State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0280

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Amanda Jo Hansen,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Schellhas, Judge*

Aitkin County District Court
File No. 01-CR-19-210

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James P. Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Lisa Roggenkamp Rakotz, Assistant County
Attorney, Aitkin, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John C. Donovan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Schellhas,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the State of Minnesota arg ues that the district court erred in
staying the adjudication of respondent over its objection when no evidence showed that the
state abused its prosecutorial charging function. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Early in the morning on January 1, 2018, a victim contacted the Aitkin County
Sheriff’s Office and reported that his house has been “ransacked.” The victim reported that
while celebrating New Year’s Eve, he returned to his residence and saw parked in his
driveway a grey car belonging to appellant Amanda Jo Hansen, his ex -girlfriend. Not
wishing to start a fight, the victim drove away. At 1:33 a.m., the victim received a text
message from Hansen informing the vic tim that she was at his house. Shortly after, he
received another text message from Hansen, informing the victim that she was waiting for
him to return home.
The victim finally returned to his residence early in the morning on January 1st to
find the front door wide open and several items missing, including: a flat screen televisio n,
a DVD player, his dog, a couch cushion, a photograph of his children, car keys, and a gun.
When a police deputy entered the residence, he found broken chairs, broken dishes, and
kitchen utensils scattered across the kitchen floor. The deputy also noted that the floor was
covered in broken glass. Police contacted Hansen, who admitted sending the text messages,
but denied being at the victim’s home that night. Hansen claimed that the last time she was
at the victim’s house was several weeks earlier.

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Later in the morning on January 1, 2018, the victim contacted the police and stated
that, despite not smoking, he found a cigare tte butt in his kitchen. The brand of cigarette
was the same brand that Hansen smoked. The victim assured the police that he had cleaned
his kitchen since the last time Hansen had been at his home and believed that the cigarette
butt was from New Year’s Eve. The deputy obtained a search warrant for her cellpho ne
records and determined that Hansen’s phone was used near the victim’s residence on New
Year’s Eve.
Several months later, the victim informed the deputy that Hansen had returned all
of the stolen property except for the gun. The deputy spoke with Hansen, who denied
returning any property, but admitted to being in the area of the victim’ s home after the
deputy confronted her with the cellphone data. A DNA test of the cigarette butt revealed
that the DNA profile matched the DNA sample collected from Hansen.
The state charged Hansen with one count of felony theft of a firearm and one coun t
of felony theft, both in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016); one count
of second -degree felony burglary in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2016); and one count of felony first -degree criminal damage to property in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4) (2016).
A plea hearing was held in December. At the plea hearing, in accordance with a plea
agreement, Hansen pleaded guilty to felony theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582,
subd. 2(a)(1). The remaining charges were dismissed. The terms of the plea agreement
allowed Hansen to request a stay of adjudication, but noted that the state would arg ue for
a stay of imposition.

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A sentencing hearing was held in February . During this time, the state noted twice
that it was “opposed to a stay of adjudication in this matter.” In response, Hansen argued
for a stay of adjudication, and stated that “as part of [Hanson’s] plea deal, [the state] agreed
that [it] would not appeal [the stay of adjudication] if the Court so ordered that.” The state
subsequently asked for it to be clarified on the record that “the state did not agree that it
would not appeal any decision by this Court for a stay of adjudication” and that the plea
agreement only stated that Hansen could argue for a stay of adjudication to which “the
state is opposed.” The district court responded to the state: “[t]hat’s understood.”
The district court acknowledge d that Hansen would have trouble with her
employment should the district court impose a stay of imposition and not adjudication. In
light of Hansen’s relatively minor criminal history, the district court issued a stay of
adjudication and not a stay of imposition.
The state appealed.
D E C I S I O N
I. The state properly objected to Hansen’s request for a stay of adjudication.
Hansen argues that the substantive question i n this case is not properly before this
court as the state never “formally objected” to Hansen’s request for a stay of adjudicatio n
as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(4). Appellate jurisdiction is a question of
law subject to de novo review. State v. Lee , 706 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Minn. 2005),
Furthermore, “[t] he interpretation of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure is a
question we review de novo.” Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016).

