In re the Marriage of: Kevin James Stanton, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0211

In re the Marriage of: Kevin James Stanton, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Megan Caroline Curran,
Respondent.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-1840

Nahid Abuelhassan, Abuelhassan Law, PLLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Becky Toevs Rooney, Edward F. Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from a marital dissolution judgment and decree, appellant father
argues that the district court erred by (1) denying his request to change the child’s last
name, (2) requiring his parenting time to be supervised, (3) granting the parenting
consultant limited authority to address the parties’ parenting disputes, (4) awarding his
nonmarital property to respondent mother, (5) awarding mother need -based and conduct -

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based attorney fees and costs, (6) requiring that he secure his child support obligation, (7)
awarding mother retroactive child support, and (8) requiring that he pay the supervisio n
fees associated with his parenting time. Father also argues that the dissolution process was
unfair. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Kevin James Stanton (Stanton) and respondent Megan Caroline Curran
(Curran) are the parents of one minor child, who was born on November 24, 2014. The
parties married in 2015 and lived together for approximately six months until they
separated. In March 2016, Stanton filed a petition for dissolution. After the parties
stipulated to custody and parenting time, they reconciled their differences and lived
together for another four months. Following a period of inactivity, their d ivorce case was
administratively dismissed. In March 2017, Stanton filed a new petition for dissolution.
In the same month, Curran obtained an ex parte OFP for herself and the minor child
based on her assertions that Stanton had thrown dishes and food du ring a heated argument
between the parties while the minor child was present. Shortly after, the district court
appointed a guardian ad litem for the minor child. Following a preliminary report from the
guardian ad litem regarding his communications with child protective services, the district
court held a hearing and issued an OFP on behalf of Curran, excluding the minor child as
a “protected person.” However, because the guardian ad litem reported that child
protective services had concerns about Stanton’s access to the minor child, the district court
reserved Stanton’s parenting time. The district court also granted Curran temporary sole
legal and temporary sole physical custody of the minor child. Although the state

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subsequently brought criminal cha rges against Stanton for violating the OFP, that matter
settled when Stanton pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. The OFP was eventually
extended through August 12, 2024.
Approximately a month after the issuance of the original OFP, the district court
issued an order, which was based on the parties’ stipulation, awarding Stanton supervised
parenting time with the minor child. While Stanton exercised his supervised parenting
time for nearly two years, he chose to stop exercising his parenting time during the three
months prior to the dissolution. Stanton also refused to pay his child support obligatio n
and proportionate share of child-related expenses for two months prior to the dissolution.
At trial, two jointly commissioned neutral experts, a parenting time evaluator, who
had conducted a custody and parenting time evaluation, and a psychological evaluator, who
had completed psychological evaluations of the parties, appeared and presented their
reports. Two lay witnesses from Stanton’s family a lso offered testimony: Stanton’s sister
and his step-daughter from a prior marriage. Both witnesses testified as to Stanton’s violent
past. Stanton’s sister described Stanton’s acts of violence in his childhood against herself
and their mother. Stanton’s stepdaughter spoke of Stanton’s acts of violence against herself
and her mother, as well as Stanton’s failure to supervise the parties’ minor child.
Throughout the dissolution proceeding, Stanton, who had been terminated from a
family-owned business by his father in 2015, remained unemployed. However, Stanton
was due to receive an inheritance between $4 million and $4.5 million, with an initial
distribution of $1.4 million to $1.5 million. Stanton conceded that he was voluntarily
retired and agreed that income for temporary support purposes could be imputed to him at

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a rate commensurate with his historical earnings. He also testified that he currently runs a
“sober lodge” business, an unlicensed alcohol detoxification program for up to eight
people, out of his home. Stanton charges program participants $600 in rent per month.
Curran was employed as a nurse by the Emily program and as a personal care
attendant for her developmentally-disabled brother. According to her W -2s, Curran’s 2018
gross earnings were $39,879.96 for her work with the Emily program and $1,509.37 for
her work as a personal attendant. Curran also received an additional $500 per month in
child support from the father of a child from another relationship. Finally, Curran received
$1,450 as monthly gross income from renting out her premarital townhome.
After trial, the district court issued a judgment and decree, denying Stanton’s request
to change the minor child’s surname; determining child custody, parenting time, and child
support; dividing the parties’ property; and awarding need -based and conduct -based
attorney fees to Curran. Stanton appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stanton’s petition to
change the minor child’s last name.

