State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0215

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Vincent Pierce,
Appellant.

Filed June 28, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-14363

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition, appellant Steven Vin cent Pierce argues that (1) the evidence is
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insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed a firearm and
(2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were established durin g Pierce’s jury trial. One morning in
February 2019, officers of the Minneapolis Police Department responded to a report of an
unresponsive person inside of a pickup tr uck. Upon approaching the truck, officers
observed that the “vehicle was running, the driver’s side window was rolled approximately
halfway down,” and Pierce, sitting upright, “appeared to be sleeping” in the driver’s seat.
No other occupants were inside the truck, and its doors were locked. After unlocking the
door through the open window, officers opened the door and took hol d of Pierce’s wrists
to remove him from the car. Although officer s had removed the keys from the truck’s
ignition, Pierce grabbed at the truck’s gearshift, apparently attempting to put the truck in
gear. Officers were ultimately able to remove Pierce from the truck. They observed that he
seemed to be in an “altered [mental] state” and began to lose consciousness so they called
for emergency medical personnel. Responding emergency personnel informed the officers
that a firearm was located on the driver’s side floor pan of the truck. An officer retrieved
the firearm and determined that it had two bullets in its magazine and one in its chamber.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Pier ce with being an ineligible person in
possession of a firearm or ammun ition, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2018). The firearm, cartridges, and magazine were all swabbed, but none contained
sufficient DNA to perform a DNA test. Similarl y, no useful “ridge impression[s]” were
found for purposes of a fingerpri nt comparison. At trial, the parties stipulated to Pierce’s
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ineligibility to possess a firear m. The jury found Pierce gu ilty, and the district court
imposed the presumptive sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.
Pierce appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Pierce knowingly possessed the firearm
found in the truck.

Pierce argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasona ble doubt that he
knowingly possessed the firearm that officers found in the truck. When an appellant claims
that the state failed to satisfy its burden of proving the elements of a crime, an appellate
court conducts “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors
to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted).
To convict Pierce, the jury had to determ ine that he was an ineligible person and
“possess[ed]” ammunition or a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Possession of a
firearm may be either actual or constructive. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn.
2015). To establish constructive possession of a firearm, the state must demonstrate either
that “the prohibited item was found in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to which
other people did not normally have access,” or that, “if the prohibited item was found in a
place to which others had access, there is a strong probability . . . that defendant was at the
time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. (quotation omitted). In either
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instance, the state must prove that the defendant’s possession of a firearm is knowing. Id.
at 161.
Pierce does not allege that the evidence is insufficient to establish his possession of
a firearm or ammunition or that he was ine ligible to possess a firearm or ammunition.
Instead, he contests only whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that he knowingly
possessed the firearm.
Knowledge, as a state of mind, is generally proved through circumstantial evidence.
State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 4 73 (Minn. 2010). A conviction based on
circumstantial evidence is subj ect to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 474. Appellate courts
analyze the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence through a two-step analysis. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 598. First, we identify the circumstances proved. See id. In doing so, we
“defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence
in the record that conflicted with th e circumstances proved by the State.” Id. at 598-99
(quotations omitted). Similarly, we “consider only those circumstances that are consistent
with the verdict.” Id. at 599.
Next, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotations
omitted). At this step, we do not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.
See Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d at 474. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, “the circumstances must form a complete chain whic h, in light of the evidence
as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572,
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581 (Minn. 2007) (quotation om itted). Accordingly, if there is any rational hypothesis of
innocence, the evidence is insufficient and we must overturn the conviction. See Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 474.
The circumstances proved in this case in clude that officers found Pierce in the
driver’s seat of a locked, running truck, in which he was the sole occupant. When officers
attempted to remove Pierce from the truck, he tried to engage the vehicle to drive. After
his removal from the truck, emergency personnel located a loaded firearm in plain view at
the foot of the driver’s seat.
Pierce argues that the circumstances proved do not give rise to the rational inference
that he knew that the firearm was in the vehicle or that they at least give rise to the rational
inference that he did not know that the firearm was in the vehicle. He contends that the
firearm’s proximity and his access to it are not enough to demonstrate knowing possession,
and that, given his “altered state of mind” when officers found him in the truck, he may not
have noticed the firearm. Pierce emphasizes the fact that the state did not prove ownership
of the truck, the firearm, or any other item within the truck and points to the absence of any
evidence as to whether he would have seen the firearm when he first got into the truck. We
are not persuaded.
As the state observes, the circumstances of this case are similar to the facts
underlying this court’s decision in State v. Smith , 619 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. App. 2000),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). In Smith, law enforcement located the defendant
“slumped over in the driver’s seat of an automobile with the driver’s side door locked and
the engine running.” Id. at 768. The defendant “appear ed to be asleep,” and law
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enforcement located a handgun on the driver’s seat. Id. Fingerprint testing of the firearm
was insufficient to establish a match with the defendant. Id. at 769. The defendant did not
own but was renting the vehicle in which he was found, and, the day before his arrest, he
had “smoked crack” and consumed alcohol before falling asleep in the vehicle. Id. The
state charged the defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm, and the defendant
argued at trial that he did not know the firearm was in the vehicle. Id. The jury found him
guilty, and, on review, we concluded that the fact that the defendant was found “alone and
asleep in a partly locked vehicle, engine running, with a handgun partially beneath his right
leg is sufficient to find the defendant possessed a firearm.” Id. at 772. Here, Pierce was
found alone in a locked truck, engine running, with a firearm in plain view at his feet. We
see no reason to conclude that the firearm’s location at Pierce ’s feet, rather than on the
driver’s seat, should dictate a different result than in Smith.
Pierce argues, though, that it is a reasonable inference that the firearm started under
the driver’s seat when he entered the truck and, without Pierce’s knowledge, shifted to
Pierce’s feet while the truck was in motion. However, although its engine was running, the
truck was parked when Pierce was found. Th e proposition that, while Pierce was driving
the truck, the firearm shifted from under the s eat to its place at Pi erce’s feet without his
noticing it is conjecture based on no evidence. This court will not overturn a conviction
based on mere speculation. See State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted).
We conclude that the circumstances of th is case, when viewed as a whole, are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence.
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II. The prosecutor did not commit reversible plain error in closing argument.
Pierce argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial plain error by informing the
jury during closing arguments that persons conv icted of crimes of violence are ineligible
to possess a firearm or ammunition, despite the parties’ stipulation that Pierce is ineligible.
He contends the prosecutor then directed the jury to speculate as to why he was ineligible
by telling them that “there’s a reason” the law does not allow certain people to possess
firearms, and that both statements affected his substantial rights.
In turn, the state argues that the prosecutor’s statements were not error when read in
context. Additionally, it contends that the prosecutor’s statements did not misstate the law
or the admissible evidence.
Because Pierce failed to object during the prosecutor’s closing argument, his claim
of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed under a modified plain-error standard. See State v.
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under that standard, Pierce bears the burden
of establishing an error that is plain. See id. If Pierce establishes plain error, the state then
has the burden to show that Pierce’s substantial rights were not affected. See id. If the state
fails to meet its burden, we will order a new trial only if the error “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public repu tation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Peltier , 874
N.W.2d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Pierce’s argument centers on the following portion of the state’s closing argument:
[Prosecutor]: What [the district court] has just given you about
this charge is the law. He’s de scribed to you the definition of
this crime which says whoever has been convicted of a crime
of violence and possesses or receives a firearm or ammunition
is guilty of a crime.
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Later stating:
[Prosecutor]: We talked in ju ry selection about guns being
serious, being violent.

