State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0233

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohamed Farookh Mohamed Abdulazeez,
Appellant.

Filed March 29, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-8115

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Max A. Keller, Erik S. Nielsen, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Mohamed Farook h Mohamed Abdulazeez challenges his convictions for
prostitution of a person believed to be betw een ages 13 and 16 and electronic solicitation
of a child to engage in sexual conduct. He argues that his convictions must be reversed
because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish, first, that he intended to solicit a
minor for sexual contact, and second, that he reasonably believed the person he was
communicating with was a child . Alternatively, Abdulazeez ar gues that his convictions
must be reversed because law enforcement entrapped him. Because the evidence was
sufficient to support the convictions and because the evidence supports the jury’s decision
to reject Abdulazeez’s entrapment defense, we affirm.
FACTS1
In April 2019, in conne ction with the NCAA Men’s Final Four basketball
tournament in Minneapolis, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
conducted a “Juvenile Demand Suppression”2 operation. The BCA uses these operations
to locate individuals who seek out or solicit minors to engage in prostitution, purportedly
reducing the “demand” for child sex trafficking. As part of the operation, law enforcement
officers post advertisements on various websites that advertise sexual services. When “sex

1 The facts derive from the evidence presented at Abdulazeez’s jury trial.

2 These operations used to be called “Guardian Angel Operations.”

3
buyers” call or text the phone number in an advertisement, officers working as “undercover
chatters” respond and play the role of a child.
One of the BCA’s fake advertisements was posted on List Crawler, which is a
website that compiles postings from various sex-advertisement websites. The BCA’s
posting stated: “HOT GIRL WAITING FOR U . . . AVAILABLE NOW . . . Lets HAVE
FUN Text if you want to en joy some time together Incall3 Only.” An undercover female
law-enforcement officer posed suggestively in the advertisement, with her face concealed.
The BCA does not reveal agents ’ faces in these fake adver tisements to protect agents’
identities and to mimic the practice of actual ch ild traffickers, who conceal the faces of
children. The age of the “hot girl” was listed as 21. Again, this simulated the practice of
child traffickers, who typically advertise children as being in their early twenties. Websites
that allow advertisements for sexual services remove postings for individuals under 18.
Abdulazeez found the BCA’s advertisemen t on ListCrawler and called the phone
number listed. His call was routed to a detective with the Coon Rapids Police Department
who was working with the BCA as a “chatter.” The detective played the role of a 15-year-
old girl while communicating with Abdulazeez. He did not answer the phone call so as not
to reveal his identity, but instead replied as the fictitious gi rl with a text message: “hey
baby i only text.”

3 According to a BCA agent, “i ncall,” in sex-industry termi nology, means that the buyer
must go to the location of the advertiser, as opposed to “outcall,” where the advertiser will
go to the purchaser’s location.

4
Abdulazeez responded with “Hi,” “How r u doing,” and as ked how much a
“session” would cost. The fictitious girl answered, “im good babe thanks. $200 hr or $150
hh,” which indicated $200 for an hour of service or $150 for a half hour. Abdulazeez then
asked whether she accepted cash or credit card, and the fictitious girl replied, “cash only.”
She inquired, “what u lookn for babe,” a nd Abdulazeez responded, “Just bj,” which
referred to a “blow job or oral sex.”
The fictitious girl then asked Abdulaz eez if he was “good with younger,” and
Abdulazeez replied with “Mmmmm” and “How old r u.” The fictitious girl responded that
she was 15 and stated that her “friend got [her] a hotel room for the weekend.” Abdulazeez
then sent four separate text messages: “Ohh omg,” “That’s young,” “Sorry hun,” and “But
u look 18+.” The fictitious girl texted back: “k. bye.”
Abdulazeez continued the conversation, se nding two messages: “U r some law
enforcement or something” an d “Ur ad says 21.” The fic titious girl messaged back
explaining that she had lied about her age in the posting in order to make money.
Abdulazeez asked her to call him, and then he attempted to call the number. The fictitious
girl responded, texting that she did not have any “minutes on [her] phone rite now” and
was using the hotel wireless to text. Abdulazeez, without any other prompting, messaged:
“Send me ur address.” He then told the fictitious girl that he had $100 and asked if that
was “ok.” The fictitious girl responded that she was in Brooklyn Park, and Abdulazeez
asked for her specific location. Responding to Abdulazeez’s question about money, the
fictitious girl inquired, “so 100 for a bj?” Abdulazeez replied, “Ok.” He then asked again:
“U r not a cop or law enforcem ent right?” The fictitious girl responded, “no just tryn to

