a petitioner seeking to invoke the exception set forth in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5),
must establish “to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the
interests of justice.” A petitioner knows or should know about that claim when he has
information that allows him to make such an argument. In Sanchez, we held that the
petitioner knew or should have known about his interests -of-justice claim —based on
ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to file his appeal—on the date
he learned that the appeal had not been filed. 816 N.W.2d at 560.
The fact that the petitioner knew or should have known that he could file a
postconviction petition under the interests-of-justice exception (notwithstanding the 2-year
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time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)) as of the date he learned that his lawyer did
not file his appeal, however, was not dispositive of whether he would actually prevail on
the merits of his postconviction petition. It merely meant that, as of that date and for 2 years
going forward, the petitioner could have filed his subdivision 4 (b)(5) interests-of-justice
claim in accordance with the time limit applicable to subdivision 4(b) exceptions without
the district court dismissing his petition as untimely. See 816 N.W.2d at 560 ; see also
Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783–84 (Minn. 2011) (interpreting the “newly discovered
evidence” exception in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2) , to require a petitioner “to
sufficiently allege the existence of evidence which, if true, would establish” his innocence,
not introduce evidence “that actually proves his innocence”).
We now turn to our jurisprudence on whether a new rule of law applies retroactively
to convictions or sentences that became final before the decision announcing the new rule
was announced. The Teague Court set forth a general standard for analyzing whether a
rule of federal constitutional law announced in a court decision applies retroactively to
final convictions. See 489 U.S. at 301, 310–12. We follow this approach, which proceeds
in two steps. First, “we ask whether the rule in question is a new rule or an old rule .”
Johnson I, 916 N.W.2d at 681. Second, if we decide that a court announced a new rule of
law, we assess whether the law is substantive or procedural.4 Id. Substantive rules apply

4 For several decades, the Supreme Court also recognized a second exception to the
general presumption against retroactive application of new rules: “watershed” rules of
criminal procedure. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The Supreme Court recently eliminated
the wate rshed rule of criminal procedure exception for federal court convictions. See
Edwards v. Vannoy , __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021). That exception is not at
issue in this case. See Johnson I , 916 N.W.2d at 681 (noting that the watershed rule of

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retroactively to convictions or sentences that became final be fore the new rule was
announced, while procedural rules do not. Id.
Finally, we address the meaning of the disputed postconviction exception in this
case: a new interpretation of constitutional or statutory law that is retroactively applicable
to the petitioner’s case, see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3). A straightforward reading
of the plain language to this exception makes clear that the provision applies to claims
asserting that a court decision issued after a petitioner’s conviction has become final has
announced a new rule of law that applies retroactively under the Teague standard.5 Once
again, the language of subdivision 4(b)(3) states: “ [T]he petitioner asserts a new
interpretation of federal or state constitutional or statutory law by either the United States
Supreme Court or a Minnesota appellate court and the petitioner establishes that thi s

criminal procedure exception was not at issue in determining whether the Birchfield rule
applied retroactively). Because the issue is not before us, we express no opinion on
whether the watershed rule of criminal procedure exception applies when determinin g
whether a new rule applies retroactively to Minnesota state court convictions and
sentences. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–81 (2008) (holding that Teague
does not limit the authority of state courts, when reviewing state criminal convicti ons, to
fashion their own remedies in determining whether a new rule should apply retroactively).

