In the Matter of: Holly Elizabeth Often, o/b/o Minor Children, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0217

In the Matter of: Holly Elizabeth Often, o/b/o Minor Children, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathan Marsh Dornquast,
Appellant.

Filed August 3, 2020
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-DA-FA-19-1485

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-20-1154

Eva F. Wailes, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Eric C. Nelson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant father challenges the district court’s order granting the respondent
mother’s petitio n for an order for protection (OFP ) on behalf of their two daughters.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by: (1) finding that his use of corporal

2
punishment constituted domestic assault against his daughters, (2) limiting evidence at the
OFP hearing of the daughters’ past misbehavior, and (3) issuing the OFP. For the first time
on appeal, appellant also argues that the district court violated his due process rights. We
affirm because the district court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion.
FACTS
The facts are mostly undisputed. Appellant Nathan Dornquast and respondent Holly
Often divorced in 2008 and thereafter shared legal and physical custody of their two
daughters. Sometime in 2018, Dornquast became concerned about the daughters’ alleged
drug use. During the fall of 2019, he was also concerned that the daughters were missing
school, their grades were declining, and one daughter had been caught with drug
paraphernalia in her backpack. Dornquast attempted va rious disciplinary measures,
including grounding the daughters and restricting visits with their friends.
On December 2, 2019, the daughters were together in a room at Dornquast’s house,
when he knocked on the door to ask a question. Upon opening the door, Dornquast smelled
marijuana and saw a vape charger. The daughters denied knowing anything about the vape
charger. Dornquast testified at the OFP hearing that he spent 15 minutes “begging” them
to confess then warned: “[Y]ou know we’ve talked about using the belt previously . . . . I
don’t want to have to do this but I will do it.”
Dornquast instructed the daughters to dress in underwear and meet him in the guest
bedroom. He testified to the district court that he “whacked” his hand with the belt a few
times, “making sure they could hear it” and “trying to find some point where it could sting

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without really hurting.” He did not want to “get laughed at” but also wanted to “cause a
sting with a snap.”
Dornquast instructed his daughters to bend over the bed. He testified that he “gave
them each a little whack with the belt.” The older daughter told the younger daughter to
“come clean,” and Dornquast proceeded to “whack” the younger daughter again, ultimately
hitting her with the belt a total of four to five times. During the incident, the daughters felt
“scared.” The belt left swollen red lines across each daughter’s behind, which developed
into bruises over the following days.
The younger daughter then admitted that the vape charger belonged to her, and
Dornquast found additional vaping paraphernalia in her backpack. He told the younger
daughter to stand on the bed, photographed the marks on her behi nd, and forwarded the
photograph by text to Often. He admits that he then “whacked” the younger daughter on
the face.
Often moved the district court for an OFP on behalf of her daughters. At the
evidentiary hearing, Dornquast argued that his use of force was a justifiable disciplinary
measure. The district court disagreed, finding that Dornquast had “committed acts of
domestic violence against [both of the daughters].” The district court explained:
It is clear both from the testimony of the girls, which I find to
be completely credible, as well as the photographic evidence
that Mr. Dornquast in striking the children with a leather belt
went well beyond any form of corporal pun ishment that is
allowed either by statute or case law . . . causing injury to both
girls. There [are] visible welts, raised skin, swelling, and
bruising on the site of the injuries . . . . That is not discipline,
that is abuse.

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The district court “did not find [Dornquast’s] description of his use of force to be credible.”
The district court further found “that both of the girls are of slight stature” and the strikes
they received went beyond “moderate discipline.”
Based on it s findings, the district court issued an OFP for two years. The OFP
prohibited Dornquast from contact with either daughter except, upon completion of
parenting education, weekly four-hour supervised visits. At the hearing, when Dornquast’s
attorney stated that “whatever is ordered here today on a temporary basis could be modified
in family court,” the district court responded affirmatively. Dornquast did not object to the
parameters of the district court’s order at the hearing or request a more lenient order, such
as a reduced length of time that the OFP would remain in effect. Dornquast now appeals
the OFP.
D E C I S I O N
Given the nature of Dornquast’s arguments , we first emphasize the principles that
govern our review. As an appellate court, our purp ose is to correct errors, not retry cases.
See Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House , 276 N.W.2d 63, 68 n.2 (Minn. 1979) (“The
purpose of appellate review is to determine whether the trial court made an error and not
to try the case de novo. ”). We do not re weigh the evidence or find new facts . Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
I. The district court did not commit clear error when it found that father
had committed domestic abuse.

Dornquast’s primary argument is that his use of force was reasonable and, therefore,
the district court’s finding of domestic abuse was clearly erroneous. The findings

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underlying a decision to issue an OFP are reviewed for clear error. Gada v. Dedefo, 684
N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2 004). We view the record in the light most favorable to
the findings and will reverse those findings only if “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009). We give considerable deference to the district court’s findings on
witness credibility. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
The Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act provides that an OFP may be issued if domestic
abuse has occurred. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4 (2018). “Domestic abuse” includes
“physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” as well as “the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” Id., subd. 2(a) (2018). Ample ca selaw has
affirmed findings of domestic abuse on facts similar to those presented by this record. See
Aljubailah ex rel. A.M.J. v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 642–43 (Minn. App. 2017) (affirming
finding of domestic abuse and issuance of an OFP when a father admitted striking his son
with a belt and photographs showed bruising); Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 63, 66
(Minn. App. 2015) (affirming OFP based on two incidents of spanking); Gada, 684
N.W.2d at 515 (affirming an OFP based on testimony that father kicked mother in the back
and twisted her arm).
It is undisputed that Dornquast struck both of his daughters with a leather belt,
leaving visible welts, raised skin, and swelling. Both daughters testified that they felt
“scared” during the incident. Dornquast admitted that he wanted the belt to “sting.”
Although he testified that he did not intend for his actions to cause injury, the district court

