State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0292

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Philip Nelson Green,
Appellant.

Filed January 25, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-18-1303

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Holly A. Danielson, Assistant County
Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO), arguing that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it is not supported
by a proper factual basis. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In April 2018, appellant Philip Green was served with a DANCO prohibiting him
from having contact with a female protected person. In the early morning hours of July 6,
a Minnesota State Patrol trooper pulled Green’s vehicle over for speeding. The protected
person was in the passenger seat. Green was charged with a felony -level DANCO
violation. An amended complaint asserted an additional charge for possessi ng stolen
property.
The parties reached an agreement under which Green would plead guilty to the
DANCO violation and the state would dismiss the stolen-property charge . During the
October 10, 2019 plea hearing, Green and his lawyer discussed his knowledge of the
DANCO at the time of the offense:
Q: So, Mr. Green, do you agree that back on July 6, 2018,
you were traveling through Becker County?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at that time, you were approached by law
enforcement, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: And so you agree there was a passenger in that vehicle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there was an active court order prohibiting contact
with that person?
A: It was in the middle of hearings for cancellation or
dismissal based on evidence and rights for which was to be
followed that wasn’t followed. But, yes, at the time, it was still
pretty much active even though it was in the midst of hearings
for cancellation.
Q: So fair to say the circumstances were a little confusing
whether the order was active or not in your mind?
A: Yes.
Q: But you were aware that the order needed another order
to be canceled, correct?

3
A: I was actually waiting on the documentation for the
cancellation at the time in which I was pulled over.
Q: But it just so happens that on July 6, 2018, you hadn’ t
actually received a physical order canceling it?
A: I did not receive the physical order until after the fact.
It required one more hearing for cancellation of it, and I had to
wait until I was out of detainment to be able to participate in
the cancellation hearing along with the sentencing hearing; for
which on March 8 th [2019, 1] I was finally given the
cancellation document, which does not date when it was
actually placed into effect.
Q: But you’ll agree today that —so at that time when you
were pulled over with that person that you hadn’t received the
order, so, therefore, you should have reasonably should have
know[n] that it was probably still in effect?
A: Correct.

Following this exchange, the district court inquired further:
THE COURT: I just want to clari fy, Mr. Green, that although
you had taken some steps to have the no contact order canceled,
at the time of the incident, it was still in place; is that correct?
A: Under my belief, the judge was waiting to do his own
research based on the evidence for which I presented to him. I
had not heard back. And all I know is that I got contacted by
my attorney, my public defender out of Thief River, indicating
that we needed to have what was called a cancellation hearing
and a sentencing hearing for the other prior offense.
THE COURT: Okay. So you did not have any document in
your possession indicating the order had been canceled at the
time of the incident?
A: No. I actually asked the judge from the other district if
I needed something with his statement in regards to him doing
his research for cancellation and he said I didn’t.
THE COURT: Okay.
A: So I didn’t—and my own knowledge for the way it was
presented by the judge, he didn’t state that it was active or
inactive so I honestly didn’t know.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
A: But I can’t argue once it comes up on my record.

1 The DANCO was vacated on May 8, 2019.

4
The district court determined that the facts supported Green’s guilty plea, and that
he entered his plea voluntarily and intelligently. The court adjudicated Green guilty and
stayed imposition of a sentence for five years , pursuant to the plea agreement . Green
appeals.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea . State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a defendant must be allowed to do so if the
plea is not valid. Id. at 94. To be valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
Id. We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. State v. Johnson , 867 N.W.2d 210,
214-15 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015).
Green contends that his guilty plea is inaccurate. The accuracy requirement is
designed to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious charge than he could
be convicted of if he went to trial. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009)
(citing State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21,
2009). This goal is achieved by establishing a “proper factual basis” for the plea, usually
by asking the defendant to explain the circumstances of the offense in his own words. Id.
The district court must ensure that “facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime
charged can be reasonably inferred.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). A factual basis “is inadequate when the defendant makes statements
that negate an essential element of the charged crime because such statements are
inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003).

5
A person violates a DANCO when the person “knows of the existence of a domestic
abuse no contact order issued against the person and violates the order .” Minn. Stat.
§ 629.75, subd. 2(b) (2016). Accordingly, an element of the offense is Green’s knowledge
that the DANCO existed.
Green argues that his guilty plea lacks a proper factual basis because his statement
to the district court that he “honestly didn’t know” whether the DANCO was “active or
inactive” negates the knowledge element of the offense. We are not persuaded.
This isolated statement stands in marked contrast to the rest of Green’s testimony
and other evidence presented during the plea hearing. The DANCO was issued and
personally served on Green in April 2018. It did not contain an expira tion date , and
explicitly states that it “ WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL DISPOSITION OF THE
CASE OR UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OR MODIFICATION.” During the plea colloquy,
Green said he understood the DANCO “was in the middle of hearings for cancellation or
dismissal” on the day the state trooper found him with the protected person. But he agreed
that “at the time, it was still pretty much active.” Green explained that one more hearing
was required before the DANCO would be cancelled, and that hearing had not yet taken
place at the time of the offense . He confirmed this in response to the district court’s
questioning, stating that he knew he needed a cancellation order from the court that issued
the DANCO and did not have such an order in July 2018 . This record as sures us that
Green’s guilt may be reasonably inferred from the circumstances of the offense. Nelson,
880 N.W.2d at 861.

6
In sum, we are confident that Green did not plead guilty to a more serious crime
than he could have been convicted of following a trial. The record demonstrates ample
factual support for his guilty plea.
Affirmed.