In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A20-0330

In re the Marriage of:

Amy Jo Yurek, n/k/a Amy Jo Sellers, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Francis Yurek,
Appellant.

Filed March 8, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-FA-18-1400

Troy A. Scotting, Hutchinson, Minnesota (for respondent)

Brian M. Olsen, Cokato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appella nt-husband argues that the district court
erred by (1) classifying the hom estead as a partial marital asset, (2) awarding spousal
maintenance to wife, and (3) placing a mar ital lien on the homestead. Respondent-wife

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filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the dist rict court erred by de nying her request for
need-based attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Michael Francis Yure k and respondent-wife Amy Jo Sellers
married in 2000 and had one child together. The parties separated in May 2018, and wife
petitioned to dissolve the marriage in August 2018. Based on the parties’ stipulations, the
district court entered a partial judgment and decree in March 2019 dissolving the marriage.
The partial judgment and decree resolved certain issues, in cluding custody of the minor
child, while reserving other issues, including property division and spousal maintenance.
The district court conducted a trial in October 2019 to consider the reserved issues. The
following is a summary of the evidence presented at trial that is most relevant to the issues
on appeal.
Homestead Farm
At the time of trial, husband and wife jo intly owned a farm consisting of two parcels
of farmland in Silver Lake, Minnesota, which totaled 109.5 acres and included a
homestead. Husband grew up on the farm. The farm had been in his family for generations.
Husband’s father owned the farm until 1995 wh en he conveyed the farm to husband and
husband’s sister as tenants in common, while reserving a life estate for himself. The deed
specified that husband and his sister each received a 50-percent interest. Husband and his
father lived on the farm at the time of the transfer. Husband’s sister lived on a neighboring
property.

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Wife first moved onto the farm in 1998, two years before she and husband married.
Husband’s father continued to live on the farm with them, and the three of them earned
income off the farmland during the early years of husband and wife’s marriage.
Husband’s father passed away in 2001 , extinguishing his life estate. Shortly
thereafter, husband and wife bought husband’s sister’s half-interest in the farm for $25,000.
Husband later conveyed his half-interest in the fa rm to himself and wife as joint tenants.
Both deeds were recorded in January 2002. Up until the dissolution, husband and wife
owned the farm as joint tenants. Husband testified that when he signed the documents
creating a joint tenancy in the fa rm, he did not intend to give half of the farm to wife but
included his wife on the deeds in order to obtain loans against the property.
At the time that husband’s father passed away in 2001, the fa rm was encumbered
by liens amounting to roughly $48,500 in loans. Husband and wife refinanced the debt and
took out additional loans on the farm over the years. In 2002, they took out loans totaling
$95,000. Husband used the loan proceeds to pay off part of the previous loans on the farm,
to pay his sister for her half-interest in the fa rm, and to pay for his father’s funeral. The
parties also obtained loans for $23,000 in 2004 and $252,500 in 2006, as well as a line of
credit secured by the farm in 2007. At the time of the dissolution trial, there were two
loans on the farm: one for $187,782.44 through Compeer Financial, and one for $80,298.98
through Wells Fargo. Husband testified that he was not currently living at the farm and
had to stay in an apartment because of mold problems at the home. Wife had moved out
of the farm in May 2019 and testified that she was living in a house that she and her sister
inherited from their father.

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Parties’ Incomes and Expenses
The parties submitted evidence of their incomes and expenses. Husband testified
that he worked 40 hours pe r week at $19.51 pe r hour and that he frequently worked
overtime. The district court received evid ence of husband’s most recent pay stubs. The
pay stubs reflected that husband had earned $53,677.42 in gross in come in 2018 and
$40,661.98 to date in 2019 as of August, which, after accounting for taxes and other
deductions, resulted in an annua l net income of roughly $30, 500 in 2018 and $25,000 as
of August 2019.
Husband further testified th at he earned additional income from the farm and that
he expected the annual net in come on the farm to be around $22,000 per year. Much of
this income came by renting out the farmland. He indicated that he received about $19,500
in rental income in 2018 and $18,000 in 2019 but that he expected the rental income to be
greater in 2020. Husband testif ied that he used all of the fa rm rental income to cover the
Compeer Financial loan payments.
Husband introduced evidence showing that his average monthly expenses totaled
$3,280. This amount included a $600 child-support obligation, plus an additional $120 in
arrearages, for a total of $720 per month in child-support expenses. Husband’s monthly
expenses also included $500 in attorney fees , although husband testified that he was not
paying that full amount at the time of trial. When pressed on cross-examination, husband
indicated that he could probably meet his needs if he cut his expenses down to about $1,600
per month.