5
make some $$$ are u,” and Abdulazeez responded, “Ok,” and said that he did not want to
“get into trouble.” The two continued to arrange a meeti ng, with the fictitious girl
indicating that she was near the Home Depot in Brooklyn Park (which was a BCA staging
location) and then asking Abdulazeez how far aw ay he was. He replied that he was 25
minutes away, and the fictitious girl asked hi m to let her know wh en he neared Home
Depot.
Abdulazeez then asked the fictitious girl to send him a picture. The detective playing
the role of the fictitious girl sent a stock photo of a female law-enforcement agent with her
face blurred. Abdulazeez once again asked if the fictitious girl was law enforcement; the
response was no. He then sent a message that said “We can be friends.” The fictitious girl
replied with “u coming or what?” and Abdulazeez messaged back “I can just give u money
sweetheart” followed by “Just need a friend.” The fictiti ous girl responded with
“whatever...im just tryn to make $$$ u coming or not.” Abdulazeez wrote back: “Ok” and
“Sure.” Then, without additional prompting, he asked, “Raw or with cover?” This referred
to a sex act with or without a condom. The fictitious girl responded that “raw is extra.”
Soon after, Abdulazeez texted the fictitious girl that he was at the Home Depot, and
she gave him the address of a nearby hotel and her room number. Abdulazeez went to the
room and knocked on the door. Once he entered, agents arrested him. The agents searched
Abdulazeez, finding the phone that he had used to send the texts and $200 in cash. Upon
subsequent questioning, Abdulazeez told law enforcement that he searched ListCrawler for
a “sexy massage” and that he responded to the BCA advertisement and engaged in the text
conversation with the fictitious girl. He also admitted that the fictitious girl told him she

6
was 15 years old. When the interviewing agent asked him “what that meant,” Abdulazeez
said it meant that she was a minor. Abdulazeez was remorseful throughout the interview
and expressed that he had gotten “carried away.”
The state charged Abdulazeez with prostitu tion of a person believed to be between
ages 13 and 16 in violati on of Minnesota Statutes sec tion 609.324, subdivision 1(b)(3)
(2018) (count one), and electron ic solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct in
violation of Minnesota Statut es section 609.352, subdivision 2a(1) (2018) (count two).
Abdulazeez had a jury trial. Du ring the trial, Abdulazeez requested a jury instruction for
the lesser-included offense of prostitution of a person age 18 or older in violation of section
609.324, subdivision 3(a)(2) (2018), which wa s accordingly added as count three. The
district court also granted Abdulazeez’s request for an instruction regarding the affirmative
defense of entrapment.
The jury found Abdulazeez guilty of all thre e counts. At sentencing, the district
court entered a conviction for count one and sentenced Abdulazeez to 60 days’
imprisonment, stayed for three years; the district court entered a conviction but no sentence
for count two, and did not adjudicate or sentence count three.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Abdulazeez challenges his convictions on two bases. He first argues that this court
should reverse his convictions because the evidence was insufficient to prove two elements
of the offenses. Alternatively, he contends that the jury improperly rejected his entrapment
defense. We address each argument in turn.

