State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0275

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cortney John Edstrom,
Appellant.

Filed October 26, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-28931

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Stan Keillor, Special Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2016, Cortney John Edstrom was convicted of a first-degree controlled-substance
crime and was sentenced to 134 months of imprisonment. In 2019, he moved to correct

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his sentence on the ground that he was entitled to the shorter sentence prescribed by the
Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) , which had become law four days before his
sentencing hearing. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Edstrom
possessed not only controlled substances but also firearms, thereby implicating the new
offense of aggravated first -degree controlled -substance crime, which was created by a
different section of the DSRA . We conclude that the district court erred by denying
Edstrom’s motion even though he satisfied all three of the requirements of the amelioration
doctrine. Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing pursuant to the DSRA.
FACTS
In October 2015, police officers received a report that Edstrom was selling
methamphetamine from his apartment in Brooklyn Park. In a search of the apartment
conducted pursuant to a search warrant, officers found “several firearms, ammunition,
scales with methamphetamine residue, marijuana, and approximately 226 grams of
methamphetamine.” State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 2018) (Edstrom II).
The state charged Edstrom with four offenses: (1) first-degree controlled-substance
crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014), based on his alleged sale of
ten grams or more of methamphetamine; (2) first-degree controlled-substance crime, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014), based on his alleged possession
of 226 grams of methamphetamine; (3) possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014); and (4) fifth degree controlled -
substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014), based on his
alleged possession of marijuana.

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In May 2016, a jury found Edstrom not guilty of the first charge and guilty of the
second, third, and fourth charges. On May 27, 2016, the district court imposed concurrent
prison sentences of 134 months and 60 months for the convictions on the second and third
charges.
On direct appeal, Edstrom made four arguments to this court, including a challenge
to the district court’s denial of his pre -trial motion to suppress evidence. We concluded
that the district court erred by denying the motion to suppress. State v. Edstrom ,
901 N.W.2d 455, 457-58 (Minn. App. 2017) (Edstrom I), rev’d, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.
2018). On further review, the supreme court reversed this court’s opinion and remanded
for consideration of Edstrom’s three other arguments. Edstrom II, 916 N.W.2d at 514. On
remand, we rejected Edstrom’s remaining arguments and affirmed his conviction. State v.
Edstrom, 2019 WL 178448 (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2019) (Edstrom III). At no time on direct
appeal did Edstrom challenge his sentence.
In August 2019, Edstrom fil ed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to rule
27.03, subdivision 9, of the rules of criminal procedure . He argued that the sentence for
his conviction of first -degree controlled-substance crime is not authorized by law on the
ground that the presumptive sentence for that offense was made shorter by section 18 of
the DSRA, 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160 , which had become law four days before the
sentencing hearing, and that he was entitled by the amelioration doctrine to the shorter
sentence. In response, the state argued that the amelioration doctrine should not apply on
the ground that the sentence Edstrom received is authorized by another section of the

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DRSA, which created a new offense entitled aggravated first -degree controlled-substance
crime.
In November 2019, the district court filed an order in which it adopted the state’s
argument and denied Edstrom’s motion. Edstrom appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Edstrom argues that the d istrict court erred by denying his motion to correct his
sentence. A district court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. An offender may obtain a correction of his or her
sentence by filing a motion to correct sentence. See, e.g., Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d
736, 739 (Minn. 2013); Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 2011). A sentence
is not authorized by law if it is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” State v. Schnagl,
859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015).
Under the common -law amelioration doctrine, a law that mitigates punishment
applies to acts committed before the effective date of the law if final judgmen t has not yet
been entered. State v. Kirby , 899 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn. 2017); State v. Coolidge ,
282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn. 1979). The amelioration doctrine is grounded in the principle
that if the legislature has amended a statute to mitigate criminal punishment in a particular
situation, “the legislature has manifested its belief that the prior punishment is too severe
and a lighter sentence is sufficient.” Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d at 514. In that situation,
“[n]othing would be accomplished by imposing a harsher punishment, in light of the
legislative pronouncement, other than vengeance.” Id. at 514 -15. Consequently, a
defendant or offender whose criminal case has not yet reached final judgment may receive

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the benefit of the new, more lenient law, so long as there is no “contrary statement of intent
by the legislature.” Edstrom v. State , 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982). Thus, the
amelioration doctrine applies if three conditions are satisfied: “(1) there is no statement by
the Legislature that clearly establishes the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the amelioration
doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punishment; and (3) final judgment has not been
entered as of the date the amendment takes effect.” Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 490. This court
applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s decision concerning the application
of the amelioration doctrine. See State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012).
In this case, the district court recited the three requirements of the amelioration
doctrine, as articulated by Kirby, but did not determine whether any of the requirements
are satisfied. Rather, the district court referred to section 3 of the DSRA , which created
the offense of aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime, which requires evidence
of a firearm as well as controlled substances and specifies a presumptive sentence that is
equivalent to the presumptive sentence that previously governed the offense of first-degree
controlled-substance crime. T he district court reasoned that “[a]pplying the amelioration
doctrine to this case would be inconsistent with the legislative intent in passing DSRA”
because Edstrom was found to have unlawfully possessed a firearm. The district court
further reasoned that a person who possesses “firearms as well as drugs” was not “intended
to be a beneficiary of sentence mitigation.” For that reason and that reason alone , the
district court denied Edstrom’s motion to correct sentence.
On appeal, the parties essentially renew the argument s that they presented to the
district court. Edstrom argues that he satisfied the three requirements of the amelioration

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doctrine, as articulated by Kirby. The state does not dispute that point. Indeed, the state
concedes that the DSRA reduced the presumptive sentence for Edstrom’s conviction from
134 months to 105 months, thereby conceding that the second requirement is satisfied. But
the state relies on the newly created offense of aggravated first-degree controlled-substance
crime and notes that the presumptive sentence for that offense is the same as the
presumptive sentence for the offense of which Edstrom was convicted. The state contends
that “Edstrom’s conduct . . . falls within” the new aggravated offense because “ the State
proved that Edstrom possessed at least 151 grams of methamphetamine and possessed two
firearms in the same course of conduct.” As a consequence, the state contends, the DSRA
“does not mitigate the punishment for Edstrom’s conduct.”
The district court’s reasoning and the state’s argument are flawed because they are
based on an offense of which Edstrom was not convicted. The only conviction at issue is
Edstrom’s conviction of first-degree controlled-substance crime. See Minn. Stat. § 152.025,
subd. 2(a)(1). Edstrom was neither charged with nor convicted of the offense of aggravated
first-degree controlled-substance crime. He could not have been charged with or convicted
of that offense because the law creating the new offense did not become effective until
August 1, 2016, which was after his trial and his sentencing. See 2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160,
§ 3. The state does not ci te any legal authority for the proposition that an amelioration
claim may be defeated on the ground that an offender is culpable of an offense that was
neither charged nor proved, and we are not aware of any such caselaw.

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Thus, the district court erred by rejecting Edstrom’s amelioration argument despite
the fact that he satisfie d each of the three requirements of the doctrine . Therefore, we
reverse and remand for resentencing pursuant to section 18(b) of the DSRA.
Reversed and remanded.