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Wife testified that she is disabled due to a back injury and was receiving $790 per
month in Social Security disability income (after a Medicare deduction) at the time of trial.
She also was receiving $600 per month in child support (not including arrearage payments)
and $213 per month as a child benefit for Social Security, fo r a total monthly income of
$1,603. Wife submitted evidence of her monthly expenses totaling $2,445. Her expenses
included $100 per month in attorney fees. Wife testified that, after her separation, she was
unable to meet her monthly expenses and relied on her friends and church to meet many of
her everyday needs.
District Court’s Order
The district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order entering
judgment and decree in January 2020. The district court determined that the farm was
partially marital property and pa rtially nonmarital property. The district court noted that
husband owned a 50-percent interest in the farm before the marriage, and husband and wife
jointly owned the farm after th ey married. Because the proper ty was subject to a loan of
$48,000 prior to the marriage, the district court calculated husband’s nonmarital equity in
the farm to be 45.5 percent. The district court based its calculation on the formula set forth
in Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981).
The district court awarded the farm to husband subject to a marital lien in the amount
of $95,117.88 in favor of wife. The lien accoun ted for wife’s share of the marital equity
in the property and an equaliza tion payment. The district court ordered that, if husband
failed to pay the lien by refinancing the ex isting loans on the farm, husband would be
required to sell the farm to pay off the lien.

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The district court also awarded permanen t spousal maintenance to wife. It found
that wife’s claimed monthly e xpenses of $2,445 were reas onable. Based on her income,
including child support, the district court calculated that wife had a shortcoming of roughly
$550 to $750 per month. 1 Relying on husband’s August 2 019 pay stub, the district court
determined that husband’s in come was $3,172 per month (aft er deductions for taxes and
other expenses) and that he had $800 to $1 ,100 in discretionary income depending on his
overtime hours. The district court therefore ordered husband to pay wife $600 per month
in permanent spousal maintenance.
Finally, the district court denied wife’s reque st for attorney fees. It found that wife
had shown that she was in need of attorney fees but that husband did not have the means
to pay wife’s attorney fees in light of his other obligations, including spousal maintenance
and child support.
The parties appeal from the district court’s order.
DECISION
Husband challenges three aspects of the distri ct court’s order: (1) the district court’s
finding that the farm is partia lly a marital asset, (2) the dist rict court’s award of spousal
maintenance to wife, and (3) the district court’s placement of a marital lien on the farm. In
her cross-appeal, wife challenges the district court’s denial of her request for attorney fees.
We address each argument in turn.

1 We note that the district court’s math is o ff slightly. Based on the evidence the district
court relied on, wife’s shortcoming is even greater.

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I. The district court did not clearly err by classifying the homestead farm as a
partial marital asset.
Husband argues that the district court erre d by finding the homestead farm to be part
marital and part nonmarital property. Husband maintains that the district court should have
classified the entire farm as husband’s nonmarital property. We are not persuaded.
“All property acquired by either spouse s ubsequent to the marriage and before the
valuation date is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in a form of co-ownership.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b
(2020). Nonmarital property includes proper ty acquired by either spouse before the
marriage. Id., subd. 3b(b). It also includes prope rty acquired before, during, or after
marriage, which is “acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a third party
to one but not to the other spouse.” Id., subd. 3b(a). For a pa rty to overcome the
presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, the party must prove
that the property is nonmarital by a preponderance of the evidence. Olsen v. Olsen ,
562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). Whethe r property is marital or nonmarital is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018).
We defer to the district cour t’s underlying factua l findings and will not set them aside
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
The record supports the district court’s finding that husband had both a marital and
a nonmarital interest in the farm. Husband obt ained a 50-percent intere st in the farm in
1995 when his father conveyed the property to him and hi s sister as tenants in common.
This interest is nonmarital because it was acqui red before the marriage. In 2001, during