5 As noted, the Legislature adopted time limits for postconviction petitions and
accompanying exceptions to those limits, including the exception for a ne w interpretation
of law that applies retroactively, in 2005. Act of Aug. 1, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005
Minn. Laws 901, 1097–98 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2020)).
The year before the Legislature amended the postconviction statute, we adopted the Teague
standard for assessing whether a new rule applies retroactively to Minnesota state court
convictions and sentences. See O’Meara v. State , 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2004),
overruled by Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). Accordingly, Teague was the
law in Minnesota when the Legislature adopted the exception for a retroactive new
interpretation of law. We reaffirmed that we would apply the Teague standard to assess
the finality of Minnesota state court convictions in Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498, and have
continued to employ the standard since then. See, e.g., Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480,
488–99 (Minn. 2012); Johnson II, 956 N.W.2d at 622–23.
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interpretation is retroactively applicable to the petitioner ’s case.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(b)(3). The language tracks the two-step analysis we carry out under Teague: (1) did
the court decision adopt a new rule of law and (2) is the new rule substantive and thus
retroactive? Johnson I, 916 N.W.2d at 681 . Accordingly, subdivision 4(b)(3) creates an
exception to the 2-year time limit for postconviction petitions in subdivision 4(a) when the
petition asserts that a judicial opinion issued after a conviction is final announced a new
substantive rule that applies retroactively.
B.
With this background in mind, we turn to the question before us: When should a
postconviction pet itioner know that he has a claim for postconviction relief based on a
judicial opinion issued after his conviction bec ame final that announced a new rule that
applies retroactively to his conviction ? We conclude that the answer to the core question
in this case is self-evident. A postconviction petitioner knows or should know he has a
claim on the date that a court decision announces an interpretation of law that provides the
basis for a claim that the petitioner is entitled to relief because the interpretation is a new
rule of law that applies retroactively to the petitioner’s conviction. Here, the decisions that
respondents claim announced a new retroactive rule of law are the opinions that announced
the Birchfield rule. Consequently, respondents’ postconviction petitions, filed in 2019, fell
beyond the 2-year time limit prescribed by subdivision 4(c), which elapsed on October 12,
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2018—2 years from the date we decided Thompson and Trahan.6 Thus, the district court
correctly dismissed respondents’ postconviction petitions as untimely.
Respondents argue that , even accepting this conclusion, application of the
subdivision 4(c) time limit to bar their claims is manifestly unjust because Johnson I, the
decision that announced that the Birchfield rule was a new rule of law that applied
retroactively, was decided only about 6 weeks before the 2 -year window following our
decisions in Thompson and Trahan closed. They urge use to invoke our supervisory
powers to extend or toll the 2 -year time limit so that their postconviction petitions may
proceed.
We may invoke our supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice,
but do so only in rare cases See, e.g., State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. 1999).
Respondents’ circumstances here are neither rare nor extraordinary. Their argument holds
no weight for the reasons set forth above. T he plain text of subdivision 4(b)(3) says that
the subdivision 4(c) time limit begins to run when a court decides a case upon which a

6 The State proceeded in this case on the assumption that the Birchfield rule was
announced—and the 2 -year time limit started to run —when we decided Thompson and
Trahan, not when the Supreme Court decided Birchfield. The Birchfield Court held that
an individual can be constitutionally convicted for refusing a warrantless breath test but
not a warrantless blood test (unless a valid warrant exception applied). ___ U.S. at ___,
136 S. Ct. at 2185–86. It did not address the constitutionality of warrantless urin e test
refusal convictions because none of the petitioners in Birchfield had refused a urine test.
See id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 2168 n.1. In Thompson, we extended the logic in Birchfield to
prohibit warrantless urine test refusal convictions. 886 N.W.2d at 231–33.
Here, r espondents refused both blood and urine tests and were convicted under
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014), which at the time criminalized refusal of blood,
breath, and urine tests. Because Birchfield did not address urine test refu sal convictions,
the 2 -year time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), did not begin to run on
respondents’ new interpretation of law claims under subdivision 4(b)(3) until we decided
Thompson and Trahan, applying the Birchfield rule in Minnesota.
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postconviction petitioner may rely to claim that a new rule of law was announced and
applies retroactively to his conviction. Respondents had clear notice of their obligation to
bring a claim within two years of the decisions in Trahan and Thompson.
Indeed, Johnson I is the ultimate refutation of respondents’ argument and
demonstrates that we need not invoke our supervisory powers here to ensure the fair
administration of justice. Johnson’s two test refusal convictions from 2010 and 2015 were
final before we announced our decisions in Thompson and Trahan. Johnson I, 916 N.W.2d
at 677–78. His 2010 conviction fell outside of the 2-year time limit set forth in subdivision
4(a). Relying on the exception in subdivision 4(b)(3), Johnson filed a postconviction
petition within 2 years of the decisions in Thompson and Trahan, asserting that
Birchfield/Thompson/Trahan announced a substantive new rule that applied retroactively
to his convictions. Id. at 678. Even though Johnson filed his postconviction petition before
we had determined whether the Birchfield rule was a new , substantive rule that applied
retroactively, we still considered the postconviction claim.7 Here, respondents could have
proceeded in precisely the same fashion but failed to do so.8

7 In Johnson I, we spent little time answering the question of whether the Birchfield
rule was a new rule because the State conceded that it was a new rule. 916 N.W.2d at 681.