Stanton first challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to change the minor
child’s last name from Curran to Stanton. This court reviews a district court’s denial of a
request to change a minor child’s name for an abuse of discretion. See In re We lfare of
C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). “A district court abuses its discretio n
when evidence in the record does not support the factual findings, the court misapplied the

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law, or the co urt settles a dispute in a way that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. §§ 259.10, .11 (2018) govern the procedures for changing a name. If a
name change involves a minor, the application must be made by the c hild’s guardian, and
both of the child’s parents must be provided notice. Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1 (2018).
A district court may deny a request for a name change if it finds that the change is not in
the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a) (2018) . A best-interests-of-the-child
analysis concerning a name change includes consideration of the following factors:
(1) how long the child has had the current name , (2) any
potential harassment or embarrassment the change might
cause, (3) the chi ld’s preference , (4) the effect of the
change on the child’s relationship with each parent , and (5)
the degree of community respect associated with the
present and proposed names.

C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d at 561. “If neither parent of the child opposes the request to change
the child’s name, the district court must grant the request after determining that the name
change is in the child’s best interests.” Foster, 802 N.W.2d at 757. However, if a parent
objects to the name change, a district court should grant the name change “only where the
evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such
change.” In re Saxton , 309 N.W.2d 298, 300 –01 (Minn. 1981). A district court may still
grant a request for a name change over a parent’s objection, but must do so “with great
caution,” Foster, 802 N.W.2d. at 757 (quotation omitted), and must clarify the clear and
compelling reasons that support such a decision. C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d at 561.

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Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not properly
consider the appropriate factors when denying his request to change the minor child’s
surname. The district court’s order indicates that it denied Stanton’s re quest for the
following reasons, which are supported by the record: (1) the child has used his mother’s
surname since the child’s birth, as confirmed by the child’s birth certificate and baptismal
certificate; (2) the parties did not dispute that the child has never used a different surname
than Curran; (3) both parties were present at the child’s baptism, where the child’s full
name was affirmed; and (4) the child’s medical and school records use the surname Curran.
The district court also noted that Stan ton offered no evidence that the substantial welfare
of the minor child necessitated a name change.
Because Curran objected to the name change, Stanton had the burden of proving by
clear and compelling evidence that the substantial welfare of the child nec essitated a name
change. Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 300–01. Stanton offered no evidence at trial detailing why
changing the child’s surname was in the child’s best interest, so the district court could
neither conduct a complete analysis of the relevant facto rs nor find any clear and
compelling reasons to support a name change. Given the absence of such evidence in the
record, the district court’s determination that there were no clear and compelling reasons
for the name change was not clearly erroneous. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Stanton’s request to change the minor child’s surname.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that, without
modification until the minor child attains the age of eight, Stanton’s parenting
time will be supervised.

Stanton argues that the district court clearly erred by granting him parenting time
only in a high sup ervision setting without modification until the minor child reaches age
eight. “The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting-time issues and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72,
75 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotations omitted). In deciding parenting time issues, a district
court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence
or if it misapplies the law. Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We
view “the record in the light most fa vorable to the [district] court’ s findings.” Vangsness
v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). A district court’s findings of fact
will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735
(Minn. 1978). This court defers to the district court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow
v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2018), the district court shall “grant such
parenting time on behalf of the child and a parent as will enable the child and the parent to
maintain a child to parent relationship that will be in the best interests of the child. ”
“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is entitled to receive a minimum of 25
percent of the parenting time for the child.” Id., subd. 1(g) (2018). If “parenting time with
a parent is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s
emotional development, the cour t shall restrict par enting time with that parent as to time,
place, duration, or supervision and may deny parenting time entirely, as the circumstances