7
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Abdulazeez’s convictions.
The constitutional right to due process re quires that the state prove every element
of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 197,
210, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977 ). Abdulazeez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying two separate elements of the offenses.4 First, he argues that “the evidence fails
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] intended to engage in sexual activity with the
[fictitious girl].” Second, he argues that th e evidence did not estab lish his belief that the
fictitious girl was 15 years old. Before addressing these claims, we begin with the
appropriate standard of review.
A. Standard of review
Under the traditional standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges,
reviewing courts “carefully ex amine the record to determin e whether the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). We
review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the conviction” and “assume the jury

4 As explained below in connection with his individual arguments, Abdulazeez presents
the first challenge regarding intent as onl y to count one—the pr ostitution-of-a-minor
offense. He presents the second challenge, regarding his belief about age, as to both counts,
as each requires reasonable belief that the fictitious girl was a child. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3) (requiring that the defendant reasonably believed the individual
hired to be under 16 but at least 13), .352, subd. 2a(1) (requiring that the defendant solicited
a child or someone the defendant reasonably believed to be a child, with “child” defined as
a person 15 years of age or younger).

8
believed the State’s witnesses and disbelie ved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
When a conviction rests on circumstantia l evidence, reviewing courts apply a
heightened level of scrutiny. State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010).
Under the heightened standard, appellate courts “consider whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis
other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). In cases involving both direct and circumstantial
evidence, reviewing courts apply the traditiona l standard, rather than the circumstantial-
evidence standard, when an elem ent is “sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone.”
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016); State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307
(Minn. 2014).
Direct evidence is “evidence that is ba sed on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Bernhardt v. State, 684
N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on the
other hand, is “evidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation,
and all evidence that is not given by eyewitness testimony.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Abdulazeez argues that the state used excl usively circumstantial evidence to prove
both his intent to hire the fictitious girl for sexual conduct and his belief about her age. As
to intent to hire for sexual conduct, he argues that “[a]t no point in the record did [he]
specifically declare or describe an intent to so licit [the fictitious girl] for sex.” And as to
his knowledge of her age, he argues that “[ w]ithout an express declaration of [his] belief
as to the [fictitious girl’s] age,” this element necessarily rested on circumstantial evidence.

9
The state counters that Abdulazeez’s text messages and his interview statements following
his arrest provide sufficient direct evidence of both his intent to engage in sexual conduct
and his understanding of the fi ctitious girl’s age, citing State v. Gundy for support. 915
N.W.2d 757, 762, 764-65 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Aug. 7. 2018).5
We need not decide which standard applies because, even under the heightened
circumstantial-evidence standard requested by Abdulazeez, the evid ence is sufficient to
support the convictions. See State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013)
(determining the court “need not resolve the pa rties’ dispute regarding the standard of
review because, even under the more favora ble standard proposed by [defendant], the
record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict”). We accordingly apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard of review in addressing Abdulazeez’s sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claims.
The circumstantial-evidence standard of review requires a two-step inquiry. Loving
v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Mi nn. 2017). First, the revi ewing court identifies the
circumstances that the state proved. Id. To do so, we “winno w down” the evidence by
“resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict” and disregarding any evidence
inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017) (citing
State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 (Minn. 2011). Second, we determine “whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational

5 The state also cites and contrasts severa l unpublished opinions of this court, but
unpublished opinions are not binding, Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800
(Minn. App. 1993), and the choice of standard depends on the specific evidence presented
in this case.

10
hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013). With
that standard in mind, we turn to Abdulazeez’s specific assertions of insufficient evidence.
B. The evidence is sufficient to show that Abdulazeez intended to engage in
sexual activity with the fictitious girl.