And, on rebuttal:
[Prosecutor]: We have laws th at prohibit certain people from
possessing firearms, and there’s a reason for those.

Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor’s statements constituted plain error,
we turn to the question of whether the state has satisfied its burden of establishing that
Pierce’s substantial rights were not affected. To do so, the state must show that there is “no
reasonable likelihood” the misconduct significantly affected the verdict. Ramey, 721
N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). In evaluating whether the state has met its burden, this
court considers “the strength of evidence against the defe ndant, the pervasiveness of
improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts
to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Minn. 2010).
First, the state’s evidence, although circum stantial, was particularly strong. Pierce
was found asleep in the driver’s seat of a locked, running truc k, in which he was the sole
occupant. Soon after officers unlocked the tr uck and removed Pierce from it, emergency
personnel saw the loaded firearm in plain view on the driver’s-side floor pan of the truck.
And Pierce stipulated that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. In sum, the state presented
strong evidence that Pierce was ineligible and possessed ammunition or a firearm.
Second, the prosecutor’s statements were not pervasive, constituting three sentences
of the prosecutor’s 13-page closing arguments.
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Finally, Pierce did not address in his clos ing argument the prosecutor’s statement
pertaining to persons convicted of violent cr imes, but we cannot say that Pierce had, but
ignored, a meaningful opportunity to rebut the improper suggestion because addressing it
may have only highlighted it. And Pierce did not have th e opportunity to rebut the
prosecutor’s statement that there is a “reaso n” individuals are ineligible from possessing
firearms because the statement was made during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument.
Nevertheless, the district court mitigated the effect of the prosecutor’s comments by
instructing the jury that “[t] he law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy,
prejudice, or public opinion.” See State v. Hawkins , 511 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Minn. 1994)
(determining that instructions “lessened the impact of the improper comments”).
Considering all three factors, we conc lude that the state met its burden to
demonstrate that the prosecutor’s statements in closing arguments di d not affect Pierce’s
substantial rights.
Affirmed.