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warrant.” Id., subd. 1(b) (2018 ). “It is well established that the ultimate question in all
disputes over [parenting time] is what is in the best interest of the child.” Clark v. Clark,
346 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. June 12, 1984).
The district court awarded sole physical custody of the minor child to Curran and
ordered Stanton’s parenting time to be in a high-supervision setting until the child reaches
age eight. The district court found that based upon the record, including the reports and
testimony of the experts, unsupervised parenting time with Stanton would endanger the
minor child’s physical or emotional health and would likely impair the child’s emotional
development. In making this finding, the district court specifically considered Stanton’s
“unilateral decision to stop parenting time” and his “expulsion from his AA [c]hapter.”
The district court also highlighted Stanton’s inability to “sustain and nurture his
relationship with [the child] or curb his own worst tendencies,” even while under the
scrutiny of the court. Additionally, the district court noted that Stanton’s unlicensed “sober
lodge” business operations support its concerns about Stanton’s judgment and ability to
safely parent the child. The district court also found that Stanton’s “failure to exercise
parenting time for three months affects issues relating to how parenting time will occur
going forward,” and that a high degree of supervisory services was in the best interests of
the child.
Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion by making findings of fact
that are not supported by the record. He contends that the district court gave “little regard
to the evidence presented in support of [Stanton’s] request for equal and unrestricted
parenting time.”

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The district court’s detailed findings are supported by ample evidence in the record.
In her thorough child custody and parenting time evaluation, the parenting time evaluator
recommended that Stanton have supervised parenting time with the minor child with an
option to “motion the [c]ourt for unsupervised parenting t ime after [the child] reaches the
age of 7.” She cited police reports indicating that “[the minor child] was present in the
house when Mr. Stanton screamed and threw things at Ms. Curran.” The parenting time
evaluator expressed “serious concerns about Mr . Stanton’s ability to adequately monitor
[the minor child] in an unsupervised setting.” She also noted that Stanton “repeatedly
verbally and emotionally abused Ms. Curran” in the presence of the child, “showing no
concern about the distress” this caused the child. The parenting time evaluator summarized
Stanton’s relationship with Curran as “one of coercive controlling violence,” and opined
that he minimizes the secondhand abuse that the child experienced by living in the home.
She stated that “it does not appear that [Stanton] has taken responsibility for his actions.”
She also raised “serious doubts about [Stanton’s] ability to care for the child without
supervision” due to “coercive controlling violence and longstanding patterns of antisocial
behavior.”
Similarly, the psychological evaluator reported that Stanton’s “history is marked by
a violation of common societal norms, and raises concern about whether he is capable of
dealing with the day to day demands of caring for a young child.” She also no ted that
Stanton’s inability “to control his verbally abusive tirades in front of [the minor child], ”
raised “concern about his capacity for self-control.” The psychological evaluator indicated
that Stanton “showed elevations on verbal expression (lashing out in verbal attacks) and

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retaliation (acting in ways to subvert persons he believes have betrayed him)” on an
instrument used to evaluate anger disorders. Additionally, she reported that Stanton
consistently downplayed his “troubling history of assault ive behavior,” which included
“incidents with Ms. Curran, and prior verbal altercations with various persons that resulted
in police involvement.”
Two of Stanton’s own family members, Stanton’s sister and stepdaughter, also
testified as to Stanton’s violen t past. Specifically, his sister testified about a time when
Stanton “grabbed [their] mom from behind and was holding a scissors to her neck.” She
also testified that she remembered Stanton “pushing his wife and a lot of screaming” during
Stanton’s prior marriage.
His stepdaughter testified that Stanton once “got angry,” threw a pot or pan at her
leg, and “broke the blood vessels” in her leg. She also testified about a time during a family
Christmas event when she had to prevent the minor child, who was not yet skilled at
climbing stairs, from walking up the stairs because she did not “believe [her] dad was
watching [the child].” She further testified about a time when Stanton “slammed the door”
on her when “he had [her mom] by the neck in the corner of the room up against a wall.”
The record is replete with instances of Stanton’s inability to curb his volatile,
violent, and abusive tendencies in the presence of children, as well as of his otherwise
irresponsible behavior. Although he testified that he h as been sober for 18 years, Stanton
is a recovering alcoholic. Stanton did not dispute Curran’s testimony that he never had
responsibility for the minor child’s care overnight without another adult present. Shortly
before the dissolution trial, after a woman asserted that Stanton made unwelcome sexual

