Peter Richard Rickmyer, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0312

Peter Richard Rickmyer,
Appellant,

vs.

Mimmie Woodall,
Respondent.

Filed February 1, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-19-17062

Peter Richard Rickmyer, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Mimmie Woodall, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
On appeal from dismissal of his petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO),
appellant Peter Richard Rickmyer argues the district court erred by concluding that the
conduct described in the petition did not constitute harassment. Because appellant did not

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allege repeated incidents of harassment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the HRO. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Rickmyer petitioned for an HRO against respondent Mimmie Woodall. His petition
and testimony to the referee at a hearing on his petition assert ed the following facts. In
September 2019, Rickmyer called 911 to report a vehicle, that he presumed was stolen,
parked on the street outside of his home. Hi s neighbor, Woodall, took pictures and video
of him with her cell phone. After the 911 ca ll, Woodall told Rickmyer “you better watch
your house” and “I’m going to swat your house.”1 A Minneapolis police officer arrived at
Rickmyer’s home approximately 30 minutes later. Rickmyer also believes Woodall falsely
told the responding officer that he had been “stealing mulch” from her apartment building.
Rickmyer stated in his petition that he is fearful of “[Woodall’s] threats of violence”
and afraid of his house being “vandalized,” “damaged,” or “swatted.” He stated Woodall’s
actions were intrusive and unwanted, and that her “false allegations of theft” made him feel
“harassed and threatened.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the referee recommended dismissal of the HRO
petition, explaining that “even if true, what [Rickmyer] has written and supplemented by
his testimony are an insufficient basis for a harassment restraining order.” The referee
noted that “even if [everything is] proven, it would not justify the issuance [of an HRO].

1 Rickmyer testified that “swatting” mean s making a false police report against someone
to dispatch law enforcement to their residence.

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It’s a single incident. It’s not repeated incidents.” The district court accepted the referee’s
recommendation and issued a standard form order dismissing the petition.2
Following Rickmyer’s request for further review, the district court issued a written
order affirming the dismissal of the HRO petition. Rickmyer appeals.
DECISION
A district court’s authority to issue an HRO is established by Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5 (2018), and “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de
novo,” Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). “A district court’s
findings of fact will not be se t aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to
the district court’s oppo rtunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Kush v. Mathison,
683 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
Ultimately, the issuance of an HRO is re viewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 843;
Witchell v. Witchell, 606 N.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Minn. App. 2000).
Minnesota law provides that the district court “may issue [an HRO]” if “the court
finds . . . that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the res pondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5( b)(3) (2018). Subjec t to exceptions not
applicable here, a single incident of harassing conduct is not enough to justify the grant of

2 Paragraph 6 of the order in cluded this language: “6. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
Taking all facts alleged in the Petition in the light most favorable to [Rickmyer], the Court
holds that the Petition fails to set forth suffici ent facts to support a finding that [Woodall]
has harassed [Rickmyer]. [Rickmyer] was questioned at the hearing. His answers revealed
only a single incident, on September 14, 2019. It did not include a physical assault. There
must be ‘repeated incidents’ of acts of hara ssment to justify the issuance of a restraining
order. Even if true, the allegations as to September 14, 2019 are an insufficient basis upon
which to issue a harassment restraining order.”

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an HRO. Instead, the relevant part of the harassment statute requires “repeated incidents
of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect” on
the victim. Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2018); see also Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 766 (“One incident
of an intrusive or unwanted act is insufficient to prove harassment if there is no infliction
of bodily harm or attempt to inflict bodily harm.”). Two or more instances of harassing
conduct, however, constitute “repeated incidents.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844.
Rickmyer argues the district court erre d in concluding that Woodall’s alleged
conduct did not constitute “repeated incidents.” The HRO statute does not define “repeated
incidents.” If a word or phrase of a statute is undefined, appellate courts “generally turn to
the plain, ordinary meaning of a statutory phrase.” See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606,
609 (Minn. 2011). We may also consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning.
Getz v. Peace, 934 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Minn. 2019).
The dictionary defines “repeated” as “[s]ai d, done, or occurring again and again.”
The American Heritage Dictiona ry of the English Language 1489 (5d ed. 2011).
“Incident” is defined as “[ a] particular occurrence.” Id. at 888. Here, Rickmyer told the
reviewing judge that all of Woodall’s alle ged conduct occurred over a single 30-minute
period. Further, Rickmyer made no allegati ons that Woodall harassed him at any other
time. On this record, Rickmy er has not shown that the dist rict court erred or otherwise
abused its discretion by treatin g the alleged sequence of events as a single incident.
Because all of Woodall’s alle ged conduct was part of a si ngle occurrence, that conduct

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does not constitute the “repeated” acts necessary for the issuance of an HRO.3 Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Rickmyer’s petition.
Affirmed.

3 Rickmyer also argues he was denied the right to have an evidentiary hearing. However,
the record indicates Rickmyer was allowed to present testimony and evidence to the referee
as well as the district court during the subsequent review hearing.