State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0269

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Trevon Lashaun Manuel,
Respondent.

Filed August 31, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-15840

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Erik Nilsson, Acting Minneapolis City Attorney, Rebekah M. Murphy, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth District Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Trevon Lashaun Manuel is charged with driving while impaired. He moved to
suppress evidence obtained by police officers who responded to a report that a person was

2
unconscious or asleep in the driver’s seat of a minivan in the drive -thru lane of a White
Castle restaurant in Mi nneapolis at 3:30 a.m. The district court granted the motion,
reasoning that the officers made a de facto arrest of Manuel without probable cause when
they handcuffed him, and reasoning further that the officers did not have a reasonable belief
that Manuel might be armed and dangerous . The state appeals. We conclude that the
officers did not arrest Manuel when they handcuffed him . We further conclude that the
officers’ observations justified a reasonable belief that Manuel might have been armed and
dangerous and that, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio , the officers’ reasonable belief permitted
them to take necessary measures to determine whether Manuel was carrying a weapon and
to neutralize the risk to the officers’ safety. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In July 2019, Manuel was tab-charged with two counts of driving while impaired
(DWI), for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2018), and for having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 within
two hours of driving, operating, or being in physical control of a motor vehicle, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2018).
In August 2019, Manuel moved to suppress the state’s evidence and to dismiss the
charges. His one-page motion asserted that police officers did not have probable cause to
arrest him for DWI. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion in
December 2019. The state called one witness, Officer Jesada Moua . He testified as
follows:

3
He was dispatched to a White Castle restaurant at 3:30 a.m. on July 5, 2019 , in
response to a call that a person was unconscious or asleep at the wheel of a minivan in the
drive-thru lane. Whenever he receives a report that a person is “unconscious at the wheel,”
he naturally considers whether the person is intoxicated. When he arrived at the White
Castle, he saw a minivan in the drive-thru lane and saw a man, later identified as Manuel,
sitting in the driver’s seat. Officer Moua and his partner exited their squad car and walked
toward the minivan. As they approached, they saw Manuel “reaching back into the
vehicle.” Officer Moua considered Manuel’s action to be a “safety concern” because “[w]e
don’t know if he’s reaching for a weapon or if he ’s reaching for something else.” Officer
Moua ordered Manuel to not reach for anything and to place his hands on the steering
wheel, and Manuel complied. When Officer Moua and his partner arrived at the minivan,
they directed Manuel to get out of the vehicle. The officers placed Manuel in handcuffs so
that they could search his person to ensure that he did not have a weapon and that he could
not reach for a weapon. The officers escorted Manuel away from his minivan so that they
could search it for weapons. Officers found an open bottle of alcohol in the back seat of
Manuel’s minivan and observed numerous signs of impairment . Manuel eventually was
arrested for DWI. He submitted to a breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration
of 0.13.
At the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated to the introduction of three video-
recordings, all of which were created by the officers’ body -worn cameras. We have
reviewed the video -recordings, two of which depict the following sequence of events:
After arri ving at the White Castle and placing his squad car in park, Officer Moua

4
approached Manuel’s minivan on the passenger’s side. As he approached, Manuel was
sitting in the driver’s seat with his torso turned clockwise toward the area behind the
driver’s seat, with his head lean ing over the back of his seat and his right arm extended
backward as if he were reaching for something. Officer Moua immediately yelled at
Manuel, saying “stop reaching around” and “throw your hands on the steering wheel.”
Manuel turned around, faced forward, and put one hand on the steering wheel. Officer
Moua then directed Manuel to place his vehicle in park, unbuckle his seat belt, and step
out of the vehicle. Manuel did so. Officer Moua walk ed around to the driver’s side of
Manuel’s vehicle , where his partner instructed Manuel, who was standing next to his
vehicle, to place his hands behind his back. Moua’s partner handcuffed Manuel and briefly
searched him.
After the evidentiary hearing, the state filed a two-page letter brief. The state
asserted that the only issue in dispute was whether there was probable cause for Manuel’s
arrest. The state assumed that the issue in dispute was whether the officers had probable
cause to arrest Manuel for DWI after completing their inv estigation, and the state argued
that the officers observed multiple indications that Manuel was intoxicated . Manuel later
filed a 25-page memorandum of law in support of his motion. He made four arguments:
(1) the officers unlawfully arrested him “immed iately upon making contact with him”;
(2) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him immediately upon making contact
with him; (3) in the alternative, the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify an investigative stop; and (4) the officers unlawfully searched Manuel’s
vehicle.