6
did not find this testimony to be credible. Dornquast has not shown that the district court’s
findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
Dornquast argues that he is entitled to a defense of the authorized use of force
provided in the criminal code. Minnesota criminal statutes state that “reasonable force may
be used upon or toward the person of another . . . when used by a parent . . . of a child . . .
in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct such child.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06,
subd. 1(6) (2018). But the district court expressly found that Dornquast’s use of force was
unreasonable.1 The district court expressly found that: (1) Dornquast’s actions were “not
justified as reasonable physical discipline,” (2) the “force used was not modera te but was
rather excessive,” (3) his actions “went well beyond any form of corporal punishment that
is allowed eithe r by statute or case law,” and (4) such actions constitute abuse, not
discipline. The district court found that Dornquast’s use of force was unreasonable under
the circumstances, and this finding is supported by the record.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the
evidence available at the OFP hearing.

Dornquast argues that the district court should not have limited evidence of the
daughters’ past misbehavior, contending that such evidence is relevant to the i ssue of

1 Before the district court, Dornquast cited In re Welfare of Children of N.F. to support the
proposition that his use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. 735 N.W.2d 735, 738–
39 (Minn. App. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part , 749 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2008) . The
district court distinguished N.F. because the daughters are of slight statute, in contrast to
the 195 -pound children described in N.F., and the discipline imposed by appellant was
more severe than the discipline at issue in N.F. See N.F., 7 35 N.W.2d at 737, 739
(describing spankings with a wooden paddle using “moderate force” with no evidence of
injury in a juvenile protection proceeding). The parties do not cite N.F. on appeal.

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whether his use of force was reasonable. He also raised this objection at the evidentiary
hearing.
“District courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence on a number of
grounds, including relevance. ” Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 7 64, 788 (Minn. 2014) .
“[T]his court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling unless it is based on an erroneous view
of the law or is an abuse of that discretion.” Aljubailah ex rel. A. M. J., 903 N.W.2d at 644.
The district court ruled: “You can focus on any misbehavior that occurred on
December 2nd or that weekend but we’re not going to . . . go through everything that’s
happened. We’re going to focus on the allegations in the petition and what is going on
there.” Accordingly, the district court exclude d school attendance records and testimony
that one of the daughters had stolen the keys to her grandmother’s condominium sometime
in early 2019.
Yet, the district court did allow substantial testimony regarding the girls’ behavior
over the fall semester of 2019, including testimony of marijuana use, absences from school
because of drug use, declining grades, and incidents in which one daughter was caught
with drug paraphernalia in her backpack. Thus, notwithstanding the district court’s ruling,
Dornquast elicited ample testimony to illustrate his concerns with his daughters’ alleged
drug use. He also elicited testimony regarding other disciplinary measures he had
attempted to use in the past. Even assuming that he was entitled to a reasonableness
defense—a proposition that he has not established —the record shows that any additional
evidence of past misbehavior would not have influenced the district court’s findings and
conclusions. See Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 788 (“In making its decision to exclude the evidence,

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the court effectively decided that the testimony would have no effect on its decision about
whether to issue the extended OFP.”).
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the OFP.

Dornquast further contends that, even if his actions qualify as domestic abuse, the
district court abused its discretion by issuing an OFP. However, his brief simply restates
his arguments that the district court should not have found domestic abuse, stating that he
had a “rational justification” for corporal punishment.
“We review a decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion. ” Thompson ex
rel. Minor Child v. Schrimsher , 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). “A district court
abuses its discretion if its findings are unsupported by the record o r if it misapplies the
law.” Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 98.
As set forth above, the district court’s findings are supported by the record.
Dornquast cites to no authority to show that the district court misapplied the law when it
issued an OFP after finding that Dornquast used unreasonable force against the daughters.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an
OFP.
IV. Dornquast has forfeited his due process argument.

Finally, Dornquast argues for the first time on appeal that the district court violated
his procedural and substantive due process rights because: (1) the district court did not
appoint a guardian ad litem2 and (2) the district court should have made more particularized

2 Chapter 518B does not expressly require appointment of a guardian ad litem for an OFP
proceeding. Dornquast relies on Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2 (2018), which governs

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findings to support its order. But Dornquast neither raised any due process argument before
the district court, requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem , nor challenged the
particularity of the findings before the district cour t. Constitutional issues may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. St. Aubin v. Burke, 434 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. App.
1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1989) . Moreover, Dornquast does not cite any
authority, or provide any analysis, to support his contention that the statute or the district
court’s application of the statute violated his due process rights in any specific respect. “A
party who inadequately briefs an argument waives that argument.” Brodsky v. Brodsky ,
733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007). Accordingly, we decline to address Dornquast’s
due process arguments.
Affirmed.

custody proceedings, but he does not explain why this requirement should apply to a
proceeding under Chapter 518B. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has distinguished
Chapter 518B from Chapter 518, Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 285–86 (Minn. 1992),
Dornquast presents a significant issue of statutory interpretation without providing any
analysis of the statutory language at issue. Although he cites cases issued by this court, all
of those cases were decided before the supreme court issued Baker. See J.E.P. v. J.C.P.,
432 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. App. 1988); Johnson v. Smith , 374 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. App.
1985).