Abdulazeez first challenges th e sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
of count one, prostitution of a pe rson believed to be between ag es 13 and 16. In order to
prove that offense, the state had to prove that Abdulazeez (1) intentionally (2) hired,
offered, or agreed to hire (3) an individual that he reasonably believed to be under the age
of 16 years but at least 13 years (4) to engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact. Minn.
Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3). Abdulazee z’s argument regards the first and fourth
elements, as he contends that the evidence supports a reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt: that he did not act with intent to engage in sexual contact with the fictitious girl, but
instead with intent to “mer ely ‘give her money’ in c onsideration for (non-sexual)
fellowship.”
The circumstances that the state proved as to Abdulzeez’s intent with the fictitious
girl are as follows. Abdulazeez responded to an online posting found on ListCrawler that
advertised a “HOT GIRL WAITING . . . AV AILABLE NOW.” The advertisement used
sex-industry terminology, as did Abdulazeez in his text messages to the fictitious girl.
Before learning the fictitious girl’s age, A dbulazeez asked about the price for a “session”
and indicated that he sought a “bj,” meaning or al sex. After learning the fictitious girl’s
age, Abdulazeez continued to arrange a meeti ng with her. He atte mpted to negotiate a
lower price, asking if $100 was “ok,” and the fictitious girl sought to clarify the service by

11
asking: “so 100 for a bj?” Abdulazeez rep lied, “Ok,” and then c ontinued to arrange a
meeting. He asked for more photos of the fictitious girl a nd expressed repeated concern
that she was in law enforcemen t, but when the fictitious girl asked if he was coming, he
replied, “Ok” and “Sure.” He then asked her, “Raw or cover?” which referred to sex with
or without a condom. After that, Abdulazeez promptly drove to the hotel and went to the
room number that the fictitious girl provided, and he brought along $200 cash.
The circumstances proved undoubtedly permit the reasonable inference that
Abdulazeez intended to engage in sexual conduct with the fi ctitious girl. Abdulazeez
argues, though, that his messages stating “We can be friends,” “I can just give u money
sweetheart,” and “Just need a friend” give rise to the alternative reasonable inference that
he intended to engage in exclusively platonic conduct. We disagree.
Even assuming that the evidence Abdulaz eez identifies should be considered part
of the “circumstances proved ,” the totality of the circ umstances does not permit the
inference that Abdulazeez proposes. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (“We review the
circumstantial evidence not as isolated fact s, but as a whole.”). Abdulazeez initially
responded to an advertisement for sexual services. After he learned the fictitious girl’s age,
he continued to plan a meeting with her. Even though he sent some messages expressing
hesitation and suggesting friendship, he subsequently inquired whether the negotiated price
was for sex, with or without, a condom. And after asking that question, he promptly
traveled to the meeting loca tion. Under these circumst ances, it is unreasonable to
hypothesize that Abdulazeez intended to engage in exclusively platonic conduct with the

12
fictitious girl. The evidence is accordingly sufficient to show that Abdulazeez intended to
engage in sexual conduct with the fictitious girl.
C. The evidence is sufficien t to show that Abdulazeez reasonably believed
the fictitious girl was 15 years old.

Abdulazeez also challenges the jury’s guilty verdict on count two, electronic
solicitation of a 15-year-old child to engage in sexual conduct. To convict Abdulazeez of
that offense, the state had to pr ove (1) that he is 18 years of age or older, and (2) that he
used an electronic communication system, (3) to solicit someone that he reasonably
believed to be a child to engage in sexual conduct, and (4) that he had the intent to arouse
the sexual desire of any person. Minn. Stat . § 609.352, subd. 2a(1). A “child” is defined
as “a person 15 years of age or younger.” Id., subd. 1(a) (2018). “Solicit” means
“commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific person.” Id., subd. 1(c)
(2018).
Abdulazeez argues that the state failed to sufficiently prove the third element—that
he reasonably believed the fictitious person was a child. 6 He contends that the evidence
instead suggests that he thought he was communicating with an adult.
The circumstances proved regarding Abdulaz eez’s knowledge of the fictitious girl’s
age are as follows. The fictitious girl asked Abdulazeez early in the conversation if he was

6 Although Abdulazeez’s brief only makes th e knowledge-of-age argument in connection
with count two, the argument applies with equal force to count one, for the prostitution-of-
a-minor conviction, which required proof that he hired or agreed to hire a “an individual
who [he] reasonably believes to be under the age of 16 years but at least 13 years.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3). We accord ingly understand his argument as challenging
both convictions.