5
In February 2020, the district court filed a ten-page order and memorandum in
which it granted Manuel’s motion. The district court concluded that the officers unlawfully
arrested Manuel when they handcuffed him, that the officers did not have probable cause
to arrest Manuel at that point in time, and that the officers did not have a reasonable belief
that Manuel might be armed and dangerous. The state appeals.

D E C I S I O N
The state argues that the district court erred by granting Manuel’s motion to suppress
evidence.
A.
Before considering the state’s arguments for reversal, we must consider a threshold
issue: whether the state may challenge the district court’s suppression ruling in a pre-trial
appeal. As a general rule, the state is not entitled to appellate review of a district court’s
pre-trial order as a matter of right . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2; see also Minn.
R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd . 1. To obtain appellate review of a pre -trial order, the state must
show that, unless the district court’s ruling is reversed, it “will have a critical impact on the
outcome of the trial.” State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. 1977); see also Minn.
R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(2)(b). The state can satisfy the critical -impact standard if the
challenged ruling either “‘completely destroys’ the state’s case” or “‘significantly reduces
the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.
2005) (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn. 1987)). In this case,
the state contends that the critical -impact requirement is satisfied. Manuel does not

6
respond to the contention. We agree with the state that t he district court’s order, which
suppressed evidence and dismissed the charges against Manuel, satisfies the critical-impact
standard. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). Thus, the state may
proceed with its pre-trial appeal.
B.
The district court considered and decided three issues. First, t he district court
considered Manuel’s argument “that he was under arrest the moment he was ordered out
of his vehicle, surrounded by police officers, and placed in handcuffs.” The district court
concluded that “Defendant was de facto arrested when the officers ordered him out of his
car and immediately handcuffed him.” Second, the district court considered whether the
officers had probable cause to arrest Manuel when they handcuffed him and concluded that
they did not. Third, the district court considered whether “Defendant’s furtive movements
within the vehicle (i.e., reaching into the backseat) provided the officers with a reasonable
basis to seize Defendant.” The district court conclude d that the record did not “ contain[]
specific and articulable facts supporting the officers’ belief that the suspect was armed and
dangerous” because “[t]he only articulated basis the officers had for suspecting Defendant
was armed and dangerous was the fact that he reached into the backseat as they
approached.”
For its primary argument on appeal, the state argues that the district court erred by
concluding that the officers arrested Manuel when they placed him in handcuffs. The state
contends that the offi cers merely detained Manuel for a brief investigation, which was
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The state also contends that the

7
officers’ decision to handcuff Manuel was justified by concerns of officer safety. In
response, Manuel argues that the district court correctly concluded that the officers arrested
Manuel when they placed him in handcuffs.
C.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses , papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. As a
general rule, a law -enforcement officer may not make a warrantless arrest of a person
without probable cause that the person “had committed or was committing an offense.”
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 ( 1964). But a law-enforcement officer
may temporarily detain a person for investigatory purposes if the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio ,
392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 -80 (1968); State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-
43 (Minn. 2011).
In addition, officer s who are detaining a person for investigatory purposes may
“protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence .” Terry, 392 U.S. at 24,
88 S. Ct. at 1881. “When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presen tly dangerous to
the officer or to others, ” the officer may “take necessary measures to determine whether
the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Id.
at 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. “The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” and the

