Lawrence Lanoux, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0266

Lawrence Lanoux, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Jeff Huber, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed October 19, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-18-352

Mark R. Anfinson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Paul D. Reuvers, Stephanie A. Angolkar, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from an order granting respondents’ motion for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the Minnesota Open Meeti ng Law (OML), Minn. Stat. §§ 13D.01-.07 (2018),
appellants argue that the district court ’s findings were insufficient to establish that their
OML action was frivolous and without merit. Because we conclude that the district court’s

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independent finding was insufficient to allow our meaningful review, we reverse and
remand for more detailed findings.
FACTS
In a complaint filed in January 2018, appellants —former Grant city
councilmembers—brought an OML action against respondents—the Grant city mayor, city
councilmembers, planning commission members, and the city administrator—seeking civil
penalties for purported violations of the OML, which provides that “[a]ll meetings,
including executive sessions, must be open to the public,” including meetings of city
committees and commissions. Minn. Stat. § 13D.01, subd. 1 (2018). Appellants allege
that respondents violated this provision of the OML by congregating in a meeting room
and discussing agenda items following adjournment of a city council meeting in March
2017, and by improperly using a consent agenda to approve items at meetings.
Following a hearing on respondents’ motion for summary judgment, the district
court granted summary judgment on the OML claims . The district court concluded that
“[t]here is absolutely no evidence before the Court to support [appellants’] claim that the
[respondents] have violated Minnesota’s open meeting law” in relation to the March 2017
city council meeting and that the claims were based on “speculation.” In reference t o
appellants’ consent agend a claim , the district court concluded that appellants wrongly
inferred that city officials “must [have been] conducting secret meetings to determine the
consent agenda” and that appellants “failed to identify any law that the council has violated
by its use of a consent agenda .” The district court described the OML claims as “beyond

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meritless” and “frivolous and malicious.” This order is not the subject of our review. The
order granting attorney fees which followed, is what we now review.
Following respondents’ subsequent motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 13D.06, subd. 4(b) (2018), a different district court judge issued an order
granting respondents’ motion, stating the following:
Here, the Court g ranted motion for summary judgment to
[respondents] in a prior Order (“Order”), dated December 10,
2018. In the Order, the Court found [appellants] made a
“strained attempt to create a fact issue,” and there is absolutely
no evidence . . . that [respondents] have violated Minnesota’s
open meeting law.” Order 4, 6. Moreover, the Court declared
that [appellants’] claims are “frivolous and malicious.” Id.
at 6. The Court finds that [appellants’] claims, history, and
discovery practices, demonstrate that an award of attorney
fees and costs is appropriate. Accordingly, [respondents’]
motion is granted.

(Emphasis added.) The district court awarded respondents attorney fees of $66,513.33.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“The [district] court must scrupulously assure that findings and conclusions —
whether they be the court ’s alone, one or the other party ’s, or a combination—are always
detailed, specific and sufficient enough to enable meanin gful review by this court.” Bliss
v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993).
We review a district court’s decision on an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.
Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 21, 2007) . Pursuant to the OML, the district court may award attorney fees

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and costs to a party “only if the court finds that the action under this chapter was frivolous
and without merit.” Minn. Stat. § 13D.06, subds. 4(a), (b) (2018).
The district court, in granting the attorney fees award, repeated the language from
the summary-judgment order that deemed the claims “frivolous and malicious,” though
provided no analysis as to why the claims were “frivolous and malicious.” The district
court did find that appellants’ “claims, history, and discovery practices, demonstrate that
an award of attorney fees and costs is appropriate.” This single independent finding does
not allow us sufficient basis upon which to meaningfully review the attorney fees award.
The OML “action” is the only relevant consideration in determining whether
attorney fees and costs are warranted pursuant to the OML statute. Id. There is nothing in
the record to suggest appellants’ “history” in this action was at issue, nor is there any record
of discovery sanctions or violations. The district court did no t issue independent factual
findings sufficient for our court to review whether the award of attorney fees and costs was
an abuse of the district court’s discretion. We reverse and remand on these grounds.
On remand and based upon the attorney fees provision in the OML statute , the
district court should review the entire record preceding the summary -judgment hearing,
which may include a review of the legal merits of the claims, in making findings as to
whether appellants’ claims were frivolous and without merit.1
Reversed and remanded.

1 Because the district court did not make the findings on which its exercise of discretion
must be based, we do not address the merits of appellants’ original OML claim.