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advances toward her while physically blocking her from leaving a room , Stanton’s
Alcoholics Anonymous group obtained a notice of trespass against him to exclude him
from the premises. Further, Stanton admitted that he runs his sober lodge program in his
home without zoning approval, formal training, licensure, or medical supervision. He also
admitted that he has purchased and provided alcohol to an individual as part of the home
detoxification program. This evidence in the record supports the district court’s findin gs
that (1) unsupervised parenting time with Stanton would endanger the minor child’s
physical or emotional health and would likely impair the child’s emotional developme nt,
and (2) a high degree of supervisory services was in the best interests of the child.
The record indicates that the district court’s findings were supported by the evidence
and were not clearly erroneous and that the district court properly applied the law by
considering the best interests of the minor child. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by ordering Stanton’s parenting time to be in a highly supervised setting until
the child attains the age of eight, which will occur in November 2022.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in defining the scope of the
parenting consultant’s duties and responsibilities.

Stanton argues that the district court exceeded the authority given to it by the parties’
stipulation in establishing the powers and limitations of the limited -scope parenting
consultant. Courts favor the use of stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of
simplifying and expediting litigation. Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997).
As a result, stipulations are accorded the sanctity of binding contracts. Id. The
interpretation of stipulations in a dissolution judgment is a question of law subject to de

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novo review, and we do not defer to the district court’ s interpretation of a stipulat ed
provision in a dissolution decree. Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. App.
2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008). We construe a stipulation using the ordinary
rules of contract interpretation. Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 28 1 (Minn. App.
2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). “We review the language of a contract to
determine the intent of the parties.” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820
N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 2012). When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguo us,
we construe it according to its plain meaning. Starr v. Starr, 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (1977).
The parties agreed, in a post -trial stipulation, that the district court had authority to
appoint a parenting consultant and to determine the po wers of the consultant. Stanton
argues that the district court exceeded the authority given to it by the parties’ stipulatio n
“by rubber-stamping the limited scope proposed by [r]espondent’s counsel.” But the plain
language of the parties’ stipulation pla ces no limits on the district court’s authority to
determine the powers of the parenting consultant. The parties clearly expressed their intent
to give the district court “the power to determine the authorities (and limitations thereon)
of the [p]arenting [c]onsultant.” The district court exercised its broad authority by
appointing a limited-scope parenting consultant, which falls within the power granted to it
by the parties’ stipulation. The district court’s appointment also followed the
recommendation of the parenting time evaluator who testified that the appointment of a
parenting consultant with broad powers would create opportunities for Stanton to engage
with Curran in ways that could be harmful.

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Because the district court acted within the scope of the power given to it by the
parties’ stipulation, it did not abuse its discretion in defining the scope of the parenting
consultant’s duties and responsibilities.
IV. The evidence in the record sustains the district court’s determinations that
certain items were marital property.

Stanton challenges the district court’s determination that the parties’ homestead,
their joint signature Wells Fargo account, and a Honda motorcycle were marital property.
Appellate courts independently review whether property is marital or nonmarital, bu t in
doing so must defer to the district court’s finding of fact. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797,
800 (Minn. 1997). A district court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous “if we are left with
the definite and firm convicti on that a mistake has been made . . . notwithstanding the
existence of evidence to support such findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
All property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be marital; property acquired
before the marriage is nonmarital. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2018) ; Antone v.
Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100–01 (Minn. 2002). To overcome the presumption that property
acquired during a marriage is marital, a party must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is nonmarital. Baker v. Baker , 753 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn.
2008). Nonmarital property includes property acquired during a marriage that was a gift
made by a third party to one spouse only. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2018).
“The most important factor in determining whether a gift is marital or nonmarital is
the donor’s intent.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. To constitute a valid gift inter vivos, the
donor must intend to make a gift, the property must be delivered, and the donor must