8
officer’s search for weapons must be “limited in scope to this protective purpose.” Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972). “The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger. ” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. Moreover, “in determining
whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given . . .
to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience.” Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
In the context of a traffic stop, the principles of Terry allow a law -enforcement
officer to require a driver to exit the vehicle while the officer conducts a brief investigation.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109-12, 98 S. Ct. 330 , 332-34 (1977); State v.
Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Minn. 2009). The officer in Mimms did so as a matter of
course, and the Court approved in light of “the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile,” a risk that the Court said is no less dangerous
simply because it arises from a traffic violation. 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S. Ct. at 333. The
Court balanced the interests of officer safety against the driver’s liberty interest and
reasoned that the requirement that a driver exit his or her vehicle is “at most a mere
inconvenience [that] cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concern for the
officer’s safety.” Id. at 111, 98 S. Ct. at 333. The Mimms opinion also established that, as
in Terry, if an officer “reasonabl[y] conclude[s] that the person whom he had legitimately
stopped might be armed and presently dangerous,” the officer may seek to neutralize the
threat by conducting a limited search for weapons. Id. at 111-12, 98 S. Ct. at 334.

9
This case presents the question whether an officer making a traffic stop may , in
addition to requiring a driver to exit his or her vehicle, also place the driver in handcuffs
for the purpose of ensuring the officer’s safety. Answering that question requires that we
consider the principles articulated in Terry and Mimms as well as the principle that a “de
facto arrest” may occur if a person has not been formally arrested but has been effectively
arrested because the person’s liberty has been restrained to an extent that exceeds the scope
of a lawful Terry stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-88, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
1573-76 (1985). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the analysis may
give rise to “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a
de facto arrest.” Id. at 685, 105 S. Ct. at 1575; see also Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491,
506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983) (discussing fact-specific nature of “determining when a
seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop”).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that an arrest has occurred if “a reasonable
person would have concluded, under the circumstances, that he was under a rrest and not
free to go.” State v. Beckman , 354 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 1984). The supreme court
later clarified that an arrest does not occur unless the person believes that he is both under
arrest and not free to leave because “a person who is being detained temporarily is not free
to leave during the period of detention, yet that does not convert the detention into an
arrest.” State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119-20 (Minn. 1990) ; see also Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2 000); Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98,
103 S. Ct. at 1324; In re Welfare of E.D.J. , 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) . “The
reasonable person standard is an objective standard ,” which ensures that the scope of the

10
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures “does not vary with a
particular person’s subjective state of mind .” See State v. Cripps , 533 N.W.2d 388 , 391
(Minn. 1995) (analyzing whether person was seized).
In State v. Blacksten , 507 N.W.2d 842 (Minn. 1993) , an officer stopped a vehicle
driven by an armed-robbery suspect, “pointed a shotgun at him, ordered him to get out of
the car and lie on the ground, . . . searched him,” “handcuffed [his] left hand to his rear belt
loop,” and “ plac[ed] him in the back of the squad car .” Id. at 845. The supreme court
noted that the officer “ had no intention of conducting any investigation while detaining ”
the suspect. Id. The supreme court concluded that the suspect “ was de facto under arrest
from the time he was ordered to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and placed in the
squad car.” Id. at 847. On the other hand, in State v. Munson , 594 N.W.2d 128 (Minn.
1999), officers stopped a vehicle that was suspected to contain a large amount of drugs,
ordered two occupants out of the vehicle, and temporarily handcuffed them while the
officers determined that they were not armed and dangerous, at which point the handcuffs
were removed . Id. at 133. The supreme court held that , given the totality of the
circumstances, temporarily handcuffing the suspects did not amount to an arrest. Id. at
137. The supreme court explained that “briefly handcuffing a suspect while police sort out
the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an
arrest.” Id.; see also Chase v. State, 144 A.3d 630 , 646-47 (Md. 2016) (stating that “the
use of handcuffs per se does not ordinarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest”); State v.
Wells, 859 N.W.2d 316 , 195-96 (Neb. 2015) (noting that the “use of handcuffs has been