13
okay with “younger,” and then specified that she was 15 years old. Abdulazeez responded
with messages saying, “That’s young,” and “But u look 18+.” After the fictitious girl
responded with “k. bye,” Abdulazeez kept the conversation going. He repeatedly
expressed concern about law enforcement a nd getting “into trouble.” When he was
arrested, he admitted that the fictitious girl told him that she was 15 and that he understood
that to mean she was a minor, and he expressed remorse during the interview.
We conclude that these circumstances ar e consistent with th e rational hypothesis
that Abdulazeez reasonably belie ved the fictitious girl was 15 years old. Abdulazeez
contends, however, that the facts are also cons istent with a reasonable hypothesis that he
believed the fictitious girl was older than 15. He points to his te xt message that the
fictitious girl “look[ed] 18+” and argues that that the rest of the exchange shows that he
did not believe the fictitious girl when she said that she was 15. For support, he refers to
the BCA’s advertisement on ListCrawler, which gave the age of 21 and included photos of
an adult law-enforcement agent rather than a child.7

7 Abdulazeez also includes a lengthy policy argument in his briefing about the BCA’s use
of adult pictures and an adult age in its posting. But the commander of the statewide
human-trafficking task force testified about why the BCA uses adult ages in the postings:
to avoid having the postings removed by th e websites and to mimic how sex traffickers
actually advertise children. And it would be problematic to require BCA agents to use
images of actual children. As the state point s out, this court has previously rejected a
similar policy argument, stating:

[The] argument, followed to its logical extreme, would demand
that the state, when investigating the type of crime [appellant]
is charged with, employ actual young girls to type the chat
room text, to meet with the suspect, and to follow through with

14
Again, given the totality of the evidence, it is not reasonable to believe that
Abdulazeez thought that the fictitious girl was older than 15. She specifically told him that
she was 15, and Abdulazeez acknowledged this in his interview with law enforcement. If
Abdulazeez actually believed that the fictitious girl was an adult la w-enforcement agent,
which his argument seems to suggest, then it do es not make sense that he went to the
location where he was arrested. Additionally, when asked about the fictitious girl’s age
during his postarrest statement, Abdulazeez did not state that he suspected she was older;
instead, when the agent asked “w hat [it] meant” that the girl said she was 15, he replied
that she “was a minor.” In sum, even unde r the heightened standard of review for
circumstantial evidence, the evidence was sufficient to show that Abdulazeez reasonably
believed that the fictitious girl was 15 years old.8
II. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s decision to reject Abdulazeez’s
entrapment defense.

Abdulazeez next argues that th e evidence does not support the jury’s rejection of
his entrapment defense. A defendant asserting the affirmative defense of entrapment must
“establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the st ate induced the defendant to

everything needed to get the susp ect to the point of an overt
act. We simply will not read that into the law.

State v. Coonrod, 652 N.W.2d 715, 723 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Jan. 21,
2003).

8 We note that Abdulazeez’s brief includes a pa ge of assertions, akin to testimony, about
his mental state at the time of the offenses. He concedes th at these assertions cannot be
found in the record. The state’s brief urges us to disregard or strike this portion of his brief.
We have disregarded the portions of Abdula zeez’s brief that include information outside
the record; they have no bearing on our analysis.