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the marriage, husband and wife jointly b ought the remaining half-interest in the
property from husband’s sister. This 50-pe rcent interest is presumptively marital. See
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. Husband bore the burden at trial to rebut the presumption
that this 50-percent interest is marital property. See Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. We agree
with the district court that hus band failed to rebut this presum ption. There is no basis in
the record to conclude that th is 50-percent interest in the farm that the parties jointly
acquired after marriage is nonmarital property.2
Husband, however, argues that the farm s hould be classified as entirely nonmarital
property because the property has belonged to his family for generations and he did not
intend to give wife an interest in the pr operty when they execut ed the deeds for the
property. He maintains that wife was named as a joint tena nt on the deed s because the
bank required husband a nd wife to jointly own the property in order to obtain financing.
He cites Montgomery v. Montgomery for the proposition that the transfer of property from
one party’s individual ownership before the marriage to a joint tenancy during the marriage
does not automatically change the property from nonmarital to marital. 358 N.W.2d 169,
172 (Minn. App. 1984). Montgomery does not support husband’s position. In
Montgomery, one party owned a 100-percent interest in the property and then transferred

2 At oral argument, husband suggested that this 50-percent interest should be classified as
nonmarital property because he obtained it from husband’s sister as a gift that was intended
to keep the farm in the family . Husband did not raise this ar gument to the district court,
and we generally do not consider theori es raised for the first time on appeal. Thiele v.
Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We also note that the record does not support
this theory. Although the parties may have bought husba nd’s sister’s 50-percent interest
for a low price, the record does not show that husband’s sister’s interest was intended as a
gift to husband alone, as opposed to both husband and wife.

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it to a joint tenancy during the marriage. Id. at 171. This court concluded that the property
acquired before marriage did not lose its nonmarital character based on the change in title.
Id. at 172. Here, in contrast, husband owned only a 50-percent interest in the farm before
the marriage, which he transferred to a joint tenancy duri ng the marriage. Montgomery
instructs that husband’s nonmarital interest did not lose its nonmarital character merely as
a result of the change in title. But Montgomery does not support husband’s position that
his 50-percent pre-marriage ownership in terest blossomed into a 100-percent nonmarital
interest when it was transferred to a joint tenancy.
The district court’s determination that there is a marital interest in the farm correctly
recognizes that husband and wife jointly bought a 50-percen t interest in the farm from
husband’s sister during the marriage. 3 The district court did not err by finding the
homestead farm to be partially marital property.
II. The district court did not abuse it s discretion by awarding spousal
maintenance to wife.
Husband argues that the district court im properly awarded spousal maintenance to
wife. We review a district court’s award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion.
Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). We review a district court’s
factual findings underlying a spousal-maintenance award for clear error. Maiers v. Maiers,
775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009).

3 Based on this determination, the district court calculated husband’s nonmarital equity
interest in the farm to be 45.5 percent using the formula set forth in Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d
at 750. Husband does not challenge the district court’s application of the Schmitz formula
to his nonmarital interest. He only argues the farm is entirely nonmarital property.

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Spousal maintenance is governed by Minnes ota Statutes section 518.552 (2020). A
district court may grant spousal maintenance if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance
satisfies one of two requirements: (1) she “lacks sufficient proper ty, including marital
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reas onable needs of the spouse
considering the standard of living establis hed during the marriage”; or (2) she “is unable
to provide adequate self-support, after considering the standard of living established during
the marriage and all relevant circumstances , through appropriate employment.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1. If spousal maintena nce is appropriate, the district court must
determine the amount and period of time fo r the maintenance awar d “as the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct,” and it must consider several factors. Id.,
subd. 2. The weighing of the factors essent ially requires the district court to conduct “a
balancing of the recipient’s need ag ainst the obligor’s ability to pay.” Prahl v. Prahl ,
627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (M inn. App. 2001) (citing Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 39-40); see
also Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004) (noting that the purpose
of spousal maintenance is “to allow the recipi ent and the obligor to have a standard of
living that approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the
circumstances”).
The record supports the district court’s fi nding that wife is in need of spousal
maintenance. Wife testified that she received $790 per month in Social Security disability,
$213 as a Social Security child benefit, an d $600 in child support. These amounts total
$1,603 in monthly income. Wife submitted evidence of her monthly expenses as $2,445,
which the district court found reasonable. As a result, wife’s monthly income is $842 less