11
approved when it was reasonably necessary to protect officer safety during an investigative
stop”).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit summarized the caselaw
of that circuit as follows:
A de facto arrest occurs when th e officer’s conduct is more
intrusive than necessary for a Terry investigative stop. United
States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994). During
a Terry stop, officers must use “the least intrusive m eans of
detention and investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that
are reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the Terry
stop.” United States v. Newell , 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir.
2010) (quoting United States v. Navarrete -Barron, 192 F.3d
786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999)). “A Terry stop may become an arrest,
requiring probable cause, if the stop lasts for an unreasonably
long time or if officers use unreasonable force.” Id. “As part
of a lawful Terry stop, officers may take any measures that are
‘reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to
maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.’” United
States v. Smith , 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Newell, 596 F.3d at 879). “[W]hen officers are presented with
serious danger in the course of carrying out an investigative
detention, they may brandish weapons or even constrain the
suspect with handcuffs in order to control the scene and protect
their safety.” United States v. Fisher , 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th
Cir. 2004). “In discerning whether [an officer’s] actions [meet]
the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness, the issue
is whether the officer has an objectively reasonable concern for
officer safety or suspicion of danger.” Williams v. Decker, 767
F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135
S. Ct. 1418, 191 L.Ed.2d 382 (2015).

United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 712-13 (8th Cir. 2016).
D.
The district court concluded that “Defendant was de facto arrested when the officers
ordered him out of his car and immediately handcuffed him.” The district court reasoned,

12
“A reasonable person being ordered by officers to leave his belongings and to get out of
his car and then immediately handcuffed and surro unded by additional officers would
certainly conclude that he was under arrest and not free to go” such that “it was reasonable
for Defendant to conclude under those circumstances that he was under arrest and not free
to go.” Because this legal conclusion is based on underlying facts that are undisputed, we
apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Martinson , 581 N.W.2d 846 , 849 (Minn.
1998).
The record leaves no doubt that, when the officers ordered Manuel out of his car
and handcuffed him, he was not free to leave. But the de-facto-arrest test requires more; it
also requires that a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe he was under
arrest, which depends on the scope, means, and duration of the intrusion on the person’s
liberty. See Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d at 845-47; Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d at 120. The United
States Supreme Court has expressly approved of an officer’s removal of a driver from a
vehicle for the purpose of ensuring officer safety. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S. Ct. at
333. In addition, t he Minnesota Supreme Court has approved of the use of handcuffs
during an investigative detention for the purpose of ensuring officer safety. See Munson,
594 N.W.2d at 137. Thus, the fact that the officers removed Manuel from his vehicle and
handcuffed him does not necessarily mean that he was arrested. See Chase, 144 A.3d at
647-48; Wells, 859 N.W.2d at 195-96. Rather, whether an officer made a de facto arrest
by placing a suspect in handcuffs depends primarily on whether the officer was justified in
believing that the suspect might have been armed and dangerous, in which case the officer
may “take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon

13
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm,” see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881,
and also on an assessment of the scope, means, and duration of the person’s detention, see
Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d at 845-47; Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d at 120; see also Sanford, 813 F.3d
at 712-13.
The district cou rt considered the state’s argument that the officers’ actions were
justified by “Defendant’s furtive movements within the vehicle (i.e. , reaching into the
backseat).” The district court concluded that the record does not “ contain[] specific and
articulable facts supporting the officers’ belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous”
because “[t]he only articulated basis the officers had for suspecting Defendant was armed
and dangerous was the fact that he reached into the backseat as they approached.”
The district court’s analysis conflates two distinct issues: first, whether an officer
has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity , which would justify an investigatory
detention, and, second, whether an officer has a reasonable belief that a suspect may be
armed and dangerous, which would justify protective measures, such as a pat frisk or the
use of handcuffs. The district court cited several opinions relevant to the former question
but did not express any conclusion as to whether Officer Mo ua and his partner had a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court’s analysis of the latter question
is as follows:
Minnesota law has routinely recognized the importance
of officer safety. Under our precedents, officers have been
permitted to approach suspects with weapons drawn, frisk
suspects for weapons, require suspects to lie on the ground
while officers conducted the frisk, protective search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle, and briefly detain a
handcuffed suspect in their squad car while they continued