8 Respondents alternatively argue that Johnson I itself announced a new interpretation
of law, which triggered the subdivision 4(c) 2 -year time limit and rendered their petitions
relying on the Birchfield rule timely. To support their argument, respondents rely on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190 (2016), reasoning
that “an opinion announcing a new substantive rule has announced a new interpretation of
constitutional law [because the Constitution] deprives the state of the power to punish the
individual.” In other words, respondents assert that a Teague determination that a new rule
is substantive and therefore retroactive qualifies as a new interpretation of law under
subdivision 4(b)(3). We disagree with respondents’ assertion.

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II.
Setting aside their interpretation of the plain text of paragraphs (b)(3) and (c) of
subdivision 4, respondents also argue that interpreting the provisions as we do today is
unconstitutional. Respondents make two related constitutional arguments.
First, respondents claim that our interpretation “raises a po ssible separation -of-
powers violation.” More specifically, they argue that a 2-year time limit running from the
date of the decision that a postconviction petitioner claims is a new rule of law that applies
retroactively impermissibly limits our judicial authority to determine whether respondents’
convictions were unconstitutional under the Birchfield rule.
We rejected a similar argument in Sanchez, stating that “t he Legislature did not
intrude unto a judicial function when it enacted the time limitations provisions in the
postconviction statute. We therefore hold that the statute is not unconstitutional as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.” 816 N.W.2d at 566. We observed that our

Montgomery affirms the fundamental Teague substantive versus procedural
distinction; that is, substantive rules apply retroactively because “they set forth categorical
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishme nts altogether
beyond the State’s power to impose. ” 577 U.S. at 201. Montgomery also mandated that
states may not deny retroactive effect of new substantive rules in their postconviction
proceedings. See id. at 200. But Montgomery does not support respondents’ contention
that a decision announcing the re troactivity of a new rule can also function as a new rule
that itself applies retroactively.
Respondents also argue that Montgomery stands for the proposition that because
(under their logic) a Teague retroactivity determination amounts to a new interpretation of
law, dismissing a claim brought under that new interpretation of law as untimely may
violate the petitioner’s due process rights. But Montgomery did not concern—nor did the
Supreme Court discuss —whether a state may impose reasonable time limits on
postconviction claims asserting retroactive application of a new rule. In other words,
Montgomery did not bar states from imposing timely filing requirements to petition for
postconviction relief when a new substantive, retroactive claim arises. We di scuss
respondents’ constitutional arguments in more detail in section II, infra.
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case law “consistently recognizes that the creation of statutes of limitations is strictly a
legislative function” and that “we ‘will not inquire into the wisdom of the exercise of this
discretion by the legislature in fixing the period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is
manifestly so short a s to amount to a practical denial of justice.’ ” Id. at 564 (quoting
Wichelman v. Messner , 83 N.W.2d 800, 817 (Minn. 1957)). Accordingly, respondents’
separation of powers argument is without merit.
Second, respondents claim that dismissing their postc onviction petitions as
untimely—based on our conclusion in this case that a subdivision 4(b)(3) claim arose as of
the date we decided Thompson and Trahan—“would violate [their] due process rights by
penalizing them for lawful conduct—conduct the district court lacked authority to punish.”
According to respondents, because “[a] challenge involving the application of a new
substantive rule disputes the district court’s earlier subject -matter jurisdiction to convict ,
. . . [a] defendant cannot waive that chal lenge by raising it too late.” Respondents
essentially argue that the subdivision 4(c) time limit can never apply to claims arising under
subdivision 4(b)(3) that challenge the district court’s underlying jurisdiction to convict .
Once again, we disagree.9

9 To the extent that respondents are making a constitutional avoidance statutory
interpretation argument—that we should interpret Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3), to
mean that the subdivision 4(c) 2-year time limit begins to run when an appellate court states
that a new rule is retroactive in order to avoid a constitutional problem of penalizing
conduct that is not criminal—that argument proves too much. The avoidance argument is
that no statute of limitations can ever constitutionally apply when the petitioner’s conduct
is simply not a crime. Taking this argument at face value would render res pondents’ own
interpretation of the language of subdivision 4(b)(3) (that it runs from the time Johnson I
was announced) irrelevant. According to respondents constitutional analysis, applying the
subdivision 4(c) 2-year time limit to bar a retroactive new interpretation of law claim would