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than her monthly expenses. The district c ourt’s award of $600 per month in permanent
spousal maintenance is an appropriate amount to meet much of wife’s need.
Regarding husband’s ability to pay spousal maintenance, the district court found
that husband’s monthly income was about $3,172. This amount is supported by husband’s
most recent pay stub from Augu st 2019, which shows husband’ s net income for the year
to date (after adjusting for taxes, deductions , and benefits). The district court also found
that husband had “discretionary income of $800.00–$1,100.00 depending on the amount
of overtime hours he works.” As such, th e district court implicitly found husband’s
reasonable monthly expe nses to be between $2,072 a nd $2,372 ($3,172 – ($800 to
$1,100) = ($2,0 72 to $2,372)). This fi gure is lower than hu sband’s claimed monthly
expenses of $3,280. Although the district court did no t specifically explain which of
husband’s claimed monthly expenses it was re jecting, or exactly how it arrived at the
amount of husband’s discretionary income, we believe that the amount is adequately
supported by the record for two reasons.
First, husband testified that he could meet his needs with less than his claimed
monthly expenses. He acknowledged on cross-examination that he could probably cut his
expenses down to about $1,600 per month. While the district court rejected husband’s
testimony on this exact amount as not credible , the testimony supports the district court’s
implicit finding that husband could have reasonable monthly expenses between $2,072 and
$2,372. Second, husband testified that he worked “a lot of overtime,” and his August 2019
pay stub showed that he work ed a substantial amount of over time that year. The district
court accounted for this fact when dete rmining husband’s discretionary income,

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recognizing that husband’s income varied “depending on the amount of overtime hours he
works.” The fluctuating nature of husband’s income due to his overtime hours, coupled
with his testimony confirming his ability to cut back on his claimed monthly expenses,
sufficiently supports the district court’s find ing that husband had su fficient discretionary
income to pay $600 per month in permanen t spousal maintenance. When setting the
spousal-maintenance award, the district court properly considered both wife’s need and
husband’s ability to pay, and the district court’s findings on both matters are supported by
the record.
Husband also argues that the district c ourt erred when setting the maintenance award
because it did not consider the property awarde d to wife in the disso lution, including the
funds that she will receive from the marital lien against the homestead. In determining an
award of spousal maintenance, one of the st atutory maintenance factors that the court
considers is the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property awarded to that party. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a); see also Fink v. Fink,
366 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. App. 1985) (expl aining that courts’ consideration of a
spouse’s financial resources under this factor includes “income generated by liquid
assets”). Here, none of the assets awarded to wife in the dissolution are income-producing.
The only significant property awarded to wife other than the proceeds of the marital lien
are her nonmarital home and her car, both of whic h she needs and is not expected to sell.
And, wife’s expenses will exceed her income by $242 per month even with the spousal
maintenance award of $600 per month. Thus, wife will likely be required to use the
proceeds of the marital lien to cover her living expenses. Because wife will have to invade

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the principal of the marital lien proceeds in or der to meet her needs, we see no abuse of
discretion by the district court not consider ing wife’s property award when setting the
maintenance award.
Finally, husband insists th at the spousal-maintenance award was unfair because
wife’s spending habits caused the parties to incur extensive credit- card debt during the
marriage, while he was frugal with their fina nces. But husband cites no authority for the
position that a spouse should be awarded le ss spousal maintena nce due to alleged
irresponsible spending habits during the marriag e. The district court is not permitted to
consider “marital misconduct” when setting spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 2. The only statutory maintenance factor that would be relevant to this consideration
is “the contribution of each party in the acquisition, pr eservation, depreciation, or
appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property.” Id., subd. 2(h). Although the
district court did not expressly consider this factor, it properly considered wife’s need and
husband’s ability to pay, as explained above. Husband’s argument regarding wife’s
spending habits is without merit.
We therefore conclude that the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion by awarding
wife $600 in permanent spousal maintenance.
III. The district court did not abuse its dis cretion by placing a marital lien on the
homestead farm.
Husband argues that the district court erre d by ordering a marital lien to be placed
on the homestead farm. We disagree.

