State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0224

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Marcus Angelo Caples-Guerra,
Appellant.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-1433

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant argues that the
district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to inquire whether
it would be appropriate to appoint substitute counsel after granting appellant’s request to

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discharge his public defender. Because the dist rict court acted within its discretion when
it discharged appellant’s public defender without conducting such an inquiry, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Marcus Angelo Caples-Guerra in February 2019 with
first-degree aggravated robbery and simple robbery, both felony offenses. The complaint
alleged that he punched a man at a light-rail station and took money from the man’s wallet.
At Caples-Guerra’s first appearance, the dist rict court appointed a public defender to
represent him.
Caples-Guerra appeared before the distri ct court at an April 8, 2019 omnibus
hearing. At the hearing, defense counsel told the district court that Caples-Guerra intended
to plead not guilty and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. Defense
counsel also noted that he was “still missing some discovery” from the state, and that he
was working with the prosecutor’s office to get the missing di scovery. When the district
court asked counsel why he believed that probable cause was lacking, defense counsel said,
“I don’t have much of an argument there.” Caples-Guerra then interrupted and said, “Yes,
you do,” and indicated that he had “several things” he wanted to submit to the district court.
Defense counsel explained, “[Caples-Guerra] ha s some motions that he wanted to make
that I don’t believe there is a procedural basis for at this time. But, if he would like to make
them, I don’t have any issues.” Caples-Gue rra then submitted to the district court a
one-page document labeled “Motion to dismiss.” It listed two issues: (1) “Failed to be duly
arraigned,” and (2) “Prosecutorial misconduct. Suppression of evidence.” At the bottom,
the document declared, “This is an untimely motion due to incompetency by counsel.”

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During the hearing, the district c ourt addressed the concerns raised by
Caples-Guerra’s “[m]otion to dismiss.” Regarding the failu re-to-be-arraigned allegation,
the district court explained to Caples-Guerra that, because the charges against him were
felony charges, he would not be arraigned until after he entered a plea. The district court
further explained that he would enter a plea only after the district court made a
probable-cause determination. Next, the di strict court asked the prosecutor about the
suppression-of-evidence allegation. The prosec utor told the court, “[W]e have disclosed
all evidence that we have. And if there is mo re evidence in the futu re, then that will be
disclosed to the defense.” The district court then asked defense counsel about the motion’s
allegation of incompetency. Defense counsel responded:
Judge, I don’t know what to say about that. Me and
Mr. Caples-Guerra had a meeting at my office, maybe, two
weekends ago. I wasn’t aware that he had any intention for me
to raise . . . these motions . I’ve had several phone
conversations with him and in person. We did a full case
review.
Ah, he has disagreements, of course, on whether or not
certain things are procedurally applicable, and he feels his
rights have been violated. But, there isn’t a basis from which
I can raise an actual motion. So, this is just, so rt of, I think,
sentiments and resentment for the system.
The district court asked Caples-Guerra wh ether he was asking “that the [p]ublic
[d]efender’s [o]ffice be discharged from repres enting [him].” Caples-Guerra said that he
was not and that he still wanted an attorney. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district
court denied Caples-Guerra’s motion, concluding that it lacked merit, and found probable

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cause to support the charges in the complaint. Caples-Guerra then entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges.
Caples-Guerra next appeared before the district court at a pretrial hearing on May 2,
2019. Defense counsel noted that the light-ra il train video that was provided by the state
did not include video of the alleged incident. Defense counsel asked to continue the pretrial
hearing for one week so the prosecutor could review the video to determine whether the
state had provided the complete video.
Defense counsel then told the district court that Caples-Guerra no longer wanted to
be represented by him. The following excha nge occurred between the district court and
Caples-Guerra:
THE COURT: All right. You wa nt to discharge the public
defender?
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
THE COURT: And you intend to try to retain someone
privately?
THE DEFENDANT: Possibly not. No. Myself, yes.
THE COURT: To proceed representing yourself?
THE DEFENDANT: Prob—yes.
THE COURT: And so once I di scharge the public defender,
you’re pretty much done with that option of having a public
defender represent you. Is that something you want to do now
or you want to think about it a little bit further? Because
obviously you know that this is a serious charge, and I don’t
want you to talk about—
THE DEFENDANT: I have no c hoice but to discharge him,
so that’s what I will do.