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absolutely dispose of the p roperty. Oehler v. Falstrom , 142 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1966).
“Although the issue of intent typically concerns whether the donor intended a gift at all, it
logically follows that the identity of the donee also turns on the donor’s intent.” Olsen,
562 N.W.2d at 800. Questions of intent are fact questions. Oehler, 142 N.W.2d at 585.
“Donative intent is demonstrated by the surrounding circumstances, including the form of
the transfer.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800.
The parties do not dispute that the homestead was purchased using proceeds from
the sale of a condominium, which was a gift from Stanton’s father, James Stanton. The
issue is whether the homestead was gifted to only Stanton, and not Curran, and is thus
properly classified as Stanton’s nonmarital property.
In this case, Stanton has the burden of proving the property was nonmarital. See
Baker, 753 N.W.2d at 649. Stanton argues that the parties’ homestead and their joint
signature Wells Fargo account were his nonmarital property because they were purchased
or funded with proceeds from the sale of the condominium, which Stanton claimed was
solely his nonmarital property. To support his argument that this property was his
nonmarital property, Stanton cites the following evidence: ( 1) his father’s amended trust
document, (2) an affidavit by his father’s tax preparer, (3) evidence as to his father’s tax
planning intentions, and (4) a claim that his father suffered “a brain bleed stroke.” But the
record contains none of this evidence.
The record does, however, include the following evidence supporting Curran’s
argument that the property was marital: (1) a warranty deed transferring the condominium
and naming both parties as grantees, (2) James Stanton’s gift tax return identifying the

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parties as coequal donees of his gift, and (3) James Stanton’s own affidavit indicating that
he intended the condominium to be a joint gift to both parties, which was accepted into the
district court record by stipulation.
This evidence shows that the district court’s finding that James Stanton intended to
gift the condominium to both parties is not clearly erroneous . Since donative intent is the
most important factor in determining whether a gift is marital or nonmarital, we affirm the
district court’s determination that the condominium was marital property. Because Stanton
failed to show that the condominium was his nomarital property, his derivative claims that
the homestead and the Wells Fargo account are also his nonmarital property also fail. The
evidence in the record supports the district court’s rejection of Stanton’s nonmarital
property claims, and the district court did not err in determining that the parties’ homestead
and their joint signature Wells Fargo account were marital property.
Stanton also argues that the Honda motorcycle is his nonmarital property because
he purchased it using his retirement fund. However, Stanton made no claim that the
motorcycle was nonmarital property in his parenting/financial disclosure statement or at
trial. Because Stanton failed to show that the motorcycle was his nonmarital property, the
district court did not err in determining that it was marital property.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded r espondent
$200,000 in need-based and conduct-based attorney fees and costs.

Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Curran
$200,000 in need-based and conduct-based attorney fees.

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Stanton first challenges the district court’s award of $100,000 in need -based
attorney fees to Curran. In a marriage dissolution action, a district court “shall” award
need-based attorney fees where it finds that (1) the fees are necessary to a party’s good -
faith claim “and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and ex pense of the
proceeding,” (2) the party from whom fees are sought has the means to pay, and (3) the
party who seeks the fees does not have the means to pay them. Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd.
1 (2018). In determining a party’s ability to pay attorney fees, a court may consider a
party’s nonmarital property. See Berenberg v. Berenberg, 474 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Minn.
App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1991). We review the district court’s decision
to award need-based attorney fees for an abuse of discret ion. Schallinger v. Schallinger ,
699 N.W.2d 15, 24 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).
In its analysis of need -based attorney fees and costs, the district court considered
the statutory elements outlined in Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd . 1. Concerning the first
element, the district court found Curran’s attorney fees and costs of $242,096.59 “to have
been reasonable and necessary in order to allow [her] to carry on this proceeding, to pursue
her own legitimate and appropriate requests a nd to defend against positions, often
unreasonable and unsupported by the facts or law, pursued by [Stanton].” The district court
based its assessment upon a long list of facts, concluding that (1) Curran’s counsel’s hourly
rate of $400 was reasonable; an d (2) “given the relative number of hours devoted by each
billing attorney to that attorney’s client between February 2017 [and] February 2019 (468
hours for Stanton and 352 for Curran), there is no legitimate question that can be raised as
to the reasonableness of [Curran]’s fees.”