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A marital lien is a method of distribu ting property in a marital-dissolution
proceeding. Bakken v. Helgeson, 785 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. App. 2010). We review a
district court’s lien arrangements when divi ding property for an abuse of discretion. See
Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the district court’s
award of the homestead to one party subject to an equitable lien in favor of the other party
was proper because it had “an acceptable basis in fact and principle” (quotation omitted)).
Here, the district court awarded the homestead to husband and placed a marital lien
on the property in favor of wife. The lie n was in the amount of $95,117.88, which
accounted for wife’s share of the marital equity interest in the property and an equalization
payment. The purpose of the lien was to ensu re that wife would be paid for her marital
equity interest in the homestead and that she would receive her equalization payment.
We conclude that this was an appropriate way for the district court to secure wife’s
payment. Husband has not demonstrated th at the lien arrangement was improper. He
reiterates his arguments that wife engaged in unchecked spending during the marriage and
was responsible for increasing the marital de bts. Again, husband cites no authority
supporting the proposition that wife’s spendi ng during the marriage renders the district
court’s method of securing wife’s payment improper. We discern no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s lien arrangement.
IV. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by denying wife’s request for
need-based attorney fees.
In her cross-appeal, wife argues that th e district court abused its discretion by
denying her request for need-based attorney fees. The district court found that wife was in

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need of attorney fees but determined that husband did not have the means to pay them. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that husband
lacked the means to pay wife’s attorney fees.
A district court “shall award attorney fees , costs, and disbursements in an amount
necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the pro ceeding” if it finds that three
elements are met: (1) “that the fees are necessary for the good faith assertion of the party’s
rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of
the proceeding”; (2) that the party from whom fees are sought “has the means to pay them”;
and (3) that the party seeking fees “does not have the means to pay them.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020). We review a di strict court’s decision of whether to award
attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Minn.
App. 2004). A district court abuses its discreti on if its decision is contrary to logic or the
facts in the record. Id. at 775.
Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding that husband did
not have the means to pay wife’s attorney fees. The district court found that husband had
discretionary income between $800 and $1,100 per month. Using these numbers, husband
still has some money left over after accounting for his $600 spousal-maintenance payment.
The district court expressly considered this situation, but it chose not to award all of
husband’s discretionary income to wife as spousal maintenance because it wanted to ensure
that husband could refinance the farm loans to remove wife’s name and that he could pay
wife her portion of marital assets. In denying wife’s request for attorney fees, the district
court reasoned, “considering [husband’s] in come, his obligations which include child

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support and spousal maintenance, and the si gnificant amount of debt he is receiving
through these proceedings, [hus band] does not have the mean s to pay [wife’s] attorney
fees.” We conclude that, on th is record, the district court acted within its discretion by
determining that husband would need to rely on some of his discretionary income in order
to pay his other debts and obligations.
The record supports the district court’s findings regarding husband’s obligations. In
addition to ordering husband to pay child support and spousa l maintenance, the district
court awarded husband $18,845.81 in marital debts as well as two outstanding loans on the
farm (Compeer and Wells Fargo). Wife, in contrast, was awarde d only $11,921.87 in
marital debts. In awarding husband the homestead farm, the district court placed a marital
lien of $95,117.88 on the farm th at will be paid to wife when the farm is sold if husband
does not pay the amount by refinancing the loans on the farm. In light of husband’s existing
obligations, including child support, spousal maintenance, and loan payments, the record
supports the district court’s finding that husba nd would be unable to pay wife’s attorney
fees in addition to those obligations.
For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discreti on by denying wife’s
request for attorney fees on th e basis that husband lacked th e means to pay the attorney
fees.
Affirmed.