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THE COURT: You want to do that today?
THE DEFENDANT: Right now, yes, sir.
The district court explained that there was still the issue of whethe r some of the video
evidence was missing, which would be addressed in a future pretrial hearing. The district
court noted that the state’s response might “change[] the landscape for possible resolution.”
The district court continued:
THE COURT: So that’s why I’m just sort of urging you to
consider the possibility of maintaining representation until you
have more certainty on what po tential offer there might be,
possibilities of resolution there might be.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I’m not sure if I can continue . . .
to . . . possibly test it as acquiescence that is happening, so I
don’t know if I’d be able to. I don’t want to go to trial . . . you
know, by myself, so I’m not sure.
THE COURT: Yeah, that’s—
THE DEFENDANT: -- but I have the right to a competent
attorney and that’s what I want , and he’s incompetent. And
so . . . my hands are tied behind my back as far as what I can
do. You know, every time I come to the clerk, I’m not able to
get any kind of evidence or anything . . . or have discovery now
that I want to give. I’m not ab le to do that . . . if I have
somebody representing—
THE COURT: That is not what the purpose of this hearing
is . . . for you to provide evidence. So—
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I would say that . . . once again,
the previous judge said both parties . . . must do disclosure per
Rule 9 and 7, and I’m doing my part to do so, and maybe
they’re not—
THE COURT: You would do that through your lawyer.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, sometim es he didn’t allow me to
do so.

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THE COURT: He’s got to oper ate under the rules. He’s an
officer of the court. He can’t—
THE DEFENDANT: Then he’s fired. He’s fired, Your Honor.
I have no choice. Yes, he’s discharged . . . .
Caples-Guerra then indicated that he had br ought a petition to procee d as pro se counsel
and that he wanted to proceed pro se. The district court went over the pro se petition with
Caples-Guerra, accepted the petition, and discharged the public defender.
One week later, the district court appo inted advisory counsel. After several
hearings, the state agreed to amend the comp laint to a single count of attempted simple
robbery and to dismiss the first-degree aggr avated-robbery and simple-robbery charges.
Caples-Guerra waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties agreed to submit the case to
the court for a trial on stipulated facts. Th e district court found Caples-Guerra guilty of
attempted simple robbery and sentenced hi m to 18 and one-half months in prison, a
presumptive sentence.
Caples-Guerra appeals.
DECISION
Caples-Guerra argues that th e district court violated his constitutional right to
counsel by accepting his request to discharge his public defender without conducting an
inquiry to determine whether to appoint substitute counsel. The state contends that the
district court acted within its discretion when it granted Caples-Guerra’s request to
discharge his attorney without conducting such an inquiry because there were no
exceptional circumstances warranting an inquiry, and the district court provided advisory
counsel to Caples-Guerra. We agree with the state.

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The United States Constitutio n and the Minnesota Cons titution both guarantee a
criminal defendant’s right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. An
indigent defendant has the right to compet ent counsel in all cr iminal proceedings.
State v. Vance, 254 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1977). But the right to counsel does not give
an indigent defendant an unlimited right to be represented by the attorney of his choosing.
Id.
When a defendant refuses to be represente d by a court-appointed public defender,
the district court is required to appoint substitute counsel “only if exceptional
circumstances exist.” State v. Worthy , 583 N.W.2d 270, 278 (M inn. 1998) (quotation
omitted) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request for
substitute counsel after both defendants “fired” their court-appointed attorneys because the
defendants failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances”). Exceptional circumstances
that warrant the appointment of substitute counsel are “those that affect a court-appointed
attorney’s ability or competence to represent the client.” State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440,
449 (Minn. 2001). On the other hand, a de fendant’s general diss atisfaction with his
attorney or disagreement about his attorney’s trial strategy do not rise to the level of
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 449-50. “When the defendant voices serious allegations
of inadequate representation, the district c ourt should conduct a s earching inquiry before
determining whether the defendant’s complain ts warrant the appointment of substitute
counsel.” State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d 569, 58 6 (Minn. 2013) (quo tation omitted). We
review a district court’s decision of whether to appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006).