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Regarding the second element of Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, the district court
found that despite Stanton’s unemployment, he “is in a unique position to make a
substantial contribution to [Curran’s] fees . . . due to the fact that there is no dispute that he
is on the brink of receiving, within very short order, an inheritance in the neighborhood of”
$4 million to $4.5 million. In assessing Stanton’s ability to pay Curran’s attorney fees, the
district court also considered “the sizable savings [Stanton] experienced by being charged
only $175 per hour by his attorney for the bulk of this proceeding” and “the fact that
[Stanton] is entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital homestead.”
Turning to the third element of Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, the district court found
that Curran “is in need of a substantial contribution” from Stanton to cover the fees and
costs she incurred over the course of the proceedings. The district court also found that “it
would be utterly un fair and inequitable to allow [Curran] to exit this proceeding heavily
encumbered [by] the debt she has had to incur to pay the fees and the loss of her premarital
asset (the $41,000.00 owed to her by her first husband, which funds were used to pay fees
in this proceeding), while allowing [Stanton] to exit this proceeding a millionaire.”
The district court’s findings are supported by abundant evidence in the record.
Curran submitted three separate affidavits detailing the $170,000 she had already paid in
attorney fees and costs throughout the domestic abuse and dissolution proceedings.
Although Curran made payments on this bill through June 2019, these payments were only
made possible by Curran incurring debt totaling $72,599.15, using funds owed to her by
her ex-husband as her share of the marital property, and taking distributions from the
parties’ Wells Fargo dual signature account. This evidence supports the district court’s

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finding that Curran does not have the ability to pay her attorney fees and cos ts using her
limited income.
In contrast, Stanton acknowledged at trial that he would soon receive an inheritance
of $4 million to $4.5 million. Per the district court’s judgment and decree, he is to also
receive one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ marital homestead. Finally,
an affidavit submitted by Stanton’s previous counsel indicates that Stanton paid his
previous counsel $175 per hour in attorney fees until October 2018, which is a significant
discount from that attorney’s standard rate of $350 per hour. This evidence supports the
district court’s finding that Stanton does have the ability to pay Curran’s attorney fees.
Stanton also challenges the district court’s award of $100,000 in conduct -based
attorney fees to Curran. A dist rict co urt may also impose conduct -based attorney fees
“against a party who unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding. ”
Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 . Conduct-based attorney fees may be “based on the impact
a party’s behavior has had on the costs of the litigation regardless of the relative financial
resources of the parties.” Dabrowski v. Dabrowski , 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App.
1991). We review an award of conduct -based attorney fees for an abuse of discretio n.
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007).
In its decision to award Curran conduct -based attorney fees, the district court cited
another long list of considerations: (1) Stanton’s “failure to timely participate in the custody
evaluation” and repeated requests for continuances of the final trial; (2) Stanton’s failure
to “concede significant issues until trial,” despite the district court’s observation “that he
had no true good faith basis for challenging such matters”; (3) the “unnecessary amount of