16
It is true that “a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of conduct that
is not criminal.” Johnson I , 916 N.W.2d at 680. And a conviction under an
unconstitutional statute “is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.”
Id. (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1879)). But the question in this case
is not whether Minnesota law allows a defendant to challenge a conviction on the ground
that, subsequent to a final conviction, a court announced a new rule of law that places
particular conduct beyond the State’s power to punish. It plainly does. That is precisely
what is allowed under the Teague standard and Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3).
Rather, the question is whether the Legislature has the power to place a procedural
limit on petitioners who seek to challenge their convictions on these grounds using the
remedy that the Legislature created. The answer to that question is yes. See Carlton v.
State, 816 N.W.2d 590 , 615 –16 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting a due process challenge to
applying the 2-year time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), and concluding “that any
right to review” —including postconviction review —“is not unlimited, and, like other
constitutional rights, can be forfeited and subjected to reasonable legislative limitations,”

violate due process regardless of whether the time limit begins to run from the date a new
rule originally arises or the date a court later expressly states that the rule applies
retroactively.
At any rate, we need not decide this issue on constitutional avoidance grounds for
two reasons. First, we hold today that the plain text of subdivision 4(b)(3) unambiguously
supports the conclusion that the subdivision 4(c) 2 -year time limit runs from the date a
court issues a decision upon which a postconviction petitioner has a claim that the decision
announced a new rule that applies retroactively. Accordingly, we need not consider the
canon of constitutional avoidance. See State v. Robinson , 921 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn.
2019) (noting that when “the plain meaning of the statute controls and . . . the statutory
language is not ambiguous, we need not consider the canon of constitutional avoidance”).
Second, and more fundamentally, respondents’ subject matter jurisdiction argumen t lacks
merit for the reasons stated below.
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such as the time limits in Minnesota’s postconviction statute); Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 563
(rejecting a due process claim asserting that subdivision 4 time limits unconstitutionally
denied petitioner “his right to one review of his criminal conviction under the Minnesota
Constitution”).
The fact that a postconviction petitioner claims that the court t hat entered the
original judgment of conviction lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so because the
conduct on which the conviction was based was later determined to be beyond the power
of the State to criminalize does not change this analysis. We have placed limits on the
ability of a party to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a basis for attacking a final
judgment. See, e.g., In re Petition for Instructions to Construe Basic Resol. 876 of the Port
Auth. of St. Paul , 772 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Minn. 2009) ( stating that a motion to set aside
judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be brought within reasonable
time, which “is determined by considering the attendant circumstances”) ; Bode v. Minn.
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 612 NW.2d 862, 866–68 (Minn. 2000) (noting “that total reliance on a
judgment’s validity produces problematic results when attacks on subject matter
jurisdiction are initiated long af ter a final judgment is entered” and balancing the judicial
system’s competing interests in validity versus finality of judgments).10

10 Respondents cite to Williams v. Smith , 820 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2012), to support
their claim that a postconviction petitioner may challenge the underlying district court’s
subject matter jurisdiction to convict at any time, regardless of the time limits imposed by
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. In Williams, we stated that a party may raise subject matter
jurisdiction issues at any time during the course of litigating a dispute and that the right to
do so “cannot be waived.” 820 N.W.2d at 813; see also Nelson v. Schlener , 859 N.W.2d
288, 291 (Minn. 2015) (“[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time
and cannot be waived by the parties. ”); McCullough & Sons, Inc., v. City of Vadnais

18
Consequently, based on the record and respondents’ articulated due process
theories, we hold that appl ying the subdivision 4(c) time limit to bar respondents’ use of
the legislatively created exception in subdivision 4(b) (3) for the retroactive new
interpretation of law does not implicate due process concerns.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Reversed.

Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016) (“ Courts can question subject -matter
jurisdiction at any time, even if the parties to a case have not done so.”).
In Williams, Nelson, and McCullough, we were deciding whether the district courts
in each respective case had subject matter jurisdiction to decide that case. Those cases did
not involve a collateral attack on the validity of a final judgment or conviction, like in the
postconviction context, and the notion that one has an unlimited right to file a
postconviction petition attacking the underlying subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court is not supported in our case law. See C arlton, 816 N.W.2d at 614 (quoting
Wichelman, 83 N.W.2d at 817, for the proposition that a statute of limitations “will bar any
right . . . provided that a reasonable time is given [to] a party to enforce” the right); Pearson
v. State , 946 N.W.2d 877, 883 –84 (Minn. 2020) (declining to address a petitioner’s
argument “that challenges to subject -matter jurisdiction are never untimely under the
postconviction statute”).