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Caples-Guerra argues that the district c ourt erred by not conducting a “searching
inquiry” after he told the district court that he wanted to discharge his attorney. The district
court’s duty to inquire further is triggere d only when the defendant makes “serious
allegations of inadequate representation.” See Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 587. For example, in
Munt, the supreme court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing
to make an inquiry after the defendant compla ined about the effectiveness of his counsel
at a pretrial hearing. Id. at 586-87. The defendant told the district court that his attorneys
“didn’t represent [his] interest ” and “are not following the c ode of conduct that requires
them to be pursuing [his] objectives in the matter.” Id. at 586. The district court then
permitted the defense attorneys to confer with the defendant off the record, and, when he
returned, the defendant did not ra ise any additional complaints. Id. at 587. The supreme
court held that the defendant’s allegations against his attorneys were merely expressions of
dissatisfaction and did not constitute allegations of inadequate representation. Id. For this
reason, the supreme court concluded that the district court was not obligated to inquire
further to determine whether appointment of substitute counsel was necessary. Id.
Here, Caples-Guerra’s statements to the dist rict court, like the allegations at issue
in Munt, did not constitute serious allegations of inadequate representation. When he
“discharged” his attorney at the May 2, 2019 pretrial hearing, Caples-Guerra told the
district court that he had “no choice but to discharge him” and that “he’s incompetent.”
These comments were merely general allegati ons that his attorney was not doing a good
job. Caples-Guerra did not explain how his attorney was incompetent or specify how his
attorney was failing to represent him adequately. Similar to the defendant’s statements in

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Munt, Caples-Guerra’s statements to the distri ct court were generalized expressions of
dissatisfaction with his attorney . They were not the type of allegations that required the
district court to conduct a searching inquiry.
Moreover, the record does not support Caples-Guerra’s contention that his attorney
was incompetent. At the time he discharged his attorney, he told the district court, “[E]very
time I come to the clerk, I’m not able to get any kind of evidence or anything,” and he
complained that his attorney was not allowing him to disclose evidence. When the district
court explained that defense c ounsel had to follow court rule s, Caples-Guerra responded,
“Then he’s fired. He’s fired, Your Honor. I have no choice.” This exchange shows that
Caples-Guerra was upset that his attorney wa s not taking certain actions that were not
allowed under the rules of criminal procedur e. These statements do not suggest that
defense counsel failed to adequately represent him.
Caples-Guerra’s actions and statements at the April 8, 2019 omnibus hearing—
roughly one month before he “fired” his attorney—provide additional context that further
diminishes the notion that Caples-Guerra’s attorney was incompetent. Caples-Guerra, on
his own, submitted a “[m]otion to dismiss” to the district cour t. The arguments raised in
Caples-Guerra’s motion were that he had not been duly arraigned, and that the prosecutor
had suppressed evidence. Defense counsel told the district court that he did not believe
there was a procedural basis for the motion. The district court addressed both issues raised
by the motion and quickly confirmed that neither had merit. The motion also stated that it
was untimely “due to incompetency by counsel.” The district court asked defense counsel
about the allegation of incomp etency, and the attorney responded that he had met with

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Caples-Guerra, that they had reviewed his case in full, and that he did not know that
Caples-Guerra intended to raise the issues in the motion. De fense counsel also said that
“there isn’t a basis from which I can rais e an actual motion,” and that he believed
Caples-Guerra was merely expressing “sentime nts and resentment for the system.” The
events at the April 8, 2019 hearing suggest that Caples-Guerra was dissatisfied with his
attorney because his attorney was not bringing unsuppor ted motions or raising frivolous
arguments. Caples-Guerra’s statements when discharging his attorney at the May 2, 2019
hearing were in the same vein—that he was unhappy that his attorney was not taking certain
actions that would have been improper. Noth ing in the record sup ports Caples-Guerra’s
generalized contention that his attorney was incompetently representing him.
In sum, Caples-Guerra’s expressions of fru stration with his attorney at the time he
discharged him, viewed in the context of the events at the two pretrial hearings, make clear
that Caples-Guerra was expressing only statemen ts of general dissatis faction, not serious
allegations of inadequate representation. The district court therefore was not obligated to
conduct a searching inquiry, and there were no exceptional circumstances requiring the
district court to appoint substitute counsel. The district court did not abuse its discretion
by not appointing substitute couns el, particularly given that the district court appointed
advisory counsel to assist Caples-Guerra.
Caples-Guerra also raises several argumen ts in a pro se supplemental brief. His
arguments are difficult to follow, but they appear to rely on corporate law and the law
governing trusts, which are not applicable to criminal prosecutions. To the extent that we
can discern Caples-Guerra’s arguments, we conclude that they provide no basis for relief.

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See Ture v. State , 681 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Minn. 2004) (reje cting criminal defendant’s pro se
arguments as meritless without detailed legal analysis).
Affirmed.