State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0291

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Anthony Niesen,
Appellant.

Filed January 19, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-1143

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the person
who committed the crimes of which he was convicted. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant James Anthony Niesen went to tr ial on three charges: third-degree drug
possession, giving a false name to a peace officer, and fourth-d egree criminal damage to
property. The central issue at Niesen’s jury trial was whether he was the man who
committed the offenses.
Minneapolis homeowners were in their duplex in the early morning of
September 30, 2018. Homeowner-wife testified that she heard pounding on the back door.
She looked out a second-floor window and saw a man in her backyard. The man was going
between the doors of the garage and the hom eowners’ vehicle trying to break the locks
with a large screwdriver. Homeowner-husband shouted to the man, and the man replied,
“I am Lucifer’s apprentice. This is my house . These are my cars. You must go.” The
homeowners called 911.
Two officers arrived on the scene. Ho meowner-wife, who was still looking out her
window, saw the man leave her neighbor’s mud room. She testified, “I immediately knew
it was the same individual who was in our backyard, and he began to run down the property
sidewalk to the alley.” Homeowner-wife calle d down to the office rs that the man was
running away.
One officer pursued the man on foot while the other drove to the vacant lot where
the man was eventually apprehended. A third officer drove to the scene and followed the
man to the vacant lot, where he exited his vehicle and purs ued on foot. A fourth officer
arrived at the scene, parked at a distance, and planned to approach on foot. While he
approached, the man ran past the officer, and the officer pursued him. After the man was

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detained, he gave the officers the alias of Lucifer Sufrentis. Th e officers called an
ambulance to take the man to the hospital because of suspected mental-health issues.
The next day, a fifth officer began an inve stigation. The file listed the name Lucifer
Sufrentis and a September 16, 1982 date of birt h, which yielded no results in the system.
The officer obtained a search warrant for ac cess to the medical re cords of the man who
identified as Lucifer Sufrentis in the crisis hold, but th e records did not contain any
identifying information. The investigating officer then us ed still images from the body-
camera footage of the officers on the scene to create a state-wide bulletin shared
electronically between law-enforcement agencies to help identify unknown individuals.
The officer received five responses “right away,” all identifying Niesen as the man pictured
in the images.
The jury found Niesen guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Niesen to 60
months in prison for third-degree drug po ssession for drugs he discarded while running
from the officers, and concurrent 90-day sentences for giving a peace officer a false name
and fourth-degree property damage. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Niesen argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the man who
committed the crimes.
When reviewing a challenge to the suffici ency of the evidence , this court reviews
the record “to determine whet her the evidence, direct and circumstantial, viewed most
favorably to support a finding of guilt is sufficient to perm it the jury to reach that
conclusion.” Francis v. State, 729 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2007). Appellate courts will

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not overturn a verdict if the jury, “upon appl ication of the presumption of innocence and
the [s]tate’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257,
263 (Minn. 2016). “We do not retry the fact s; we assume the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved the defendant’s witnesses.” State v. Thao, 649 N.W.2d 414, 420
(Minn. 2002).
“The identification testimony of a witne ss need not be positive and certain; it is
enough for him to testify that his belief, opini on, impression, or judgment is that [the]
accused is the person whom he saw commit the crime.” State v. Sutton, 138 N.W.2d 46,
47 (Minn. 1965) (quotation om itted). “[A] verdict may be based on the testimony of a
single witness no matter what the issue . . . .” State v. Burch, 170 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Minn.
1969).
The jury heard testimony from the homeowner-w ife about the app earance of the
man and her description of him from the 911 call. The jury also heard the testimony of
three arresting officers who spent around 10-15 minutes with the man while he was
detained. All three officers identified Niesen as the man. The state also played three of
the officers’ videos from their body cameras that showed their pursuit and detention of the
man.
The jury also heard testimony from the offi cer who investigated the file after the
incident. The officer testified that he received five responses unanimously identifying the
man captured in the officers’ body-camera foot age. After receiving the responses, the
investigating officer looked into Niesen’s file. He testified th at Niesen’s date of birth is

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only one day off from the false date of birth provided. Three law-enforcement employees
who responded to the identifica tion request testified at tria l. One testified that he
recognized Niesen because he had law-enfo rcement contacts with him “many times.”
Another testified that he recognized Niesen because he met with him about ten times in his
professional capacity. Finally, the jury looked at the still photos th at the investigating
officer took from the arresting officers’ body-camera videos. When viewing this evidence
in a light favoring the conviction, the jury could have reasonably found that Niesen was
guilty of the charged crimes. The state provi ded sufficient evidence to support Niesen’s
convictions.
Niesen argues that the evidence is insufficient b ecause some of the factors
articulated in Burch were not satisfied. See id. at 553-554. This argument is unpersuasive.
First, Burch lists five factors considered for a jury instruction about eyewitness credibility:
(1) whether the witness saw the defendant wh en the crime was committed, (2) the length
the individual was in the witn ess’s view, (3) whether the witn ess was under stress at the
time, (4) the lapse of time between the incident and the identification, and (5) “the effect
of the procedures followed by the police as either testing the identification or simply
reinforcing the witness’ initial determination that the defendant is the one who committed
the crime.” Id. Burch does not provide clear guidance on an appellate review for the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction. Second, this argument targets only a
portion of the identification evidence—th e state still provided homeowner-wife’s
description of the man on her 911 call which took place during the incident, the testimony
of three law-enforcement personnel who iden tified the man in the bulletin, and the body-

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camera footage and still pictures taken from the footage. Finally, Burch provides factors
only in weighing credibility. See id. Because two factors are not met does not make the
jury’s credibility determination erroneous. In fact, three of the five factors support the
credibility of the officers’ testimony.
Niesen next argues that the officers “could have done a number of things to ensure
an accurate identification.” But that is not the standard on appeal. The issue is whether
the state provided sufficient evidence to support all of the elements of the jury’s verdict.
Finally, Niesen argues that “while the pe rson was captured on video, the video did
not unequivocally show the person was Niesen. This is evidenced by the fact that the jury
needed a second look at a vide o during deliberations.” Nies en is referencing the jury’s
request to rewatch the videos of two office rs’ pursuit and apprehension of the man.
Niesen’s argument is unpersuasive for severa l reasons. First, these videos capture the
pursuit, so the jurors may have watched related to Niesen’s drug-possession charge to see
if he threw the drugs during pursuit. Even if they were watching to see Niesen’s identity,
viewing the evidence again does not make th e evidence ambiguous. The jury also had
photographs of the man’s face taken from the videos—an easier method to check identity.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain Niesen’s convictions.
Affirmed.