15
commit the offense by improper pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” State v. Bauer, 776
N.W.2d 462, 470 (Minn. App. 2009), aff’d, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 2011). It is not enough
that the state merely solicited or provided an opportunity for the defendant to commit the
crime. State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 1980). If the defendant establishes that
he was induced to commit the cr ime, the “burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense.” Bauer, 776
N.W.2d at 470; see also State v. Vaughn, 361 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1985).
Reviewing courts apply the sufficiency -of-the-evidence sta ndard to determine
whether a jury improperly re jected an entrapment defense, requiring reversal of the
resulting conviction.9 Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 469-70. We vi ew the evidence in the light
most favorable to the conviction and assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting
the guilty verdicts and disbelieved any contrary evidence. Id. at 470; see also State v.
Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Mi nn. 1999). We will not di sturb a guilty verdict if a
reasonable jury could find that the defendant failed to establish either element of the
entrapment defense from the record. See Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 471 (declining to reach the
second prong because a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant did not show
inducement).
Abdulazeez contends that he proved inducem ent because the evidence showed that
he initially responded to the advertisement believing it involved a 21-yea r-old adult, and

9 Though the parties do not explicitly state as much, they appear to both assume that the
traditional, rather than heightened, sufficiency standard applies. Precedent from this court
supports that position. See Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 469. We accordingly apply that standard
here.

16
that, after he expressed hesitation about the fi ctitious girl’s age, th e agent pressured him
with questions about whether he was still planning to meet in person. The state responds
that the evidence does not s how inducement, but merely that the agent presented
Abdulazeez with the opportunity to commit the offenses.10 According to the state, even if
the evidence does show inducement, it suffi ciently establishes that Abdulazeez was
predisposed to commit the offenses.
To show inducement, Abdu lazeez needed to demonstr ate that the BCA agent did
more than merely give him the opportunity to commit the crimes; he was required to show
“improper pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” Id. at 470. Our review of the text messages
satisfies us that they show nothing more than th e agent providing an opportunity. When
the fictitious girl told Abdulazeez that she was 15, and Abdulazeez observed that she was
young, the fictitious girl purported to e nd the conversation with “k. bye.” It was
Abdulazeez who then continued the conversa tion, attempting to call her and then
requesting the fictitious girl’s address. He also attempted to renegotiate the price by asking
if $100 would be “ok.” When he later expressed some hesitation, stating “I can just give u
money sweetheart,” and “Just need a frie nd,” the fictitious girl responded with
“whatever...im just tryn to make $$$ u coming or not.” This statement, rather than creating

10 The state asserts in its brie f that “[i]n this case, by gr anting Appellant’s request—over
the prosecutor’s objection—to instruct the jury on entrapment, the trial court effectively
held that Appellant had met his burden on the first step.” But, as we have specifically noted
in the past, “[t]hat the district court instructed the jury on [appellant]’s entrapment theory
does not establish that the evidence is of sufficient weight to meet [appellant]’s burden of
proof on the inducement element. Rather, it merely indicates that some evidence exists in
support of inducement.” Bauer, 776 N.W.2d at 470.

17
improper pressure, merely offered Abdulazeez the opportunity to e ither come to her
location or end the communicati on. The agent’s inquiries did not constitute “improper
pressure, badgering, or persuasion.” Id.
We conclude that the jury had a suffici ent basis to find that Abdulazeez was not
induced to commit the offenses. Because no improper inducement occurred, we need not
decide whether the state proved Abdulazeez’s predisposition to commit the offenses. See
id. at 471. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to reject the entrapment defense.11
Affirmed.

11 Abdulazeez does not raise any additional challenges to his convictions. The state notes
in its brief that “this Court has held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both agreeing
to hire a minor (Minn. Stat . § 609.324, subd. 1(b)(3)), a nd soliciting a child through
electronic communication (Minn. Stat. § 609.352, [subd. 2a(1 )]), for the same conduct,”
citing a unpublished op inion for support. See State v. Onuoha, No. A19-1256, 2020 WL
4280027, *6 (Minn. App. July 27, 2020), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2020). We do not
address that issue here, though, as Abdulazeez did not raise it in the district court or on
appeal and the parties have not briefed it. See State v. Kemp , 305 N.W.2d 322, 326
(Minn.1981) (explaining that appellate courts need not consider section 609.04 issues not
raised in the district court).