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Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(4), states “ [a]n order for a stay of adjudication to
which the prosecutor did not object is not appealable.” In the context of a legal proceeding,
“to ob ject” means “to state in opposition; to put forward an objection.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1290 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “to object”).
Hansen is correct that the state never used the word “object” to declare its oppositio n
to Hansen’s request for the stay of adjudication. But, on multiple occasions, the state made
clear to the district court i ts opposition to the requested stay of adjudica tion. Under the
terms of Hansen’s plea agreement, the parties contemplated that Hansen would argue for a
stay of adjudication and the state would oppose a stay of adjudication and argue for a stay
of imposition. The district court was aware of this arrange ment and asked for arguments
from each party. The state led by asserting: “The state is opposed to a stay of adjudicatio n
in this matter, and we would be requesting the Court to do a stay of imposition with 5 years
of supervised probation.” The state went on to confirm: “But, again, Your Honor, the state
is opposed to a stay of adjudication.”1 In light of the definition of “to object,” it is clear that
the state’s statements sufficiently communicated its objection to the stay of adjudication.
We conclude t hat the state’s assertion of opposition to the requested stay of
adjudication satisfied the requirement described in Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(4),
therefore, the district court’s order for a stay of adjudication is appealable.

1 The sentencing departure report prepared by the district court originally did not note that
the state objected to the downward departure. But, the state wrote to the district court,
stating “[as] you are well aware, the State objected, not once but twice , to this . . . stay of
adjudication.” The court subsequently amended the sentencing departure report to reflect
that the state objected to the departure.

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II. The district court erred when it issued a stay of adjudication over the objection
of the state.

The state argues that the district court erred when it issued a stay of adjudicatio n
over the state’s objection because no evidence reflected that the state abused the
prosecutorial charging function. Hansen contends that special circumstances exist to show
that the prosecutor abused the charging function. We review a district court’s impositio n
of a stay of adjudication de novo. Lee, 706 N.W.2d at 495.
In general, a prosecutor has broad discretion when it exercises its charging functio n
and a district court should not interfere with the prosecutor ’s exercise of that discretio n .
State v. Foss , 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996). But, a district court may stay an
adjudication of guilt over the prosecutor’s objection without violating the sepa ration-of-
powers doctrine when special circumstances are present. Id. Special circumstances exist
when necessary to avoid injustice “from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of the charging function. ” Id. at 541 (emphasis omitted) . The collateral
consequences of an adjudication, such as the loss of employment or educational
opportunities, or a previous lack of a criminal record, do not constitute special
circumstances. State v . Leming, 617, N.W.2d 587, 589 -90 (Minn. App. 2000); State v.
Colby, 657 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn. App. 2003); State v. Ohrt , 619 N.W.2d 790, 792
(Minn. App. 2000).
At the sentencing hearing, Hansen took responsibility for her actions, and also listed
reasons why she felt she was entitled to a stay of adjudication, including the following:
(1) the turbulent history of the relationship between Hansen and the victim; (2) the ongoing

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“physical and mental abuse” she endured ; (3) the fact that she was attending therapy;
(4) her lack of a record; (5) her children; and (6) the impact of a conviction on her current
work and her de sire to go to nursing school. The record does not contain any evidence of
“physical and mental abuse.”
The court acknowledged that a conviction would severely impact Hansen’s life and
would pose significant challenges for her future employment goals. The court also stated
that it reviewed Hansen’s pre-plea investigation report, which detailed a generally
supportive family environment, no problems with substance abuse, and Hansen’s criminal
history, which indicated only “a couple of misdemeanor convictions from some time ago”
and some driving offenses. T he court concluded that this was a “one time incident” and
imposed a stay of adjudication . In its order, the court did not describe any reasons for its
grant of a stay of adjudication.
We conclude that t he district court did not identify any special circumstances that
would suggest a stay of adjudication wa s necessary to avoid injustice “from the
prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exe rcise of the charging function. ” Foss, 556
N.W.2d at 541 (emphasis omitted). From our review of the record , we conclude that no
special circumstances exist. Merely pleading guilty, and thus taking responsibility for one’s
actions, is not a special circumstance indicating the abuse of the prosecutorial function. See
id. (finding that no special circumstance existed when a defend ant pleaded guilty to a
“typical case of misdemeanor assault”). Furthermore, a lack of a criminal history and the
collateral employment and educational consequences of a conviction do not qualify as
special circumstances. See Leming, 617 N.W.2d at 589 -90 (noting that the possibility that

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a defendant may lose her job is not a special circumstance); Colby, 657 N.W.2d at 899
(noting that the possibility that a defendant may not be able to attend nursing school is not
a special circumstance); Ohrt, 619 N.W.2d a t 792 (noting that a defendant’s lack of a
criminal record is not a special circumstance).
We t herefore conclude that the district court erred when it issued a stay of
adjudication whe n no evidence showed that the state abused its prosecutorial charging
function.
Reversed and remanded.