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time” Stanton spent “challenging and cross -examining the jointly-commissioned neutral
experts whose reports [Stanton] had” for almost a year; (4) Stanton’s repeated objections
that lacked specificity or any reference to the applicable rules of evidence or law; (5)
Stanton’s failure to meet deadlines throughout the course of the proceedings; and (6)
Stanton’s failure to provide material testimony or evidence on heavily contested issues.
Curran’s counsel submitted affidavits, which are part of the record, met iculo usly
detailing instances in which Stanton’s behavior lengthened proceedings and made them
more expensive. For example, Stanton’s counsel objected to nearly all of more than 130
exhibits proposed by Curran, including the parties’ tax returns, the part ies’ checking
account statements, and documents relating to the sale of property. In the objection letter,
Stanton’s counsel referenced no rules of evidence or legal authority. Curran’s counsel
stated that she had to spend an “extraordinary amount of time” by preparing a 33 -page table
that detailed responses to each objection. Curran’s counsel also noted that she incurred
additional attorney time in responding to the “spurious objections” to her proposed
witnesses by Stanton’s counsel. This evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that
Stanton unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding.
The district court can consider the entire record when making a determination on an
award of attorney fees. See Moore v. Moore , 734 N. W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. App. 2007),
review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007). Viewing the record as a whole, the district court
determined that it was reasonable for Stanton to pay Curran $200,000 in attorney fees.
Because the district court based its award on detailed findings of fact supported by the

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record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding need -based or conduct -
based attorney fees to Curran.
VI. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that $50,000 be
sequestered from Stanton’s estate to secure payment of future child support.

Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered that
$50,000 be sequestered from his estate to secure future child support payments. A court
may require an obligor to provide sufficient security to ensure payment of child support or
spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2018). We review the district court’s
decision to impose a security requirement for an abuse of discretion, which can occur when
the district court resolves a discretionary question in a manner “that is against logic and the
facts on record.” Hunley v. Hunley, 757 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotatio n
omitted). When addressing whether to require security for an obligor’s obligation, the
district court may consider such factors as age, work experience, earning capacity, and any
other relevant circumstance. Kampf v. Kampf , 732 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Minn. App. 2007),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007).
The district court found that it was “fair and appropriate” to sequester $50,000 from
the sales proceeds of Stanton’s estate “in light of the extraordinarily high conflict in this
case, [Stanton’s] accumulated arrearages, the fact that [Stanton] has demonstrated no effort
to obtain remunerative employment or to engage in any other activities that would . . .
provide him with an income source from which child support could be collected.” Stanton
does not dispute that he did not make his child support payments and child related expenses
in April or May of 2019. Instead, he argues that his life insurance policy provided adequate

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security for his child support obligations, but the record did not show that any such life
insurance policy existed at the time of trial.
Because the district court’s determination that it was “fair and appropriate” to
sequester $50,000 from the sales proceeds of Stanton’s estate was based on numero us
findings of fact supported by the record evidence, the district court did not abuse its
discretion on this issue.
VII. The district court did not abuse its discretion by retroactively ordering child
support.

Stanton challenges the district court’s retroactive child support award of $8,502 to
Curran. We will reverse a child support order if we conclude that the district court resolved
a discretionary question in a manner that is against logic and the facts on record. Putz v.
Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002).
Under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(f) (2018), “[a] modification of support or
maintenance . . . may be made retroactive only with respect to any period during which the
petitioning party has pending a motion for modification but only from the date of service
of notice of the motion.” That statute, which only pertains to modifications of orders or
decrees, is not implicated here.
Rather, the statute that controls this issue is Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5 (2018),
pertaining to the duration of temporary orders. While this statute does not explicitly
provide for retroactive child support orders, it does not in any way limit a court’s ability to
amend a temporary order by awarding retroactive child support in a final dissolution order,
In re J.M.K. , 507 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Minn. App. 1993), indicating only t hat a temporary