14
their investigation. . . . However, in each of those scenarios,
the record contained specific and articulable facts supporting
the officers’ belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous.
Those facts are not present in th is case. The only articulated
basis the officers had for suspecting Defendant was armed and
dangerous was the fact that he reached into the backseat as they
approached.

Contrary to the district court’s analysis, the evidentiary record does contain
“specific and articulable facts supporting the officers’ belief that the suspect was armed
and dangerous.” Officer Moua testified that he and his partner “ saw [Manuel] reaching
back into the vehicle ,” that they “didn’t know what [Manuel] was reaching for ,” that he
was concerned, and that he told Manuel “to not reach back there.” Officer Moua elaborated
by testifying that Manuel’s actions gave rise to a “safety issue” because the officers did not
“know if he’s reaching for a weapon or if he’s reaching for something else.” Officer Moua
summarized by testifying, “So , when we’re approaching , if someone is making those
furtive movements, if someone is reaching behind places in locations that we haven’t
checked yet, it’s definitely a safety concern.”
Officer Moua was the only witness at the evidentiary hearing. Manuel’s attorney
did not cross-examine him with respect to his concerns that Manuel might be armed and
dangerous. The district court did not make any findings that Officer Moua was not
credible. Inde ed, the district court’s findings of fact are consistent with Officer Moua’s
testimony. The district court found that, as the officers approached Manuel’s vehicle,
“[t]he officers saw the driver reach into the backseat area of the vehicle, and Officer Moua
told the driver to stop reaching around and to place his hands on the steering wheel.” The
district court also made the following finding of fact:

15
Officer Moua . . . handcuffed [Manuel] for “officer safety ”
because he did not know what the driver had been reaching for
inside his vehicle, and it could have been a weapon or
“something else. ” The officers had not received any
information suggesting the driver was armed or dangerous;
they based their safety concerns solely on the fact that the
driver had reached into the backseat of his vehicle as they were
approaching. . . . Therefore, the only reason the driver was
handcuffed was the officers’ belief that it was necessary for
officer safety.

The district court’s findings concerning the officers’ concerns for their safety do not
support the district court’s conclusion. In State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. 2007),
the supreme court recognized that furtive movements of a driver during a routine traffic
stop may give rise to a reasonable belief that the driver is armed and dangerous and, thus,
may justify measures to restrain the driver. In that case, police officers initiated a traffic
stop after observing that a vehicle had no rear license -plate light. Id. at 243. The driver
did not immediately stop but, instead, continued to drive slowly down an alley and made
furtive movements for 45 seconds, which led police to suspect that he may have a gun. Id.
at 243, 245. The supreme court stated, “Flowers’ movements in the vehicle, which lasted
for approximately 45 seconds, gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that Flowers . . .
might have been armed and dangerous.” Id. at 252.
The supreme court’s recognition that the furtive movements of a motorist can,
without any other indicia of criminal o r dangerous activity, give rise to a reasonable
concern for officer safety is consistent with the caselaw of other jurisdictions. For example,
in People v. Daniel , 987 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), a police officer conducting a
traffic stop in a high-crime area saw an occupant of a vehicle make furtive movements by