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order continues “in full force and effect until the earlier of its amendment or vacation,
dismissal of the main action or entry of a final decree of dissolution or legal separation. ”
Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5. Thus, under Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5, a district court
may, in its discretion, award retroactive child support by amending a temporary order in a
final dissolution order.
This conclusion is consistent with Minnesota case law. In Butt v. Schmidt , the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court did not err by failing to apply its
permanent child support order retroactively because the appellant failed to raise the issue
at any time during his dissolution proceedings, but also acknowledged that the appellant
“could have moved to amend or vacate the temporary order anytime before the court
entered its final decree, and if he had done so, the modification statute would have allowed
for retroactive application.” 747 N.W.2d 566, 579 (Minn. 2008). The supreme court
focused its analysis on the modification of orders and decrees pursuant to motions for
modification, but did not reach the issue of whether or not Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5,
limits a court’s ability to amend a temporary order by awarding retroactive chil d support
in a final dissolution order. See id. Similarly, in In re J.M.K. , we quoted Minn. Stat.
§ 518.131, subd. 5, to support our conclusion that while courts may not impose retroactive
child support pursuant to motions to show cause, such obligations may be imposed under
Minn. Stat. § 518.131, subd. 5 . 507 N.W.2d at 461.
Minnesota case law also supports a conclusion that a retroactive child support award
may cover the period of time between the parties’ separation and the district court’s original
temporary order setting child support. Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 710–11 (Minn. App.

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1996) (allowing the district court to award child support retroactiv ely by considering all
payments made since the parties’ separation); see also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303,
305 (Minn. 1981) (holding that “a parent’s obligation to support his child commences with
the child’s birth”). In Korf, we recognized that Jacobs “cannot be used to claim that
retroactive child support can go back years and years,” and that a district court generally
“may not order retroactive child support for dates prior to the commencement of an action
under chapter 518.” Korf, 553 N.W.2d at 710. However, we also clarified that the district
court is still “free to apply the Jacobs admonition that a parent’s child support
responsibilities begin at the child’s birth” by ordering retroactive child support dating back
to the parties’ date of sepa ration in a final decree. Id. The district court ordered Stanton
to pay $8,502 in equitable child support reimbursement to Curran for the period between
April 2017, the first full month of the parties’ separation and the month after the parties’
second d issolution proceeding commenced , and May 1, 2018, the effective date of
Stanton’s temporary basic support obligation. The district court found this amount to be
“fair and equitable” based on its findings supported by the record that (1) Stanton “provided
no support for the benefit of the minor child through any other mechanism” during the
period at issue, and (2) Stanton “made no contribution to maintaining the marital asset of
the homestead” during that same period.
Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion by not considering that
(1) he paid many of Curran’s expenses pending a final disposition, and (2) the district court
ordered him to “continue payments for home maintenance, property tax, property
insurance, and home association” fees , despite being excluded from the homestead.

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However, there is no evidence in the record that Stanton made any such payments toward
homestead expenses, and he did not object to Curran’s testimony that he made no
contribution to her expenses or those of th e minor child prior to the issuance of the district
court’s August 6, 2018 temporary order. Also, Stanton’s inheritance would provide him
more than enough funds to pay $8,502 in equitable child support.
Because this case does not involve a motion for mod ification, the district court was
free to amend its temporary order in its final dissolution order by awarding retroactive child
support for the time period dating back to the parties’ separation. Given the evidence in
the record supporting the district c ourt’s findings, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by retroactively ordering Stanton to pay $8,502 in child support to Curran.
VIII. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordere d Stanton to
reimburse Curran for supervised parenting time paid for by Curran.

Stanton argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Stanton
to reimburse Curran in the amount of $20,000 for supervised parenting time paid for by
Curran. But we do not reach the merits of his argument here because we generally do not
consider arguments raised first on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1998). Stanton failed to raise and preserve his arguments on this issue by presenting them
to the district court, and his arguments on appeal are therefore forfeited.
IX. The issue of whether the district court preside d over the parties’ marriage
dissolution proceedings in a fair and impartial manner is not properly before
this court.

Stanton argues that the district court ju dge was biased against him, thereby
depriving him of a fair and impartial hearing. However, there is nothing in the record to

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suggest that Stanton challenged the impartiality of the district court presiding judicial
officer at any time prior to or during trial, or in his post-trial motion for amended findings.
Because Stanton did not raise this issue at the district court, is not properly before this court
for review, and we will not address it. See id.
Affirmed.