16
reaching down toward the floorboard several times. Id. at 472. The officer directed the
occupants of the vehicle to raise their hands. Id. When the driver did not comply, the
officer opened the driver’s door and handcuffed him. Id. The appellate court concluded
that the officer’s safety concerns were reasonable due to the driver’s furtive movements
and other factors. Id. at 479-80. The court stated that “the fact that a police officer places
an individual in handcuffs does not necessarily transform a Terry stop into an arrest” and
that “concerns for officer safety and the safety of the public can, in certain limited
circumstances, justify handcuffing during a brief investigatory stop ,” so long as this
measure is “reasonable i n light of the circumstances that prompted the stop or that
developed during its course.” Id. at 478-79 (quotations omitted).
In light of this caselaw , Manuel’s reaching backward in the minivan provided the
officers with a reasonable belief that he might be armed and dangerous. The district court
discounted the officers’ concerns, stating that “[t]he only articulated basis the officers had
for suspecting Defendant was armed and dangerous was the fact that he reached into the
backseat as they approached.” But under the caselaw, and given the circumstances of this
case, the officers’ observations were a sufficient reason to believe that Manuel might be
armed and dangerous. As the Supreme Court stated in Terry, “The officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. Furthermore, “due weight must
be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. We are unaware of

17
any caselaw that would allow a court to credit an officer’s testimony that a person made
furtive movements by reaching toward a place that was not visible to the officers yet
conclude that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that the person may be armed
and dangerous. Rather, the caselaw illustrates that if an officer sees furtive movements
toward a place that is not visible to the officer , the officer is justified in believing that the
person may be armed and dangerous. See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 252; Daniel, 987 N.E.2d
at 478.
There is no issue in this case concerning the duration of the stop; Manuel argued,
and the district court concluded, that he was arrested as soon as he was handcuffed. Manuel
implies that the use of handcuffs exceeds the scope and means that are permissible in the
circumstances of this case. But if Manuel had had a weapon, either on his person or in his
minivan, the use of handcuffs would have ensured that he was unable to access it and use
it. In that event, if the officers had r efrained from using handcuffs, they would have been
exposed to the risk of an armed and potentially hostile suspect. Officer Moua testified that
he and his partner placed Manuel in handcuffs so that they could search his person to ensure
that he did not have a weapon, to ensure that he could not reach for a weapon, and to allow
them to search his minivan for weapons. The Court in Terry stated that “it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of
their duties.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. We note, having reviewed the video-
recordings, that the officers used the handcuffs in an appropriate manner, without any
unnecessary force or indignity and without any apparent discomfort to Manuel. Given the

18
evidence in the record of the suppression hearing, there is no basis for a conclusion that the
scope or means of the officers’ use of handcuffs were unreasonable.
The district court’s comparison of this case to State v. Carver , 577 N.W.2d 245
(Minn. App. 1998), is unwarranted. In Carver, a deputy sheriff stopped a vehicle that was
travelling 20 miles per hour faster than the speed limit. Id. at 247. The deputy ordered the
driver out of his vehicle, ordered him to lie prone on the road, handcuffed him, and escorted
him to the deputy’s patrol car. Id. Relying on Blacksten, this court concluded that the
deputy arrested the driver when he handcuffed him. Id. at 247-48. The facts of Carver are
different in several respects. The driver in Carver did nothing to indicate a possible threat
to the deputy’s safety . Also, the driver in Carver was forced to lie prone on the ground ,
whereas, in this case, Officer Moua and his partner did not further restrain Manuel’s
freedom by requiring him to do so. Thus, Carver is distinguishable.
In light of the forgoing , Officer Moua and his partner had a reasonable basis for
believing that Manuel may have been armed and dangerous . That reasonable belief
justified their decision to place Manuel in handcuffs while they conducted a brief search
for weapons or other threats to their safety , and they did so in a reasonable manner .
Because they were justified in handcuffing Manuel, he did not have an objectively
reasonable belief that he was under arrest. Therefore, the officers did not make a de facto
arrest of Manuel when they handcuffed him. The district court erred by concluding
otherwise. In light of that error, the district court’s probable -cause analysis is flawed
because it is based on the incorrect premise that Manuel was arrested when he was
handcuffed, not at a later point in time.

19
In sum, the district court erred by granting Manuel’s motion to suppress evidence.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.